[Peace-discuss] Truthout: To Deter Israeli Strikes on Gaza, US House Reps Should Prepare Floor Fight

[Robert Naiman]

Isn't it striking how the adversary is trying to repeal the War Powers
Resolution, just as we're trying to invoke it?

Prior to the stealthy introduction with cat-like tread of the Khanna-Massie
Yemen War Powers Resolution in 2017, the adversary wasn't too bothered by
the existence of the War Powers Resolution. Who cares if there's a forty
year old law, gathering dust in the attic, if nobody's going to bother
trying to use it? Who cares if there's a forty year old law, gathering dust
in the attic, if Pelosi and Hoyer can intimidate everyone into silence?
"Whatever you do, don't go near the attic. Don't you *dare* go fishing
around in the attic, looking for some forty year old law that you
mistakenly think you can use now. Remember what we did to Dennis Kucinich."

But now that we're actually trying to use the War Powers Resolution to
challenge, end and prevent unconstitutional wars, suddenly it is claimed by
some that repealing the WPR is a much more urgent matter of public business
than ending unconstitutional U.S. participation in the Saudi regime
deliberate-famine war and blockade against civilians in Yemen. And don't
even think about trying to have a debate and vote about I-word, or about
what I-word is doing to civilians in Gaza. "If voting changed anything,
they'd abolish it." The sun rises, and the sun sets, and there is nothing
new under the sun.

https://truthout.org/articles/to-deter-israeli-strikes-on-gaza-us-house-reps-should-prepare-floor-fight/

To Deter Israeli Strikes on Gaza, US House Reps Should Prepare Floor Fight
BY Robert Reuel Naiman <https://truthout.org/authors/robert-naiman/>,
Truthout <https://truthout.org/>PUBLISHEDOctober 3, 2021

There is a substantial grassroots clamor for floor fights in the House to
oppose unconditional U.S. military aid to Israel. This grassroots clamor
would be much better served, however, if the floor fights were focused not
on funding for the Iron Dome missile defense system but instead on Israeli
military abuses of Palestinian civilians.

The main reason that the focus has been about Iron Dome funding in the past
is because that was the terrain chosen by the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer — likely because it was the terrain they could best use
to isolate and marginalize dissenters.

But there are paths dissenters can use to force their way to the floor on
their own terms, rather than on the terms set by AIPAC, Pelosi and Hoyer.
One such path is amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). Another such path is invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
Each of these paths has its advantages and disadvantages if used alone; but
they can be used in combination, getting the advantages of both. These
paths can reorient the floor fights to discuss goals like ending the
Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and ending the
Israeli military demolitions of Palestinian homes in the West Bank.

There is a substantial grassroots clamor for floor fights in the House to
oppose unconditional U.S. military aid to Israel. This grassroots clamor
would be much better served, however, if the floor fights were focused not
on funding for the Iron Dome missile defense system but instead on Israeli
military abuses of Palestinian civilians.

The main reason that the focus has been about Iron Dome funding in the past
is because that was the terrain chosen by the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer — likely because it was the terrain they could best use
to isolate and marginalize dissenters.

But there are paths dissenters can use to force their way to the floor on
their own terms, rather than on the terms set by AIPAC, Pelosi and Hoyer.
One such path is amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). Another such path is invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
Each of these paths has its advantages and disadvantages if used alone; but
they can be used in combination, getting the advantages of both. These
paths can reorient the floor fights to discuss goals like ending the
Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and ending the
Israeli military demolitions of Palestinian homes in the West Bank.

The recent floor fight on supplemental funding for the Iron Dome missile
defense system proves that there is substantial grassroots clamor for a
floor fight in the House to oppose unconditional U.S. military aid to
Israel.

There were nine votes in opposition. There are likely many more votes to be
had in the House against unconditional military aid to Israel, but these
votes are not likely to emerge if the fight continues to be framed around
the question of funding for the Iron Dome, which is widely perceived as a
defensive weapon protecting Israeli civilians from Hamas rockets. This
makes it relatively easy for AIPAC to mobilize its supporters. If AIPAC had
to try to mobilize its supporters to defend knocking down Palestinian homes
in the West Bank, or to defend preventing Palestinian children from leaving
Gaza to get medical treatment for cancer, its task wouldn’t be so easy.

There would be many more votes for a fight against an offensive weapon
being used to attack civilians, in violation of the Arms Export Control
Act, which is U.S. law. (Note that Israeli military bulldozers being used
to knock down Palestinian homes are such a weapon — indeed the weapon that
killed Rachel Corrie
<https://truthout.org/articles/rachel-corrie-responsible-for-own-death-israeli-court-rules/>
.)

The main obstacle to this approach is that on a typical day, Pelosi and
Hoyer control what sees the light of day on the House floor. But the
Pelosi-Hoyer opposition can be overcome in two ways: forcing the House
Rules Committee to allow a vote on an NDAA amendment by threatening to vote
with Republicans to take down the rule if the amendment is not allowed, as
Rep. Jamaal Bowman just did
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-war-us-congressman-jamaal-bowman-end-military-presence-ndaa-defense-bill>
 on his Syria War Powers amendment, or by going straight to the floor with
a privileged War Powers Resolution to end unauthorized (and therefore
unconstitutional) U.S. participation in hostilities, as Rep. Ro Khanna has
done
<https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2021-09/glimmers-hope-house-action-military-policy>
 against U.S. participation in the Saudi war and blockade on civilians in
Yemen.
The Case for NDAA Amendment, Compared to War Powers Resolution

The timing and process of the House NDAA consideration is somewhat
predictable. Any member of the House can offer an amendment. It’s an
authorization bill, so lawmakers can offer conditional prohibitions, which
can attract much more support than straight prohibitions, and foster debate
and focus on specific abuses. These follow the structure of “prohibit X,
unless Y.”

For example, the Bowman Syria War Powers Amendment didn’t just say Get out
of Syria. It said: Get out of Syria, unless you pass a specific statutory
authorization for the use of military force, as required by the
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

So on an NDAA amendment, a conditional prohibition could say something like:
 Export of such-and-such weapon to Israel is prohibited, unless the
secretary of state certifies that the Israeli-Egyptian blockade against
civilians in Gaza is over. Or: Export of such-and-such weapon to Israel is
prohibited, unless the secretary of state certifies that this weapon is not
going to be used to knock down Palestinian homes in the West Bank.

Compared to invoking the War Powers Resolution, offering NDAA amendments is
widely seen among House Members as “playing by the rules,” not being “too
radical,” not directly attacking the power of the House leadership to
determine what comes to the floor. Bowman proved with his Syria War Powers
Amendment that with the support of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, he
could force a floor vote on a War Powers amendment that the House
Democratic leadership didn’t want to allow a vote on.
The Case for War Powers Resolution, Compared to NDAA Amendment

Lawmakers can introduce a privileged War Powers Resolution and force their
way to the floor
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-joint-resolution/29/text?r=2&s=1>
 any day the House is in session, which means the dissenters get to choose
the timing that suits them best, like when a war is taking place, or when
the Saudi dictator happens to be visiting the United States, as Senators
Sanders, Lee and Murphy did in March 2018 when they brought their Yemen War
Powers Resolution to a vote. Sponsors of a War Powers Resolution enjoy the
full focus of activists and the media, because their resolution is the only
thing happening on the floor, unlike the NDAA, which is a fire hydrant of
amendments, each one only getting a little bit of the focus and attention.

Here’s the beauty: these two strategies can be used in complementary
combination, as Khanna has done on Yemen War Powers. He turned to the War
Powers Resolution when House leadership wouldn’t allow a vote on his
amendment against refueling the Saudi warplanes bombing Yemen. Once the
Yemen War Powers issue was publicly joined in view of the multitude, once
the issue was already joined in the media, House leadership didn’t dare try
to block his amendments any more. And he still had — and still has — the
Yemen War Powers Resolution threat, any time he wants.

If House members adopt a strategy similar to what I have suggested here,
the lawmakers could offer conditional prohibitions as part of a bill that
functions as a public preview and preparatory organizing vehicle for
amendments. For example, a bill could stipulate that “the export of
such-and-such weapon to Israel is prohibited, unless the secretary of state
certifies that the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of civilians in Gaza is over.”
They could then get co-sponsors for the bill and popularize the idea, and
when the opportunity for an amendment comes, they could introduce the
amendment. To force a floor vote on the amendment requires political
pressure on the House leadership. Previous organizing around the bill that
had the same ideas as the amendment would make it much easier to quickly
organize support for the amendment, thereby increasing pressure on the
House leadership to allow a floor vote. Once a floor vote on the amendment
is forced, previous organizing around the bill with the same ideas would
make it much easier to get other lawmakers to vote for the amendment,
because they would have already supported the idea previously, or at least
would have been lobbied to support the idea.

After laying the groundwork with this organizing, the lawmakers who offered
the conditional prohibitions would be ready to respond quickly the next
time that Israel attacks civilians in Gaza: the lawmakers could call the
question immediately on U.S. participation on the House floor by invoking
the War Powers Resolution, proposing a straight prohibition of U.S.
participation in Israel’s attacks.

Organizing in advance around a vote to prohibit U.S. participation in a
future war could serve three vital purposes: 1) To deter Israel from having
another Gaza war; 2) To pressure Israel to end the Gaza blockade; 3) To be
ready for a House floor fight to end the war, if the war deterrence fails
and if the pressure to end the blockade also fails.

During the recent Gaza war, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and
Senator Bernie Sanders introduced Resolutions of Disapproval against a
U.S.-Israeli arms deal that had just been notified by the Biden
administration to Congress. The media coverage of these efforts added
significantly to the pressure on President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu to agree to an immediate ceasefire. But because the opportunity
to oppose such a weapons deal depends on the administration’s notification
of the deal to Congress, the timing of which is controlled by the
administration, it is impossible to know in advance if there will be such
an opportunity, and what the opportunity will be. Thus, in order to prepare
in advance, it is necessary to prepare something else. Moreover, under
current law, a Resolution of Disapproval on a weapons deal cannot be used
to force a vote in the House, only in the Senate. So to force a vote in the
House requires preparing something else.

It is a key strategy of defenders of the status quo to try to ensure that
the only vote on Israel-Palestine on the House floor is a vote on Iron Dome
funding, to isolate and marginalize critics of the status quo. In order to
change the current dynamics in the House, it is crucial that we figure out
how to force a floor vote in the House on supporting Palestinian human
rights that is not a vote on Iron Dome funding.
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