[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Angola: Updates/Commentary, 1

[Al Kagan]

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>Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2002 11:19:24 -0500
>Subject: Angola: Updates/Commentary, 1
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>Angola: Updates/Commentary, 1
>Date distributed (ymd): 020302
>Document reposted by Africa Action
>
>Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
>service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
>Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
>Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
>Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Region: Southern Africa
>Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
>  +security/peace+
>
>SUMMARY CONTENTS:
>
>This series of two postings contains a number of short documents
>concerning the prospects for peace in Angola after the Feb. 22
>death of Jonas Savimbi.
>
>In this posting:
>(1) a brief introductory note by Africa Action senior research
>fellow William Minter, (2) excerpts from the most recent issue of
>the Angola Peace Monitor, reporting on Savimbi's death and
>international reaction, and (3) a report from the Jesuit Relief
>Service on the reaction to Savimbi's death and the current
>situation in Luena, Moxico province, Angola.
>
>In another posting sent out today:
>(1) a brief excerpt from a Feb. 27 speech in Washington by
>Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, (2) an article from
>allafrica.com reporting on the Feb. 26 meeting of Presidents
>Chissano, dos Santos, and Mogae with President Bush, (3) a
>statement from Angolan traditional leaders at a Feb. 20 meeting in
>Luanda hosted by the Open Society Institute, and (4) a UN press
>briefing on the humanitarian situation in Angola.
>
>+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Introductory Note from Africa Action
>
>Jonas Savimbi died in combat on February 22 in the bush in the area
>of Moxico province which was his guerrilla base from 1968 to 1974,
>the final years before Angolan independence. His capacities for
>deception and persistence were already well-developed in that
>period, as he combined his nationalist campaign with a secret
>agreement with the Portuguese military to join forces against the
>rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which
>later became the ruling party in independent Angola. 
>
>After 1974, Savimbi won support from large numbers of Angolans on
>the basis of regional and ethnic appeals. But he also relied on
>South Africa and the U.S. to back his campaign of terror against
>civilians as well as government targets. Returning to war after two
>successive peace pacts in the 1990s and the loss of his
>international sponsors, he relied on iron discipline to control his
>soldiers and on diamonds to provide the means of war.
>
>[for a good summary of Savimbi's background, more extensive and
>accurate than the majority of media accounts, see
>Shana Wills, Washington's 'Freedom Fighter,' Africa's 'Terrorist',
>in Foreign Policy in Focus, Feb. 27, 2002;
>  http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0202savimbi_body.html]
>
>Commentators are almost unanimous that the death of Jonas Savimbi
>has removed one of the greatest single obstacles to peace in
>Angola. But the scars of war and social fragmentation are deep.
>Until now, the government in Luanda  gained much of what
>credibility it had from the contrast to Savimbi. Now it faces both
>high expectations and profound skepticism of its capacity to shift
>from war to peace.
>
>Luanda is being advised from all quarters to seize the opportunity
>to substitute dialogue for continued war. Some in Washington are
>reportedly also pushing for elections as soon as possible. Yet the
>chances for real peace are unlikely to advance far in formal talks
>unless there are also more fundamental changes, including a turn
>towards greater openness and, above all, investment of the
>country's oil wealth in meeting the humanitarian, social, and
>economic crises. Without such changes, moreover, elections are as
>likely to stir up conflict as to assuage it.
>
>Speaking the day after the meeting of three African presidents with
>U.S. President Bush, Mozambican President Chissano listed some of
>Mozambique's lessons on the requirements for a successful peace
>process. Characteristically diplomatic, President Chissano did not
>present these comments as advice for either his Angolan or U.S.
>counterpart. Nevertheless, his message, stressing the need for a
>culture of tolerance and for attention to social and economic
>factors, was clear.
>
>There is indeed a new opportunity for peace in Angola.  Taking
>advantage of it, however, requires fundamental changes for both
>Luanda and its current international partners.
>
>     - - William Minter, Senior Research Fellow
>     
>************************************************************
>
>Angola Peace Monitor
>
>Issue no.6, Vol. VIII, 6th February 2002
>
>The Angola Peace Monitor is produced every month by ACTSA - Action
>for Southern Africa. ACTSA,  28 Penton Street, London N1 9SA,
>e-mail: actsa at actsa.org, fax 44 20 7837 3001,  tel 44 20 7833 3133
>
>[Excerpts only: for full issue and archive see
>http://www.actsa.org/apm]
>
>Jonas Savimbi killed
>
>UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed on 22 February following a
>fierce battle between his rebel troops and the Angolan army (FAA).
>The battle took place in the locality of Lubuei in Moxico province,
>some 100 km away from the Zambian border.
>
>Jonas Savimbi died on the same day as some of his most senior
>generals, including Brigadier "Big Joy" and Brigadier Mbula. The
>Angolan army states that they ambushed Savimbi's military column.
>During the fighting around 25 UNITA people from his platoon were
>killed. Fighting is also reported to have taken place between FAA
>and other UNITA forces who had the task of diverting military
>attention away from their leader, led by Mbula and Big Joy.
>
>To allay the cynicism of some foreign journalists, the government
>put the body of Savimbi on show to journalists at the nearby town
>of Lucusse. The Angolan news agency, ANGOP, reported that following
>this the body was buried in the nearby cemetery.
>
>The decisive battle took place following several major FAA
>victories over UNITA, including a large-scale ambush on a column of
>UNITA fighters who were attempting to flee to Zambia earlier in the
>week. During fierce fighting many senior UNITA generals were
>captured or killed. ...
>
>Sources indicate that fierce fighting is continuing in Moxico,
>where many of Savimbi's top troops - including his "presidential
>guard" - remain under siege.
>
>Several senior UNITA figures are reportedly still alive including
>vice-president Antonio Dembo, secretary-general Paulo Lukamba Gato,
>chief of staff General Geraldo Abreu "Kamorteiro", General Esteves
>"Kamy" Pena and General Camalata Numa. ...
>
>Prospects for peace brighter
>
>Jonas Savimbi had centralised power within UNITA to such an extent
>that the main military, political and financial aspects of the
>organisation were handled primarily by him. His death has
>considerably improved prospects for peace in Angola as UNITA is no
>longer an insurrectionary force threatening the survival of the
>state.
>
>Jonas Savimbi led UNITA in a war against the Angolan government
>since the country gained independence in 1975. Relying heavily on
>the American CIA and the apartheid South African regime for
>protection and support, he denied Angola the opportunity to
>flourish.
>
>Today, two generations of children have known nothing but conflict.
>Angola is now ranked one of the worst places in the world to be a
>child - nearly one in three die before their fifth birthday because
>of war and war-induced poverty. More than half a million people
>have died, and millions have been forced to flee their homes.
>
>There have been lulls in the fighting. In 1991, negotiations led to
>a cease-fire and the following year United Nations-supervised
>elections were held. Rejecting the results, Savimbi led his troops
>back into war, seizing much of the country. It was not until the
>Angolan army managed to recover much of the lost ground that Jonas
>Savimbi allowed his organisation to enter into another peace
>agreement - the Lusaka Protocol - in 1994. This time he used the
>peace process as a breathing space to rearm his organisation under
>the noses of the United Nations using funds from his conflict
>diamonds. Eventually UNITA led the country back into full-scale war
>in 1998, using its new conventional army to try and seize the
>country. However, this effort failed, leading to the Angolan
>government's determination to destroy Savimbi's fighting force. ...
>
>The Angolan government has moved quickly to call for the end to
>conflict. In a statement on 23 February the government appealed to
>"all those, that voluntarily or involuntarily, were associated to
>these terrorist practices to consider their options and reintegrate
>themselves in the normal life of the country, contributing in this
>way to the consolidation of the democratisation and national
>reconciliation process". It continued that it will soon issue "a
>communique containing a detailed programme to cease all hostilities
>in Angola".
>
>The government reiterated its "intention to completely implement
>the Lusaka Protocol and also considers that all Angolan political
>parties are essential for Angola's democratisation". It called for
>the nation to remain calm and tranquil, "respecting law and order,
>particularly the right to differences and peaceful co-existence of
>all Angolans".
>
>During a visit to Portugal on 25 February Angolan President Jose
>Eduardo dos Santos expressed hope that the prospects for dialogue
>would improve. He stated that "we have to look to the future and
>Angolans from all quarters have to be able to pardon, pave the way
>for rapid national reconciliation and establish bridges to define
>as rapidly as possible a cease-fire conducive to the
>demilitarisation of UNITA".
>
>On the question of elections, which have not been held since 1992,
>the President stated that "if we rapidly advance this year to
>conclude a cease-fire and the demilitarisation of UNITA it may be
>that in one to two years elections will be held in Angola". ...
>
>International reaction to Savimbi's death
>
>Leaders of states and international organisations have united in
>hope that the death of Jonas Savimbi will provide an opportunity
>for Angola to finally achieve peace.
>
>Namibia's foreign minister Theo-Ben Gurirab told the Namibia
>Broadcasting Corporation that Savimbi "chose to live by the sword
>and inevitably he died by the sword".
>
>Uganda's Defence Minister Amama Mbabaza was more blunt in his
>comments, when he told AFP on 23 February that "there are no
>regrets. He was trouble maker for Angola, and Uganda never
>supported his cause". He continued that "Savimbi represented the
>reactionary forces in African politics, we think that if it is true
>that he is dead, it would be good for the region and the world".
>
>The South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was far more reticent.
>According to the South African Press Association, President Mbeki
>said on 24 February that he would prefer not to comment on Unita
>leader Jonas Savimbi's death until he had had a chance to apply his
>mind properly to the matter. Deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad,
>said that Savimbi's death will "affect the capacity of UNITA to
>sustain itself".
>
>Mozambique's president, Joaquim Chissano, on 24 February regretted
>that Savimbi's life "ended in this way, which he could easily have
>avoided if he had cooperated with the government". What was
>important now, he added, was for all Angolans, regardless of
>whether or not they were UNITA sympathisers, "to look ahead, and
>commit themselves to national reconciliation, and the consolidation
>of democracy, to end the suffering imposed by the war".
>
>Savimbi had been a major obstacle to peace, said President
>Chissano, because of his excessive pride, and his failure to keep
>his promises.
>
>President Chissano recalled that after independence, Savimbi allied
>himself with the mortal enemy of African nations, the apartheid
>regime which then ruled South Africa, which provided him with
>massive military support.
>
>The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated his
>support for the peace process. His spokesperson, Stephane Dujarric,
>said that "as far as the secretary general is concerned, it has
>created a new situation and he hopes that all stakeholders will
>take advantage of it to take the peace process forward".
>
>The representative of the European Union to the Great Lakes Region,
>Aldo Ajello, said on 23 February in Luanda that the death of Jonas
>Savimbi was an "appropriate time for a definite peace in Angola".
>He continued that "the death of a man is always sad news, but at
>the same time, and in this case, it is an opportunity for peace and
>peace concerns all people of Angola".
>
>UNITA's representative in Portugal, Carlos Morgado stated on
>Portuguese television "from now on, the scenario has changed, we'll
>have to find new paths. But this will never mean a military
>surrender. There'll be no military victory [for the government]".
>
>However, UNITA Renovada, a group of leading UNITA figures that have
>decisively broken away from Jonas Savimbi's orbit, called on all of
>Savimbi's followers to "reject any option that seeks the
>continuation of the armed rebellion begun by Jonas Savimbi".
>
>UNITA Renovada's spokesperson in the United States, Dinho Chingunji
>was more sanguine about the news. He announced "Savimbi is
>dead!!!"... For me this is definitely a cause to celebrate because
>of the genocide that Savimbi carried out against my family".
>
>He continued that "people in UNITA, especially those in the bush
>who because of Savimbi security could not leave or make their
>feelings known in fear of their lives and that of their families,
>now are coming out in hundreds and the truth will come out".
>
>...
>
>Angolan government announces full withdrawal from DRC
>
>The Angolan government on 31 January announced that it had removed
>its last soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
>
>The Angolan army had assisted Laurent Kabila in ousting the late
>dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997, in an attempt to halt UNITA
>using the country as a staging post for its insurrection. In 1998
>Angolan forces were involved in fighting when they saved Kabila
>from being overthrown by Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels.
>
>In its report on 13 November 2001, the United Nations Panel of
>Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
>Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo stated that it
>"believes that the involvement of Angola in the DRC is based on
>strategic concerns" and that "Angola is believed to be the only
>country that has not received any significant compensation for its
>military involvement in the DRC".
>
>The fact that the Angolan army has not been engaged in economic
>activities in DRC is the main explanation why it has been so fast
>in pulling out of the country. ...
>
>************************************************************
>
>JRS DISPATCHES No. 107 - 28 February, 2002
>
>Twice monthly news bulletin
>
>JRS DISPATCHES is from the International Office of Jesuit Refugee
>Service, CP  6139, 00195 Roma Prati, Italy. Tel: +39-06 689.77.391;
>Fax: +39-06 687.92.83;  Email: dispatches at jesref.org; JRS on-line:
>http://www.jesref.org;
>
>[Excerpts]
>
>ANGOLA: WHAT NEXT AFTER DEATH OF REBEL LEADER
>
>The news of the death of veteran Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi
>has been  greeted in the town of Luena with much public celebration
>and expressions of  hope for an end to the country's long-running
>civil war. Savimbi was killed by  government forces on 22 February,
>during a fierce gun battle that resulted in  heavy casualties for
>both the UNITA rebels and the regular army. JRS Luena  report that
>when confirmation of the rebel leader's death reached the town,
>people fired guns into the air during two hours of celebrations.
>Many local people  strongly believe that the war has come to an
>end, that UNITA lacks the resources  to continue the conflict, or
>a commander who can match Savimbi's strength and  aggressiveness.
>Many captured UNITA rebels have confirmed that their  movement's
>capacity has been heavily reduced of late, fuelling the
>government's  belief that it will soon be able to put an end to the
>civil war.
>
>Despite the general optimism in Luena, major challenges still have
>to be faced by  the people of Angola if peace is to be given a
>chance.
>
>-Many Angolans have suffered badly and lost family members during
>the conflict.  ''Our discussions with them indicate that they are
>not prepared to forgive easily'',  reports JRS Luena. The
>Government thus needs to construct an effective  reconciliation and
>reconstruction project for the future.
>
>-War has become a profitable business for many in Angola. Top
>government  officials, military personnel and others have enjoyed
>huge benefits because of  the conflict. How prepared are these
>people to see peace emerge?
>
>-How prepared is the government to set up democratic structures
>that will allow  for the expression of opposing views and
>philosophies?
>
>-If peace returns, Angola will receive a lot of returnees from
>Zambia and DR  Congo. Because of the infestation of mines
>throughout the country, many of the  returnees may settle
>temporarily in provincial cities. Does the government have  the
>capacity and will to deal adequately with these returnees?
>''Despite these obstacles, if the government, civil society and
>political parties  seize this moment as a genuine chance for peace,
>justice, and reconciliation, let  us also hope the international
>community can play its part to assist Angola in  bringing about an
>end to the war," writes JRS Angola.
>
>ANGOLA: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DEEPENS
>
>JRS in the Angolan town of Luena reports that the number of
>Internally displaced  people has risen dramatically of late as a
>result of increased military operations in  Moxico, and other
>nearby provinces. The government believes that the rural
>populations in the villages have been a logistical resource for
>UNITA's guerrilla  warfare in terms of supplies. As a result the
>government has embarked on a  clean-up operation moving rural
>people to Provincial capitals and settling them in  camps, a move
>that has been condemned by the UN as contributing to a growing
>number of displaced civilians. The UN estimates that up to four
>million people -  almost one third of the Angolan population - have
>now been forced to flee their  homes as a result of the
>long-running civil war.
>
>In the city of Luena alone, the displaced population has reached
>more than  89,000. During the month of January nearly 6000 people
>entered the city, 90 per  cent of whom were women, children, and
>the elderly. The total number of  orphans in Luena, including
>displaced and resident children, is 258, many of  whom live in sub
>standard conditions at a local orphanage. Clothing, food and  basic
>non-food items are urgently required for these children. On 12
>February,  addressing the UN Security Council, UN Under Secretary
>General for  Humanitarian Affairs, Kenzo Oshimo, described the
>status of children in Angola  as ''catastrophic'', with 30 percent
>of all children dying before the age of five.
>
>The new reality of Luena had not been anticipated by the
>humanitarian agencies,  most of whom had not created contingency
>plans to receive such large numbers  of displaced people. Most NGOs
>on the ground are already operating at full  capacity and simply do
>not have sufficient resources to respond to the growing
>anticipated needs of the thousands now arriving in the city. The
>delivery of  humanitarian supplies has also been severely hampered
>by the poor condition of  the Luena airstrip, the overall insecure
>environment, and the fact that surrounding  areas are heavily
>mined, limiting access to agricultural land.
>
>************************************************************
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-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu