[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [ALACOUN:9423] Re: enamed: DISinformation, ALA & the Iraq Library Issue

[Alfred Kagan]

>Here is what really happened to the Iraq National Library according 
>to the Wall St. Journal.  It has great implications for the more 
>general governance issues.
>
>_______________________________________________________________________
>To: alacoun at ala.org, member-forum at ala.org
>From: Mark Rosenzweig <iskra at earthlink.net>
>Subject: ALA School of DISinformation Studies(re: Iraq Library)
>Cc: plg-l at listproc.sjsu.edu, srrtac-l at ala.org
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
>
>Below is an article from the front page, column one of today's Wall 
>Street Journal which refutes the entire basis of the claim made by 
>those on whose bandwagon ALA has jumped with such alacrity in 
>declaring (without evidence) that "all is lost" , the treasures of 
>the Iraq national library are gone forever, the task is to build a 
>new library with new books. etc.
>
>The whole story was made up of whole cloth. It was a lie. It was 
>'disinformation' . It was never confirmed. And this feature below, 
>without in anyway trying to make the US the villain of the piece, of 
>course -- hey, this is the Wall Street Journal!-- shows (with 
>photo--not included here) that the military authorities (a) knew who 
>took the important manuscripts systematically and en masse and 
>stored them (b) why they did so (c) why they were keeping them and 
>(d) why they had no intentions of returning them to US military 
>authorities, although, since this was an organized effort, they 
>would continuie communicating in person unless they were 
>specifically told not to by their leaders.
>
>That is to say: it was UNTRUE to claim that the manuscripts perished 
>in looter-set arson and in uncontrollable looting by Iraqis. Unless, 
>of course, one considers these daily truckloads of manuscripts etc. 
>being carefully removed as the US troops watched on and taken to a 
>Shi'a mosque for safe-keeping, looting.
>
>This little gem of disinformation, which ALA helped to spread and in 
>which it couldn't resist embedding  itself , contains, in microcosm, 
>a big story which is being withhheld from the US public: that the 
>Shi'a majority of Iraq -- even in Baghdad --has de facto 
>administrative control of the country, even down to the protection 
>of heritage sites like museums and libraries which it took upon 
>itself, making a mockery of the US military occupation government 
>and the supposed new civil government being created by the US State 
>department of non-Shi'ite emigres with no support in Iraq.
>
>President Freedman, the manuscripts are saved. Even the most ancient 
>Jewish texts have been saved by the Shiite clergy. Read the article 
>below. Learn. And, please, take back the statement you issued, for 
>revision in light of the facts. That's the responsibility a 
>librarian has, even when they are talking about libraries to 
>librarians, especially when such talk has much larger political 
>implications.
>
>April 28, 2003 12:25 a.m. EDT
>PAGE ONE
>
>In This Library's Tale, Seeds
>Of Mistrust and Hope in Iraq
>Shiite Clerics Took Over a Damaged Trove
>At War's End, but Col. Kessel Tries to Help
>
>By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and FARNAZ FASSIHI
>Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
>
>
>BAGHDAD, Iraq -- Sheikh Mohammed al Timimi passed a crowd waiting to 
>see a volunteer Iraqi medic in the courtyard of his mosque, then 
>swung open a door to a storage room.
>
>Inside were treasures of Iraq's National Library that had survived 
>the fire and looting that followed the arrival of American troops. 
>From the dingy floor to the ceiling, the room was crammed with six 
>truckloads of manuscripts, records and books. Centuries-old Islamic 
>texts were piled next to a vinyl disc of Junior Walker and the 
>All-Stars and hundreds of hand-written Hebrew prayer books.
>
>Until the war, the National Library -- along with the Iraqi Museum a 
>few miles away -- held a vast trove of Iraq's cultural heritage. 
>Now, a prime chunk of the library is sitting in Sheik Timimi's 
>mosque in a Baghdad slum, under the orders of the Shiite 
>establishment.
>
>The tale of the National Library and its scattered collection 
>highlights the difficult relationship that's evolved between Iraq's 
>Shiite clerics, whose power is rising, and the U.S. military and 
>civil administration. It also shows how patient American efforts can 
>sometimes slowly win allies.
>
>Shiite Muslims make up about 60% of Iraq's population. An 
>increasingly vocal part of their clerical establishment wants a 
>strict Islamic state, opposes any American role in running the 
>country and professes unyielding hostility to Israel. As the U.S. 
>military switched from a war footing to administrative functions 
>following the fall of Baghdad April 9, the Shiite establishment 
>based in the holy city of Najaf quickly stepped in to fill the 
>vacuum. In Baghdad, the representatives of the largest group, 
>followers of Ayatollah Mohammed al Sadr who was killed by Mr. 
>Hussein in 1999, began acting as a de facto government -- largely 
>ignoring U.S. authorities.
>
>Sheikh Mohammed al Timimi with some of the Iraq National Library 
>books that he has stored in a Baghdad mosque [amazing picture in 
>print edition]
>
>The Sadr supporters in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq supervised the 
>return of looted goods, distributed food and medicines, offered free 
>health care at mosques, and appointed new directors for hospitals 
>and other essential services. They changed the name of the Shiite 
>slum once known as Saddam City, where Sheikh Timimi's mosque is 
>located, to Sadr City. They also took control of heritage sites such 
>as the National Library.
>
>Until the war, the library housed over one million books and 20 
>million documents -- the literary and historical heritage of Iraq 
>stretching back more than a millennium. The collection included 
>early Islamic texts that survived the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in 
>the 13th century and a letter believed to have been written by 
>Shiite Islam's founder, Imam Ali, in the seventh century. It also 
>contained a rich literary and religious tradition of Iraq's 
>once-thriving Jewish community, the first modern-age Iraqi 
>newspapers, the personal archives of Iraqi poets and novelists, and 
>government archives going back to Ottoman times.
>
>The future of the library, across town from Sheikh Timimi's mosque 
>and its cache of documents, is now the subject of delicate 
>negotiations between Shiite officials and a newly arrived U.S. Army 
>team. On its first visit to the library, the Special Functions Team 
>of the U.S. Army 352nd Civil Affairs Command found the three-story 
>concrete building covered in ashes and dominated by a statue of 
>Saddam Hussein in academic attire. Iraqi trenches are dug in its 
>lawn, just across the street from the Iraqi Defense Ministry 
>compound.
>
>The team's aim was to secure and preserve what remained of Iraq's 
>cultural heritage. As he surveyed the scarred facade of the building 
>last Wednesday, the team's leader, Col. A.J. Kessel said: "Oh, don't 
>tell me this is the library."
>
>Inside, the American team, made up of U.S. reservists including an 
>antiques dealer from Pennsylvania and a New York State corrections 
>officer, encountered unarmed guards posted by Sheikh Timimi. The 
>guards told Col. Kessel, 55 years old and dressed in full body 
>armor, that they believe American soldiers were responsible for the 
>destruction at the library -- an allegation the U.S. fiercely denies 
>-- and they'd rather not have Americans inside ever again.
>
>Sheikh Timimi got involved in library affairs after a library worker 
>who lived near the mosque pleaded for help in rescuing the books. 
>His first step was to rush to Najaf to consult with senior clerics 
>of the hawza -- as the Najaf religious establishment is known.
>
>On orders from Najaf, the Shiites persuaded Raad al Bandar, who ran 
>the National Library under Mr. Hussein's regime, to return to work. 
>Mr. Bandar guided a team of volunteers assembled by the hawza, 
>showing them where the most important books and manuscripts were. 
>Once a day for six days in mid-April, the books were loaded into a 
>truck at the library and driven to Sheikh Timimi's mosque in Sadr 
>City. "We have taken all the ancient books and almost all the 
>microfilms," said Syed Minhem al Mussawi, supervisor of cultural 
>affairs for the hawza.
>
>While the Shiites were moving the books, the Americans -- nominally 
>in charge of Iraq -- were nowhere near the library building. The 
>Army team led by Col. Kessel was still in Kuwait.
>
>Since arriving, Col. Kessel has worked hard to defuse the Shiite's 
>suspicions and hostility. During his team's first visit to the 
>library Wednesday, one of the guards posted by the hawza, Hamid 
>Kadhem, told the colonel he witnessed a civilian vehicle pull up to 
>the library just before the fire erupted. The men inside carted off 
>several boxes of manuscripts. The fire died down four days later. 
>Then, Mr. Kadhem said, the U.S. Marines showed up.
>
>"We thought they were protecting the building," Mr. Kadhem said. 
>"They forced us to leave through the back door." Minutes later, he 
>said, the building was ablaze again.
>
>"I can assure you, Americans aren't going to burn a library, ever," 
>Col. Kessel responded. He told Mr. Kadhem that the second fire must 
>have been sparked by the first, and the original blaze must have 
>been deliberately set by Mr. Hussein's loyalists in order to pin 
>blame on the U.S.
>
>According to Col. Kessel the building shows signs of arson, probably 
>with white phosphorus. The chemical agent triggers a fire that can't 
>be extinguished with water and is often used by military forces to 
>destroy documents, he says.
>
>Meanwhile, Mr. Mussawi, the hawza official, was assembling a team of 
>engineers and volunteers near the National Library to fill the 
>building's holes with mortar. He wanted to prevent looters from 
>getting in and stealing the remaining items, which include most of 
>the national archives and the newspaper collection. Unlike the 
>guards and Sheikh Timimi, Mr. Mussawi didn't openly accuse the 
>Americans of burning the library. But, he said, U.S. forces bear 
>ultimate responsibility for failing to safeguard the books.
>
>"If they wanted to, they could have protected the library, just as 
>they have managed to protect the oil ministry," Mr. Mussawi said, 
>referring to the only major government building in Baghdad that has 
>remained intact. "We just don't trust the Americans." However, upon 
>hearing that Col. Kessel's team was planning to revisit the library 
>two days later, Mr. Mussawi put his qualms aside and agreed to meet 
>with the colonel.
>
>The first man to address Col. Kessel was Ghanem Shamti, the former 
>head of planning at the library and the person selected by the 
>Shiite hawza to run it from now on. He lectured the Americans about 
>the army's duties: "America entered our country by force, you occupy 
>our country, and it is your responsibility to protect our heritage 
>and culture until a new Iraqi government comes in to rule again." 
>Mr. Shamti asked for American troops to be posted outside the 
>library to deter further looting.
>
>Peppering his response with Arabic words, Col. Kessel said he would 
>consider the request for military guards. Other officers cautioned 
>the Shiite group that the neighborhood is still the scene of 
>frequent firefights and shootings, and that setting up a military 
>outpost here would cause logistical and security headaches. As if to 
>underscore the point, submachine-gun fire crackled just a few blocks 
>away throughout the encounter.
>
>"I feel so bad about it," Col. Kessel told the hawza 
>representatives, as he looked up at the gutted building. He urged 
>them to put together a written list of requests for safeguarding the 
>library, and said the list would be presented to retired U.S. Lt. 
>Gen. Jay Garner, head of the American-led Office of Reconstruction 
>and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, as well as Muayad al Demerji, a 
>senior Iraqi Ministry of Culture official, who had just agreed to 
>work with the Americans.
>
>The mention of Mr. Demerji and ORHA didn't go over well. "We won't 
>cooperate with Demerji -- he's Saddam's man," interrupted Mohammed 
>Eshnawa, an engineer brought by Sheikh Timimi from Sadr City to help 
>with the mortar project. Pointing at Mr. Shamti, the library's 
>former head of planning, Mr. Eshnawa said: "Here's our 
>representative."
>
>Even more controversial was the question of using U.S. funds from 
>ORHA, Mr. Garner's agency, to help repair the library. Sheikh 
>Timimi's brother Mahmoud, who is supervising the repair work, 
>stepped in to rule out accepting such financial aid. "We don't want 
>U.S. charity," he told the colonel. "We want the U.S. to help 
>establish a new Iraqi government as soon as possible."
>
>Col. Kessel seized on the hint of common ground in the sheikh's 
>brother's last sentence. "That's why I'm here," he said, stretching 
>out his hand for a handshake.
>
>Meanwhile, Mr. Shamti, the library manager, appeared to be warming a 
>bit to cooperation with the Americans. He called Mr. Mussawi aside 
>and whispered that Sheikh Timimi's idea of mortaring up the building 
>is wrong because it could do further damage to the books. The only 
>solution, he offered, was to ask the Americans to move the books 
>still inside the library to a more appropriate site.
>
>One critical issue was left in diplomatic silence. Nobody mentioned 
>the need to move the precious books stashed in Sheikh Timimi's 
>mosque, a building that lacks air conditioning and where the only 
>fire precaution is an old fire extinguisher. Sheikh Timimi has said 
>that he plans to return the books as soon as a library building is 
>ready.
>
>Mr. Mussawi, the hawza official, addressed the Americans directly. 
>He used carefully calibrated words as he spoke to Col. Kessel: "We 
>thank any people who want to help us and support us." He also asked 
>for a pause in negotiations so that he could huddle with other hawza 
>representatives and volunteers at the library.
>
>As he waited for the Iraqis, Col. Kessel walked to the other end of 
>the courtyard and said he understood their suspicions, given that 
>the war had just ended and that swaths of Baghdad lay in ruins. "I'd 
>be frightened too," Col. Kessel said.
>
>Mr. Mussawi said he would have to travel to Najaf to obtain formal 
>permission from the hawza for further contacts. A new meeting with 
>U.S. officials is set up for this week, and Mr. Mussawi said he will 
>also bring a list of hawza nominees to represent the Iraqi side in 
>running other cultural sites in Baghdad.
>
>"We hope you are going to be friends, not occupiers," he told Col. 
>Kessel as he shook his hand. "There is no desire to be occupiers," 
>Col. Kessel said.
>
>Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov at wsj.com1 and Farnaz 
>Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi at wsj.com2
>URL for this article:
>http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB105148029164400,00.html
>Hyperlinks in this Article:
>(1) mailto:yaroslav.trofimov at wsj.com
>(2) mailto:farnaz.fassihi at wsj.com
>(3) javascript: 
>window.open('http://online.wsj.com/documents/info-iraqwanted03-frameset.html','iraqwanted03','toolbar=no,scrollbars=no,location=no,width=500,height=440,left=70,top=30'); 
>void('');
>(4) http://online.wsj.com/user-cgi-bin/searchUser.pl?action=emailalert
>(5) http://online.wsj.com/page/0,,2_0869,00.html
>
>Updated April 28, 2003 12:25 a.m.


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu