[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Rwanda/USA: "The System Worked"

[Alfred Kagan]

>To: akagan at uiuc.edu
>Subject: Rwanda/USA: "The System Worked"
>From: africafocus at igc.org
>Sender: World Wide Web Owner <www at africafocus.org>
>Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 10:03:38 -0800
>
>
>Rwanda/USA: "The System Worked"
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin
>Mar 31, 2004 (040331)
>(Reposted from sources cited below)
>
>Editor's Note 
>
>"In a sense, the system worked: Diplomats, intelligence agencies,
>defense and military officials--even aid workers--provided timely
>information up the chain to President Clinton and his top advisors.
>That the Clinton Administration decided against intervention at any
>level was not for lack of knowledge of what was happening in
>Rwanda." - William Ferroggiaro, National Security Archive Fellow
>
>A new report and declassified documents, released by the non-profit
>National Security Archive on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the
>genocide in Rwanda, confirm earlier reports that it was political
>will, not lack of information, that stopped the U.S. from acting to
>check the killing. Yet despite official inquiries into similar
>inaction by the UN and the Organization of African Unity,
>legislative inquiries in Belgium and France, and a host of non-
>official books and reports, there has been no official U.S. inquiry
>into responsibilities for these failures.
>
>Richard Clarke, now featured in the news for his critique of
>President Bush's counter-terrorism policy, reportedly played a key
>role in arguing vigorously and successfully against a more
>proactive U.S. response to the genocide. Yet neither he nor other
>officials have ever testified on their roles in the U.S. failure to
>respond.
>
>This issue of AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a press release and
>excerpts from the new report by the National Security Archive. The
>full report, which details many of the key officials and agencies
>involved in U.S. information-gathering and decision-making at the
>time, is available on the Archive's website, along with images of
>selected declassified documents (see URL below).
>
>Additional on-line sources on the U.S. decision-making process
>during the genocide include a National Defense University paper by
>Lt.-Col. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. at:
>http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n035603o.pdf
>and the 2001 Atlantic article by Samantha Power at:
>http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm
>
>Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today features excerpts from
>an overview commentary on international response ten years ago,
>written by Gerald Caplan, coordinator of "Remembering Rwanda: The
>Rwanda Genocide 10th Anniversary Memorial Project."
>
>++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>U.S. Intelligence Warned 'Genocide' In Rwanda In April, But Clinton
>Administration Waited Until Late May To Use Word
>
>National Security Archive (Washington, DC)
>
>March 29, 2004
>
>Washington, DC
>
>New Documents And Report Highlight Array Of Info Before U.S.
>Policymakers
>
>U.S. intelligence reports concluded that the slaughter in Rwanda
>ten years ago amounted to genocide as early as April 23, 1994,
>while policymakers debated for another month over whether to use
>the word publicly, according to a new report and declassified
>documents posted on the Web by the National Security Archive.
>
>Obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, the documents
>illuminate the vast array of 'information and intelligence'
>available to Clinton Administration officials during the crisis, as
>well as the policymaking committees and working groups that used
>the information.
>
>The documents reveal:
>
>* The CIA's top secret National Intelligence Daily, circulated to
>President Clinton, Vice President Gore and hundreds of senior
>officials, featured the slaughter in Rwanda on a daily or
>near-daily basis in April and May 1994, including an April 23
>analysis that Rwandan rebels will continue fighting to "stop the
>genocide, which...is spreading south";
>
>* The State Department's intelligence briefing for Secretary
>Christopher and other top officials saw in Rwanda "genocide and
>partition" as early as April 26, reporting declarations of "a
>'final solution' to eliminate all Tutsis", but the U.S. did not
>officially declare the killing genocide until May 25;
>
>* U.S. officials, including Secretary Christopher and Secretary
>Perry, met with and telephoned counterparts such as UN Secretary
>General Boutros-Ghali, Gen. Romeo Dallaire, and French Foreign
>Minister Alain Juppe throughout the crisis, with Gen. Dallaire
>pleading with USAID head Brian Atwood that "without U.S. equipment,
>UNAMIR can do virtually nothing" to save civilians in Rwanda;
>
>* U.S. officials met throughout April and May with human rights and
>humanitarian agency representatives concerned with Rwanda,
>including a May 17 meeting where International Committee of the Red
>Cross official Jean de Courten told State Department Under
>Secretary Timothy Wirth the "mass killings" in Rwanda compared to
>the "genocide in Cambodia".
>
>Archive consulting fellow William Ferroggiaro, who wrote the report
>and obtained the documents through the U.S. Freedom of Information
>Act, said, "The documents show that despite Rwanda's relative
>unimportance to U.S. interests and despite other crises demanding
>their attention, U.S. officials had the capacity and resources to
>know what was happening in Rwanda. In a sense, the system worked:
>Diplomats, intelligence agencies, defense and military
>officials--even aid workers--provided timely information up the
>chain to President Clinton and his top advisors. That the Clinton
>Administration decided against intervention at any level was not
>for lack of knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda."
>
>Ferroggiaro also serves as a research consultant to "Ghosts of
>Rwanda", a special two-hour Frontline documentary that will be
>broadcast on PBS on April 1, 2004.
>
>For the report, go to: http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117
>
>The National Security Archive is an independent non-governmental
>research institute and library located at The George Washington
>University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes
>declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information
>Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no
>U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication
>royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.
>
>**************************************************************
>
>The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
>
>Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response
>
>by William Ferroggiaro
>
>March 24, 2004
>
>[excerpts: for full report, including footnotes and images of
>documents, see http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117]
>
>Background
>
>Ten years ago this week, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
>African Affairs Prudence Bushnell visited Rwanda and Burundi. Her
>visit-one of many visits by State Department and Defense Department
>officials in the preceding year-served dual purposes: to pressure
>Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, his government and
>opposition groups to form a transitional government and to gather
>information for policymakers back home. Such diplomatic activity
>was emblematic of the resources and attention committed to Rwanda
>despite its relative unimportance to U.S. interests.
>
>In their hour-long meeting, Bushnell told Habyarimana that "Rwanda
>was in an historic transition, one which historians would record as
>being glorious, or ignominious and tragic." She observed that U.S.
>support of UN peacekeeping in Rwanda was in jeopardy and that
>"Rwanda was losing funding" from the U.S. "with each day of delay".
>Both Bushnell and her colleague, Central Africa office director
>Arlene Render, registered their "deep concern over the mounting
>violence in Rwanda", as well as "the distribution of arms and arms
>caches". While the president had earlier dismissed the
>power-sharing agreement to his followers (Note 1), he told his U.S.
>visitors that he "supported the Arusha Accord and would continue to
>do so" but was "greatly disquieted" by the "current political
>atmosphere". The next day, the officials met with rebel Rwandan
>Patriotic Front leaders who "blamed the President for the impasse".
>Document 1 Kigali 01316, 25 Mar 94
>
>Bushnell and Render's immediate efforts were in vain. Two weeks
>later, upon returning from a regional summit, the plane carrying
>Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot
>down as it approached Kigali, effectively kicking off a genocide.
>From April to July 1994, Hutu extremists in the Rwandan government,
>military and militias killed more than 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi and
>moderate Hutu in an attempt to preserve a chauvinistic, one-party
>state and prevent the establishment of the transition government
>called for in the 1993 Arusha Accords. However, Bushnell's visit
>served to educate her and U.S. officials about the situation in
>Rwanda, such that she understood and so informed Secretary of State
>Warren Christopher that the assassination of the two presidents
>would lead to "widespread violence - in either or both countries".
>(Note 2)
>
>As horrific as the killing was in Rwanda, the U.S. did not see its
>interests affected enough to launch unilateral intervention.
>President Clinton himself best articulated his Administration's
>calculus during D-Day commemorations in France on June 7 saying of
>U.S. humanitarian relief efforts on Rwanda "I think that is about
>all we can do at this time when we have troops in Korea, troops in
>Europe, the possibility of new commitments in Bosnia if we can
>achieve a peace agreement, and also when we are working very hard
>to try to put the U.N. agreement in Haiti back on track, which was
>broken." (Note 3) While some countries argued early for action, few
>actually ever brought any means to bear-the "lack of resources and
>political commitment" was "a failure by the United Nations system
>as a whole" as the Independent Inquiry on the UN noted. (Note 4)
>The U.S. did not encourage a UN response because it saw two
>potential outcomes: the authorization of a new UN force and a new
>mandate without the means to implement either; and worse, the very
>real possibility of the U.S. having to bail out a failed UN
>mission. For the recently-burned Clinton Administration, this
>looked like Somalia redux.
>
>Nevertheless, throughout the crisis, considerable U.S.
>resources-diplomatic, intelligence and military-and sizable
>bureaucracies of the U.S. government-were trained on Rwanda. This
>system collected and analyzed information and sent it up to
>decision-makers so that all options could be properly considered
>and 'on the table'. Officials, particularly at the middle levels,
>sometimes met twice daily, drafting demarches, preparing press
>statements, meeting or speaking with foreign counterparts and other
>interlocutors, and briefing higher-ups. Indeed, the story of Rwanda
>for the U.S. is that officials knew so much, but still decided
>against taking action or leading other nations to prevent or stop
>the genocide. Despite Rwanda's low ranking in importance to U.S.
>interests, Clinton Administration officials had tremendous capacity
>to be informed--and were informed--about the slaughter there; as
>noted author Samantha Power writes "any failure to fully appreciate
>the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative
>weaknesses, not informational ones." (Note 5)
>
>This report examines the information and intelligence resources
>available to and relied upon by policymakers during the Rwanda
>crisis. It also highlights the structure and personalities of U.S.
>decision-making during that late spring of 1994 when hundreds of
>thousands were killed as the U.S. and other nations stood by.
>
>Who Produced the Information?
>
>[includes details on extensive information available to U.S.
>officials through diplomatic, intelligence, and military sources.
>]
>
>Who Used the Information?
>
>The President and Vice President
>
>As the top elected official in the country and as the
>Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, President Bill Clinton had
>access to any item of information created by U.S. diplomatic,
>defense or intelligence organizations and could also order the
>production of any report, analysis or memo by these same
>Departments and agencies. Vice President Al Gore, who had a close
>working relationship with the President and whose long experience
>in foreign affairs and defense issues was much relied upon, could
>also review or call for production of any conceivable information.
>For example, both received and reviewed the President's Daily Brief
>produced by the CIA. In addition, Cabinet officials and others
>reported up to the President and Vice President. ... Besides
>official communications, the President had access to all varieties
>of information. This April 21 letter from Rwandan human rights
>activist Monique Mujawamariya, whom the President had welcomed to
>the White House in December 1993, implored President Clinton to act
>against the "campaign" of "genocide against the Tutsis", reminding
>him that the U.S. "has a moral and legal treaty obligation to
>'suppress and prevent' genocide." Document 47 Mujawamariya Letter
>to the President, 21 Apr 94 ...
>
>[report includes additional detail on the National Security
>Council, the "Principals Committee," the "Deputies Committee," and
>"Interagency Working Groups," and the "Interagency Task Force."]
>
>Excerpt on NSC:
>
>Serving the NSC are directorates to coordinate the work of the
>agencies and monitor U.S. policy, which vary in size and influence
>depending on the issue (in early 1994, nine officials were assigned
>to Europe and the former Soviet Union, two to Africa). NSC Staff
>Director Nancy Soderberg monitored the work of the directorates and
>handled issues upon which she had particular expertise. During the
>Rwanda crisis, the Senior Director for African Affairs was Donald
>Steinberg, a career Foreign Service Officer with experience in
>South Africa, in trade issues, on Capitol Hill, and most recently
>with the press operation. His deputy, serving as Director for
>African Affairs, was MacArthur "Mac" Deshazer. The Directorate for
>Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs handled peacekeeping, among
>other issues; it was headed by Senior Director Richard Clarke, an
>experienced bureaucratic insider who had previously served the Bush
>Administration in the critical position of Assistant Secretary of
>State for Politico-Military Affairs. His deputy active on Rwanda
>during the crisis was Director Susan Rice, who would go on to serve
>the second Clinton Administration as Assistant Secretary of State
>for African Affairs.
>
>Excerpt on Deputies Committee:
>
>The President also directed the establishment of the Deputies
>Committee "as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum" on national
>security policy to "vet" issues and options for the full NSC and
>Principals Committee, to monitor "policy implementation", and to
>lead "day-to-day crisis management". (Note 31)  During the
>Rwanda crisis, Deputies Committee members were deputy National
>Security Advisor Sandy Berger as Chair; Under Secretary of Defense
>for Policy Frank Wisner; Under Secretary of State for Political
>Affairs Peter Tarnoff; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Adm.
>William Studeman; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm.
>William Owens, USN; the Vice President's national security advisor
>Leon Fuerth; and others, including by invitation. (Note 32)
>In this April 28th memo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
>African Affairs Bushnell briefed Under Secretary of State Tarnoff
>for his participation in the April 29 Deputies meeting, emphasizing
>that State should "share information" it has gained and should push
>to secure assistance for Rwanda "after the current crisis passes."
>Nevertheless, she advised Tarnoff, "killing of civilians apparently
>continues." Document 50 Bushnell Memo to Tarnoff, 28 Apr 94
>  Given their responsibilities, the Deputies met
>frequently, upon direction by Mr. Berger. The Administration's new
>peacekeeping policy also required Deputies Committee review and
>approval of the U.S. position in the UN Security Council whenever
>there was consideration of a new peacekeeping operation or revision
>of an existing one. Consequently, because the UN assistance mission
>for Rwanda (UNAMIR) figured prominently in the crisis, this
>high-level group met many times on Rwanda.
>
>Excerpt on Inter-agency task force:
>
>Beginning in April and continuing throughout the crisis, an
>inter-agency task force met to coordinate policy and activities
>during the crisis. As its name suggests, this group, with more
>fluid membership, included officials from the NSC, State
>Department, USAID, defense agencies, and intelligence
>organizations, and was regularly chaired by NSC officials,
>including Richard Clarke, or Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
>Prudence Bushnell. Concerned solely with Rwanda, it was the most
>active policy grouping on Rwanda, meeting at least daily, receiving
>intelligence briefings and discussing practical actions and
>initiatives. This memorandum of the inter-agency group's May 12th
>meeting, which was called to develop a policy position for Deputies
>Committee approval concerning an expanded UNAMIR, demonstrates the
>bureaucratic input process at the mid-level-and also the serious
>policy differences between the NSC, State Department and the Joint
>Staff. As the Department of Defense representative noted, "we were
>unable to get anyone to say they would use the word Chapter VII"
>for the "mission statement"-the key Pentagon contention, challenged
>by none other than Gen. Dallaire, that Rwanda would require robust
>peace enforcement operations (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) as
>opposed to peacekeeping (Chapter VI). Document 52 Rwanda IWG, ca.
>12 May 94
>
>Conclusion
>
>In analyzing the sources and scope of information and intelligence,
>it also important to consider the ground-level reporting provided
>by journalists in Rwanda and in the region. Analysts in Washington
>often looked first to the newswires before getting confirmation of
>events from diplomatic, intelligence or military sources. Indeed,
>beginning April 8th, the massacres in Rwanda were reported on the
>front pages of major newspapers and on radio and television
>broadcasts almost daily, including the major papers read by U.S.
>officials and policy elites. (Note 34) In Rwanda, UNAMIR Force
>Commander Dallaire understood the power of the news media; despite
>his other responsibilities, he devoted considerable effort and
>resources so that a few journalists could get the story to the
>outside world, reasoning that a "reporter with a line to the West
>was worth a battalion on the ground." (Note 35) Information
>reported publicly from Rwanda not only informed policymakers in
>their decision-making, but led to pressure for intervention at
>least in France. As the following U.S. Embassy Paris telegram
>indicates, "the most consistent and readily identifiable element in
>the GOF decision to intervene was the cumulative effect of French
>journalists reporting". "Televised images of the slaughter", in
>particular, had important "effect on GOF Africanists". Document 53
>Paris 17431, 24 Jun 94
>
>Departments, agencies and military organizations of the U.S.
>government provided necessary information up to policymakers for
>their discussions and decisions during the Rwanda crisis. Although
>stated policy was that Rwanda did not affect traditional vital or
>national interests before or even during the genocide, considerable
>resources were nevertheless available and employed to ensure that
>policymakers had real-time information for any decision they would
>make. In sum, the routine-let alone crisis-performance of
>diplomats, intelligence officers and systems, and military and
>defense personnel yielded enough information for policy
>recommendations and decisions. That the Clinton Administration
>decided against intervention at any level was not for lack of
>knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda.
>
>*************************************************************
>AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
>providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
>a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
>Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus at igc.org. Please
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>
>************************************************************


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu