[Peace-discuss] Why Saddam Might Destroy His Missles

[patton paul]

Why Saddam Might Destroy His Missiles
Cooperating with UN inspectors may be more effective than brandishing an
unimpressive al-Samoud missile system in deterring an invasion
By TONY KARON


JASSIM MOHAMMED/AP
A U.N. weapons inspector examines an Al Samoud missile north of Baghdad

Monday, Feb. 24, 2003
Iraq's al-Samoud 2 missile may be more useful to Saddam Hussein as a
sacrificial offering, right now, than as an artillery weapon. As Britain,
Spain and the U.S. square off against France, Germany and Russia in a
crucial Security Council debate over Iraqi disarmament, UN weapons
inspectors have demanded that Iraq destroy its entire arsenal of the
offending missile by March 1. Chief inspector Dr. Hans Blix has declined
to negotiate with Baghdad over that demand  leaving no doubt that failure
to comply would lead him to report to the Security Council that Iraq has
failed a benchmark disarmament test. And although Saddam hinted at a
defiant response in a TV interview with CBS, Monday, his handling of the
crisis thus far suggests he'll ultimately comply.

It's not that the al-Samoud 2 is, in any sense, a weapon of mass
destruction  it is a medium-range missile designed to carry a conventional
explosive warhead. But where the missile falls foul of the inspection
regime is that its range exceeds the 93-mile limit set by the UN in 1991.
(A number of technical specifications also exceed UN limits in ways that
prompt Blix's team to suspect it may simply be version 2.0 of a planned
long-range Iraqi missile.) The fact that the extent of the al-Samoud 2's
infraction is reportedly no more than about 30 miles may indeed give it
little significance to Iraq's current strategic capability, but Dr. Blix
is insisting on upholding the letter of the law.

The inspector's demand creates a dilemma for Saddam: Why surrender a whole
category of tactical weaponry when you're expecting to be invaded even if
you do? But Iraq is believed to have manufactured about 100 of the
missiles, which don't have an onboard guidance system, and that would
hardly make a decisive difference against the legions of General Tommy
Franks. And refusing to destroy them will almost certainly bring an
invasion within weeks. Saddam's conduct until now suggests that he is well
aware that his best weapons against the U.S. military are political and
diplomatic. Every time he has been presented with an "or-else" ultimatum
in this particular crisis, Saddam has capitulated so as to avoid giving
the U.S. a pretext to launch an attack. Despite his defiant tone on CBS,
reports out of Baghdad this week quoted Iraqi officials as hinting that
Saddam may be planning to sacrifice the al-Samoud 2 to slow President
Bush's march to war.

Iraq has not attempted to hide the capabilities of the al-Samoud 2 from
the inspectors. Indeed, the information upon which Dr. Blix has based his
demand that the missiles be destroyed was initially provided by the Iraqis
themselves. While Saddam is unlikely to welcome the prospect of having to
get rid of anything his forces could use against an invading army, Blix's
demand does offer the Iraqi dictator an opportunity.

The chief inspector has designed his missile demand as a crucial test of
Iraqi compliance with UN disarmament demands, which comes in a more
crucial week for the Bush administration's efforts to win UN authorization
for war. Buoyed by the strongly antiwar tilt of public opinion in Europe
and beyond, France, Germany and Russia continue to resist moves to ditch
the inspection process and authorize an invasion. But for domestic
political reasons, even such staunch Bush allies as Britain's Tony Blair
and Italy's Silvio Berlusconi have pressed Washington to seek a second UN
resolution before going to war. Unable to secure passage of a resolution
authorizing the use of force right now, the U.S. and Britain have opted
instead for a resolution that simply finds Iraq in "material breach" of
Resolution 1441  based in part on Dr. Blix's Feb. 14 report back to the
Security Council  and notes that Baghdad has "failed to take the final
opportunity" for peaceful disarmament. But the antiwar camp at the
Security Council are acutely aware that such language would likely be
taken as a trigger for the "serious consequences" mentioned in Resolution
1441, even without a clause specifically authorizing an invasion. France
and Germany have therefore both pointed to progress in inspections cited
by Blix in the same report to argue against a new resolution and to
present counter-proposals on a continued inspection process.

With Blix due to report back again on or soon after March 1  in the middle
of the two weeks of debate on the new resolution envisaged by Britain and
the U.S.  the al-Samoud 2 test therefore becomes a crucial indicator. If
Blix tells the Council that Iraq is refusing to destroy a prohibited
weapon, that may put the kibosh on calls to give the inspection process
more time. But an Iraqi decision to destroy the missiles under UN
supervision could have the reverse effect, providing more ammunition for
France, Germany and Russia to argue that inspections be given more time.
(No wonder, then, that France very pointedly warned Iraq last weekend that
it has no choice but to submit to Blix's demand on the al-Samoud
missiles.)

Should he accede to Blix's demand, Saddam might also try to make political
capital by appealing, particularly to Arab states, for protection against
an invasion in exchange for doing the inspector's bidding. Perhaps mindful
of the danger that Iraq could make diplomatic capital out of complying on
the al-Samouds, President Bush warned over the weekend that the missiles
were simply the "tip of the iceberg" of Iraqi non-compliance. Nonetheless,
by taking a hit on his missile program, Saddam would certainly make things
easier for those on the Security Council counseling further inspections
rather than war as the international community's next step in Iraq. Then
again, Saddam's calculations haven't always been the most rational. And
Blix's demand on the al-Samouds may also simply be the tip of the iceberg
of the inspector's own agenda for Iraqi disarmament.