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<b>“This is the most remarkable regional uprising that I can
remember”<br>
Noam Chomsky on <i>Democracy Now!</i> 2 February 2011<br>
</b><br>
In recent weeks, popular uprisings in the Arab world have led to the
ouster of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the imminent
end of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, a new Jordanian
government, and a pledge by Yemen’s longtime dictator to leave
office at the end of his term. We speak to MIT Professor Noam
Chomsky about what this means for the future of the Middle East and
U.S. foreign policy in the region. When asked about President
Obama’s remarks last night on Mubarak, Chomsky said: "Obama very
carefully didn’t say anything... He’s doing what U.S. leaders
regularly do. As I said, there is a playbook: whenever a favored
dictator is in trouble, try to sustain him, hold on; if at some
point it becomes impossible, switch sides." <br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: For analysis of the Egyptian uprising and its
implications for the Middle East and beyond, we’re joined now by the
world-renowned political dissident and linguist Noam Chomsky,
Professor Emeritus at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author
of over a hundred books, including his latest, Hopes and Prospects.<br>
<br>
Noam, welcome to Democracy Now! Your analysis of what’s happening
now in Egypt and what it means for the Middle East?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, first of all, what’s happening is absolutely
spectacular. The courage and determination and commitment of the
demonstrators is remarkable. And whatever happens, these are moments
that won’t be forgotten and are sure to have long-term consequences,
as the fact that they overwhelmed the police, took Tahrir Square,
are staying there in the face of organized pro-Mubarak mobs,
organized by the government to try to either drive them out or to
set up a situation in which the army will claim to have to move in
to restore order and then to maybe install some kind of military
rule, whatever. It’s very hard to predict what’s going to happen.
But the events have been truly spectacular. And, of course, it’s all
over the Middle East. In Yemen, in Jordan, just about everywhere,
there are the major consequences.<br>
<br>
The United States, so far, is essentially following the usual
playbook. I mean, there have been many times when some favored
dictator has lost control or is in danger of losing control. There’s
a kind of a standard routine—Marcos, Duvalier, Ceausescu, strongly
supported by the United States and Britain, Suharto: keep supporting
them as long as possible; then, when it becomes
unsustainable—typically, say, if the army shifts sides—switch 180
degrees, claim to have been on the side of the people all along,
erase the past, and then make whatever moves are possible to restore
the old system under new names. That succeeds or fails depending on
the circumstances.<br>
<br>
And I presume that’s what’s happening now. They’re waiting to see
whether Mubarak can hang on, as it appears he’s intending to do, and
as long as he can, say, "Well, we have to support law and order,
regular constitutional change," and so on. If he cannot hang on, if
the army, say, turns against him, then we’ll see the usual routine
played out. Actually, the only leader who has been really forthright
and is becoming the most—maybe already is—the most popular figure in
the region is Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan, who’s been very
straight and outspoken.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam, I wanted to play for you what President Obama had
to say yesterday.<br>
<br>
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: We have spoken out on behalf of the need
for change. After his speech tonight, I spoke directly to President
Mubarak. He recognizes that the status quo is not sustainable and
that a change must take place. Indeed, all of us who are privileged
to serve in positions of political power do so at the will of our
people. Through thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of
transformation. The voices of the Egyptian people tell us that this
is one of those moments, this is one of those times. Now, it is not
the role of any other country to determine Egypt’s leaders. Only the
Egyptian people can do that. What is clear, and what I indicated
tonight to President Mubarak, is my belief that an orderly
transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must
begin now.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: That was President Obama speaking yesterday in the
White House. Noam Chomsky, your response to what President Obama
said, the disappointment of many that he didn’t demand that Mubarak
leave immediately? More importantly, the role of the United States,
why the U.S. would have any say here, when it comes to how much it
has supported the regime?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, Obama very carefully didn’t say anything.
Mubarak would agree that there should be an orderly transition, but
to what? A new cabinet, some minor rearrangement of the
constitutional order—it’s empty. So he’s doing what U.S. leaders
regularly do. As I said, there is a playbook: whenever a favored
dictator is in trouble, try to sustain him, hold on; if at some
point it becomes impossible, switch sides.<br>
<br>
The U.S. has an overwhelmingly powerful role there. Egypt is the
second-largest recipient over a long period of U.S. military and
economic aid. Israel is first. Obama himself has been highly
supportive of Mubarak. It’s worth remembering that on his way to
that famous speech in Cairo, which was supposed to be a conciliatory
speech towards the Arab world, he was asked by the press—I think it
was the BBC—whether he was going to say anything about what they
called Mubarak’s authoritarian government. And Obama said, no, he
wouldn’t. He said, "I don’t like to use labels for folks. Mubarak is
a good man. He has done good things. He has maintained stability. We
will continue to support him. He is a friend." And so on. This is
one of the most brutal dictators of the region, and how anyone could
have taken Obama’s comments about human rights seriously after that
is a bit of a mystery. But the support has been very powerful in
diplomatic dimensions. Military—the planes flying over Tahrir Square
are, of course, U.S. planes. The U.S. has been the strongest, most
solid, most important supporter of the regime. It’s not like
Tunisia, where the main supporter was France. They’re the primary
guilty party there. But in Egypt, it’s clearly the United States,
and of course Israel. Of all the countries in the region, Israel,
and I suppose Saudi Arabia, have been the most outspoken and
supportive of the Mubarak regime. In fact, Israeli leaders were
angry, at least expressed anger, that Obama hadn’t taken a stronger
stand in support of their friend Mubarak.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Talk about what this means for the Middle East, Noam
Chomsky. I mean, we’re talking about the massive protests that have
taken place in Jordan, to the point where King Abdullah has now
dismissed his cabinet, appointed a new prime minister. In Yemen
there are major protests. There is a major protest called for Syria.
What are the implications of this, the uprising from Tunisia to
Egypt now?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, this is the most remarkable regional uprising
that I can remember. I mean, it’s sometimes compared with Eastern
Europe, but that’s not much of a comparison. For one thing, in this
case, there’s no counterpart to Gorbachev in the United States or
other great powers supporting the dictatorships. That’s a huge
difference. Another is that in the case of Eastern Europe, the
United States and its allies followed the timeworn principle that
democracy is fine, at least up to a point, if it accords with
strategic and economic objectives, so therefore acceptable in enemy
domains, but not in our own. That’s a well-established principle,
and of course that sharply differentiates these two cases. In fact,
about the only moderately reasonable comparison would be to Romania,
where Ceausescu, the most vicious of the dictators of the region,
was very strongly supported by the United States right up ’til the
end. And then, when he was overthrown and killed, the first Bush
administration followed the usual rules: postured about being on the
side of the people, opposed to dictatorship, tried to arrange for a
continuation of close relations.<br>
<br>
But this is completely different. Where it’s going to lead, nobody
knows. I mean, the problems that the protesters are trying to
address are extremely deep-seated, and they’re not going to be
solved easily. There is a tremendous poverty, repression, a lack of
not just democracy, but serious development. Egypt and other
countries of the region have just been through a neoliberal period,
which has led to growth on paper, but with the usual consequences:
high concentration of extreme wealth and privilege, tremendous
impoverishment and dismay for most of the population. And that’s not
easily changed. We should also remember that, as far as the United
States is concerned, what’s happening is a very old story. As far
back as the 1950s, President Eisenhower - this is in internal
discussions, since declassified - expressed his concern for what he
called the "campaign of hatred against us" in the Arab world, not by
the governments, but by the people. Remember, [this was]1958, this
was a rather striking moment. Just two years before, Eisenhower had
intervened forcefully to compel Israel, Britain and France to
withdraw from their invasion of Egyptian territory. And you would
have expected enormous enthusiasm and support for the United States
at that moment, and there was, briefly, but it didn’t last, because
policies returned to the norm. So when he was speaking two years
later, there was, as he said, a "campaign of hatred against us." And
he was naturally concerned why. Well, the National Security Council,
the highest planning body, had in fact just come out with a report
on exactly this issue. They concluded that, yes, indeed, there’s a
campaign of hatred. They said there’s a perception in the Arab world
that the United States supports harsh and brutal dictators and
blocks democracy and development, and does so because we’re
concerned to control their energy resources.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam, I wanted to go for a minute to that famous
address of the general, of the Republican president, of the
president of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower.<br>
<br>
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: My fellow Americans, this
evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell
and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen. We have
been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast
proportions. Three-and-a-half million men and women are directly
engaged in the defense establishment. The total—economic, political,
even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every
office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need
for this development, yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications. In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: That was President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell
address in 1961. Special thanks to Eugene Jarecki and his film Why
We Fight, that brought it to us in the 21st century. Noam Chomsky,
with us on the phone from his home near Boston, Noam, continue with
the significance of what Eisenhower was saying and what the times
were there and what they have to teach us today about this Middle
East uprising.<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah, the military-industrial complex speech, the
famous one, was after what I’ve just been talking about. That was as
he was leaving office and a important speech, of course. Needless to
say, the situation he described not only persists but indeed has
amplified.<br>
<br>
It should be mentioned that there’s another element to the
military-industrial complex issue, which he didn’t bring up. At that
time, in the 1950s, as he certainly knew, the Pentagon was funding
what became the next phase of the high-tech economy at that time:
computers, micro-electronics, shortly after, the internet. Much of
this developed through a Pentagon subsidy funding procurement, other
mechanisms. So it was a kind of a cover for a basic theme of
contemporary economic development. That is, the public pays the
costs and takes the risks, and eventual profit is privatized, in the
case of computers and the internet, after decades. So that’s another
aspect of the military-industrial complex which is worth keeping in
mind.<br>
<br>
But Eisenhower was speaking particularly about the military aspect,
what’s called "defense," though in fact it’s mostly aggression,
intervention, subversion. It doesn’t defend the country; it harms
it, most of the time. But that’s separate — not, of course,
unrelated, but distinct from the Middle East problem. There, what
Eisenhower and the National Security Council were describing is a
persistent pattern. They were describing it in 1950. And I’ll repeat
the basic conclusion: the United States does support brutal and
harsh dictatorships, blocks democracy and development; the goal is
to maintain control over the incomparable energy resources of the
region—incidentally, not to use them. One of the things that
Eisenhower was doing at exactly the same time was pursuing a program
to exhaust U.S. energy reserves, rather than using much cheaper
Middle East energy, for the benefit of Texas oil producers. That’s a
program that went on from the late '50s for about 15 years. So, at
the time, it was not a matter of importing oil from Saudi Arabia,
but just ensuring the maintenance of control over the world's major
energy resources. And that, as the National Security Council
concluded correctly, was leading to the campaign of hatred against
us, the support for dictators, for repression, for violence and the
blocking of democracy and development.<br>
<br>
Now, that was the 1950s. And those words could be written today. You
take a look at what’s happening in the Middle East today. There’s a
campaign of hatred against the United States, in Tunisia against
France, against Britain, for supporting brutal, harsh dictators,
repressive, vicious, imposing poverty and suffering in the midst of
great wealth, blocking democracy and development, and doing so
because of the primary goal, which remains to maintain control over
the energy resources of the region. What the National Security
Council wrote in 1958 could be restated today in almost the same
words.<br>
<br>
Right after 9/11, the Wall Street Journal, to its credit, ran a poll
in the Muslim world, not of the general population, [but] of the
kind of people they are interested in, I think what they called the
moneyed Muslims or some phrase like that—professionals, directors of
multinational corporations, bankers, people deeply embedded in the
whole U.S.-dominated neoliberal project there—so not what’s called
anti-American. And it was an interesting poll. In fact, the results
were very much like those that were described in 1958. There wasn’t
a campaign of hatred against the U.S. among these people, but there
was tremendous antagonism to U.S. policies. And the reasons were
pretty much the same: the U.S. is blocking democracy and
development; it’s supporting dictators. By that time, there were
salient issues, some of which didn’t exist in 1958. For example,
there was a tremendous opposition in these groups to the murderous
sanctions in Iraq, which didn’t arouse much attention here, but they
certainly did in the region. Hundreds of thousands of people were
being killed. The civilian society was being destroyed. The dictator
was being strengthened. And that did cause tremendous anger. And, of
course, there was great anger about U.S. support for Israeli crimes,
atrocities, illegal takeover of occupied territories and so on,
settlement programs. Those were other issues, which also, to a
limited extent, existed in ’58, but not like 2001.<br>
<br>
In fact, right now, we have direct evidence about attitudes of the
Arab population (I think I mentioned this on an earlier broadcast) -
strikingly not reported, but extremely significant. Last August the
Brookings Institute released a major poll of Arab opinion, done by
prestigious and respected polling agencies - they do it regularly -
and the results were extremely significant. They reveal that there
is again, still, a campaign of hatred against the United States.
When asked about threats to the region, the ones that were picked,
near unanimously, were Israel and the United States—88 percent
Israel, about 77 percent the United States, regarded as the threats
to the region. Of course, they asked about Iran. Ten percent of the
population thought Iran was a threat. In the list of respected
personalities, Erdogan was first. I think there were about 10.
Neither Obama or any other Western figure was even mentioned. Saddam
Hussein had higher respect.<br>
<br>
Now, this is quite striking, especially in the light of the
WikiLeaks revelations. The one that won the headlines and that led
to great enthusiasm and euphoria was the revelation, whether
accurate or not—we don’t know—but the claim, at least, by diplomats
that the Arab dictators were supporting the U.S. in its
confrontation with Iran. And, you know, enthusiastic headlines about
how Arab states support the United States. That’s very revealing.
What the commentators and the diplomats were saying is the Arab
dictators support us, even though the population is overwhelming
opposed, everything’s fine, everything’s under control, it’s quiet,
they’re passive, and the dictators support us, so what could be a
problem? In fact, Arab opinion was so antagonistic to the United
States as revealed in this poll, that a majority of the Arab
population, 57 percent, actually thought the region would be better
off if Iran had nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the conclusion here,
and in England and the continent, was it’s all wonderful. The
dictators support us. We can disregard the population, because
they’re quiet. As long as they’re quiet, who cares? People don’t
matter. Actually, there’s an analog of that internal to the United
States. And it’s of course the same policy elsewhere in the world.
All of that reveals a contempt for democracy and for public opinion
which is really profound. And one has to listen with jaws dropping
when Obama, in the clip you ran, talks about how, of course,
governments depend on the people. Our policy is the exact opposite.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam Chomsky, I wanted to read to you what Robert Fisk
has written from the streets of Cairo today. Robert Fisk, the
well-known reporter from The Independent of London. He said, "One of
the blights of history will now involve a U.S. president who held
out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when it
fought a dictatorship and demanded democracy." Noam Chomsky, your
response?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, Fisk’s reporting, as usual, has been inspiring
and phenomenal. And yeah, he’s exactly right. And it is the old
pattern. As I say, it goes back 50 years right there in Egypt and
the region, and it’s the same elsewhere. As long as the population
is passive and obedient, it doesn’t matter if there’s a campaign of
hatred against us. It doesn’t matter if they believe that our
official enemy can perhaps save them from our attacks. In fact,
nothing matters, as long as the dictators support us. That’s the
view here.<br>
<br>
We should remember there’s an analog here. I mean, it’s not the
same, of course, but the population in the United States is angry,
frustrated, full of fear and irrational hatreds. And the folks not
far from you on Wall Street are just doing fine. They’re the ones
who created the current crisis. They’re the ones who were called
upon to deal with it. They’re coming out stronger and richer than
ever. But everything’s fine, as long as the population is passive.
If one-tenth of one percent of the population is gaining a
preponderant amount of the wealth that’s produced, while for the
rest there 30 years of stagnation, just fine, as long as everyone’s
quiet. That’s the scenario that has been unfolding in the Middle
East, as well, just as it did in Central America and other domains.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam, I wanted to ask you if you think the revelations
from WikiLeaks, the U.S. diplomatic cables, before that, Iraq and
Afghan war logs, this massive trove of documents that have been
released, Julian Assange talking about the critical issue of
transparency—have played a key role here. I mean, in terms of
Tunisia, a young university graduate who ended up, because there
were no jobs, just selling vegetables in a market, being harassed by
police, immolates himself—that was the spark. But also, the
documents that came out on Tunisia confirming the U.S. knowledge,
while it supported the Tunisian regime, that it was wholly corrupt,
and what this means from one country to another, Yemen, as well. Do
you think there is a direct relationship?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, actually, the fact of the matter is that
WikiLeaks are not really telling us anything dramatically new.
They’re providing confirmation, often, of reasonable surmises.
Tunisia was a very interesting case. So one of the leaks comes from
the ambassador, July 2009, and he describes Tunisia. He says it’s a
police state with little freedom of expression or association,
serious human rights problems, ruled by a dictator whose family is
despised for their corruption, robbery of the population and so on.
That’s the assessment of the ambassador. Not long after that, the
U.S. singled out Tunisia for an extra shipment of military aid. Not
just Tunisia, also two other Arab dictatorships—Egypt and Jordan—and
of course Israel—it’s routine—and one other country, namely
Colombia, the country with the worst human rights record in the
western hemisphere for years and the leading recipient of U.S.
military aid for years, two elements that correlate quite closely,
it’s been shown.<br>
<br>
Well, this tells you what the understanding was about
Tunisia—namely, police state, a bitterly hated dictator and so on.
But we send them more arms afterwards, because the population is
quiet, so everything’s fine. Actually, there was a very succinct
account of all of this by a former high Jordanian official who’s now
director of Middle East research for the Carnegie Endowment, Marwan
Muasher. He said, "This is the principle." He said, "There is
nothing wrong. Everything is under control." Meaning, as long as the
population is quiet, acquiescent—maybe fuming with rage, but doing
nothing about it—everything’s fine, there’s nothing wrong, it’s all
under control. That’s the operative principle.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: What about what’s happening now in Jordan, what you
think is going to happen, and also in Saudi Arabia, how much it
drives this and what you feel Obama needs to do and what you think
he actually is doing?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, Jordan, the prime minister was just replaced. He
was replaced with an ex-general who is claimed to be moderately
popular, at least not hated by the population. But essentially
nothing changed. There are changes of the Jordanian cabinet
frequently, and the basic system remains. Whether the population
will accept that, whether the Muasher principle will work—nothing’s
wrong, everything’s under control—that, we don’t know.<br>
<br>
Saudi Arabia is an interesting case. The king of Saudi Arabia has
been, along with Israel, the strongest supporter, most outspoken
supporter of Mubarak. And the Saudi Arabian case should remind us of
something about the regular commentary on this issue. The standard
line and commentary is that, of course, we love democracy, but for
pragmatic reasons we must sometimes reluctantly oppose it, in this
case because of the threat of radical Islamists, the Muslim
Brotherhood. Well, you know, there’s maybe some—whatever one thinks
of that. Take a look at Saudi Arabia. That’s the leading center of
radical Islamist ideology. That’s been the source of it for years.
It’s also the support of Islamic terror, the source for Islamic
terror or the ideology that supports it. That’s the leading U.S.
ally, and has been for a long, long time. U.S. relations, close
relations, with Israel, incidentally, after the 1967 war, escalated
because Israel had struck a serious blow against secular Arab
nationalism, the real enemy, Nasser’s Egypt, and in defense of
radical Islam, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Egypt had been in a
proxy war just before that, and there was a major conflict. And
that’s quite typical.<br>
<br>
Going back to WikiLeaks, maybe the most significant revelation has
to do with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the WikiLeaks cables show that the
ambassador, Ambassador Patterson, is pretty much on top of what’s
going on. The phrase "campaign of hatred against the United States"
is an understatement. The population is passionately anti-American,
increasingly so, largely, as she points out, as a result of U.S.
actions in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the pressure on the
Pakistani military to invade the tribal zones, the drone attacks and
so on. And she goes on to say that this may even lead to what is in
fact the ultimate nightmare, that Pakistan’s enormous nuclear
facilities, which incidentally are being increased faster than
anywhere else in the world, that there might be leakage of fissile
materials into the hands of the radical Islamists, who are growing
in strength and gaining popular support in part, as a result of
actions that we’re taking.<br>
<br>
Well, this didn’t happen overnight. The major factor behind this is
the rule of the dictator Zia-ul-Haq back in the 1980s. He was the
one who carried out radical Islamization of Pakistan, with Saudi
funding. He set up these extremist madrassas. The young lawyers who
were in the streets recently shouting their support for the assassin
of the political figure who opposed the blasphemy laws, they’re a
product of those madrassas. Who supported him? Ronald Reagan. He was
Reagan’s favorite dictator in the region. Well, you know, events
have consequences. You support radical Islamization, and there are
consequences. But the talk about concern about the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, whatever its reality, is a little bit ironic,
when you observe that the U.S. and, I should say, Britain, as well,
have traditionally supported radical Islam, in part, sometimes as a
barrier to secular nationalism.<br>
<br>
What’s the real concern is not Islam or radicalism; it’s
independence. If the radical Islamists are independent, well,
they’re an enemy. If secular nationalists are independent, they are
an enemy. In Latin America, for decades, when the Catholic Church,
elements of the Catholic Church, were becoming independent, the
liberation theology movement, they were an enemy. We carried out a
major war against the church. Independence is what’s intolerable,
and pretty much for the reasons that the National Security Council
described in the case of the Arab world 50 years ago.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam Chomsky, I wanted to read to you what two people
are writing. One is Ethan Bronner in the New York Times, saying,
"Despite [Mr.] Mubarak’s supportive relations with Israel, many
Israelis on both the left and right are sympathetic [to] the
Egyptians’ desire to rid themselves of his autocracy and build a
democracy. But they fear what will follow if things move too
quickly." He quotes a top Israeli official saying, "We know this has
to do with the desire for freedom, prosperity and opportunity, and
we support people who don’t want to live under tyranny, but who will
take advantage of what is happening in its wake?" The official goes
on to say, "The prevailing sense here is that you need a certain
stability followed by reform. Snap elections are likely to bring a
very different outcome," the official said.<br>
<br>
And then there’s Richard Cohen, who’s writing in the Washington
Post: "Things are about to go from bad to worse in the Middle East.
An Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is nowhere in sight."<br>
<br>
Noam Chomsky, your response?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: The comment of the Israeli official is standard
boilerplate. Stalin could have said it. Yes, of course, the people
want peace and freedom, democracy; we’re all in favor of that. But
not now, please. Because we don’t like what the outcome will be. In
fact, it’s the same with Obama. It’s more or less the same comment.
On the other hand, the Israeli officials have been vociferous and
outspoken in support of Mubarak and [in] denunciation of the popular
movement and the demonstrations. Perhaps only Saudi Arabia has been
so outspoken in this regard. And the reason is the same. They very
much fear what democracy would bring in Egypt.<br>
<br>
After all, they’ve just seen it in Palestine. There has been one
free election in the Arab world, exactly one really free
election—namely, in Palestine, January 2006, carefully monitored,
recognized to be free, fair, open and so on. And right after the
election, within days, the United States and Israel announced
publicly and implemented policies of harsh attack against the
Palestinian people to punish them for running a free election. Why?
The wrong people won. Elections are just fine, if they come out the
way we want them to.<br>
<br>
So, if in, say, Poland under Russian rule, popular movements were
calling for freedom, we cheer. On the other hand, if popular
movements in Central America are trying to get rid of brutal
dictatorships, we arm the military and carry out massive terrorist
wars to crush it. We will cheer Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia
standing up against the enemy, and at the very same moment, elite
forces, fresh from renewed training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
under command of the military, blow the brains out of six leading
Latin American intellectuals, Jesuit priests, in El Salvador. That
passes in silence. But that’s exactly the pattern that we see
replicated over and over again.<br>
<br>
And it’s even recognized by conservative scholarship. The leading
scholarly studies of what’s called "democracy promotion" happen to
be by a good, careful scholar, Thomas Carruthers, who’s a
neo-Reaganite. He was in Reagan’s State Department working on
programs of democracy promotion, and he thinks it’s a wonderful
thing. But he concludes from his studies, ruefully, that the U.S.
supports democracy, if and only if it accords with strategic and
economic objectives. Now, he regards this as a paradox. And it is a
paradox if you believe the rhetoric of leaders. He even says that
all American leaders are somehow schizophrenic. But there’s a much
simpler analysis: people with power want to retain and maximize
their power. So, democracy is fine if it accords with that, and it’s
unacceptable if it doesn’t.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam, there’s a sign, a big banner that people are
holding in the square, in Tahrir, that says, "Yes, we can, too."<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah. You know where they got that from. Well, except
that they mean it. Whether they can or not, no one knows. I mean,
the situation - we should recognize - has ominous aspects. The
dispatch of pro-Mubarak thugs to the square is dangerous and
frightening. Mubarak, presumably with U.S. backing, clearly feels
that he can reestablish control. They’ve opened the internet again.
The army is sitting by. We don’t know what they’ll do. But they
might very well use the conflicts in the streets, caused by the
pro-Mubarak gangs that have been sent in, to say, "Well, we have to
establish military control," and they’ll be another form of the
military dictatorships that have been the effective power in Egypt
for a long time.<br>
<br>
Another crucial [thing] is how long the demonstrators can sustain
themselves, not only against terror and violence, but also just
against economic crisis. Within a short time, maybe beginning
already, there isn’t going to be bread, water. The economy is
collapsing. They have shown absolutely incredible courage and
determination, but, you know, there’s a limit to what human flesh
can bear. So, amazing as all this is, there’s no guarantee of
success.<br>
<br>
If - [from] the United States, the population of the United States,
[and] Europe - if there is substantial vocal, outspoken support,
that could make a difference. Now, remember the Muasher principle:
as long as everyone’s quiet, everything’s under control, it’s all
fine. But when they break those bonds, it’s not fine. You have to do
something.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: If you were president today, what would you do right
now, president of the United States?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, if I had made it to the presidency, meaning with
the kind of constituency and support that’s required to be a
president in the United States, I’d probably do what Obama’s doing.
But what ought to be done is what Erdogan is doing. Turkey is
becoming the most significant country in the region, and it’s
recognized. Erdogan is far and away the most popular figure. And
they’ve taken a pretty constructive role on many issues. And in this
case, he is the one leading public figure, leader, who has been
frank, outspoken, clear, and says Mubarak must go now. Now is when
we must have change. That’s the right stand. Nothing like that in
Europe, and nothing like that here.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: And what do you think of the role of the U.S.
corporations? We spoke to Bill Hartung, who wrote this book,
"Prophets of Power," about Lockheed Martin. The overwhelming amount
of money, the billions, that have gone to Egypt, haven’t really gone
to Egypt; they’ve gone to U.S. weapons manufacturers, like General
Dynamics, like Lockheed Martin, like Boeing, etc. In fact, Boeing
owns Narus, which is the digital technology that’s involved with
surveillance of the cell phone, of the internet system there, where
they can find dissident voices for the Egyptian regime. And who
knows what they will do with those voices, just among others? But
these corporations that have made such a killing off the repression,
where are they standing right now in terms of U.S. policy?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, they don’t issue press releases, so we have to
speculate. But it’s pretty obvious that they have a major stake in
the dictatorships, not just Egypt. So, for example, a couple of
months ago, Obama announced the biggest military sale in history to
Saudi Arabia, $60 billion worth of jet planes, helicopters, armored
vehicles and so on and so forth. The pretext is that we have to
defend Saudi Arabia against Iran. Remember that among the
population, if anyone cares about them, 10 percent regard Iran as a
threat, and a majority think the region would be better off if Iran
had nuclear weapons. But we have to defend them against Iran by
sending them military equipment, which would do them absolutely no
good in any confrontation with Iran. But it does a lot of good for
the American military-industrial complex that Eisenhower was
referring to in that clip you ran a while back. So, yes, William
Hartung was quite right about this.<br>
<br>
In fact, a part of the reason why there is such strong support for
Israel in the military lobby, in the military-industrial lobby in
the United States, is that the massive arms transfers to Israel,
which, whatever they’re called, end up essentially being gifts, they
go from the pocket of the U.S. taxpayer into the pocket of military
industry. But there’s also a secondary effect, which is well
understood. They’re a kind of a teaser. When the U.S. sends the most
advanced jet aircraft, F-35s, to Israel, then Saudi Arabia says,
"Well, we want a hundred times as much second-rate equipment," which
is a huge bonanza for military industry, and it also recycles
petrodollars, which is a necessity for the U.S. economy. So these
things are quite closely tied together.<br>
<br>
And it’s not just military industry. Construction projects,
development, telecommunications—in the case of Israel, high-tech
industry. So, Intel Corporation, the world’s major chip producer,
has announced a new generation of chips, which they hope will be the
next generation of chips, and they’re building their main factory in
Israel. Just announced an expansion of it. The relations are very
close and intimate all the way through—again, in the Arab world,
certainly not among the people, but we have the Muasher principle.
As long as they’re quiet, who cares? We can disregard them.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: And the significance of Mubarak in the
Israel-Palestine-Egypt axis? I mean, going back to 1979, if you
could briefly remind people why he’s so important, as the media
keeps saying he has meant peace and stability with Israel, he gives
the U.S. access to their air space, he guarantees access to the Suez
Canal. Talk about that and what the change would mean.<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: We should actually go back a little further. In 1971,
President Sadat of Egypt offered Israel a full peace treaty in
return for withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. He cared about
the Sinai, not [the West Bank and Gaza]—but Israel considered it,
rejected it. Henry Kissinger, national security adviser, supported
the rejection. (The State Department then supported Sadat.) It was a
fateful decision. That’s the point at which Israel quite explicitly
chose expansion over security. They were then expanding into the
Sinai, planning to build a city of a million people, Egyptian Sinai,
settlements driving farmers out into the desert and so on. Well,
that was the background for the 1973 war, which made it clear that
Egypt can’t simply be dismissed. Then we move on to the negotiations
which led, in 1979, to the U.S. and Israel pretty much accepting
Sadat’s offer of 1971: withdrawal from the Sinai in return for a
peace treaty. That’s called a great diplomatic triumph. In fact, it
was a diplomatic catastrophe. The failure to accept it in 1971 led
to a very dangerous war, suffering, brutality and so on. And
finally, the U.S. and Israel essentially, more or less, accepted it.<br>
<br>
Now, as soon as that settlement was made, [in] 1979, Israeli
strategic analysts—the main one was Avner Yaniv, but others,
too—recognized right away that now that Egypt is excluded from the
confrontation, Israel is free to use force in other areas. And
indeed, it very soon after that attacked Lebanon, [and] didn’t have
to worry about an Egyptian deterrent. Now, that was gone, so we can
attack Lebanon. And that was a brutal, vicious attack, killed 15,000
[to] 20,000 people, led finally to the Sabra-Shatila massacre,
destroyed most of southern Lebanon. And no defensive rationale. In
fact, it wasn’t even pretended. As it was said, it was a war for the
West Bank. It was an effort to block embarrassing Palestinian
negotiation, diplomatic offers, and [to] move forward on integrating
the Occupied Territories. Well, they were free to do that once the
Egyptian deterrent was gone. And that continues. Egypt is the major
Arab state, the biggest military force by far, and neutralizing
Egypt does free Israel—and when I say Israel, I mean the United
States and Israel, because they work in tandem—it frees them to
carry out the crimes of the occupation, attacks on Lebanon—there
have been five invasions already, there might be another one—and
Egypt does not interfere.<br>
<br>
Furthermore, Egypt cooperates in the crushing of Gaza. That terrible
free election in January 2006 not only frightened the U.S. and
Israel—they didn’t like the outcome, so turned instantly to
punishing the Palestinians—but the same in Egypt. The victor in the
election was Hamas, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That was very much feared by the Egyptian dictatorship, because if
they ever allowed anything like a free election, the Muslim
Brotherhood would no doubt make out quite well, maybe not a
majority, but it would be a substantial political force. And they
don’t want that, so therefore they cooperate. Egypt, under Mubarak,
cooperates with Israel in crushing [Gaza], built a huge fence on the
Egyptian border, with U.S. engineering help, and it sort of monitors
the flow of goods in and out of Gaza on the Egyptian side. It
essentially completes the siege that the U.S. and Israel have
imposed. Well, all of that could erode if there was a democratic
movement that gained influence in Egypt, just as it did in
Palestine.<br>
<br>
I should mention that there’s one other semi-democratic election in
the Arab world, regularly. Now that’s in Lebanon. Lebanon is a
complex story. It’s a confessional democracy, so the Shiite
population, which is the largest of the sects, is significantly
underrepresented under the confessional system. But nevertheless the
elections are not just state elections under dictatorships. And they
have outcomes, too, which are suppressed here. So, for example, in
the last election, the majority, a popular majority, was the
Hezbollah-led coalition. They were the popular majority in the last
election. I think about 53 percent. Well, that’s not the way it was
described here. If you read, say, Thomas Friedman, he wrote an ode
about the election—he was practically shedding tears of joy at free
elections, in which Obama won over Ahmadinejad. Well, you know, what
he meant is that in the representation under the confessional
system, which seriously underrepresents the Shiite population, the
pro-U.S. coalition won the most seats. That again reflects the
standard contempt for democracy. All we care—we don’t care that the
majority of the population went the other way, as long as they’re
quiet and passive. And interestingly, Hezbollah quietly accepted the
outcome, didn’t protest about it at the time. But since then, their
power has increased, and now there’s a serious threat in Lebanon,
which we should not overlook.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam, finally, as we wrap up, I’ve asked you a lot
about what this means for the Middle East, this rolling revolution,
from Tunisia to Egypt, what we’re seeing in Jordan, in Yemen and
beyond. But what about what these mass protests mean for people in
the United States?<br>
<br>
NOAM CHOMSKY: I think they mean a lot, and I’ve been trying to hint
about that. The doctrine that everything is fine as long as the
population is quiet, that applies in the Middle East, applies in
Central America, it applies in the United States. For the last 30
years, we have had state-corporate policies specifically
designed—specifically designed, not accidentally—to enrich and
empower a tiny sector of the population, one percent—in fact,
one-tenth of one percent. That’s the basic source of the extreme
inequality. Tax policies, rules of corporate governance, a whole
mass of policies, have been very explicitly designed to achieve this
end—deregulation and so on. Well, for most of the population, that’s
meant pretty much stagnation over a long period. Now, people have
been getting by, by sharply increasing the number of work hours, far
beyond Europe, by debt, by asset inflation like the recent housing
bubble. But those things can’t last.<br>
<br>
And as soon as Obama came into office, he came in in the midst of
the worst crisis since the Depression. In fact, Ben Bernanke, we
know from recent testimony that was released, head of the Fed, said
it was even worse than the banking crisis in 1929. So there was a
real crisis. Who did he pick to patch up the crisis? The people who
had created it, the Robert Rubin gang, Larry Summers, Timothy
Geithner, basically the people who were responsible for the policies
that led to the crisis. And it’s not surprising. I mean, Obama’s
primary constituency was financial institutions. They were the core
of the funding for his campaign. They expect to be paid back. And
they were. They were paid back by coming out richer and more
powerful than they were before the crisis that they created.<br>
<br>
Meanwhile, the population, much of the population, is literally in
depression. If you look at the unemployment figures, among the top
few percent, maybe 10, 20 percent, unemployment is not particularly
high. In fact, it’s rather low. When you go down to the bottom of
the income ladder, you know, the lower quintiles, unemployment is at
Depression levels. In manufacturing industry, it is at Depression
levels.<br>
<br>
And it’s different from the Depression. In the Depression, which I’m
old enough to remember, it was very severe. My own family was mostly
unemployed working class. But there was a sense of hopefulness—we
can do something. There’s CIO organizing. There’s sitdown strikes,
that compelled New Deal measures, which were helpful and hopeful.
And there was a sense that somehow we’ll get out of this, that we’re
in it together, we can work together, we can get out of it. That’s
not true now. Now there’s a general atmosphere of hopelessness,
despair, anger and deep irrationality. That’s a very dangerous mix.
Hatred of foreigners, you know, a mix of attitudes which is volatile
and dangerous, quite different from the mood in the Depression.<br>
<br>
But the same governing principle applies: as long as the population
accepts what’s going on, is directing their anger against teachers,
firemen, policemen, pensions and so on, as long as they’re directing
their anger there, and not against us, the rulers, everything’s
under control, everything’s fine. Until it erupts. Well, it hasn’t
erupted here yet, and if it does erupt, it might not be at a
constructive direction, given the nature of what’s happening in the
country now. But yes, those Egyptian lessons should be taken to
heart. We can see clearly what people can do under conditions of
serious duress and repression far beyond anything that we face, but
they’re doing it. If we don’t do it, the outcome could be quite
ugly.<br>
<br>
AMY GOODMAN: Noam Chomsky, I want to thank you very much for being
with us. Noam, author, Institute Professor Emeritus at MIT, and most
recent book, Hopes and Prospects, has written more than a hundred
books.<br>
<br>
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