[Peace-discuss] Timeline for the Iraq War

[C. G. Estabrook]

[CounterPunch is circulating this long but important summary of the
history we lived through but forget -- or were never told. I do note two
surprising omissions: the National Security Strategy document from
September 2992, and the Congressional vote for war in October 2002 (well,
maybe not so surprising because not so important).  --CGE]

	<http://www.ameu.org/page.asp?iid=258&aid=434&pg=1>
	Timeline for War
	by: John F. Mahoney
	September - October 2004
	The Link - Volume 37, Issue 4

Timeline for War

The Timeline was written by AMEU executive director John Mahoney, with
considerable input and editing from AMEU board members and staff.

March, 1992: The Pentagon. Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for
policy for President Bush, drafts an update of America's overall military
strategy called the "Defense Planning Guidance." In it he argues that the
U.S. might be faced with taking preemptive military action to prevent the
use or development of WMD. The official ultimately responsible for the
document is Bush's defense secretary Dick Cheney. The draft is actually
written by Wolfowitz's prote©eé and top assistant Lewis Libby.

Sept. 1, 1992: New York. Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, arrives at JFK Airport. Born of a Palestinian mother, his goal
is to punish the United States for its support of Israel, knowing that the
U.S. government every year sends military and financial aid worth billions
of dollars to Israel. Ramzi says that he and his uncle, an engineer who
had studied higher mathematics and jet propulsion in the U.S., have been
planning to bring down the towers of the World Trade Center, the ultimate
symbol of America's worldwide financial muscle.

Feb. 26, 1993: New York. Ramzi Yousef, with others, sets off explosives at
the World Trade Center. Later in the day he flies out of JFK for Karachi,
disappointed that both towers were still standing and determined to bring
them down at another time.

Feb. 27, 1993: New York. A group calling itself the "Liberation Army"
sends a letter to The New York Times saying the World Trade Center bombing
was in retaliation for American support for Israel, and warning that if
America did not change its Middle East policy, more terrorist missions
would be carried out, some by suicide bombers.

April 15, 1993: Kuwait. Kuwaiti police say they have prevented an
assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush, his wife, two
sons, and daughter-in-law Laura. Most in the CIA promptly point the finger
at Saddam Hussein; others, including investigative journalist Seymour
Hersh, doubt the Iraqi president had any involvement in the plot.

Jan. 7, 1995: Manila. Ramzi Yousef and a colleague, Abdul Hakim Murad,
accidentally set off an explosion in their apartment. Murad is captured
and, under torture, tells the Philippine police of a plan to board an
American commercial aircraft, hijack it, control the cockpit, and dive the
plane into the CIA headquarters. The Chief of Intelligence Command for the
Philippine National Police tells the Associated Press that its office
shared the information immediately with FBI agents in Manila, along with
the message they found on Yousef's laptop explaining why they were doing
it: "If the U.S. government keeps supporting Israel ... then we will
continue to carry out operations inside and outside the United States."

April 18, 1996: Lebanon. Israel attacks a U.N. refugee camp at Qana,
killing women and children. Israel says it was a mistake. The U.N. and
Amnesty International say it was intentional. Shortly afterwards, Osama
bin Laden moves to the mountains of Afghanistan, where he uses the Qana
massacre to recruit fighters in a war against the U.S. and Israel.

July 9, 1996: Washington, DC. Douglas Feith, the Washington, DC partner of
an Israeli firm soliciting American business for Israel's right-wing
settler movement, joins with other pro-settlement supporters Richard
Perle, David Wurmser and Wurmser's wife, Meryav, to develop a
foreign-policy position paper for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. Titled "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,"
it calls for Israel to overthrow Saddam Hussein and put a pro-Israel
regime in his place. Netanyahu rejects it.

July 25, 1996: Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia. A truck bomb rams a high-rise
complex housing U.S. airmen. Nineteen are killed. The bombing is blamed on
Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors, although the U.S. commission
investigating the 9/11 attacks will later conclude that Osama bin Laden
may have had an involvement -- but not Saddam Hussein.

Aug. 23, 1996: Afghanistan. Bin Laden, with his new mastermind for
worldwide operations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, issues a call to action: "My
Muslim Brothers of the world ... Your brothers in Palestine and in the
land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] are calling upon your help and
asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy -- your enemy and
their enemy -- the Americans and the Israelis ... The horrifying pictures
of the massacre of Qana in Lebanon are still fresh in our memory ... They
[Americans] are not exonerated from responsibility, because they chose
this [their] government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its
crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in other places."

Jan. 26, 1998: Washington, DC. Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald
Rumsfeld, Richard Armitage, and 14 others send letter to President Clinton
urging regime change in Iraq and a more aggressive Middle East policy. The
letter is sponsored by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC),
founded by William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard.

July 31, 1998: New York. David Wurmser meets with Israel's permanent
representative to the U.N., Dore Gold, in an effort to get Israel to put
pressure on the American Congress to approve a $10 million grant to Ahmed
Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, an exile group based in London with a
guerilla army based in northern Iraq, whose purpose is the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein.

Aug. 7, 1998: Tanzania and Kenya. Suspected Al Qaeda cells bomb U.S.
embassies in both countries, killing 258, including 12 Americans.

Aug. 20, 1998: Afghanistan and Sudan. President Clinton orders missile
attack against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in
Sudan said to produce nerve gas and to be linked to bin Laden. Bin Laden
survives and doubts are raised about the pharmaceutical plant, which
Sudanese say produced infant formula. Shortly after, bin Laden tells ABC
News that, if the liberation of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the
Ka'aba in Saudi Arabia is a crime, he indeed is a criminal.

Feb.-March, 1999: Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden summons Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed to tell him that his proposal to use aircraft as terror weapons
against the U.S. has the full support of Al Qaeda.

Sept. 28, 2000: Jerusalem. Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, flanked by
1,000 armed police, visits site of the Al Aqsa Mosque. Bin Laden reacts by
asking that the planned attacks against the U.S. be moved up.

Oct. 12, 2000: Yemen. The USS Cole is attacked; 17 sailors are killed and
39 wounded. Bin Laden, the suspected mastermind, praises the suicide
attackers, then reads a poem he wrote in honor of Palestinian children
killed in their struggle against Israel's occupation of their land.

Jan. 1, 2001: Washington, DC. David Wurmser recommends to President-elect
Bush that America and Israel join forces to "strike fatally, not merely
disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region -- the regimes of
Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza," and he suggests that
"crises can be opportunities" to implement this plan.

Jan. 30, 2001: The White House. President Bush holds his first high-level
National Security Council meeting. Two topics are on the agenda: Israel
and Iraq. He says he plans to "tilt it [U.S. policy] back toward Israel"
and -- in what turns out to be the prime focus of the meeting -- he says
he wants to remove Saddam Hussein. Condoleezza Rice explains: "Iraq might
be the key to reshaping the entire region."

Feb. 5, 2001: The White House. Rice chairs a principals' committee meeting
to review Iraq policy. All agree that the sanctions were only hurting the
Iraqi people, not Saddam. Powell proposes stricter U.N. sanctions on
Saddam's military programs.

April, 2001: The White House. Cabinet deputies meet to review terrorism
policy. Richard Clarke warns that the network of terrorist organizations
called Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, presents an immediate and serious
threat to the U.S., and that the U.S. had to target bin Laden and his
leadership by reinitiating flights of the Predator drone. Wolfowitz
replies that Iraq is just as much a terrorist threat. Clarke says he is
unaware of any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed at the U.S. Deputy CIA
director John McLaughlin backs up Clarke. Wolfowitz tells Clarke he gives
bin Laden too much credit and that he had to have a state sponsor. Clarke
replies that bin Laden has made plain his terrorist aims and, as with
Hitler in Mein Kampf, you have to believe these people will actually do
what they say. Wolfowitz responds that he resents comparing the Holocaust
to "this little terrorist in Afghanistan." Clarke replies: "I wasn't
comparing the Holocaust to anything. I was saying that like Hitler, bin
Laden has told us in advance what he plans to do and we would make a big
mistake to ignore it."

June 21, 2001: Afghanistan. Bin Laden aide Ayman al-Zawahiri announces
over the Middle East Broadcasting Company that, "The coming weeks will
hold important surprises that will target American and Israeli interests
in the world."

Aug. 6, 2001: Crawford, Texas. President Bush receives a President's Daily
Brief entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." It warns that the
FBI has intelligence indicating that terrorists might be preparing for an
airline hijacking in the U.S. and might be targeting a building in lower
Manhattan. No action is taken.

Sept. 4, 2001: The White House. Counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke meets
with the President to walk him through a proposed National Security
Presidential Directive, whose goal is to eliminate bin Laden and Al Qaeda
leaders. Clarke had asked for the meeting, calling it "urgent," back in
January, but only now is allowed to see him. He tells Bush that the use of
minimum-wage rent-a-cops to screen passengers and carry-on at airports has
got to stop. The President agrees.

Sept. 11, 2001: New York, Washington, DC, Pennsylvania. Nineteen Middle
Eastern hijackers, 15 from Saudi Arabia, commandeer four commercial
airplanes, crashing two into the World Trade Towers in Manhattan, one into
the Pentagon in Washington, and one in a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly
3,000 are killed. Rumsfeld directs Pentagon lawyer to talk to Wolfowitz
about Iraq's connection to the attacks.

Sept. 12, 2001: Germany. Seven members of Rumsfeld's brain trust meet at
an airport in Frankfurt and board an Air Force refueling plane sent to
ferry them back to Washington. Group includes Douglas Feith, now
undersecretary of defense for policy. On the flight back they sketch out a
plan for the defense secretary according to which the U.S. would first
topple the Taliban government of Afghanistan, then go after other terror
states, including Iraq. Feith appoints David Wurmser to put together a
secret intelligence unit in his Pentagon office that will bypass the
normal channels and report directly to him; called the Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, its purpose is to find loose ties
between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda in order to counter the CIA, whose
analysts had found no credible links between the two. Later in the day,
counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke attends White House meetings
of the inner circle of Bush's war cabinet and is stunned to learn that
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to take advantage of the national
tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Rumsfeld specifically asks if
the attacks did not present an "opportunity" to launch war against Iraq.

Sept. 15, 2001: Camp David. Bush gathers closest advisers. Much discussion
is on Afghanistan, but Wolfowitz advocates attacking Iraq, maybe even
before Afghanistan. He says there's a 10 to 50 percent chance Iraq was
involved in 9/11. Bush sends note to Wolfowitz saying he doesn't want to
hear more on Iraq that day. Cheney, Powell, Wolfowitz, and Rice vote
against hitting Iraq first; Rumsfeld abstains. Powell, who is appalled at
the idea of hitting Iraq, finds Rumsfeld abstention interesting. Richard
Perle, who is also present, says Wolfowitz planted the seed.

Sept. 16, 2001: Washington, DC. Richard Perle and other neoconservatives
send letter to Bush urging him to focus immediately on a war with Iraq,
whether or not a connection with 9/11 can be shown.

Sept. 17, 2001: The White House. Bush signs a Top Secret order that lays
out his plan for going to war in Afghanistan and directs the Pentagon to
begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq.

Sept. 19, 2001: The Pentagon. Perle convenes a two-day meeting of the
Defense Policy Board, a group that advises the Pentagon. He introduces two
guest speakers: Prof. Bernard Lewis of Princeton, a longtime friend of
Cheney and Wolfowitz, who says U.S. must respond to 9/11 with a show of
strength, and must support such democratic reformers in the Middle East as
Ahmad Chalabi. The second speaker, in fact, is Ahmad Chalabi, who tells
the group that Iraq does possess WMD, although, as yet, there is no
evidence linking Iraq to 9/11.

Oct. 7, 2001: Afghanistan. U.S. and U.K. planes bomb Taliban bases; the
war against Al Qaeda begins.

Nov. 13, 2001: Afghanistan. The capital, Kabul, falls. Most of the Taliban
leaders flee.

Nov. 21, 2001: The White House. At the end of a National Security Council
meeting, President Bush secretly directs Rumsfeld to prepare for war on
Iraq.

Nov. 27, 2001: Florida. Rumsfeld flies to see General Franks at CENTCOM
headquarters in Tampa and tells him to update the Top Secret Operation
Plan on attacking and invading Iraq.

Dec. 4, 2001: The Pentagon. Franks presents a slightly revised plan on
invading Iraq. Estimated force level is reduced from 500,000 to 400,000.
Rumsfeld thinks fewer forces will be needed in light of the Afghanistan
success. Franks agrees.

Dec. 12, 2002: The Pentagon. Franks returns with updated plan. Rumsfeld
tells him he has to look at a plan that he could do "as early as April or
May."

Dec. 20, 2001: New York. The New York Times reporter Judith Miller has
front-page interview with Iraqi defector Adnan Ishan Saeed al-Haidere, who
says he has recently been working in Baghdad in secret facilities for
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Miller secures the interview
through Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, which has close contacts
with Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith. Miller will later
say that it is Chalabi who provided most of the front page exclusives on
WMD to The New York Times.

Dec. 28, 2002: The White House. Franks tells Bush that, with support from
other Muslim countries, Iraq could be invaded with an initial 105,000 U.S.
forces, but 230,000 eventually would be needed.

Jan. 2002: The White House. Bush's top speechwriter, Michael Gerson, gives
instructions to David Frum, a Canadian, to write a speech making the best
case for war in Iraq.

Jan. 29, 2002: Washington, DC. Bush gives State of the Union address; he
calls North Korea, Iran, and Iraq an axis of evil and pledges not to wait
while dangers gather.

Feb. 1, 2002: The Pentagon. Franks tells Rumsfeld a unilateral U.S.-only
invasion of Iraq could be readied in 45 days with an initial force of
105,000; ultimately, 300,000 would be needed to stabilize Iraq after it
fell.

Feb. 7, 2002: White House Situation Room. Rumsfeld introduces notion of
shock and awe, i.e., building up such a carrier force and bombing
onslaught that it might, by itself, trigger regime change.

Feb. 12, 2002: Washington, DC. Powell tells the Senate Budget Committee
there are no plans to go to war with Iran or North Korea, but U.S. is
looking into ways of bringing about regime change in Iraq.

Feb. 16, 2002: White House. The National Security Council ratifies Policy
Directive on Iraq, committing the U.S. to examining ways of bringing about
a CIA-backed coup and providing military support for Chalabi's Iraqi
National Congress.

Feb. 20, 2002: Iraq. CIA survey team secretly enters northern Iraq to
prepare for deployment of CIA paramilitary teams.

Feb. 28, 2002: Pentagon. Franks brings Rumsfeld a list of nearly 4,000
possible bombing targets in Iraq. Rumsfeld tells him to prioritize the
list.

March 6, 2002: The White House. In preparation of his upcoming visit to
the Middle East, Cheney is briefed by Franks, who tells him what the U.S.
will need in its invasion of Iraq from other Arab and Muslim countries.
When he does go to the Middle East, the vice president is surprised to
learn that Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is seen by Arab
leaders as a greater threat to the region than Saddam Hussein.

March 9, 2002: Washington, DC. CIA tells the White House reports that
Niger was supplying Iraq with uranium were investigated by Ambassador
Joseph Wilson and were found not to be credible.

March 14, 2002: The White House. The Joint Chiefs of Staff report that an
invasion of Iraq "would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep
shortages of certain critical weapons."

April 20, 2002: Camp David. Bush tell Franks he wants the invasion of Iraq
done "right and quickly."

April 24, 2002: Doha, Qatar. Franks tells his major commanders to do
whatever it takes to prepare for an invasion, no matter the costs.

May 11, 2002: Camp David. Franks presents a five-front war plan to Bush.

June 19, 2002: The White House. Franks tells Bush he could do the invasion
within 30 days with a little over 100,000 ground assault troops.

Late Aug. 2002: The Pentagon. Office of Special Plans is set up at the
Pentagon to plan for the war and its aftermath. Picked to head the OSP is
longtime protégé of Richard Perle, Abram Shulsky. As part of itmission,
the OSP forges close ties to a parallel intelligence unit within Ariel
Sharon's office in Israel, whose job is to provide key Bush administration
people with cooked intelligence on Saddam's Iraq. One Pentagon official,
Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, later relates how she had escorted
six or seven Israeli generals to Feith's OSP office. The generals surged
ahead of her, waved aside the required sign-in book, and entered the OSP
office; seeing Feith's office door closed, the generals demanded to know
from his secretary who Feith was talking to.

Sept. 7, 2002: The White House. Bush tells reporters that an International
Atomic Energy Agency report estimates that the Iraqis are six months away
from developing a nuclear weapon. The new report, however, turns out to be
an old IAEA document from 1996 that described a weapons program that the
inspectors had long ago destroyed.

Sept. 12, 2002: New York. Bush addresses U.N. General Assembly, saying the
U.S. will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary
resolutions to go to war with Iraq.

Sept. 16, 2002: New York. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan says he has
received a letter from Iraqi authorities allowing inspectors access
"without conditions." Bush administration is livid because it did not say
"unfettered access," meaning "anytime, anyplace."

Sept. 19, 2002: Washington, DC. Rumsfeld, speaking before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, says current U.N. inspection team is weak. At the
White House, Bush says if U.N. Security Council won't deal with Iraq, "the
U.S. and some of our friends will." Bush also meets with 11 House members,
telling them the biggest threat is that Saddam, with his WMD, "can blow up
Israel and that would trigger an international incident."

Oct. 1, 2002: Langley, Virginia. CIA prepares secret National Intelligence
Estimate on the case for war with Iraq. NIE claims Saddam has chemical and
biological weapons, including mobile labs, and that it is building nuclear
weapons. Bush wants condensed version for the public in the form of a
White Paper. The White Paper, however, distorts the facts to make the
strongest possible case for war. (See the Vanity Fair article for specific
examples of distortions.)

Nov. 8, 2002: New York. U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1441,
which gives Iraq a "final opportunity" to come clean on its WMD, adding
that the council would meet again, following the inspectors’ report, to
"consider the situation." The French, who oppose war with Iraq, say off
the record that they understand the resolution is enough to give America
and Britain legal cover for going it alone, if they felt Iraq hadn't
complied to their satisfaction.

Dec. 7, 2002: Baghdad. Iraqi government delivers a 12,000-page document in
Arabic to UNMOVIC. It is intended to account for the state of its weapons
programs. The U.S. takes possession of it, has it translated, submits it
to the Security Council with large portions deleted, then dismisses it as
a "material breach" of Resolution 1441.

Jan. 13, 2003: The White House. The French call for a meeting that is held
in Rice's office. Attending are Chirac's top adviser, Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne, and French Ambassador to the U.S., Jean-David Levitte.
Both explain their country's reasons for opposing the war, then Levitte
says that if the U.S. was determined to go to war, it should not seek a
second U.N. resolution, that 1441 arguably gave the White House enough
cover, and that France would keep quiet if the U.S. went ahead. White
House dismisses the offer because it has promised Tony Blair it would seek
a second resolution. The French are angry. On the same day, Bush tells
Powell in the Oval office, "I'm really going to do this." Powell asks if
he understands the Pottery Barn principle: if he breaks Iraq, he'll own
it. Bush says he understands.

Jan. 20, 2003: New York. French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin
announces that France will not support military intervention in Iraq. The
White House is irate.

Jan. 21, 2003: The White House. Franks delivers final war plan to Bush. He
estimates fewer than 1,000 U.S. killed. No public pictures of returning
coffins and no body count of Iraqis killed will be permitted, as both
practices created bad PR during the Vietnam war.

Jan. 25, 2003: White House. Lewis Libby makes presentation on Saddam's WMD
and ties him to bin Laden. Much of the material comes from Feith's Office
of Special Plans. Richard Armitage, the second in authority at the State
Department, sees it as drawing the worst conclusions from fragmentary
threads; Wolfowitz finds it convincing. Bush aides Karen Hughes and Karl
Rove think Powell should make the U.N. presentation. Powell agrees to do
it.

Jan. 27, 2003: New York. Hans Blix delivers his first inspections report
to U.N. He acknowledges that no WMD have been found but notes that Iraq
has failed to account for undetermined quantities of the nerve agent VX
and anthrax, and for 6,500 chemical bombs.

Jan. 28, 2003: Washington, DC. Bush gives State of the Union address in
which he claims: "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Jan. 29, 2003: The State Department. Powell gives his chief of staff,
Larry Wilkerson, a 48-page dossier that the White House wants Powell to
use in his U.N. speech making the case for war with Iraq. The dossier is
prepared in Cheney's office by a team led by Cheney's chief of staff,
Lewis Libby, and his deputy assistant for national security affairs, John
Hannah.

Jan. 30, 2003: Langley, Virginia. Wilkerson, with several staff members
and CIA analysts, sets up shop at CIA headquarters to prepare Powell's
speech. Meanwhile the White House supplies 45 more pages on Iraq's links
to terrorism and human rights violations.

Jan. 31, 2003: Langley, Virginia. Wilkerson throws out the White House
dossier, suspecting much of it originated with the Iraqi National Congress
and its chief, Ahmad Chalabi, whose information in the past often proved
suspect or fabricated. Powell is convinced that much of the material had
been funneled to Cheney by the separate OSP unit set up by Rumsfeld. "We
were so appalled at what had arrived from the White house," says one staff
member.

Feb. 5, 2003: New York. At 2 a.m., on the day of his U.N. speech, Powell
receives a call from the CIA's George Tenet, who says he wants another
look at the speech. Tenet is afraid Powell has cut too much about Saddam's
supposed links to terrorism, especially the 9/11 attack. For days the
White House and Cheney have pressed Powell to include a widely discredited
Czech intelligence report that Mohamed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader, had met
in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence officer. Powell had thrown out the
Prague material as suspect and unverified. But Powell does keep much of
what the White House wants, including mobile biological weapons labs, ties
to Al Qaeda, and anthrax stockpiles. One of the sources for the mobile
labs is an Iraqi major known to the CIA to be a liar. That morning, at the
U.N., Powell insists that Tenet sit behind him as a signal that he is
relying on the CIA to make the case for war.

Feb. 8, 2003: The White House. President Bush, in his weekly radio
address, says: "Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing
ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and Al
Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990's. Iraq has sent
bomb-making and document-forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda. Iraq has
also provided Al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. And
an Al Qaeda operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990's
for help in acquiring poisons and gases. We also know that Iraq is
harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior Al Qaeda terrorist
planner. This network runs a poison and explosive training camp in
northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad."

Feb. 14, 2003: New York. Hans Blix goes before the U.N. Security Council.
He contradicts Powell, saying the trucks Powell had described as being
used for chemical decontamination could just as easily have been used for
routine activity, and he contradicts Powell's statement that the Iraqis
knew in advance when the inspectors would be arriving. And he adds that
Iraq is finally taking steps toward real cooperation with the inspectors,
allowing them to enter Iraqi presidential palaces, among other previously
prohibited sites. Disarmament through inspections is still possible, he
concludes.

Feb. 15, 2003: Worldwide. Tens of millions participate in an
unprecedented, antiwar demonstration. The biggest crowds are in the
countries that support the war: Britain, Italy, and Spain.

Feb. 24, 2003: New York. Claiming Iraq has failed to take the final
opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441, the U.S., Britain, and Spain
propose the second resolution Tony Blair has been seeking.

Feb. 27, 2003: The White House. Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel
visits Bush and tells him Iraq is a terrorist state that should be invaded
as a matter of morality, otherwise Saddam will unleash a weapon of mass
destruction on Israel. Bush later remarks, "If Elie Wiesel feels that way,
I am not alone."

March 1, 2003: Turkey. The Turkish government rejects U.S. request to move
troops through its country.

March 3, 2003: The White House. Pope John Paul II's envoy, Cardinal Pio
Laghi, visits Bush and tells him war with Iraq would be unjust and illegal
because it would cause so many civilian casualties, create a wider gap
between the Christian and Muslim world, and overall would not make things
better. Bush replies it would absolutely make things better.

March 7, 2003: France. The French announce they will veto a second
resolution to authorize the automatic use of force. The U.S. begins
lobbying the six undecided members of the Security Council: Pakistan,
Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Guinea, and Angola, having first wiretapped their
offices. Chile and Mexico say they will not support a second resolution.

March 10, 2003: France. French President Chirac goes on TV and announces,
"My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote
'no'."U.S. and Britain blame France for the diplomatic breakdown, and use
it as the reason for not seeking the second resolution.

March 14, 2003: The White House. As a concession to Blair, Bush announces
agreement on a road map for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

March 16, 2003: The Azores. Bush, Blair and Spanish prime minister Aznar
meet. Bush says they need to start the war soon because antiwar sentiment
will only get worse if they delay. He says he is going to give Saddam a
48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq.

March 17, 2003: The White House. Bush reneges on his commitment to seek
U.N. approval, claiming 1441 provides ample authorization. In a TV
announcement he gives Saddam the 48-hour ultimatum. Prior to the
announcement he calls Australian prime minister Howard and Israeli prime
minister Sharon to tell them of his decision. Meanwhile, Cheney tells
congressional leaders of the decision, noting that Israel will not be part
of the coalition, "but we are working closely with them on their
reaction."

March 18: 2003: London. Blair wins a Commons vote for war, barely carrying
his own party.

March 19, 2003: The White House. Bush gives Franks order to execute
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Around 4 p.m., CIA information is received that
Saddam and his two sons are or will be in a bunker in Baghdad. Cheney
advises Bush to strike at the target, effectively beginning the war. Bush
agrees. At 7:30 p.m., Rice phones Israeli finance minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, telling him the war had begun; he says he knows. Rice then
summons Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar to come to the White House. Around
8:30 p.m. she tells him that, within a half-hour, all hell will break
loose. At 10:10 p.m., Bush informs the nation the war has started.

April 7, 2003: Washington. Rumsfeld appoints Gen. Jay Garner to direct
Pentagon's new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for
Iraq. Garner, a JINSA advisor, says the first person he will invite to
work with him is former Israeli defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer.

May 2, 2003: The USS Lincoln. President Bush tells nation, "In the battle
of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed."

May 6, 2003: Washington. L. Paul Bremer III is appointed administrator of
Iraq, replacing Jay Garner.

June 5, 2003: Washington, DC. The Washington Post reports that VP Cheney
and his aide Lewis Libby paid multiple visits to the CIA in the months
leading up to the Iraq war. Later, former CIA Counterterrorism chief Vince
Cannistraro will tell a congressional hearing that prior to the war, the
White House exerted unprecedented pressure on the CIA and other
intelligence agencies to come up with evidence linking Iraq to bin Laden
and Al Qaeda.

June 8, 2003: Washington, DC. David Kay, former chief weapons inspector
for the U.N., is asked to take over the search for WMD in Iraq.

July 6, 2003: New York. Former U.S. ambassador Joseph Wilson IV writes
column in The New York Times saying he was sent on a fact-finding mission
to Niger by the CIA and that, well before the president's State of the
Union Address, he reported his finding that no uranium had been shipped to
Iraq.

August 27, 2003: Washington. Newly available documents reveal that
Halliburton, the company VP Cheney formerly headed, wins contracts for
more than $1.7 billion out of Operation Iraqi Freedom and stands to
receive hundreds of millions more under a no-bid contract awarded by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Bechtel Group, George Shultz's company,
wins contracts for one billion dollars.

Sept. 17, 2003: The White House. President Bush tells a reporter, "No,
we've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11."

Oct. 2, 2003: Washington, DC. Kay delivers interim report to Congress
saying, "We have not yet found stocks of weapons."

Dec. 13, 2003: Iraq. Saddam Hussein is captured.

Jan. 23, 2004: David Kay resigns.

Jan. 28, 2004: Washington. Regarding the existence of WMD in Iraq, Kay
tells Senate Armed Services Committee, "We were almost all wrong." His
testimony forces White House to name a presidential commission to
investigate the prewar intelligence on Iraq.

Feb. 5, 2004: Washington, DC. Tenet admits in a speech at Georgetown
University that as far back as May 2002 the Defense Information Agency had
issued a "fabrication notification" to steer clear of the Iraqi major who
had attested to the mobile biological labs mentioned in Powell's U.N.
speech. Somehow the CIA never saw it.

Feb. 24, 2004: Washington, DC. CIA director Tenet tells the Senate Select
Committee that, despite our invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of
Iraq, the worldwide threat from bin Laden and Al Qaeda has grown, not
diminished.

March 11, 2004: Madrid. Train bombs kill 200 people. Search leads to a
widening web of organizations that may have few ties to Al Qaeda but share
its goals.

March 14, 2004: Madrid. Conservative prime minister José Aznar is
defeated by Socialist challenger José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, who on a
pledge to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq unless they were placed under
U.N. sanction. The new prime minister calls the Iraq war an error, saying:
"It divided more than it united, there were no reasons for it, time has
shown that the arguments for it lacked credibility, and the occupation has
been poorly managed."

April 18, 2004: Madrid. Spain withdraws all its troops from the Coalition
of the Willing.

April 19, 2004: Nicaragua. President Maduro says Nicaragua will withdraw
its forces from Iraq.

April 28, 2004: CBS's Sixty Minutes II shows U.S. troops mistreating Iraqi
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in violation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.

April 29, 2004: Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic withdraws its troops
from Iraq, citing security concerns. Wolfowitz tells a congressional
hearing that Iraq is still a combat zone, "and until it becomes
peacekeeping, a lot of countries are probably going to stay on the
sidelines."

May 20, 2004: Baghdad. Iraqi police and U.S. military raid home of Iraqi
National Council finance minister Ahmad Chalabi as part of an
investigation into suspected fraud. CIA also charges him with informing
Iran that the U.S. had cracked its secret codes and was eavesdropping on
its intelligence messages. The Pentagon stops monthly payments of $340,000
to Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress.

May 26, 2004: New York. The New York Times acknowledges that its
reporters, among them Judith Miller, used questionable sources in
affirming the existence of WMD in Iraq, and that Ahmad Chalabi, the INC
leader, was feeding bad information to journalists and the White House,
information the White House eagerly received.

May 29, 2004: Baghdad. Iyad Alawi, a longtime CIA operative, is chosen
interim prime minister of Iraq.

June 4, 2004: Langley, Va. CIA Director George Tenet resigns.

June 16, 2004: Washington, DC. The 9/11 Commission investigating the
September 11 attacks reports that there did not appear to be a
collaborative relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

June 22, 2004: Washington. Wolfowitz tells a House Armed Services
Committee that the Pentagon had underestimated Iraq's postwar insurgency
and that the U.S. may have to keep a significant number of troops in Iraq
for years to come.

July 5, 2004: Former U.S. Army General Janis Karpinski, who had been in
charge of the Abu Ghraib prison when Iraqi detainees were abused and
humiliated, tells BBC radio that she knew of at least one Israeli involved
in the prisoner interrogation.

July 9, 2004: Washington. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
concludes in its report that the most pivotal assessments used to justify
the war against Iraq were unfounded and unreasonable. Senator Jay
Rockefeller, vice chairman of the committee, concludes: "We in Congress
would not have authorized that war -- we would NOT have authorized that
warâ-- with 75 votes if we knew what we know now." The second part of the
report on whether the White House and Pentagon tried to influence
intelligence agencies is postponed until after the November election.

July 12, 2004: The Philippines. President Arroyo announces that her
country will withdraw from the Coalition of the Willing in order to save
the life of a Filipino hostage held by Iraqi insurgents.

Aug. 1, 2004: Number of U.S. killed in the Iraq war reaches 910. The media
is barred from showing their returning coffins. Number of Iraqi civilians
killed is not available from official U.S. sources; independent sources
estimate the number to be between 11,305 and 13,315. (For updates on
Iraqis killed and wounded, see: www.iraqbodycount.org.)

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