<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
In fact, to anyone who's been reading what Chomsky's written over
the years, his consistency is clear. (See, e.g., his views in "Peace
in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood" [1975],
where I first read of a "bi-national socialist state.") <br>
<br>
Chomsky agrees with the best English-language reporter on the scene,
Patrick Cockburn, that the US war aims in Iraq - viz., bases in that
major oil-producing country and control of its oil production - have
been at best only partially accomplished. And he's pointed out
accurately for many years that the murder of 4 million SE Asians and
the devastation of a peasant society with several times the ordnance
used in WWII prevented the emergence of an independent, socialist
Vietnam - and that was the primary US aim, to prevent "the threat of
a good example." But the opposition to the Bush/Obama war by the US
population and major segments of the foreign policy elite meant that
the carpet-bombing of Vietnam couldn't be repeated in Iraq. <br>
<br>
On 10/28/10 6:47 PM, Morton K. Brussel wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:4D9BC5E6-77BA-4EC2-A3BD-377D8F02D940@illinois.edu"
type="cite">Curious interview. For example,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">Hicham Yezza: … You
compared the Iraq war protest movement favourably to the
anti-Vietnam one due, largely, to the fact mass opposition
to the Iraq war actually started before the invasion. Do you
still see the anti-Iraq-war movement in that positive light,
especially considering how small it is now, seven years on?<br>
<br>
Noam Chomsky: The anti-Iraq-war movement was always much too
small in my view, though in fact much larger than the
anti-Vietnam-war movement at any comparable stage -- a
crucial qualification often ignored. I think there is good
reason to believe that the anti-Iraq-war movement
contributed to the US defeat in Iraq as contrasted with its
considerable victory in Vietnam, already evident 40 years
ago -- abandonment of core war aims in Iraq, while they were
basically achieved in Vietnam.</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
I've always believed that Chomsky's views about anti-Iraq war
activism were overly sanguine. Here, he's equivocating, for it's
obvious that after seven years, the anti-war movement is far
from having the strength of the anti-war movement at that time
in Vietnam. Then, his statement that we won ["a considerable
victory"] the Vietnam war, whereas the anti-war movement was
largely effective in causing our "defeat" in Iraq, seems
uncompelling at best. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Later in the interview, there is a similar kind of
equivocation with respect to Israel-Palestine. He clearly has
backed off his former antipathy to talking about a one-state
solution. His remarks about BDS, which he formerly
dismissed/discouraged/"dissed" [He calls that notion mythology—I
wonder how/why it arose.] , now appears somewhat modified. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Chomsky is never one to admit that his positions or ideas
might have changed. Surprising?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>--mkb</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Oct 28, 2010, at 5:51 PM, C. G. Estabrook wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000"> "<b>The tea party
movement itself is quite small,</b> though heavily
funded and granted enormous media attention, Much more
significant is the great number of Americans, probably a
majority, for whom it has some appeal, even though its
programs would be extremely harmful to their interests if
implemented. <b>There is tremendous anger in the country,
and bitter opposition to virtually all institutions</b>:
government, corporations, banks, professions, the
political parties (Republicans are even more unpopular
than Democrats), etc. At the same time, careful studies
show that <b>people largely retain attitudes that are
basically social democratic</b>, facts rarely discussed
in the media. The anger and frustration are
understandable: <b>for about 30 years, real incomes have
stagnated for the majority, working hours have increased
(far beyond Europe), benefits -- which were never great
-- have declined, while public funds are bailing out the
rich and economic growth is finding its way into very
few pockets.</b> In manufacturing industry unemployment
is at the level of the Great Depression, and these jobs
are not coming back if the bipartisan policies of
financialization of the economy and export of production
proceed. But anger and frustration can be very dangerous,
unless focused on the real causes of the plight of the
population. That is barely happening, and the outcome
could be ominous, as history more than amply illustrates."<br>
<br>
Noam Chomsky interviewed by Hicham Yezza<br>
Ceasefire, September 22, 2010<br>
<br>
Hicham Yezza: In your recent London lectures, you
recounted a wonderful anecdote about student radicalism
days in MIT and also at the LSE. Do you think the
intellectual/academic culture has changed drastically
since then? You compared the Iraq war protest movement
favourably to the anti-Vietnam one due, largely, to the
fact mass opposition to the Iraq war actually started
before the invasion. Do you still see the anti-Iraq-war
movement in that positive light, especially considering
how small it is now, seven years on?<br>
<br>
Noam Chomsky: The anti-Iraq-war movement was always much
too small in my view, though in fact much larger than the
anti-Vietnam-war movement at any comparable stage -- a
crucial qualification often ignored. I think there is good
reason to believe that the anti-Iraq-war movement
contributed to the US defeat in Iraq as contrasted with
its considerable victory in Vietnam, already evident 40
years ago -- abandonment of core war aims in Iraq, while
they were basically achieved in Vietnam.<br>
<br>
HY: The global recession and crisis in the past two years
have yielded a lot of popular anger against financial
institutions and governmental subservience to them. And
yet, nothing structural has shifted in terms of people
saying: we want a different system. Do you think the left
has made mistakes in responding to the crisis?<br>
<br>
NC: A lot more can be done, and should be. To take merely
one example, the left could be active in efforts by
workers and communities to take over production that is
being shut down by the state-capitalist managers and
convert the facilities to urgent needs, such as high-speed
public transportation and green technology. Just one case.<br>
<br>
HY: Your 1970 lecture* on 'Government in the Future' is
now a classic of the genre. Does it still reflect your
views entirely or has there been a change? Many find it
now extremely rare to see this sort of explicit, serious
engagement with fundamental ideas about how society should
be run, as if the case for state capitalism has been
definitively made and the left should just give up trying
to argue for radical alternatives. Is this your view? Or
do you think the situation is more hopeful?<br>
<br>
NC: I have not changed my views on these matters -- of
course expressed only sketchily in this talk. In fact, I
had pretty much the same views as a teen-ager. The left
should very definitely be actively engaged in critical
analysis of the destructive system of state capitalism and
in developing the seeds of the future within it, to borrow
Bakunin's image. I think there are many opportunities, and
some of them are being pursued, though still on much too
limited a scale.<br>
<br>
HY: Turning to the Middle East, regarding the movement
which calls for boycotting, divesting from and sanctioning
(BDS) Israel, why do you think there is such a drastic
disagreement between yourself and people (such as Naomi
Klein) who traditionally agree with you wholeheartedly on
Middle-East and other issues? Is this a mere issue of
tactics? Is the BDS movement doing more harm than good?<br>
<br>
NC: There is an interesting mythology that I have opposed
the BDS movement. In reality, as explained over and over,
I not only support it but was actively involved long
before the "movement" took shape. BDS is, of course, a
tactic. That should be understood. Norman Finkelstein
warned recently that it sometimes appears to be taking on
cult-like features. That should be carefully avoided. Like
all tactics, particular implementations have to be judged
on their own merits. Here there is room for legitimate
disagreement. I have been opposed to certain
implementations, particularly those that are very likely
to harm the victims, as unfortunately has happened.<br>
<br>
More generally, I think we should question the formulation
you gave. It is convenient, particularly for Westerners,
to regard it as an "anti-Israel movement." There are
obvious temptations to blaming someone else, but the fact
of the matter is that Israel can commit crimes to the
extent that they are given decisive support by the US, and
less directly, its allies. BDS actions are both principled
and most effective when they are directed at our crucial
contribution to these crimes, without which they would
end; for example, boycott of western firms contributing to
the occupation, working to end military aid to Israel,
etc.<br>
<br>
HY: My understanding is that you believe a one state
solution can only happen via a two state solution. Is this
correct? If so, do you think a call for a one state
solution is detrimental to Palestinian interests? Or
merely unhelpful?<br>
<br>
NC: I have never felt that we must honour the boundaries
imposed by imperial violence, hence do not see a solution
keeping to the Mandatory boundaries as something holy, or
even desirable in the long-term. A "no-state solution"
eroding those boundaries is, in my view, both preferable
and conceivable, a matter I have discussed elsewhere.
However, I know of no suggestion as to how to reach that
goal without proceeding in stages, at first by way of a
"one-state" (bi-national) solution of the kind I have
advocated since the 1940s, and still do.<br>
<br>
There have been periods when it was feasible to move
fairly directly towards a settlement of this sort --
pre-1948 and from 1967 to the mid-70's, and during those
periods I was quite actively involved in urging direct
moves towards such a settlement. Since Palestinian
nationalism became an active force in the international
system in the mid-1970s, I know of no suggestion as to how
to reach this limited goal without proceeding in stages,
at first by way of the two-state solution of the
overwhelming international consensus, blocked for 35 years
by the US (and Israel) with rare and temporary exceptions.<br>
<br>
Calling for a one-state (or better, a no-state) settlement
is fine, as are many other calls, for example, for
eliminating nuclear weapons, warding off environmental
catastrophe, etc. But we should distinguish between
"calls" and true advocacy, which requires sketching a path
from here to there. The latter is the more serious and
demanding task, both in thought and action.<br>
<br>
HY: You have said before that you would accept whatever
solution the Palestinians/Israelis wanted (one state/two
state/etc), but you also said that if, for instance,
Somalis were in favour of an international course of
action that, in your view, would actually harm them, you
naturally wouldn't participate in it. How would you
clarify the distinction between the two moral imperatives?
Is it possible at the same time to listen to the
Palestinians' wishes but also independently decide what's
good for them?<br>
<br>
NC: If I said that, it was misleading. I have no
authority, right or ability to "accept" or "reject"
international agreements. Speaking personally, I do not
regard nation-states as acceptable institutions, except as
temporary expedients. It is always possible, and often
imperative, to decide that the wishes of some population
are not good for them. We all do it all the time, surely.
And if we are serious about decent human values, we may
often decide not to participate in actions that
populations choose to carry out. I see no general issues
here, though particular cases always raise questions.<br>
<br>
HY: You've recently dismissed the idea that China and
India can pose any serious challenge to Western dominance.
What will the post-unipolar world look like in your view,
if current trends continue?<br>
<br>
NC: They do pose a serious challenge, something I have
been speaking and writing about, though much of the
excited rhetoric about the topic is highly misleading. For
many years the world has been becoming more diverse, with
more diffusion of power. In the past decade, even Latin
America -- which the US has traditionally taken for
granted -- is drifting out of control.<br>
<br>
One striking illustration today is Iran's nuclear
programs. For the US and most of Europe, that is THE
problem of the day. This is "the year of Iran" in foreign
policy circles, and the "Iranian threat" is depicted as
the greatest current danger facing the world. The US is
demanding that China and others meet their "international
responsibilities": to adhere to unilateral US sanctions,
which have no force other than what is conferred by power.
Few are paying attention. Not China, not Brazil, not the
nonaligned countries (most of the world), not even Iran's
neighbors, particularly Turkey.<br>
<br>
HY: Recent reports have shown inequality in the US to be
greater than ever. And yet all we hear of is the rise of
the tea party movement and its crusade against Obama's
"socialist" agenda. Is this because people are campaigning
against their own interests out of ignorance? Or is it
that those who really suffer from inequality (the very
poor) are completely cut off from the political debate in
the first place and thus utterly voiceless?<br>
<br>
NC: The tea party movement itself is quite small, though
heavily funded and granted enormous media attention, Much
more significant is the great number of Americans,
probably a majority, for whom it has some appeal, even
though its programs would be extremely harmful to their
interests if implemented. There is tremendous anger in the
country, and bitter opposition to virtually all
institutions: government, corporations, banks,
professions, the political parties (Republicans are even
more unpopular than Democrats), etc.<br>
<br>
At the same time, careful studies show that people largely
retain attitudes that are basically social democratic,
facts rarely discussed in the media. The anger and
frustration are understandable: for about 30 years, real
incomes have stagnated for the majority, working hours
have increased (far beyond Europe), benefits -- which were
never great -- have declined, while public funds are
bailing out the rich and economic growth is finding its
way into very few pockets.<br>
<br>
In manufacturing industry unemployment is at the level of
the great depression, and these jobs are not coming back
if the bipartisan policies of financialization of the
economy and export of production proceed. But anger and
frustration can be very dangerous, unless focused on the
real causes of the plight of the population. That is
barely happening, and the outcome could be ominous, as
history more than amply illustrates.<br>
<br>
HY: You often state that global warming and nuclear war
are the two great dangers threatening human life. Why do
you think there's such resistance against believing in
human-caused climate change? It's difficult to put this
simply down to financial interests since many "sceptics",
as they call themselves, seem genuinely convinced global
warming is some sort of hoax. Are they just blinded by
propaganda?<br>
<br>
NC: There is a very small group of serious scientists who
are skeptical about global warming. Major sectors of
business have been entirely open about the fact that they
are running propaganda campaigns to convince the public
that it is a hoax. That is an interesting phenomenon,
because those very same corporate executives probably
share our views on the severity of the crisis. But they
are acting in their institutional capacity as corporate
managers, which require them to focus on short term gain
and to ignore "externalities," in this case the fate of
the species.<br>
<br>
The problem is institutional, not individual. As for the
public, many are genuinely confused. That is not
surprising when the media present a "debate" between two
sides -- virtually all scientists versus a scattering of
skeptics -- while incidentally ignoring almost entirely a
much more serious array of skeptics within the scientific
world, namely those who believe that the general
scientific consensus is much too optimistic. There are
doubtless other reasons too. Taking the problem as
seriously as we should leads to difficult choices and
actions. It is easier to transfer the problems somewhere
else, in this case to the world's poor and to our
grandchildren.<br>
<br>
HY: We had a discussion recently with some of our readers
about independent media outlets receiving money from
foundations. Some argue this is fundamentally wrong
because even if it comes with no explicit strings
attached, it would still affect the way an organisation
reports and analyses the news. A case that was mentioned
was Democracy Now!, which we love. Do you think receiving
donations from charities/foundations is fine, or is it
merely a lesser evil to be avoided if possible?<br>
<br>
NC: I do not feel that it must be avoided in principle,
though naturally considerable caution is necessary.<br>
<br>
HY: Our next print issue, out in October, will feature a
celebration of the late Edward Said. Why should young
students/activists pay a great deal of attention to his
legacy?<br>
<br>
NC: In his highly original and justly influential
scholarly work, and in his dedicated and courageous
activism in support of suffering and oppressed people,
Edward Said -- a close and highly valued friend -- was one
of those very rare figures who actually fulfilled the
responsibility of intellectuals that he wrote about so
compellingly. He is an inspiring model.<br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://chomsky.info">chomsky.info</a><br>
________________________<br>
<br>
* I was present to hear this lecture, at MIT in 1970, and
I was quite impressed; it's still much worth reading. <br>
<br>
</div>
_______________________________________________<br>
Peace-discuss mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net">Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net</a><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss">http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<pre wrap="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
_______________________________________________
Peace-discuss mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net">Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss">http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>