[Commotion-admin] [luci-commotion] [CLOSED] Remote code execution in commotion debug helper (Medium) (#218)

[oti-tech]

<a href="https://github.com/areynold"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/755312?" align="left" width="96" height="96" hspace="10"></img></a> **Issue by [areynold](https://github.com/areynold)**
_Monday Sep 09, 2013 at 15:25 GMT_
_Originally opened as https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-debug-helper/issues/2_

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Parameters in form displayed on Commotion Debug Helper page are not sanitized when passed to OS command execution, which allows for arbitrary command  execution. However, page is accessible to node admin only and requires the presence of session token, so the impact of this vulnerability is limited.

https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-bug-info/blob/3fb4acddcedaacd8b20768b93a1eef1f5c034f8f/luasrc/controller/debugger.lua#L31-L43

This vulnerability allows for OS code execution by modifying name,
contact, whatYouDo, behaviorExpected and badBehavior parameters.
Similar vulnerability exists within buginfo parameter value which is
being passed to another OS command:

https://github.com/opentechinstitute/commotion-bug-info/blob/3fb4acddcedaacd8b20768b93a1eef1f5c034f8f/luasrc/controller/debugger.lua#L45-L55

Originally reported as WRT-01-004

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Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/opentechinstitute/luci-commotion/issues/218
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