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FYI. <br>
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An admirable analysis. What I do not know is how much the Iranian people are willing to suffer from the imposed (and proposed further) sanctions, or from a possible military attack supported by the U.S.
<div>Is the suffering already a cause of serious instability for the regime? </div>
<div>Secondly, it is not clear to me just how probable a military attack on Iran would be if Iran refused to submit to the agreement already concluded. My guess is that a military attack on Iran supported by the U.S. is not that probable, for various reasons
that have prevented such an attack from already occurring. </div>
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<div>--mkb</div>
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<div>On Dec 7, 2013, at 10:35 AM, <b>Eleanor Ommani</b> wrote:</div>
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<div>Begin forwarded message:</div>
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<span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1);"><b>From:
</b></span><span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">Ardeshir Ommani <<a href="mailto:ardeshiromm@optonline.net">ardeshiromm@optonline.net</a>><br>
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<span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1);"><b>Date:
</b></span><span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">December 7, 2013 10:43:35 AM EST<br>
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<span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1);"><b>To:
</b></span><span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;">'Ardeshir Ommani' <<a href="mailto:ardeshiromm@optonline.net">ardeshiromm@optonline.net</a>><br>
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<span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium; color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 1);"><b>Subject:
</b></span><span style="font-family:'Helvetica'; font-size:medium;"><b>Did Iran Have to Give Up So Much...?</b><br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><font size="4" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;
font-family:Arial">Dear Friends and Readers of the AIFC: here is another all-rounded approach for assessing the character of <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
- <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region></st1:place> interim nuclear deal. Doubtlessly, the issue at hand urgently needs to be discussed and analyzed from various perspectives.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font size="2" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial"><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font size="2" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:
10.0pt">Reflections on the Iranian Nuclear Deal<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<h1><b><font size="6" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:24.0pt">Did <st1:country-region w:st="on">
<st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> Have to Give Up So Much to Get So Little?<o:p></o:p></span></font></b></h1>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font size="2" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:
10.0pt">by ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The (interim) nuclear agreement that was signed on 24 November 2013 by
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region> and the so-called P5+1 group in
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> is questionable on a number of grounds.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">The Irony and Absurdity of the Negotiations: When the Guilty Tries the Innocent</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The underlying logic for the Iran nuclear negotiations was (and continues to be) altogether preposterous: on one side of the negotiating table sat major nuclear powers who are all in violation
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires them to have either dismantled or drastically reduced their nuclear arsenal; on the other side, an NPT–compliant country (Iran) that neither possesses nor pursues nuclear weapons—a fact that is testified
to both by the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies. Yet, in an ironically perverse way, the culprits have assumed the role of the police, the prosecutor and the judge, shamelessly persecuting and prosecuting the innocent for no other reason than trying
to exercise its NPT-granted right to peaceful nuclear technology.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This obviously means that
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> is essentially negotiating under duress. Largely shut out of normal international trade, and constantly threatened by economic strangulation, it is essentially negotiating
with <st1:personname w:st="on">a b</st1:personname>ullet to its head. As an astute observer of the negotiations has pointed out: “<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> voluntarily agreed to the [nuclear] deal
the same way that a robbery victim voluntarily agrees to give up valuable possessions”, to save his/her life (source).<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">The Imbalance between what Iran Gave and what it Took</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">To reach the interim deal, the Iranian negotiators agreed to a number of concessions with very little reciprocity in terms of relief from sanctions. These included: limiting its enrichment
of uranium to only 3-5 percent purity, from the current level of 20 percent purity; rendering unusable its existing stockpile of 20 percent fuel for further enrichment; not using its more advanced IR-M2 centrifuges for enrichment; not activating its heavy-water
reactor in <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Arak</st1:place></st1:city>; and consenting to highly intrusive inspections.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This means that under the deal, the Iranian negotiators have agreed to more than freezing
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s nuclear technology; perhaps more importantly, they have reversed and rolled back significant scientific achievements and technological breakthroughs of recent years.
One can imagine the feeling of disappointment (and perhaps betrayal) on the part of the many dedicated scientists, engineers and technicians who worked so hard to bring about such scientific advances; only to see them dishonored or degraded by reversing and
freezing them at a much lower level.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">In return for these significant concessions, the U.S. and its allies would agree: to unfreeze less-than 7 billion dollars of Iran’s nearly 100 billion dollars of oil revenue frozen in bank
accounts overseas; to consider easing sanctions banning trade in precious metals, petrochemicals and auto industry; and to suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on insurance and transportation services for the drastically reduced sale of Iran’s oil.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The most crippling sanctions on
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s oil and banks, which served as the financial facilitators of international trade, would remain intact under the proposed interim deal.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">Threat to Iran’s Sovereignty</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">A careful reading of the interim agreement reveals that the Iranian negotiators gave up more than scaling down and freezing their country’s nuclear technology and/or knowledge. More importantly,
if implemented, the deal effectively places <st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>’s nuclear program (through IAEA) under total control of the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> and its allies. This is no speculation; it follows from the interim deal’s vastly invasive inspections regime, which is described under the subheading “Enhanced
Monitoring”:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">- Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the
scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">- Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Arak</st1:place></st1:city>, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">- Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced
inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">- IAEA inspector managed access to: centrifuge assembly workshops; centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, uranium mines and mills.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">The fact that provisions of “enhanced monitoring” tend to infringe upon Iran’s national sovereignty was implicitly acknowledged by the
<i><span style="font-style:italic">Washington Post</span></i> when it reported on the morning following the signing of the deal (24 November 2013) that, according to Western officials in Geneva, the Iranian concessions “not only halt Iran’s nuclear advances
but also make it virtually impossible for Tehran” to make any changes in its nuclear technology “without being detected.”<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Another indication of
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>’s national sovereignty being threatened is the interim deal’s establishment of “a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s domestic needs. . . . This channel could also enable: transactions required to pay
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s UN obligations; and, direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad.” Although the financial channel would be using Iran’s
own money, currently frozen abroad, it would not be controlled or managed by Iranians—sadly reminiscent of Iraq’s “oil for food” neo-colonial deal under Saddam Hussein.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">Did
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> Have to Give up so Much for so Little?</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Deprived of more than half of its oil exports/revenue, and largely locked out of the international banking and/or trade system, the Iranian economy and its people are already gravely suffering
from the ravages of economic sanctions. Additional sanctions, which are pre-packaged and frequently brandished as Damocles’ Sword in the background of the nuclear negotiations, are bound to further depress
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s economy and the living conditions of its people.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Under these circumstances,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> basically faced (or faces) two options. One option would be embarking on the path of a war economy, as it has, in effect, been subjected to
<st1:personname w:st="on">a b</st1:personname>rutal economic war by the <st1:country-region w:st="on">
<st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> and its allies. This would be similar to the eight years (1980-88) of war with
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iraq</st1:country-region>, when at the instigation and support of regional and global powers Saddam Hussein launched a surprise military attack against
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The other option would be compromising its legal and legitimate rights to peaceful nuclear technology in order to appease the global bully (the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region>) and its minions in the hope that this may prevent a further tightening of the noose of economic sanctions around the neck of the Iranian people.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">During the eight-year war with Saddam’s
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iraq</st1:country-region>, not only did the Western powers and their allies in the region support the Iraqi dictator militarily but they also subjected
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> to severe economic sanctions. With its back against the wall, so to speak,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> embarked on a revolutionary path of a war economy that successfully provided both for the war mobilization to defend its territorial integrity and for respectable living
conditions of its population. By taking control of the commanding heights of the national economy, and effectively utilizing the revolutionary energy and dedication of their people, Iranian policy makers further succeeded in bringing about significant economic
developments. These included: extensive electrification of the countryside, expansion of transportation networks, construction of tens of thousands of schools and medical clinics all across the country, provision of foodstuffs and other basic needs for the
indigent at affordable prices, and more.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Despite its record of success, this option is altogether ruled out by today’s Iranian ruling powers. There are a number of reasons for this aversion to a regimented war economy. A detailed
discussion of such reasons is beyond the purview of this essay. Suffice it to say that many of the revolutionary leaders who successfully managed the 1980-88 war economy have now become business entrepreneurs and prosperous capitalists. Having effectively
enriched themselves in the shadow of the public sector economy, or by virtue of the political/bureaucratic positions they held (or still hold) in various stations in the government apparatus, these folks have by now lost all appetite they once had for the
radical economic measures required by a war economy. Instead, they now seem eager to strike business and investment deals with their counterparts in the West.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">More than any other social strata, President Rouhani and his administration represent the interests and aspirations of this ascending capitalist–business class in
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Representatives of this class wield economic and political power through the highly influential Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture (ICCIMA).
Ideological and/or philosophical affinity between President Rouhani and the power-brokers residing within ICCIMA is reflected in the fact that, immediately upon his election, the president appointed former head of the Chamber of Commerce <st1:personname w:st="on">Mohammad</st1:personname>
Nahavandian, a U.S.-educated neoliberal economist and an advisor to former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, as his chief of staff.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">It was through Nahavandian and the Iran Chamber of Commerce that, in September 2013, an Iranian economic delegation accompanied President Rouhani to the United Nations in
<st1:state w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:state> to negotiate (behind the scenes) potential business/investment deals with their American counterparts. The Iran Chamber of Commerce also organized a number of economic delegations that
accompanied <st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>’s Foreign Minister Zarif to
<st1:city w:st="on">Geneva</st1:city> in pursuit of similar objectives in <st1:place w:st="on">
Europe</st1:place>.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">It is understandable, therefore, why major factions within
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>’s ruling circles, especially the Rouhani administration and their allies and co-thinkers, have no stomach for a regimented, war-like economy; and why, instead, they opted for compromises over
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s nuclear program. The question remains, however, why did they make so many concessions in return for so little? Did they have to compromise as much as they did?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Two major reasons can be identified for why they could strike
<st1:personname w:st="on">a b</st1:personname>etter nuclear deal in <st1:city w:st="on">
<st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> than they actually did. For one thing, President Rouhani’s and his team of negotiators’ liaison with the P5+1 group got off on the wrong foot: they showed their hand prematurely by approaching the negotiations
with a sense of desperation and an attitude of eagerness to reach a deal.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Indeed, it is fair to argue that President Rouhani condemned
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> to an unsound or flawed deal long before he was elected. He did so during his presidential campaign by pinning his chances for election on economic recovery through a nuclear
deal. This was a huge mistake, as it automatically weakened <st1:country-region w:st="on">
Iran</st1:country-region>’s bargaining position and, by the same token, strengthened that of the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> and its allies. By exaggerating (perhaps opportunistically) the culpability of his predecessor in the escalation of economic sanctions against
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>, he committed two blunders: one downplaying the culpability of the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> and its allies; the other (and by the same token) placing the onus of reaching a nuclear deal largely on
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Secondly, whereas the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> and its junior partners constantly brandished the so-called “stick” of additional sanctions in the background of the
<st1:city w:st="on">Geneva</st1:city> negotiations to extract more concessions from
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the Iranian side does not seem to have effectively used its country’s recent geopolitical successes in the region to resist the one-sided concessions. While the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> and its allies have in recent months experienced a major setback over the Syrian crisis,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region> and its allies (<st1:country-region w:st="on">Russia</st1:country-region>,
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Syria</st1:country-region>, Hezbollah and, indirectly and minimally,
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">China</st1:place></st1:country-region>) have by the same token experienced success. And while the results of the U.S. military adventures of the past dozen years or so have been chaos and civil war in countries
like Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, Iran remains a relatively stable and an ascending regional power, indeed, a powerbroker—sanctions-induced economic distress notwithstanding.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">It is thus altogether reasonable to argue that had the Iranian negotiators (a) not gone to
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> with such an openly eager attitude to reach a nuclear deal, and (b) taken more effective advantage of their country’s recent geopolitical successes in the region, they could have struck
<st1:personname w:st="on">a b</st1:personname>etter nuclear deal than they actually did. For example, while agreeing on the freezing of their nuclear technology was (under the circumstances) unavoidable, they could more strongly argue that there was no reason
for them to roll back Iran’s scientific achievements from 20 percent enrichment of uranium to 5 percent—20 percent enrichment is both NPT-sanctioned, or legal, and required for the Tehran Research Reactor, which manufactures medical isotopes.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Likewise, while agreeing to more intrusive inspections of nuclear sites was (again, under the circumstances) inescapable, Iranian negotiators could reasonably resist allowing inspectors
access to and monitoring of their country’s centrifuge assembly workshops, or its uranium mines and mills. Furthermore, the Iranian team could, again quite reasonably, insist on making the elements of the “final agreement,” which is supposed to remove all
of the sanctions against <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>, more specific. As they now stand, these elements are so vague, fluid and inconsistent that they seem to be crafted in order to be broken.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">Regime Change From Within</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Ever since the 1979 revolution in Iran, which significantly undermined the U.S. influence in Iran and elsewhere in the region, the United States has been on a “regime change” mission in
that country. Its efforts in pursuit of this nefarious goal are rather well established. They range from instigating and supporting Saddam Hussein to invade
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region>, to training and supporting destabilizing terrorist organizations to attack
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>, to constant war and military threats, to efforts to sabotage the 2009 presidential election through the so-called “green revolution,” and to systematic escalation of economic
sanctions.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Not only have these imperialistic schemes fallen short of their goal of “regime change” in Iran, they have, in fact, driven that country to become a major power in the region, which has
further thwarted the geopolitical plans of the United States in the area. While the U.S.–supported mercenary forces in
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Syria</st1:country-region> as well as its allies in
<st1:city w:st="on">Ankara</st1:city>, <st1:city w:st="on">Cairo</st1:city> and <st1:city w:st="on">
Riyadh</st1:city> have experienced serious setbacks in their efforts to overthrow the government in
<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Damascus</st1:place></st1:city>, the Iran-Russia-Syria-Hezbollah alliance has (by the same token) gained strength and prestige in recent months.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Having thus failed at its plots for “regime change” in Iran from without, the U.S. (or more precisely, a major faction of its ruling powers) now seems to have opted for regime change (or
reform) from within; that is, through political and economic rapprochement with Iran. Even some of the U.S. allies such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Israel that have always been wary of Iran’s radical influence in the region, and who initially opposed
vehemently the Iran–P5+1 nuclear agreement, are beginning to see the “moderating” or “stabilizing” benefits of the success of this tactic.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">What has made this option more promising (to the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> and its client regimes) is the rise of an ambitious capitalist class in
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> whose chief priority seems to be the ability to do business with their counterparts in the West. These folks literally
<i><span style="font-style:italic">mean business</span></i>, so to speak; for them, issues such as nuclear technology or national sovereignty are of secondary importance. As mentioned earlier, they are the staunchest supporters of President Rouhani and the
unquestioning supporters of his lopsided concessions in the nuclear deal. Also as mentioned before, it was the representative delegations of this class of Iranian capitalists that accompanied President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st="on">
Europe</st1:place> in order to negotiate business/investment deals with their counterparts in the West.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">To be sure, the jingoistic factions of the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> ruling circles, headed by the beneficiaries of war dividends and the Israeli lobby, continue to push for direct military intervention and/or further economic strangulation of
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>. But the leaders and/or beneficiaries of non-military industries such as oil, automobile, airlines, agriculture, and the like are lobbying the Obama administration for
economic and political rapprochement with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Which of these two major factions of the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> ruling powers (Proponents of regime change from within or from without) would succeed, depends largely on the process and/or outcome of nuclear negotiations. While making
threats of additional sanctions, the hardline or militaristic faction seem to be for now sitting on the fence: if Iran continues to make more one-sided concessions, which would basically mean giving up its right to a level of uranium enrichment that is necessary
for its peaceful domestic needs, they would soften their positions and gradually lower their shrill and menacing voices. On the other hand, if
<st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region> does not relent on its legal and legitimate enrichment rights, and insists that the
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> and its allies need to reciprocate
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s interim concessions by lifting the sanctions, they would further harden their positions by calling for additional sanctions and/or military intervention. Under this latter
scenario, proponents of rapprochement with Iran, having failed in their tactic of regime change/reform from within, would most probably join the hardliners, thereby embarking, once again, on the long-standing policy of regime change from without—<i><span style="font-style:italic">back
to square one</span></i>, so to speak.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">So, how would all of these new developments on both the Iranian and the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> side affect and/or be affected by the interim nuclear deal toward a “comprehensive final step”?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><b><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;
font-weight:bold">Problematic and Uncertain Future of the Interim Nuclear Deal</span></font></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Components of the interim agreement are so vague, inconsistent and even contradictory that it makes them subject to divergent interpretations and, therefore, potential breaches of the deal
in the future. This explains why soon after the agreement was signed conflicting understandings of it began to surface. While the Iranian president and his team of negotiators have frequently declared that the agreement acknowledges the country’s right to
uranium enrichment, the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> side, headed by President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, has vigorously denied that right.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">Equally vague and (potentially) problematic is the meaning of the “elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution.” According to
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s negotiators, the “final step” would “Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions,” as it is, indeed, stipulated as such
in the interim agreement. However, the agreement immediately adds that the final step would “Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment
activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.” And it is this ambiguous and condition-laden (“mutually defined enrichment…, mutually agreed parameters…, agreed limits on scope…, for a period
to be agreed upon”) sentence in the interim deal that is frequently highlighted by the
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> as governing the status of the “final step.”<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt">This is an indication, as pointed out by Gareth Porter (among others), “of uncertain
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> commitment to the ‘end state’ agreement.”
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> reservations or unfaithfulness toward a clear, comprehensive and sanctions-free final deal, Gareth further points out, “came in
<st1:personname w:st="on">a b</st1:personname>ackground press briefing by unidentified senior
<st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> officials in <st1:city w:st="on">
<st1:place w:st="on">Geneva</st1:place></st1:city> via teleconference late Saturday night [23 November 2013]. The officials repeatedly . . . referred to the negotiation of the ‘comprehensive solution’ outlined in the deal . . . as an open-ended question rather
than an objective of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy” (source). It is this ambiguous, unsure and noncommittal
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> approach to the nuclear deal that serves as grounds for the pessimistic conclusion that the deal is facing an uncertain future.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p><st1:personname w:st="on"><em><b><i><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-weight:bold">Ismael Hossein-zadeh</span></font></i></b></em></st1:personname><em><i><font face="Times New Roman"> is Professor Emeritus of Economics,
<st1:placename w:st="on">Drake</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">University</st1:placetype>,
<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Des Moines</st1:city>, <st1:state w:st="on">
Iowa</st1:state></st1:place>. He is the author of The Political Economy of <st1:country-region w:st="on">
U.S.</st1:country-region> Militarism (Palgrave–Macmillan 2007) and the Soviet Non-capitalist Development: The Case of Nasser’s
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Egypt</st1:place></st1:country-region> (Praeger Publishers 1989). His latest book, titled Beyond Mainstream Explanations of the Financial Crisis: Parasitic Finance Capital, is forthcoming from Routledge Books.</font></i></em><o:p></o:p></p>
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<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><font size="2" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial;font-weight:bold">Ardeshir Ommani, AIFC Analyst</span></font><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><font size="2" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial;font-weight:bold">Political Economy
</span></font><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><font size="2" color="#cc0000" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:#CC0000;font-weight:bold"><a href="mailto:Ardeshiromm@optonline.net">Ardeshiromm@optonline.net</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><font size="2" face="Arial"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial;font-weight:bold">Tel: 914-273-8852</span></font></b><b><font face="Century"><span style="font-family:Century;font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></font></b></p>
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