[Peace-discuss] Assume they find WMDs

[patton paul]

Here is an expert appraisal of the evidence Colin Powell presented to the
Security Council.  It's from the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace proliferation news and resources site.
-Paul P.

Powell Proves Deception, But Not Imminent Threat
By Joseph Cirincione, Senior Associate and oject Director
Wednesday, February 05, 2003

Secretary of State Colin Powell calmly detailed before the United Nations
Security Council US evidence of Iraq's failure to comply fully with UN
disarmament orders. While the secretary focused on Iraqi deception, most
nations remained fixed on the threat. They did not hear any new evidence
that the danger from Iraq was urgent or severe enough to justify the
extreme step of authorizing an invasion and occupation of an Arab state.

Within the Arab world, the editorial opinion of the Jordan Times was
typical: the speech "did not amount to convincing evidencethat Iraq
presents any real or imminent danger." The Times argues that the US
charges "can only be answered by allowing the UN inspectors the time,
resources and support neede to carry out their mandate." (Jordan Times,
"Unconvincing Evidence," 6 February 2003)

Secretry Powell's case was powerful, but partial and incomplete. He
presented the Security Council with evidence that Iraqi officials have on
at least several occasions swept facilities of any prohibited materials
before inspectors arrived. He criticized Iraq's refusal to allow unimpeded
access to scientists and said that Saddam personally had warned the
scientists not to cooperate or agree to interviews outside the country.
This was an "active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi
regimeto prevent any meaningful inspection work."

Security Council members need little convincing that Saddam is a liar or
that Iraq is not in full compliance with UN resolutions. What they need,
however, is proof that Iraq actually has chemical or biological weapons.
The evidence seems to point to further material breaches of UN resolution
1441. However, the secretary did not, or could not, provide hard evidence
that Iraq still had chemical, biological or nuclear weapons

Shuffling Biological and Chemical Weapons
Powell said that the US knew that Saddam had recently moved rockets with
biological agents in their warheads and sanitized bunkers for chemical
weapons, prior to inspections. He provided satellite photos of trucks said
to be moving materials from missile sites and a suspected biological
laboratory days before inspections, claiming similar activity at close to
30 sites. These seemed to be new evidence that could be handed over to the
inspectors, to investigate the secret facilities. If verified, this could,
indeed, increase UN willingness to back the use of force.

On the biological weapons program, Powell reiterated UN inspectors'
findings that Iraq has never fully accounted for the destruction of all
suspected biological weapon agents and growth media for cultivating new
agents and repeated information on Iraq weapons programs unearthed by
inspectors in the 1990s. He offered new defector claims and artists'
drawings of Iraqi biological research laboratories on trucks and trains.
Inspectors could never find these mobile units, he asserted. These claims
could well be true, but might also be exaggerations from defectors eager
to prove their worth.

On chemical weapons, Powell cited UNSCOM's 1999 report and the failure of
Iraq to certify the destruction of thousands of munitions. He provided
photos from May and June 2002 of the Al-Musayyib Chemical Complex, showing
what he said was the movement of chemical weapons from the site, then the
bulldozing of the facilities to hide the evidence. While most experts
assume that Iraq still has some chemical weapons, the range of uncertainty
is large, from a few to many weapons. Powell said that Iraq had 100 and
500 tons of chemical agents, but failed to provide any hard evidence that
these actually exist or exist in these numbers. The US had previously
asserted (in the October 2002 CIA assessment) that Iraq had resumed
large-scale production of chemical weapons, but inspections to-date have
failed to turn up any evidence of this industrial activity and Powell did
not repeat the charge in his speech.

No Nukes, But Maybe UAVs
The only new weapons capability clearly demonstrated in the presentation
was provided by evidence of Iraqi test of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
that circumvented flight restrictions by looping for 500 kilometers inside
a much smaller test range. This is a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors.
In particular, a drone of slightly longer range could strike Israel from
central Iraq. While Powell repeated past charges that Iraq was working on
missile with ranges above 1000 kilometers, Iraq has never been able to
build such systems, even in the 1980s when such work proceeded without any
external limitations. The drones seem a real and current threat and a
clear violation of the 150-kilometer limit on Iraq's missile systems.

On the critical issue of nuclear weapons--the only weapons that can change
the strategic balance in the region--Powell recounted past Iraqi lies
about their program and repeated US assertions that Saddam tried to import
aluminum tubes for centrifuges to enrich uranium. He acknowledged that the
tubes were suited for rockets, as Iraq claims, but says they could be
adapted to serve in centrifuges, as some experts believe. He noted other
efforts to import equipment that could be used in an enrichment program.

However, on this key issue, UN sanction actually blocked the imports.
Despite Iraqi efforts, Saddam has been unable to reconstitute the nuclear
weapons program dismantled by UN inspectors after the Gulf war. Powell
does not claim that Iraq now has a nuclear weapon, nor that it soon could.
He pointed to attempts and desires, but failed to demonstrate capability.

The Council Divide
This is the crucial divide on the Security Council. Few support or trust
Saddam, but most believe that he is successful caged and his programs
throttled. Most nations fear that the invasion and occupation of Iraq
entails far more political, economic and military risks to the region and
to the world than continued inspections. They believe the inspections have
barely begun and must be given time to work.

Powell tried to overcome this reluctance and demonstrate the urgent threat
by linking Iraq to Al Qaeda. With Saddam contained by tens of thousands of
troops outside his borders, and large-scale production of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons thwarted by hundreds of inspectors inside
the country, this link is critical to the US argument that war is needed
now. Saddam must be removed now, officials say, before he can transfer a
weapon to terrorists for delivery to the US. Powell repeated in greater
detail alleged links between Baghdad and Al Qaeda, relying on the stay in
a Baghdad hospital of terrorist Al-Zarqawi and statements from detained Al
Qaeda members. Despite his best efforts, the evidence remains
exceptionally vague and circumstantial.

In the end, even with the secretary's skill and credibility, he failed to
win many new converts to war. His presentation may represent the
high-water mark of the administration's efforts to recruit allies for
invasion. Many of the dozen or so countries that now back the US effort do
so reluctantly and often against the popular opinion of their citizens.
The ranks are unlikely to grow much based on Powell's presentation (though
private arm-twisting still has time to work).

The president will soon confront the dangerous decision of whether to
invade Iraq without the support of the United Nations.