[Peace-discuss] Shireen Al-Adeimi | ITT: Truce or Not, Congress Must Urgently Bring About a Real End to the War on Yemen

[Robert Naiman]

https://inthesetimes.com/article/truce-yemen-war-powers-resolution-congress-biden-saudi-arabia

Truce or Not, Congress Must Urgently Bring About a Real End to the War on
YemenCongress needs to pass a War Powers Resolution to end U.S. complicity
in the chaos and suffering in Yemen.SHIREEN AL-ADEIMI
<https://inthesetimes.com/authors/shireen-al-adeimi> APRIL 21, 2022

More than seven years after the first airstrikes were launched on Yemen by
the U.S.-supported Saudi-UAE coalition, a two-month truce with Yemen’s
Ansar Allah (also referred to as Houthis) was announced
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60962188> at the beginning of
this month. This UN-mediated truce comes after weeks of negotiations in
Oman and marks the first pause in airstrikes
<https://mailchi.mp/7cded39568e7/april_may-2022-yemen-data-project-saudi-ceasefire-update-week1-13497813>
 on Yemen since March 2015. As part of the truce
<https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/fuel-ship-allowed-yemens-hodeida-part-truce-83842596>,
the first fuel ships were allowed entry into the port of Hodeidah, and
limited flights were allowed to enter Sanaa airport from Egypt and Jordan.

Despite these positive developments, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
remain entangled in Yemen — militarily and politically. Days after the
truce was announced, the Saudi-led coalition dismissed
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-pushed-yemens-elected-president-to-step-aside-saudi-and-yemeni-officials-say-11650224802>
 President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who had hitherto been touted as
justification for occupying and intervening in Yemen’s conflict, and
replaced him with a Presidential Leadership Council
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61020866>. With the
so-called “legitimate”
president now reportedly confined to his Riyadh home, the coalition’s plan
for Yemen appears to be entering a new phase.

The Saudi-led coalition’s latest actions will likely sow further chaos in
Yemen, thereby underscoring the urgency of legally disentangling the bloc’s
largest supporter, the United States, from any further military actions in
Yemen. In a letter
<https://www.fcnl.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Yemen-WPR-Coalition-Letter-April-20-2022.pdf>
 released April 20, nearly 70 progressive organizations called on Congress
to “cosponsor and publicly support” a War Powers Resolution, soon to be
introduced
<https://www.thenation.com/article/world/yemen-wars-power-resoultion/?utm_source=P%26S%3A+Drone+News+Roundup+%E2%80%94+All&utm_campaign=7040d9c2e1-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_01_04_01_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_066db1cbcd-7040d9c2e1-391882509>
 by Reps. Pramila Jayapal (D‑Wash.) and Peter DeFazio (D‑Ore.), aimed at
compelling an end to U.S. involvement in the Yemen War. “We urge all
members of Congress to say ‘no’ to Saudi Arabia’s war of aggression,”
states the letter, “by fully ending all U.S. support for a conflict that
has caused such immense bloodshed and human suffering.
Uptick in Violence

Last year, a UN-led investigation into human rights abuses in Yemen
dissolved due to Saudi “threats and incentives,” in the words of
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/01/saudi-arabia-yemen-un-human-rights-investigation-incentives-and-therats>
 John Fisher, the Geneva director of Human Rights Watch. This was followed
by a perceptible uptick
<https://quincyinst.org/report/the-yemen-war-in-numbers-saudi-escalation-and-u-s-complicity/>
 in air raids. Without any semblance of accountability, the Saudi-led
coalition increased its attacks on civilians, going as far as targeting
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/25/yemens-internet-returns-after-airstrike-causes-4-day-blackout>Yemen’s
telecommunications infrastructure, killing three children nearby, and
causing a four-day blackout of the country’s internet in January. In the
early months of this year, U.S.-supported attacks on civilians also
included an airstrike on a detention center that killed
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110842> 91 people, most of whom
were migrants.

On the ground, the Houthis remained the de facto government in much of
northern Yemen, but were unsuccessful
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/17/coalition-says-killed-160-yemen-rebels-in-battle-for-marib>
 in wresting the gas-rich province of Marib from the coalition’s control.
And as Saudi-led air raids increased in frequency, Houthis scored a rare
incursion against Saudi Arabia and the UAE by successfully striking
both countries.
Houthis fire back

As the seven-year anniversary of the Saudi-UAE war on Yemen approached,
Yemen’s Houthis launched
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/timeline-uae-drone-missile-attacks-houthis-yemen>
 several missile and drone attacks on both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. While
many of these attempts were intercepted, a fuel tank in the UAE’s capital,
Abu Dhabi, came under a Houthi drone
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/17/fires-in-abu-dhabi-houthis-announce-operation-deep-in-uae>
 attack. The Houthis followed this with a missile attack
<https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/25/reports-of-huge-fire-at-aramco-oil-facility-in-saudi-arabia.html>
 on an Aramco oil facility in the Saudi city of Jeddah just as the city was
preparing to host the Formula One race.

With both countries’ stability now threatened, and with the Houthis’
unsuccessful bid to capture Marib, warring parties participated in
UN-mediated negotiations in neighboring Oman and subsequently agreed to
a truce. Shortly after the truce was announced, however, Saudi Arabia
assembled a council of eight Yemeni men who now lead Yemen instead
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-president-relieves-deputy-his-post-2022-04-07/>
 of President Hadi and his vice president of five years (and a longtime
Houthi foe), Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar.
War council

The eight-member council
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-shakes-up-yemen-alliance-bid-exit-quagmire-2022-04-07/>
 is led by the Riyadh-based Rashad Al-Alimi, a former minister and Hadi
adviser with close ties to Saudi Arabia, and a member of the Islamist Islah
Party. He and three other members are allied with and backed by Saudi
Arabia: Riyadh-based Abdullah Al-Alimi is a member of the Islah;
Riyadh-based Othman Majli is a tribal leader from Saadah and a member of
Hadi’s party, the General People’s Congress; and Sultan Al-Aradah is the
governor of Marib, which is the Riyadh-based government’s last stronghold
in northern Yemen and where ground battles continue
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/18/fighting-rages-in-marib-despite-un-truce>
 despite the truce. He is also allied with the Islah Party.

The remaining four members are backed (and funded) by the UAE: Aidarous
Al-Zubaidi heads the Southern Transitional Council, a secessionist group;
Tareq Saleh is former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew, who switched
from fighting alongside the Houthis to fighting against them after his
uncle was killed in 2017; Faraj Al-Bahsani is the governor of Hadramout;
and Abdulrahman Abu Zara’a Al-Muharrami is a Salafist commander of the
UAE-funded Giants Brigades militia that defeated the Houthis in the
southern, oil-rich province of Shabwa.

While they are tasked with leading negotiations with the Houthis, all were
hand-selected for their allegiance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Nearly all
have fought the Houthis at various battlefronts, and some have a history of
fighting each other <https://merip.org/2019/12/the-battle-for-south-yemen/>.
The appointment of this war council may mark a new, chaotic phase in the
war on Yemen: one that involves a smaller Saudi and UAE military footprint,
but nonetheless furthers both countries’ agendas through their anti-Houthi
coalition of warlords.

The military conflict in Yemen left the majority of Yemeni civilians in
dire conditions. To end their suffering, a diplomatic approach is
essential, coupled with an end to foreign involvement through bombardment,
the imposition of the blockade, and financing local warlords and political
parties. The latest political reshuffling by foreign governments that took
place away from the negotiating table in Oman will likely lead to continued
fighting on the ground, and may even serve to shield Saudi Arabia and its
allies from accountability.
The U.S. war on Yemen

The truce in Yemen may or may not hold. Regardless of the outcome, however,
the United States must legislate an end to its illegal involvement in the
war on Yemen. Thus, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to further
their agendas in Yemen by financing local warlords, Congress must ensure
that the current (or future) U.S. administration does not follow a similar
policy.

Despite calling
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/01/president-biden-statement-on-un-mediated-truce-in-yemen/#:~:text=This%20initiative%20is%20a%20long,Saan'a%20to%20agreed%20destinations.>
 the truce a “long-awaited reprieve for the Yemeni people,” President
Biden’s administration has mirrored both Trump and Obama administration
policies in Yemen by continuing to provide assistance and arms to the
Saudi-UAE coalition. One year ago, in his first major foreign policy speech
as president, Biden announced
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55941588> an end to U.S.
support for “offensive” operations in the war on Yemen. Questions about the
distinction between offensive and defensive involvement remained unanswered
<https://theintercept.com/2021/05/27/yemen-biden-support-congress-letter/>,
and the U.S. policy appeared to be nothing more than a rebranding
<https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-has-merely-rebranded-the-brutal-war-against-yemen-2022-2>
 of Obama and Trump’s policies in Yemen. This prompted Jayapal and DeFazio
to announce
<https://www.thenation.com/article/world/yemen-wars-power-resoultion/>in
February their intention to introduce a War Powers Resolution, a federal
law that places war-making under Congressional, not executive, powers. The
measure would therefore force President Biden to end the unconstitutional
U.S. intervention in Yemen, which has ensured
<https://quincyinst.org/report/the-yemen-war-in-numbers-saudi-escalation-and-u-s-complicity/>
 the smooth operation of Saudi war jets through spare parts and maintenance,
 supplied
<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-01/news/congress-fails-block-saudi-arms-sales>
 weapons, and provided diplomatic, as well as logistical and intelligence,
support to the coalition.

With a War Powers bill at his desk, it would be unlikely — or at least
unpopular — for Biden to veto the bill as his predecessor had done. If
nothing else, a veto would contradict his publicly stated intention to end
the U.S. role in the war. With the future of this fragile truce uncertain,
a likelihood of continued foreign entanglement in Yemen, and a mounting
civilian death toll that now nears
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60962188> 400,000 and involves
a Yemeni child dying every 75 seconds
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/12/one-child-dying-every-75-seconds-yemen-brink-biggest-famine/>,
passing a War Powers bill and ending all forms of support for the Saudi and
UAE coalition and their allies should be the top priority for Congress.

SHIREEN AL-ADEIMI <https://inthesetimes.com/authors/shireen-al-adeimi> is
an assistant professor of education at Michigan State University. Since 2015,
she has played an active role in raising awareness about the Saudi-led war
on her country of birth, Yemen, and works to encourage political action to
end U.S. support.
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