[Peace-discuss] The truth about Iraqi WMDs

[ppatton at uiuc.edu]

U.S. Report Finds No Evidence of Iraq WMD

By KEN GUGGENHEIM

WASHINGTON (AP) - Contradicting the main argument for a war 
that has cost more than 1,000 American lives, the top U.S. 
arms inspector said Wednesday he found no evidence that Iraq 
produced any weapons of mass destruction after 1991. He also 
concluded that Saddam Hussein's capabilities to develop such 
weapon had dimmed - not grown - during a dozen years of 
sanctions before last year's U.S. invasion.

Contrary to prewar statements by President Bush and top 
administration officials, Saddam did not have chemical and 
biological stockpiles when the war began and his nuclear 
capabilities were deteriorating, not advancing, said Charles 
Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group.

The findings come less than four weeks before an election in 
which Bush's handling of Iraq has become the central issue. 
Democratic candidate John Kerry has seized on comments by the 
former U.S. administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, that the 
United States did not have enough troops in Iraq to prevent 
lawlessness after Saddam was toppled.

The inspector's report could boost Kerry's contention that 
Bush rushed to war based on faulty intelligence and that 
United Nations sanctions and U.N. weapons inspectors should 
have been given more time.

But Duelfer also supports Bush's argument that Saddam 
remained a threat. Interviews with the toppled leader and 
other former Iraqi officials made clear that Saddam had not 
lost his ambition to pursue weapons of mass destruction and 
hoped to revive his weapons program if U.N. sanctions were 
lifted, his report said.

``What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of use of 
force, and had experiences that demonstrated the utility of 
WMD,'' Duelfer told Congress.

Campaigning in Pennsylvania, Bush defended the decision to 
invade.

``There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would 
pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist 
networks,'' Bush said in a speech in Wilkes Barre, Pa. ``In 
the world after Sept. 11, that was a risk we could not afford 
to take.''

But a top Democrat in Congress, Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, 
said Duelfer's findings undercut the two main arguments for 
war: that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and that he 
would share them with terrorists like al-Qaida.

``We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions 
to obtain weapons of mass destruction,'' said Levin, ranking 
Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Under questioning from Levin, Duelfer said his report found 
that aluminum tubes suspected of being used for enriching 
uranium for use in a nuclear bomb were likely destined for 
conventional rockets and that there is no evidence Iraq 
sought uranium abroad after 1991. Both findings contradict 
claims made by Bush and other top administration officials 
before the war the Bush administration before the war.

He also found no evidence of trailers being used to develop 
biological weapons, Duelfer said, although he said he 
couldn't flatly declare that none existed.

Traveling in Africa, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said 
the report shows Saddam was ``doing his best'' to evade the 
U.N. sanctions.

Duelfer presented his findings in a report of more than 1,000 
pages, and in appearances before the Armed Services Committee 
and the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The report avoids direct comparisons with prewar claims by 
the Bush administration on Iraq's weapons systems. But 
Duelfer largely reinforces the conclusions of his 
predecessor, David Kay, who said in January, ``We were almost 
all wrong'' on Saddam's weapons programs. The White House did 
not endorse Kay's findings then, noting Duelfer's team was 
still searching for weapons.

Duelfer found that Saddam, hoping to end U.N. sanctions, 
gradually began ending prohibited weapons programs starting 
in 1991. But as Iraq started receiving money through the U.N. 
oil-for-food program in the late 1990s, and as enforcement of 
the sanctions weakened, Saddam was able to take steps to 
rebuild his military, such as acquiring parts for missile 
systems.

However, the erosion of sanctions stopped after the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks, Duelfer found, preventing Saddam from pursuing 
weapons of mass destruction.

``He was making progress in eroding sanctions - a lot of 
sanctions,'' Duelfer told Congress. ``And had it not been for 
the events of 9-11-2001, things would have taken a very 
different course for the regime.''

Duelfer's team found no written plans by Saddam's regime to 
pursue banned weapons if U.N. sanctions were lifted. Instead, 
the inspectors based their findings that Saddam hoped to 
reconstitute his programs on interviews with Saddam after his 
capture, as well as talks with other top Iraqi officials.

The inspectors found Saddam was particularly concerned about 
the threat posed by Iran, the country's enemy in a 1980-88 
war. Saddam said he would meet Iran's threat by any means 
necessary, which Duelfer understood to mean weapons of mass 
destruction.

Saddam believed his use of chemical weapons against Iran 
prevented Iraq's defeat in that war. He also was prepared to 
use such weapons in 1991 if the U.S.-led coalition had tried 
to topple him in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Tuesday that 
Saddam was ``a gathering threat that needed to be taken 
seriously, that it was a matter of time before he was going 
to begin pursuing those weapons of mass destruction.''

But before the war, the Bush administration cast Saddam as an 
immediate threat, not a gathering threat.

For example, Bush said in October 2002 that ``Saddam Hussein 
still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing 
his capabilities to make more.'' Bush also said then, ``The 
evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear 
weapons program.''

Interviews with Saddam left Duelfer's team with the 
impression Saddam was more concerned about Iran and Israel as 
enemies than he was about the United States. Saddam appeared 
to hold out hope that U.S. leaders ultimately would recognize 
that it was in the country's interest to deal with Iraq as an 
important, secular, oil-rich Middle Eastern nation, the 
report found.

On the Net:

Key findings from the report are available at:

http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/041006keyfindings.pdf