[Peace-discuss] Fwd: USA/Africa: New Data on Murder of Lumumba

[Alfred Kagan]

Some of you may be interested in this new information about Project 
Wizard, a 1960-61 CIA covert action program to oust and ultimately 
assassinate Patrice Lumumba, the first and only democractically 
elected leader of The Congo.  Lumumba was an inspiring nationalist at 
a time when their was great hope for the new countries of Africa, 
which had just gotten independence from their colonial masters in one 
way or another. It has taken 40 years for this information to come 
out.

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>Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 22:23:24 -0500
>Subject: USA/Africa: New Data on Murder of Lumumba
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>USA/Africa: New Data on Murder of Lumumba
>Date distributed (ymd): 020801
>Document reposted by Africa Action
>
>Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
>service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
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>+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Region: Continent-Wide
>Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+ +US policy focus+
>
>SUMMARY CONTENTS:
>
>This posting contains an article written by Stephen Weissman for
>the Sunday Washington Post of July 21, revealing new data from
>classified documents on the U.S. role in the murder of Patrice
>Lumumba in 1961. It also contains a link and brief excerpts from
>the extensive Belgian parliamentary report which led to an official
>Belgian apology, in February this year, for Belgian complicity in
>Lumumba's death. The Belgian parliamentary report was prompted by
>a book first published in 1999, "The Assassination of Lumumba," by
>journalist Ludo de Witte. The book concentrated on Belgian
>complicity, and gave the impression of exonerating the U.S. of
>direct involvement. In the introduction to the English translation
>of the book, however, de Witte stressed the joint responsibility of
>the U.S. as well.
>
>Weissman's article, referring to new evidence, calls for U.S.
>honesty about the past as well as U.S. action to make reparation
>for the damage caused by its earlier actions in the Congo.
>
>Another posting sent out today has updates on the latest
>developments in the current Congo peace process.
>
>In a related development, World Bank President James Wolfensohn,
>visiting Kinshasa in mid-July, announced that the World Bank was
>considering cancelling more than 80 per cent of the debt owed by
>the country to the World Bank. The cancellation should take effect
>in early 2003, he told reporters.
>
>Background information on the recent film "Lumumba" is available at
>http://www.zeitgeistfilms.com/current/lumumba/lumumba.html
>
>+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder
>
>By Stephen R. Weissman Washington Post, July 21, 2002
>
>[Reposted by permission of the author. Dr. Weissman was staff
>director of the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on
>Africa from 1986 to 1991. He has done extensive research on U.S.
>policy in the Congo as well as other African countries.]
>
>In his latest film, "Minority Report," director Steven Spielberg
>portrays a policy of "preemptive action" gone wild in the year
>2054. But we don't have to peer into the future to see what harm
>faulty intelligence and the loss of our moral compass can do.
>U.S. policies during the Cold War furnish many tragic examples. One
>was U.S. complicity in the overthrow and murder of Congolese Prime
>Minister Patrice Lumumba.
>
>Forty-one years ago, Lumumba, the only leader ever democratically
>elected in Congo, was delivered to his enemies, tortured and
>summarily executed. Since then, his country has been looted by the
>U.S.-supported regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and wracked by regional
>and civil war.
>
>The conventional explanation of Lumumba's death has been that he
>was murdered by Congolese rivals after earlier U.S. attempts to
>kill him, including a plot to inject toxins into his food or
>toothpaste, failed. In 1975, the U.S. Senate's "Church Committee"
>probed CIA assassination plots and concluded there was "no evidence
>of CIA involvement in bringing about the death of Lumumba."
>
>Not so. I have obtained classified U.S. government documents,
>including a chronology of covert actions approved by a National
>Security Council (NSC) subgroup, that reveal U.S. involvement in --
>and significant responsibility for -- the death of Lumumba, who
>was mistakenly seen by the Eisenhower administration as an African
>Fidel Castro. The documents show that the key Congolese leaders who
>brought about Lumumba's downfall were players in "Project Wizard,"
>a CIA covert action program. Hundreds of thousands of dollars and
>military equipment were channeled to these officials, who informed
>their CIA paymasters three days in advance of their plan to send
>Lumumba into the clutches of his worst enemies. Other new details:
>The U.S. authorized payments to then-President Joseph Kasavubu
>four days before he ousted Lumumba, furnished Army strongman Mobutu
>with money and arms to fight pro-Lumumba forces, helped select and
>finance an anti-Lumumba government, and barely three weeks after
>his death authorized new funds for the people who arranged
>Lumumba's murder.
>
>Moreover, these documents show that the plans and payments were
>approved by the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration,
>either the NSC or its "Special Group," consisting of the national
>security adviser, CIA director, undersecretary of state for
>political affairs, and deputy defense secretary.
>
>These facts are four decades old, but are worth unearthing for two
>reasons. First, Congo (known for years as Zaire) is still
>struggling to establish democracy and stability. By facing up to
>its past role in undermining Congo's fledgling democracy, the
>United States might yet contribute to Congo's future. Second, the
>U.S. performance in Congo is relevant to our struggle against
>terrorism. It shows what can happen when, in the quest for national
>security, we abandon the democratic principles and rule of law we
>are fighting to defend.
>
>In February, Belgium, the former colonial power in Congo, issued a
>thousand-page report that acknowledged "an irrefutable portion of
>responsibility in the events that led to the death of Lumumba."
>Unlike Belgium, the United States has admitted no such moral
>responsibility. Over the years, scholars (including myself) and
>journalists have written that American policy played a major role
>in the ouster and assassination of Lumumba. But the full story
>remained hidden in U.S. documents, which, like those I have
>examined, are still classified despite the end of the Cold War, the
>end of the Mobutu regime and Belgium's confession.
>
>Here's what they tell us that, until now, we didn't know, or didn't
>know for certain:
>
>* In August 1960, the CIA established Project Wizard. Congo had
>been independent only a month, and Lumumba, a passionate
>nationalist, had become prime minister, with a plurality of seats
>in the parliament. But U.S. presidential candidate John F. Kennedy
>was vowing to meet "the communist challenge" and Eisenhower's NSC
>was worried that Lumumba would tilt toward the Soviets.
>
>The U.S. documents show that over the next few months, the CIA
>worked with and made payments to eight top Congolese -- including
>President Kasavubu, Mobutu (then army chief of staff), Foreign
>Minister Justin Bomboko, top finance aide Albert Ndele, Senate
>President Joseph Ileo and labor leader Cyrille Adoula -- who all
>played roles in Lumumba's downfall.
>
>The CIA joined Belgium in a plan, detailed in the Belgian report,
>for Ileo and Adoula to engineer a no-confidence vote in Lumumba's
>government, which would be followed by union-led demonstrations,
>the resignations of cabinet ministers (organized by Ndele) and
>Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba.
>
>* On Sept. 1, the NSC's Special Group authorized CIA payments to
>Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. On Sept. 5, Kasavubu fired
>Lumumba in a decree of dubious legality. However, Kasavubu and his
>new prime minister, Ileo, proved lethargic over the following
>week as Lumumba rallied supporters. So Mobutu seized power on Sept.
>14. He kept Kasavubu as president and established a temporary
>"College of Commissioners" to replace the disbanded government.
>
>* The CIA financed the College and influenced the selection of
>commissioners. The College was dominated by two Project Wizard
>participants: Bomboko, its president, and Ndele, its
>vice-president. Another CIA ally, Lumumba party dissident Victor
>Nendaka, was appointed chief of the security police.
>
>* On Oct. 27, the NSC Special Group approved $250,000 for the CIA
>to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu government. However, when
>legislators balked at approving any prime minister other than
>Lumumba, the parliament remained closed. The CIA money went to
>Mobutu personally and the commissioners.
>
>* On Nov. 20, the Special Group authorized the CIA to provide arms,
>ammunition, sabotage materials and training to Mobutu's military in
>the event it had to resist pro-Lumumba forces.
>
>The full extent of what one U.S. document calls the "intimate"
>relationship between the CIA and Congolese leaders was absent from
>the Church Committee report. The only covert action (apart from the
>assassination plots) the committee discussed was the August 1960
>effort to promote labor opposition and a no-confidence vote in the
>Senate.
>
>How did Lumumba die?
>
>After being ousted Sept. 5, Lumumba rallied support in parliament
>and the international community. When Mobutu took over, U.N. troops
>protected Lumumba, but soon confined him to his residence.
>Lumumba escaped on Nov. 27. Days later he was captured by Mobutu's
>troops, beaten and arrested.
>
>What happened next is clearer thanks to the Belgian report and the
>classified U.S. documents. As early as Christmas Eve 1960, College
>of Commissioners' president Bomboko offered to hand Lumumba over to
>two secessionist leaders who had vowed to kill him. One declined
>and nothing happened until mid-January 1961, when the central
>government's political and military position deteriorated and
>troops guarding Lumumba (then jailed on a military base near the
>capital) mutinied. CIA and other Western officials feared a
>Lumumba comeback.
>
>On Jan. 14, the commissioners asked Kasavubu to move Lumumba to a
>"surer place." There was "no doubt," the Belgian inquiry concluded,
>that Mobutu agreed. Kasavubu told security chief Nendaka to
>transfer Lumumba to one of the secessionist strongholds. On Jan.
>17, Nendaka sent Lumumba to the Katanga region. That night, Lumumba
>and two colleagues were tortured and executed in the presence of
>members of the Katangan government. No official announcement was
>made for four weeks.
>
>What did the U.S. government tell its Congolese clients during the
>last three days of Lumumba's life? The Church Committee reported
>that a Congolese "government leader" advised the CIA's Congo
>station chief, Larry Devlin, on Jan. 14 that Lumumba was to be
>sent to "the home territory" of his "sworn enemy." Yet, according
>to the Church Committee and declassified documents, neither the CIA
>nor the U.S. embassy tried to save the former prime minister.
>
>The CIA may not have exercised robotic control over its covert
>political action agents, but the failure of Devlin or the U.S.
>embassy to question the plans for Lumumba could only be seen by the
>Congolese as consent. After all, secret CIA programs had enabled
>this group to achieve political power, and the CIA had worked from
>August through November 1960 to assassinate or abduct Lumumba.
>
>Here, the classified U.S. chronology provides an important
>postscript. On Feb. 11, 1961, with U.S. reports from Congo strongly
>indicating Lumumba was dead, the Special Group authorized $500,000
>for political action, troop payments and military equipment,
>largely to the people who had arranged Lumumba's murder.
>
>Devlin has sought to distance himself from Lumumba's death. While
>the CIA was in close contact with the Congolese officials involved,
>Devlin told the Church Committee that those officials "were not
>acting under CIA instructions if and when they did this." In a
>recent phone conversation with Devlin, I posed the issue of U.S.
>responsibility for Lumumba's death. He acknowledged that, "It was
>important to [these] cooperating leaders what the U.S. government
>thought." But he said he did "not recall" receiving advance word
>of Lumumba's transfer. Devlin added that even if he had objected,
>"That would not have stopped them from doing it."
>
>By evading its share of moral responsibility for Lumumba's fate,
>the United States blurs African and American history and sidesteps
>the need to make reparation for yesterday's misdeeds through
>today's policy. In 1997, after the Mobutu regime fell, the
>Congolese democratic opposition pleaded in vain for American and
>international support. Since then, as many as 3 million lives have
>been lost as a result of civil and regional war. The United States
>has not supported a strong U.N. peacekeeping force or fostered a
>democratic transition. The collapse in late April 2002 of
>negotiations between Congolese factions threatens to reignite the
>smoldering conflict or ratify the partition of the country.
>
>Our government's actions four decades ago in Congo also have
>special meaning after the tragedy of Sept. 11. They warn that even
>as we justly defend our land and our people against terrorists, we
>must avoid the excessive fear and zeal that lead to destructive
>intervention betraying our most fundamental principles.
>
>************************************************************
>
>Parliamentary Committee of enquiry in charge of determining the
>exact circumstances of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the
>possible involvement of Belgian politicians
>
>[brief excerpts from conclusions]
>
>The full 1,000 page report of the committee is available in French
>and Flemish at:
>http://www.lachambre.be/commissions/LMB/indexF.html
>and
>http://www.lachambre.be/commissions/LMB/indexN.html
>
>Links to a summary, introduction, and conclusions in English, in
>Word or PDF formats, can be found at the same site.
>
>Parliamentary Committee of enquiry in charge of determining the
>exact circumstances of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the
>possible involvement of Belgian politicians
>
>THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE
>
>December 2001
>
>I. THE FIGHT AGAINST LUMUMBA
>
>A. Political Elimination
>
>Lumumba was and remains a striking yet controversial personality.
>He was called a Satan by some, and honoured as a true people's hero
>by others. The latter mythologized Lumumba after his death. Indeed,
>it is a fact that he was the first democratically elected Prime
>Minister of the Congo. ...
>
>Between 10 and 14 July, following the beginning of the Belgian
>military intervention and the interruption of diplomatic relations,
>there was a spiral of mutual accusations, leading to a complete
>split. During that period, the Belgian government - convinced of
>the fact that it no longer had to consider the Lumumba government
>- attempted to influence the creation of a new Congolese
>government. ... In order to finance the policy against the Lumumba
>government, the Belgian government appealed to so-called secret
>funds, only some of which were approved by Parliament. ...
>
>The Belgian action is only one element in a wider group of
>opposition forces. Crucial to the final fall of Lumumba was the
>split between the Congolese Prime Minister and the UN Secretary
>General Hammarskjold, because it forced Lumumba on the one hand to
>(openly) ask for the support of the Soviet Union and on the other
>hand encouraged the United States (behind the scenes) to organise
>active opposition against Lumumba (with the first plans of physical
>elimination). ...
>
>The activities of the Commission have been aimed at detecting
>possible Belgian responsibilities in the murder of Patrice Lumumba.
>But it is clear that a Belgian, or even an American action had
>little or no chance of success without the existence of internal
>opposition within the Congo itself. ... different factors, domestic
>as well as foreign, can be shown to have contributed to the
>deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba on 5 September 1960. After 5
>September, there was a period of great confusion. ...
>
>During this period, the Belgian government was especially concerned
>about the actions of Lumumba. After having given its support to the
>deposition of Prime Minister Lumumba, it was eager to prevent him
>from returning to power and this was a real possibility. ... When,
>finally, Mobutu took action to arrest Lumumba on 10 October, which
>he had always refused to do until that time, it was in exchange for
>a Belgian promise to provide technical and military support to the
>Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC). The Belgian government was
>opposed to all possible forms of reconciliation, direct or
>indirect, between the Congolese leaders. The expression
>"elimination definitive" by Minister d'Aspremont Lynden on 6
>October 1960 - in a telex to the ambassador Rothschild in
>Elisabethstad - should be seen from this perspective.
>
>Conclusion:
>
>With regard to the exact circumstances of the murder of Patrice
>Lumumba: after a thorough analysis, it is highly probable that
>Lumumba was executed in the jungle on 17 January 1961 between 9.40
>pm and 9.43 pm, within 5 hours after his arrival in Katanga (for a
>more detailed description, the commission refers to the experts'
>report). Regarding the possible involvement of Belgian politicians:
>The transfer of Lumumba to Katanga was organised by the Congolese
>authorities in Leopoldstad, supported by Belgian government
>authorities, especially the Ministers of Foreign and African
>Affairs and their colleagues.
>
>Belgian advisors in Leopoldstad collaborated with the organisation
>of the transfer. No single document, of which the commission is
>aware, indicates that the Belgian government or a member thereof
>gave the order to physically eliminate Lumumba. The investigation
>does not show that the Belgian authorities premeditated the murder
>of Lumumba when it attempted to transfer him to Katanga. It is very
>clear, though, that the physical safety of Lumumba was of no
>concern to the Belgian government. It deemed the safety of Lumumba
>less important than other interests. By not considering the
>possible risks of the transfer, not asking guarantees for his
>physical safety or insisting on humane treatment and a trial, the
>Belgian government and especially the Minister of African Affairs
>showed a lack of forethought and a lack of respect for the
>constitutional state.
>
>After hearing about the events of 17 January, the government, or at
>least certain members of it, acted irresponsibly by opting to
>spread lies to the public and all its allies. This attitude
>inevitably raised doubts about the role of the Belgian authorities.
>Considering the preceding, the current norms regarding public
>morality and, without considering the personal and moral
>considerations of that time, the commission concludes that certain
>members of the Belgian government and other Belgian participants
>were morally responsible for the circumstances leading to the death
>of Lumumba.
>
>************************************************************
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-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu