[Commotion-admin] [commotion-apps] Stored XSS in local application URL (High) (#12)

areynold notifications at github.com
Mon Sep 9 15:42:21 UTC 2013


The Commotion node web interface allows anonymous (unauthenticated)
users of the node to add local application URLs using Application
Portal. Before checking the application URL passed in ipaddr parameter
is sanitized as described in WRT-01-001, namely the protocol and path
parts are stripped out from the URL to perform port scan. When the
port scan is successful, application is added to the pool and is later
visible to other node users. Optionally administrator can approve the
application on admin/commotion/apps page.

It is possible to inject javascript code as an application URL, such
that it will still pass the port scanning check.

This can be used e.g. to trick Node administrator into clicking on application link and taking over CSRF token and session ID to hijack administrative session. As original form to add application does not require authentication or Anti CSRF tokens, the attack can be effectively performed from the Internet by enticing Commotion node
users to visit a certain malicious page.

---
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-apps/issues/12
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/commotion-admin/attachments/20130909/4dd8fcb1/attachment-0001.html>


More information about the Commotion-admin mailing list