[Peace-discuss] what really happened

[Evan Past]

In case you are curious. Here is what Tenet said
before the Invasion. I think we are supposed to forget
this part.


Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company 
The New York Times

October 9, 2002 Wednesday 
Late Edition - Final 

SECTION: Section A; Column 2; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12

LENGTH: 741 words

HEADLINE: THREATS AND RESPONSES; 
C.I.A. Letter to Senate on Baghdad's Intentions

BODY:


Following is the text of a letter dated Oct. 7 to
Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida and chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, by George J. Tenet,
director of central intelligence, about decisions to
declassify material related to the debate about Iraq:

In response to your letter of 4 October 2002, we have
made unclassified material available to further the
Senate's forthcoming open debate on a Joint Resolution
concerning Iraq. 

As always, our declassification efforts seek a balance
between your need for unfettered debate and our need
to protect sources and methods. We have also been
mindful of a shared interest in not providing to
Saddam a blueprint of our intelligence capabilities
and shortcomings, or with insight into our expectation
of how he will and will not act. The salience of such
concerns is only heightened by the possibility of
hostilities between the U.S. and Iraq. 

These are some of the reasons why we did not include
our classified judgments on Saddam's decision-making
regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction
(W.M.D.) in our recent unclassified paper on Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Viewing your request with
those concerns in mind, however, we can declassify the
following from the paragraphs you requested:

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or
C.B.W. chemical and biological weapons against the
United States. 

Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no
longer be deterred, he probably would become much less
constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such
terrorism might involve conventional means, as with
Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive
in 1991, or C.B.W. 

Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting
Islamist terrorists in conducting a W.M.D. attack
against the United States would be his last chance to
exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims
with him.

Regarding the 2 October closed hearing, we can
declassify the following dialogue:

Senator Levin Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan : . . .
If (Saddam) didn't feel threatened, did not feel
threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an
attack using a weapon of mass destruction?

Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would
be that the probability of him initiating an attack --
let me put a time frame on it -- in the foreseeable
future, given the conditions we understand now, the
likelihood I think would be low. 

Senator Levin: Now if he did initiate an attack you've
. . . indicated he would probably attempt clandestine
attacks against us . . . But what about his use of
weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack
and he thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what's
the likelihood in response to our attack that he would
use chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.

In the above dialogue, the witness's qualifications --
"in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we
understand now" -- were intended to underscore that
the likelihood of Saddam using W.M.D. for blackmail,
deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds.
Moreover, if Saddam used W.M.D., it would disprove his
repeated denials that he has such weapons.

Regarding Senator Bayh's Evan Bayh, Democrat of
Indiana question of Iraqi links to al-Qa'ida. Senators
could draw from the following points for unclassified
discussions:

*Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq
and al-Qa'ida is evolving and is based on sources of
varying reliability. Some of the information we have
received comes from detainees, including some of high
rank.

*We have solid reporting of senior level contacts
between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade.

*Credible information indicates that Iraq and
al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal
nonaggression.

*Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid
evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members,
including some that have been in Baghdad.

*We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders
sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire
W.M.D. capabilities. The reporting also stated that
Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the
areas of poisons and gases and making conventional
bombs.

*Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians
coupled with growing indications of a relationship
with al-Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to
terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military
action. 

URL: http://www.nytimes.com 

LOAD-DATE: October 9, 2002 



	
		
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