<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
<title></title>
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffff">
I'd like to see an option on the 1040 form to donate a <br>
to the terrorist organization of one's choice.<br>
<br>
<font face="Courier New, Courier, monospace">42. Would you like to
donate $2 to one of the following terrorist organizations? <br>
If so, please check one (only one):<br>
<br>
( ) al-Qaeda<br>
( ) Hamas<br>
( ) Sinn Fein<br>
( ) Sean Penn<br>
( ) Drunken Rednecks with Guns<br>
( ) AIPAC<br>
<br>
<font face="Times New Roman, Times, serif">*<br>
</font><font face="Times New Roman, Times, serif">Ok, ok. Some of
those are sworn enemies of the American people.<br>
Which makes them no different from the presidential candidates.</font><br>
<br>
*<br>
<br>
43. Have you ever had the Chicken Pox? <br>
<br>
( ) y ( ) n<br>
<br>
If so, how many? _________<br>
</font><br>
<br>
On 7/27/2012 6:39 PM, C. G. Estabrook wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:AEA1F836-FFCF-483E-99FE-A2A33EFAE270@shout.net"
type="cite">"BAN, BAN, TALIBAN / HAS A NEW MASTER: GET A NEW MAN"<br>
<br>
The ironies are replete. The US, surreptitiously fighting on the side
of al-Qaeda to overthrow the Alewite government in Syria, is quietly
arranging with the Taliban to oppose together al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
according to Anatol Lieven.<br>
<br>
AQ owes its existence to the US, descending as it does from the
fanatical and ruthless Islamists whom the Carter administration
gathered together and sent into Afghanistan in the 1970s (before the
Russian invasion) "to give to the USSR its Vietnam war," as Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, said. "What is
most important to the history of the world?" he asked later. "The
Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems
or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?"<br>
<br>
When the stirred-up Muslims counterattacked on 9/11/2001 for a
generation of US depredations of the Mideast - for murderous sanctions
against Iraq, suppression of the Palestinians, and the military
investment of Saudi Arabia, as AQ claimed - the US launched what George
Bush called a "crusade" against "terrorists" - i.e., against the armed
opposition to a generation-long US attempt to control the energy
producing regions of the world.<br>
<br>
But the terrorists are not homogeneous, and Lieven points here to the
gap between the Afghan national resistance to foreign invasion - the
Taliban - and the international terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda. "...
on certain key issues the Taliban leadership and the US administration
are far closer than most analysts believe. The chief obstacle to
a peace settlement is likely to come not from Taliban links to al-Qaeda
but rather from the question of how to divide up power within
Afghanistan."<br>
<br>
US policy - as flexible in strategy as it is in ethics, as torture
and assassination make clear - is consistent as to goals: the
Obama administration will work both with and against al-Qaeda, the
great Satan of the War on Terrorism (or as the Obamanians prefer to
call their broader and more brutal version, "overseas
contingency operations") its object all sublime to achieve in time -
control of the Mideast. --CGE
<div><br>
</div>
<div>========</div>
<div><i><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/45b83f50-d59b-11e1-af40-00144feabdc0.html#axzz21obxqphU">http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/45b83f50-d59b-11e1-af40-00144feabdc0.html#axzz21obxqphU</a></i></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>July 25, 2012 7:57 pm</div>
<div>Lessons from my talks with the Taliban<br>
By Anatol Lieven<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>To judge by discussions I had with figures close to the Afghan
Taliban in Dubai last week, on certain key issues the Taliban
leadership and the US administration are far closer than most analysts
believe. The chief obstacle to a peace settlement is likely to come not
from Taliban links to al-Qaeda but rather from the question of how
to divide up power within Afghanistan.<br>
My colleagues and I spoke with four people: two former members of
the Taliban government (one of them a founder member of the movement),
a senior former Mujahedin commander with close ties to the Taliban,
and a non-official Afghan mediator with the Taliban. All emphasised
the realism of the Taliban leadership, born of their experiences of
the past decade, and their willingness to break with al-Qaeda and
exclude it and other international terrorist groups from areas under
their control.<br>
All said that Taliban commanders and fighters would accept such an
order if it came from Mullah Omar. A former Taliban minister
said that reports of a continued presence of al-Qaeda elements could
be referred to a joint commission of Isaf, the Taliban and the
Afghan government, which would verify the reports and decide what
action to take.<br>
Such action might even be taken by US troops within Afghanistan.
For perhaps the most striking thing to emerge from our
discussions was that three of our four interviewees said the Taliban
would consider agreeing to US bases and military advisers in
Afghanistan after 2014 – something that contradicts every previous
Taliban statement.<br>
However, all our interviewees emphasised that the Taliban would only
agree to this as part of an overall peace settlement and that
they “will never accept anything that looks like surrender”. They also
all said the Taliban would be willing to commit to continuing
existing health and education programmes, including for women, as long
as separation of men and women was guaranteed.<br>
This new pragmatism includes acceptance of the present
Afghan constitution. All our interlocutors said the Taliban had no
serious problem with the constitution as such – but would never agree
to it as a precondition of talks, as hitherto demanded by
Washington. They expect the constitution to be debated and approved as
part of a national debate including themselves.<br>
All this is very encouraging. However, it reflects something else,
which is essential for a settlement, but much more problematic.
The Taliban like the present, highly centralised constitution because
they want a strong central government in which they will play a
leading part. They do not expect this to be an exclusive part. Three
interviewees said the Taliban knew they could not govern without
other forces’ participation, and that government must include educated
technocrats. They want a strong national army – even one trained by the
US – to hold Afghanistan together, prevent a return to warlord rule
and deter interference by neighbours.<br>
But with whom would the Taliban be willing to share power?
Our interviewees said that the Taliban recognised the need to guarantee
a share of power to other groups from the existing regime, but
were vague on which those groups might be. All said that particular
“very corrupt and brutal people” would be utterly unacceptable, but
that others, less compromised, could take part.<br>
Above all, they stressed the Taliban will never accept Hamid Karzai as
a legitimate interlocutor, or participate in a grand national assembly
or national elections while he is president. They fear – with good
reason, given his record – that he would rig these processes.<br>
So this apparent new pragmatism leaves two huge questions open.
The first is whether the Taliban could possibly agree to the US
using bases in Afghanistan to continue drone attacks and raids against
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such an agreement would outrage
many Pashtuns and give Pakistan a strong motive to wreck any peace
settlement through its allies in the Haqqani network; while our
interviewees stressed the Taliban’s obedience to Mullah Omar and his
comrades, they were studiously evasive about the Haqqanis.<br>
The second question is whether, or how, Washington could agree to
force its existing Afghan allies to accept a deal with the Taliban
that would exclude many of them from power. Would a promise of
luxurious retirement to the US or the Gulf be enough to persuade them?<br>
Above all, any settlement will end the rule of Mr Karzai and his clan.
An agreement on this between Washington and the Taliban is
not impossible, given the contempt for Mr Karzai felt by many leading
US officials and soldiers. Many in Washington oppose the idea of
him trying to arrange a succession to the presidency for a family
member.<br>
So there seems real room for agreement on a caretaker government
of neutral figures to supervise constitutional discussions leading
to elections. But with the next elections due in 2014, there is not
much time to lose. As soon as the US presidential elections are
over, Washington should do its best to open substantial talks with
the Taliban and find out whether what we heard in Dubai really
does represent their position and can be the basis for peace.<br>
<i>The writer is a professor in the War Studies Department of
King’s College London. His latest book is ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’</i><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<pre wrap="">
<hr size="4" width="90%">
_______________________________________________
Peace-discuss mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net">Peace-discuss@lists.chambana.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss">http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/listinfo/peace-discuss</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>