[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [SRRTAC-L:7039] ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION GUTTING PRIVACY STANDARDS BECOMES LAW

[Al Kagan]

 From the Center for Democracy and Technology.

>Delivered-To: akagan at alexia.lis.uiuc.edu
>Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 19:02:03 -0500
>To: SRRT Action Council <srrtac-l at ala.org>
>From: Mark Rosenzweig <iskra at earthlink.net>
>Subject: [SRRTAC-L:7039] ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION GUTTING PRIVACY 
>STANDARDS BECOMES LAW
>Reply-To: srrtac-l at ala.org
>Sender: owner-srrtac-l at ala.org
>Status:  
>
>(1)  ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION GUTTING PRIVACY
>STANDARDS BECOMES LAW
>
>President Bush on October 26 signed into law an anti-terrorism
>package that dismantles many privacy protections for
>communications and personal data.   Many of the provisions are not
>limited to terrorism investigations, but apply to all criminal or
>intelligence investigations.
>
>This bill has been called a compromise but the only thing
>compromised is our civil liberties.
>
>The bill:
>
>* Allows government agents to collect undefined new information
>about Web browsing and e-mail without meaningful judicial review;
>
>* Allow Internet Service Providers, universities, network
>administrators to authorize surveillance of "computer trespassers"
>without a judicial order;
>
>* Overrides existing state and federal privacy laws, allowing FBI to
>compel disclosure of any kind of records, including sensitive
>medical, educational and library borrowing records, upon the mere
>claim that they are connected with an intelligence investigation;
>
>* Allows law enforcement agencies to search homes and offices
>without notifying the owner for days or weeks after, not only in
>terrorism cases, but in all cases - the so-called "sneak and peek"
>authority;
>
>* Allows FBI to share with the CIA information collected in the name of
>a grand jury, thereby giving the CIA the domestic subpoena powers it
>was never supposed to have;
>
>*  Allows FBI to conduct wiretaps and secret searches in criminal
>cases using the lower standards previously used only for the
>purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.
>
>The text of the legislation and analyses by CDT and others are online
>at http://www.cdt.org/security/010911response.shtml
>______________________________________________________
>_______________
>
>(2)  PROVISIONS TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY; SOME "SUNSET" IN
>2005
>
>As passed, some of the surveillance provisions expire, or "sunset," in
>four years unless renewed by Congress.   In four years, before any
>extension of the provisions, CDT hopes that there will be a
>Congressional review that will involve the deliberative balancing of
>civil liberties and national security that was lacking from the current
>debate.
>
>CDT made it clear throughout the debate that terrorism was a
>serious problem, that the U.S. counter-terrorism effort had failed on
>September 11, and that changes to government security programs
>were needed.  What is doubly distressing about the new law is that it
>was enacted without any examination of why existing authorities
>failed to prevent the September 11 attacks.
>
>It is our greatest concern that the changes will be worse than
>ineffective - that, by cutting government agencies loose from
>standards and judicial controls, they will result in the government
>casting an even wider net, collecting more information on innocent
>people, information that distracts the government from the task of
>identifying those who are planning future attacks.
>
>The sunset provision does not apply to the sharing of grand jury
>information with the CIA, giving the CIA permanent benefit of the
>grand jury powers.  Nor does it apply to the provisions for sneak and
>peek searches or  the provision extending application of the pen
>register and trap and trace law to the Internet.
>
>The sunset also does not apply to ongoing investigations.  Since
>intelligence investigations often run for years, even decades, the
>authorities will continue to be used even if they are not formally
>extended in 2005.
>______________________________________________________
>_____________
>
>(3)  NEW LAW REQUIRES CLOSE OVERSIGHT; OTHER CIVIL
>LIBERTIES ISSUES LOOM
>
>Many threats to civil liberties loom in the short and mid-term. CDT is
>planning a series of efforts to monitor implementation of the new law
>as well as to counter additional efforts to erode privacy and other civil
>liberties:
>
>*  CDT is calling upon Congress to exercise its oversight powers to
>conduct a probing and sustained review of how the new law is
>interpreted and applied.  To that end, CDT will be working, through its
>Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, to share information
>among affected members of the telecommunications and Internet
>industry and other civil liberties groups.  The co-chairs of the
>Congressional Internet Caucus have asked CDT to use DPSWG and
>the Internet Caucus Advisory Committee to examine the new law and
>future proposals.
>
>*  The FBI may be pushing for extension to the Internet of the
>Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the 1994 law
>requiring telecommunications carriers -- but not providers of
>information services -- to build surveillance capabilities into their
>networks.  Implementing CALEA in the traditional and wireless
>telephone networks has proven extremely contentious.  Extending it
>to the Internet could have even worse consequences for network
>operations and security.
>
>*  CALEA for the Internet is only one shape that design mandates
>may take.  European governments have been particularly aggressive
>in pushing data retention requirements -- rules requiring ISPs and
>others to maintain logs of all communications for a period of months.
>The issue of critical infrastructure protection also could serve as a
>vehicle for government controls on technology.
>
>*  Calls have been made for a national ID card.  In addition to the civil
>liberties implications of hard copy identity cards, the concept poses
>additional risks if extended to the Internet.  Several bills have been
>introduced or are being drafted calling for greater use of biometrics at
>the borders and in other contexts.
>
>*  Encryption is not entirely off the agenda.  While Senator Judd Gregg
>pulled back from his announced intent to introduce mandatory key
>recovery legislation, the issue may return.
>
>*  At the behest of the new cyber-security czar, NSC official Richard
>Clarke, the Bush Administration issued a Request for Information
>(RFI) to the U.S. telecommunications industry seeking information
>and suggestions for the development of a special
>telecommunications network, separate from the Internet.   The
>proposal's impact on e-government and citizen access to information
>is unclear, and it raises questions about the lack of government
>confidence in, and commitment to, the Internet.
>
>____________________________________________________
>
>Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be found
>at
>http://www.cdt.org/.
>
>This document may be redistributed freely in full or linked to
>http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_7.11.shtml
>
>Excerpts may be re-posted with prior permission of ari at cdt.org
>
>Policy Post 7.11 Copyright 2001 Center for Democracy and
>Technology
>---------------------------------------
>CDT Policy Post Subscription Information
>
>To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to majordomo at cdt.org In
>the BODY of the message type "subscribe policy-posts" without the quotes.
>
>To unsubscribe from CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to majordomo at cdt.org
>In the BODY of the message type "unsubscribe policy-posts" without
>the quotes.
>
>Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be found at
>http://www.cdt.org

-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu