<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0" ><tr><td valign="top" style="font: inherit;">The trillion$ spent on current wars isn't contributing to the US's deficit?? Tying up funds that could be spent on social programs, education, etc?? <div> --Jenifer<br><br>--- On <b>Tue, 8/3/10, Robert Naiman <i><naiman.uiuc@gmail.com></i></b> wrote:<br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><br>From: Robert Naiman <naiman.uiuc@gmail.com><br>Subject: Re: [Peace-discuss] Bacevich...<br>To: "C. G. Estabrook" <galliher@illinois.edu><br>Cc: "Brussel Morton K." <mkbrussel@comcast.net>, "Peace-discuss List" <peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net><br>Date: Tuesday, August 3, 2010, 8:47 PM<br><br><div class="plainMail">I have to admit, although Michael Lind is obviously a jerk, I enjoyed<br>reading his review, which was well-written.<br><br>By the way, his critique of Bacevich
on the economics is spot on.<br>Unfortunately, in purely economic terms, the US can "afford" this war<br>and many more. War is not the primary cause of the US budget woes, as<br>Lind correctly points out.<br><br>Nonetheless, obviously, there is a broader point here which is true:<br>from the point of view of the interest of the majority of Americans,<br>and certainly the majority of humanity, the money could obviously be<br>much better spent - including by refunding it to the American people<br>by lowering their taxes. I myself would rather spend it on social<br>needs, but would unite in a second with any Republican to refund it<br>through lower taxes, if it would keep the money away from the<br>Pentagon.<br><br>On Tue, Aug 3, 2010 at 8:02 PM, C. G. Estabrook <<a ymailto="mailto:galliher@illinois.edu" href="/mc/compose?to=galliher@illinois.edu">galliher@illinois.edu</a>> wrote:<br>> Bacevich was certainly a well-out-of-the-closet imperialist
when he<br>> published his book "American Empire" in 2002, where he wrote about "the<br>> imperative of America's mission as the vanguard of history, transforming the<br>> global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its own dominance [guided by]<br>> the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity and projected<br>> globally" (p.215ff.) That's barely English, but the import is clear.<br>><br>> What's remarkable - and didn't come thru to me in his rather bland interview<br>> with Democracy Now! (with its one-sentence mention of oil) - is how much<br>> he's quite consciously changed his views in recent years.<br>><br>> Bacevich now is a vaguer version of Bill Kauffman ("Ain't My America: The<br>> Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American<br>> Anti-Imperialism," 2008). At the heart of his new book is a notion of a<br>> left-right coalition against the war - quite right, but I
didn't hear it in<br>> the DN interview.<br>><br>> That does come thru in a hostile review of Bacevich's new book. David Green<br>> found this when he was researching Michael Lind, a true imperialist goof,<br>> who therefore liked the old (2002) Bacevich, not the New Model Army man, as<br>> he explains below.<br>><br>> The critical bromide is that the best analysis comes from an acute critic.<br>> I don't think Lind's too acute (some do), but he gives a better account of<br>> Bacevich's views here than Bacevich himself seemed to on Democracy Now. And<br>> they are important views, as Bob notes:<br>><br>> America Under the Caesars<br>> Review of "Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path<br>> to Permanent War" (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010)<br>> by Andrew J.
Bacevich<br>> Michael Lind, New America Foundation<br>> June 22, 2010<br>><br>> IN THE waning years of the Vietnam War, leftist and liberal opponents of the<br>> Cold War discovered that they shared much in common with the critics of<br>> these policies on the libertarian or traditionalist right. The result was a<br>> rebirth of a current of thinking about American foreign policy that is<br>> usually labeled isolationism but which, out of deference to members of this<br>> school who reject such a term as perhaps far too loaded, I shall instead<br>> describe as “anti-interventionism.”<br>><br>> This is a tradition that has long dominated American politics, and one that<br>> can find its heartland in the small-town America of the Midwest. In fact,<br>> its political eclipse lasted for a very short period of time indeed—from the<br>> selection of Dwight
D. Eisenhower over Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft for<br>> president by the Republican Party in 1952 to the Democratic Party’s<br>> nomination in 1972 of George McGovern, with his slogan “Come Home, America.”<br>> Taft and McGovern were both products of the Midwest, which along with much<br>> of New England had been the center of opposition to U.S. participation in<br>> both world wars and the battle with the Soviet Union. The supporters of<br>> these conflicts were disproportionately found in the South and Southwest and<br>> among the Atlanticist financial and commercial elites of the northeastern<br>> cities. During the Cold War, the former diplomat George Kennan and the<br>> scholar William Appleman Williams argued for drastically reducing America’s<br>> military interventions and foreign commitments, as the influential historian<br>> and Indiana native Charles Beard had done in the 1930s and 1940s. Kennan
and<br>> Williams, too, were products of the Midwest. Williams was an Iowan; Kennan<br>> hailed from Wisconsin and wrote elegantly about his pioneer roots. Whether<br>> they were on the left or right, all of these thinkers lamented the passing<br>> of pastoral, small-town Middle America and blamed social change in part on<br>> the effects of what they saw as American imperialism.<br>><br>> According to these men, the United States was once a country with a<br>> public-spirited, frugal citizenry and a limited government that abstained<br>> from aggression abroad. Then, at some point, the Republic was betrayed by<br>> elites who steered the United States on the course to perpetual empire and<br>> war. It is a narrative whose origins lie in a parallel between the United<br>> States and ancient Rome, which lost its republican government and became an<br>> autocratic empire under the Caesars.<br>><br>>
Anti-interventionists do not agree on the exact moment when the American<br>> Republic gave way to the American empire. For some, the transition came with<br>> the rise of the Cold War “national-security state” during the administration<br>> of Harry Truman. For others, it was William McKinley and Theodore<br>> Roosevelt’s “splendid little war” against Spain in 1898.<br>><br>> Nor is there universal agreement among anti-interventionists as to the<br>> motives of those who turned the Republic into an empire. For Williams, it<br>> was the desire of American mass-production industries to obtain foreign<br>> markets through a global Open Door economic policy. For Beard, it was the<br>> lust for power on the part of politicians like Franklin Roosevelt, whom<br>> Beard detested and accused of knowing about Pearl Harbor in advance (an<br>> accusation only slightly less deranged than the claim of “truthers”
that<br>> 9/11 was staged by the U.S. government).<br>><br>> Yet whatever their differences, members of this school share the hope that a<br>> repudiation of most or all U.S. foreign-policy commitments and a dramatic<br>> reduction in armed forces can make possible a restoration of something like<br>> the idealized, small-town America of the nineteenth- and<br>> early-twentieth-century Midwest.<br>><br>> IN RECENT years, this venerable American tradition has found its most<br>> eloquent and influential champion in Andrew Bacevich. Now a professor of<br>> international relations and history at Boston University, Bacevich served in<br>> Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, retiring from the army with the rank of<br>> colonel. Although he is a traditionalist conservative, or<br>> “paleoconservative,” Bacevich has found his audience chiefly on the liberal<br>> left, where he has filled the role of Kennan, another
conservative and<br>> former insider whose views seemed to validate the Left’s critique of U.S.<br>> foreign policy.<br>><br>> In a number of books and articles, Bacevich has sought to revive the<br>> anti-interventionist approach. He has written sympathetically about Beard<br>> and wrote an introduction to a reprint of a book by Williams. He has also<br>> authored a series of polemics criticizing contemporary U.S. foreign policy,<br>> including The New American Militarism (Oxford University Press, 2006) and<br>> The Limits of Power (Metropolitan Books, 2008). Washington Rules is the<br>> latest salvo in this campaign.<br>><br>> Bacevich claims that the foreign policy of both parties is determined by<br>> four “Washington rules.” According to him, “Every president since Harry<br>> Truman has faithfully subscribed to these four assertions and Obama is no<br>> exception.”<br>><br>> The rules are
as follows:<br>><br>> "First, the world must be organized (or shaped). . . . Second, only the<br>> United States possesses the capacity to prescribe and enforce such a global<br>> order. . . . Third, America’s writ includes the charge of articulating the<br>> principles that should define the international order. . . . Finally, a few<br>> rogues and recalcitrants aside, everyone understands and accepts this<br>> reality."<br>><br>> Bacevich declares:<br>><br>> "Mainstream Republicans and mainstream Democrats are equally devoted to<br>> this catechism of American statecraft. Little empirical evidence exists to<br>> demonstrate its validity, but no matter: When it comes to matters of faith,<br>> proof is unnecessary."<br>><br>> The Washington rules have condemned imperial America to perpetual “semiwar.”<br>><br>> This new offering portrays Bacevich’s increasing
alienation from the U.S.<br>> foreign-policy consensus in terms of a narrative of awakening and<br>> repentance: “In measured doses, mortification cleanses the soul. It’s the<br>> perfect antidote for excessive self-regard.” His doubts about U.S. foreign<br>> policy began, he writes, when he visited the former Communist state of East<br>> Germany and discovered it to be run-down and impoverished. He took this, not<br>> as proof that the West’s superior system had prevailed over that of the<br>> Soviets, but as evidence that the Cold War threat had been exaggerated or<br>> nonexistent.<br>><br>> Like others in the tradition in which he writes, Bacevich views disasters<br>> like Vietnam and Iraq as the all-but-inevitable results of the hubris of<br>> America’s postrepublican empire builders. “George W. Bush’s decision to<br>> launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 pushed [Bacevich] fully into<br>>
opposition” to what he saw as a growing American willingness to adopt an<br>> aggressive posture across the world. Bacevich’s son Andrew, an army first<br>> lieutenant, was killed in Iraq.<br>><br>> IN THE same vein as Bacevich’s other recent books, Washington Rules is a<br>> polemic, not a dissertation, and should be judged by the standards of its<br>> genre. But even as such, Washington Rules will not persuade those who do not<br>> belong to the choir to whom Bacevich is preaching.<br>><br>> Bacevich recycles many of the references used by other anti-interventionist<br>> authors. Once again, we read that publishing magnate Henry Luce proclaimed<br>> the American Century. Once again, Graham Greene’s 1955 novel The Quiet<br>> American is cited as evidence of the folly of American diplomacy in Vietnam,<br>> or elsewhere.<br>><br>> Bacevich also parades the familiar anti-interventionist pantheon,
ranging<br>> from John Quincy Adams’s opposition to the Mexican-American War, through<br>> Dwight D. Eisenhower with his warning about the “military-industrial<br>> complex,” all the way to Vietnam War critics Martin Luther King Jr., William<br>> Fulbright and Mike Mansfield. Other than providing quotes that could be<br>> taken out of context and used as proof texts by later generations of<br>> anti-interventionist polemics, these figures have little in common—Adams,<br>> for example, may have opposed the Mexican War, but he favored the American<br>> acquisition of Cuba and the Pacific Northwest, and Fulbright was a<br>> reactionary segregationist, unlike his fellow Vietnam War critic King.<br>> Eisenhower supported the Johnson administration’s escalation of the war in<br>> Vietnam, a point never mentioned by the anti-interventionists who quote him<br>> about the military-industrial complex.<br>><br>>
Like the isolationists of the 1930s and early 1940s who quoted George<br>> Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” in his Farewell Address,<br>> Bacevich tries to enlist Washington as a patron saint of the<br>> anti-interventionist school:<br>><br>> Americans once believed—or at least purported to believe—that citizenship<br>> carried with it a responsibility to contribute to the country’s defense. In<br>> his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” written in the immediate<br>> aftermath of the American Revolution, George Washington offered the classic<br>> formulation of this proposition. “It may be laid down, as a primary<br>> position, and the basis of our system,” the general wrote, “that every<br>> citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a<br>> proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense<br>> of it.”
Out of this proposal came the tradition of the citizen-soldier, the<br>> warrior who filled the ranks of citizen armies raised for every major war<br>> fought by the United States until that system foundered in Vietnam.<br>><br>> Turning George Washington, rather than Thomas Jefferson, into the champion<br>> of citizen militias does violence to history. In reality, Washington, like<br>> his wartime aide and later political ally Alexander Hamilton, was so<br>> appalled by the performance of state militias during the War of Independence<br>> that he supported a large and well-equipped standing army. At the<br>> Constitutional Convention, George Washington allegedly inspired Charles<br>> Cotesworth Pinckney to mock a proposal that the constitution limit the<br>> regular army to several thousand men by asking whether invading foreign<br>> armies would agree to the same limitation. And Washington was far from a<br>>
Middle American populist. He ruthlessly kicked squatters off the vast<br>> acreage that he owned as a speculator in the future Midwest, and when<br>> frontier farmers rose up against excise taxes in the Whiskey Rebellion, the<br>> wealthy, slave-owning president mounted the saddle and led the U.S. Army to<br>> intimidate them into submission. Indeed, late in life, William Appleman<br>> Williams, one of the predecessors whom Bacevich so admires, came to believe<br>> that the adoption of the Constitution had set the United States on the<br>> course to imperial aggrandizement. Washington was as much a power-mongering<br>> imperialist for Williams as FDR was for Beard.<br>><br>> BACEVICH’S RHETORICAL technique here resembles that found in similar works<br>> by linguist Noam Chomsky, the late historian Howard Zinn, and their<br>> imitators on the anti-military left and the anti-interventionist right. The<br>> heroes
in Bacevich’s narrative include Midwesterners who see through the<br>> pretensions of the conceited East Coast elite. For example, Bacevich writes<br>> the following about former–Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup, who<br>> criticized the Vietnam War:<br>><br>> "Like Fulbright, David Shoup was a son of the Middle Border, born and<br>> raised in Indiana and carrying to Washington a wariness of East Coast<br>> elites. . . . In a speech to a gathering of students in Los Angeles on May<br>> 14, 1966, the former marine revealed his own populist inclinations,<br>> targeting what he saw as the bogus rendering of U.S. history that Americans<br>> had been conditioned to accept. In surveying the landscape of the past,<br>> Shoup saw mostly lies."<br>><br>> One senses a self-portrait in this description.<br>><br>> When it comes to those with whom he disagrees, the mocking of major figures<br>> in
U.S. foreign policy following World War II, whether liberal or<br>> conservative, Democratic or Republican, that goes on in Washington Rules<br>> seems mean-spirited after a while.<br>><br>> A few examples will have to stand in for many others. CIA Director Allen<br>> Dulles was “the great white case officer.” One imagines Bacevich’s audience<br>> of populists and leftists hissing at his frequent cues: “A cool, urbane,<br>> Princeton-educated patrician. . . . Breeding and education seemingly fitted<br>> Dulles for his sensitive post. If the United States was going to dirty its<br>> hands in the spy business, at least there was a gentleman in charge.” One<br>> American policy maker after another suffers from denigration-by-description.<br>> General David Petraeus:<br>><br>> "Petraeus was a gifted officer, identified early in his career as someone<br>> meant for big things. Among his most
prominent gifts were those of a<br>> courtier: The young Petraeus displayed a considerable talent for cultivating<br>> influential figures, both in and out of uniform, who might prove useful in<br>> advancing his own prospects. And he was nothing if not smart."<br>><br>> Now and then Bacevich uses the cartoonist’s art to draw caricatures of U.S.<br>> foreign-policy makers as a group. “Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, every<br>> U.S. president had insisted that at the far side of America’s resistance to<br>> totalitarianism world peace awaited. The reward for exertions today was to<br>> be a reduced need for exertions on the morrow.” Bacevich expects his<br>> audience to nod in agreement at the folly of Roosevelt and his successors,<br>> but a critical reader might ask: if that was really their belief, weren’t<br>> they correct? After all, the defeat of Nazi Germany allowed the United<br>> States to
rapidly demobilize up until the Korean War, and the defeat and<br>> collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Washington and its allies to<br>> dramatically draw down their troop numbers and military spending. Indeed,<br>> Bacevich’s constant editorializing and sarcasm are used to point the reader<br>> to a conclusion that the factual narrative itself does not necessarily<br>> support.<br>><br>> NOWHERE IS this more true than in Bacevich’s treatment of the Cold War,<br>> which echoes the polemical literature of the anti-interventionist Left<br>> between the 1960s and the 1980s. Those works sought to make U.S. policy<br>> toward Korea, Indochina, Cuba and Latin America appear ludicrous and<br>> irrational, by insisting that these conflicts were not what they in fact<br>> were—proxy wars in great-power struggles—but unprovoked attacks by a<br>> bullying superpower on small countries whose regimes were really
independent<br>> of Moscow and Beijing. Much of that writing has been discredited since the<br>> end of the Cold War, by the partial publication of Soviet archives, which<br>> shed light on the workings of other regimes, and the controlled releases of<br>> material by China, North Korea and Vietnam. All tell a far more complicated<br>> story than the simple tale of unprovoked American aggression.<br>><br>> Scholars are still sorting through the reams of new information, but already<br>> the material has transformed our understanding of the Cold War. For example,<br>> during that struggle many American historians claimed that North Korea’s<br>> invasion of the South caught Stalin and Mao by surprise. We now know that<br>> Stalin and Kim Il Sung arranged the attack and consulted with Mao in<br>> advance. We have learned that Soviet pilots took part in air combat with<br>> their American counterparts in the skies
above Korea, while hundreds of<br>> thousands of Chinese troops were stationed in North Vietnam during the<br>> mid-1960s, running the North’s infrastructure, manning antiaircraft defenses<br>> and enabling North Vietnamese regulars to infiltrate South Vietnam.<br>><br>> One could still make an argument against the Korean and Vietnam wars, as<br>> well as America’s anti-Castro policy. But even a critic of American foreign<br>> policy, in a book on the subject published in 2010, ought to cite some of<br>> the voluminous scholarship about the Cold War from the other side that has<br>> been published since 1989. Instead, there is not a single reference in<br>> Bacevich’s book to this growing body of work.<br>><br>> THIS DEMONSTRATES one of the fundamental weaknesses of the type of<br>> foreign-policy thinking which Bacevich has embraced and seeks to revitalize.<br>> Its basic article of faith is that since
the 1940s or the 1890s (if not the<br>> 1790s), U.S. policy makers have invented nonexistent threats or exaggerated<br>> real threats in order to justify military buildups and military<br>> interventions which, in fact, serve other purposes: opening foreign markets,<br>> winning elections for hawkish politicians, or padding the resumes of<br>> careerist diplomats and soldiers. In order to make that case, however, an<br>> anti-interventionist historian must demonstrate—using evidence from the<br>> other side, not just from the United States—that Washington’s enemies were<br>> never threats at all, except in the imaginations of American policy makers.<br>> Simple assertion is not enough.<br>><br>> In the great-power struggles of the twentieth century, America was joined by<br>> other great-power allies. Russia, Britain and France fought with the United<br>> States against Germany twice, and when the Cold War
ended, Washington was<br>> formally allied with the major European powers and Japan, and informally<br>> with the People’s Republic of China. French President François Mitterrand, a<br>> socialist, flew to Bonn to persuade the West German Bundestag to allow the<br>> installation of U.S. missiles. If leaders in Washington invented or<br>> exaggerated the threats from Germany and the Soviet Union, were leaders in<br>> London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Tokyo and Beijing equally foolish or equally<br>> hypocritical, all at the same time? Were America’s allies colluding with<br>> Washington to pretend that there were threats to their shared interests when<br>> none in fact existed? An older generation of anti-interventionists proposed<br>> a solution to this problem: gullible Americans were tricked into fighting on<br>> behalf of the British Empire in two world wars and the Cold War, with the<br>> help of Anglophiles (and,
in some versions, Jews) on the East Coast.<br>> Bacevich does not propound such conspiracy theories, but absent some sort of<br>> international elite collusion, it is difficult to understand why a number of<br>> great powers would engage in hot or cold war together against another great<br>> power or great powers. Unless, of course, the threats were real.<br>><br>> A DIFFERENT problem weakens Bacevich’s arguments against our most recent<br>> forays into Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-interventionists always proclaim that<br>> not only are the threats themselves ephemeral but also the military spending<br>> required to fight them will inevitably lead to our downfall. It is one thing<br>> to oppose the Iraq War and the escalation of the Afghan war because they are<br>> unnecessary conflicts that have inflicted needless suffering on the people<br>> of those countries, as well as American soldiers and their families—a
view I<br>> share. It is quite another to claim that the United States cannot afford<br>> them. Bacevich argues that America’s perpetual “semiwar” policy is on the<br>> verge of bankrupting the country. According to Bacevich, “Promising<br>> prosperity and peace, the Washington rules are propelling the United States<br>> toward insolvency and perpetual war.” He points to the national debt and<br>> deficits:<br>><br>> "A study by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office forecast<br>> trillion-dollar deficits for the next decade. Based on that analysis, by<br>> 2019 the total size of the national debt is likely to surpass $21 trillion,<br>> an amount substantially greater than the nation’s GDP."<br>><br>> But relatively little of that red ink is the result of military spending,<br>> even on two simultaneous wars. The chief short-term cause is the collapse of<br>> government revenues,
as a result of the global economic crisis. Long-term<br>> budget shortfalls are caused partly by the Bush tax cuts and partly by the<br>> escalating costs of Medicare, which are driven by industry-wide medical-cost<br>> inflation in the United States. If America were to adopt measures to ensure<br>> that its citizens pay no more for doctors, hospitals or drugs than those in<br>> other industrial democracies, then projected deficits will shrink<br>> dramatically. Certainly, if medical costs are not contained, the U.S.<br>> economy will be wrecked, even if the United States radically downsizes the<br>> military.<br>><br>> AS A passionate and articulate exponent of the American anti-interventionist<br>> tradition, Bacevich is a worthy successor to Kennan, Williams and Beard. But<br>> that tradition is not convincing, either in its portrayal of American<br>> foreign policy as an avoidable decline from republic to
empire, or its<br>> assumption that America’s economic and social problems would be<br>> significantly different if the United States adopted a minimalist defense<br>> strategy. It is not enough to offer an alternative to America’s<br>> foreign-policy orthodoxy. The alternative must be plausible.<br>><br>> Copyright 2010 The National Interest Online<br>><br>> <a href="http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/america_under_the_caesars_33484" target="_blank">http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/america_under_the_caesars_33484</a><br>><br>> On 8/3/10 6:46 PM, Brussel Morton K. wrote:<br>>><br>>> Thanks for sending this on, Bob. Some on this list think Bacevich is a<br>>> stooge, a closet imperialist. Quoting: * * */*Bacevich is an imperialist<br>>> goof.<br>>><br>>> For his generally benighted view, see his book "American Empire" (2002),<br>>> where he
wrote about "the imperative of America's mission as the vanguard<br>>> of<br>>> history, transforming the global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its<br>>> own<br>>> dominance [guided by] the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in<br>>> perpetuity and projected globally" (p.215ff.)<br>>><br>>> This is the sort of person who ends up as professor of "international<br>>> relations" at Boston University (where Howard Zinn was hounded out).<br>>><br>>> His objection to American policy in the Mideast on Democracy Now! today is<br>>> that it isn't working. We're not killing enough Asians to make our writ<br>>> run,<br>>> and it's too expensive.<br>>><br>>> To his credit - because it's so rare - he devotes exactly one sentence to<br>>> the<br>>> real purpose of the war - "We are in that part of the world because of<br>>> oil" -<br>>>
but that's all!<br>>><br>>> The totality of the interview is the sort of objection that Nazi generals<br>>> might have made of the Russian campaign.<br>>><br>>> The antiwar movement continues to be in serious trouble when people who<br>>> purport to be against the war praise Bacevich. --CGE*/* */ /* *Quite<br>>> remakable. *<br>>><br>>> What is to be emphasized here are the virulent attacks on those who do not<br>>> precisely say what these guys want them to say (or admit),/ even when they<br>>> are saying things that would get the U.S. government to change its<br>>> behavior.<br>>> /It is all devious, they say. / /It appears as a kind of absolutely rigid<br>>> ideological response not so different from when the Communist party line<br>>> eminating from Lenin and Stalin condemned those like Rosa Luxemberg,<br>>> Mensheviks, Trotskyities, socialists of various
stripes, etc. in the early<br>>> part of the 20th century. They would have been happy to see these deviants<br>>> burned at the stake. (Trotsky indeed was assasinated, and others also<br>>> fell.)<br>>><br>>> --mkb On Aug 3, 2010, at 5:16 PM, Robert Naiman wrote:<br>>><br>>>> Campaigning for President, Senator Obama said: "I don't want to just end<br>>>> the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the first<br>>>> place." But as Andrew Bacevich notes in his new book, "Washington Rules:<br>>>> America's Path to Permanent War," as President, Obama has done the<br>>>> opposite: he has promoted and acted on behalf of the mindset that leads<br>>>> to<br>>>> war. Bacevich's book is a call for Americans to reject the Washington<br>>>> consensus for permanent war, global counterinsurgency and global military<br>>>> power
projection, and to demand instead that America "come home," as<br>>>> Martin<br>>>> Luther King called for in 1967, and focus on resolving its own domestic<br>>>> problems rather than act as a self-appointed global police and occupation<br>>>> force. Because of his personal background and establishment credentials,<br>>>> Bacevich may be able to move Americans currently beyond the reach of the<br>>>> peace movement. This is important, because a key task for ending our<br>>>> current wars and preventing future ones is to break the current<br>>>> near-monolithic support for permanent war among the dominant institutions<br>>>> of the Republican Party - a stance that effectively disenfranchises the<br>>>> substantial minority of Republican voters who oppose the permanent war.<br>>>><br>>>> This is why Bacevich's new book is potentially important for
the U.S.<br>>>> peace<br>>>> movement. Get the book, read it, give it to a Republican friend, and talk<br>>>> to them about it. Join Just Foreign Policy on September 24th for a<br>>>> "Virtual<br>>>> Brown Bag" with Andrew Bacevich, and try to virtually bring your<br>>>> Republican<br>>>> friend.<br>><br><br><br><br>-- <br>Robert Naiman<br>Policy Director<br>Just Foreign Policy<br>www.justforeignpolicy.org<br><a ymailto="mailto:naiman@justforeignpolicy.org" href="/mc/compose?to=naiman@justforeignpolicy.org">naiman@justforeignpolicy.org</a><br><br>Urge Congress to Support a Timetable for Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan<br><a href="http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern" target="_blank">http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/act/feingold-mcgovern</a><br>_______________________________________________<br>Peace-discuss mailing list<br><a
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