[Peace-discuss] Piecing together the story of the weapons that weren't

[Paul Patton]

This is from USA Today. For once, the mainstream media is doing its job!
-Paul Patton


Piecing together the story of the weapons that weren't By Charles J. Hanley
Beneath the giant dome of a Baghdad palace, facing his team of scientists 
and engineers, George Tenet sounded more like a football coach than a 
spymaster, a coach who didn't know the game was over. 
    Weapons of mass destruction were not found by these U.N. weapons 
inspectors, right, in Baghdad Feb. 5, 2003, nor since.   By David 
Guttenfelder, AP  

"Are we 85% done?" the CIA boss demanded. The arms hunters knew what he 
wanted to hear. "No!" they shouted back. "Let me hear it again!" They 
shouted again. 

The weapons are out there, Tenet insisted. Go find them. 

Veteran inspector Rod Barton couldn't believe his ears. "It was nonsense," 
the Australian biologist said of that February evening last year, when the 
then-chief of U.S. intelligence secretly flew to Baghdad and dropped in on 
the lakeside Perfume Palace, chandelier-hung home of the Iraq Survey Group. 

"It wasn't that we didn't know the major answers," recalled Barton, whose 
account matched that of another key participant. "Are there WMD in the 
country? We knew the answers." 

In fact, David Kay, quitting as chief of the U.S. hunt for WMD, or weapons 
of mass destruction, had just delivered the answer to the world. The 
inspectors were 85% finished, Kay said, concluding: "The weapons do not 
exist." 

The story of the weapons that weren't there, the prelude to war, was over, 
but a long post-mortem is still unfolding — of lingering questions in 
Washington, of revelations from investigations, leaks, first-person 
accounts. Some 52% of Americans believe the Bush administration deliberately 
misled them about the presence of banned arms in Iraq, according to a
*Washington
Post*-ABC News poll taken in June. 

Hans Blix, U.N. inspector, says Washington's "virtual reality" about Iraq 
eventually collided with "our old-fashioned ordinary reality." Now, drawing 
from findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other official investigations, 
from U.N., U.S., Iraqi and British documents, from Associated Press 
interviews and on-scene reporting, from books by Blix and others, it's 
possible to reconstruct much of the "ordinary reality" of this extraordinary 
story, one that has changed the course of history. 
    By Mario Tama/Getty Images  U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, left, and 
Hans Blix listen Colin Powell make a case against Iraq Feb. 5, 2003. Blix 
battled U.S. impatience for war while leading inspections in Iraq.    

*Destroyed in 1991*

The story could begin behind the creamy stone walls of another palace, the 
hilltop Hashemiyah outside Amman, Jordan, where in August 1995 a prize Iraqi 
defector was pouring out for interrogators whatever they wanted to know 
about Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction. 

Hussein Kamel, son-in-law of President Saddam Hussein, had headed Iraq's 
advanced arms programs during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, when the 
Baathist regime unleashed chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Iraqi 
civilians in rebellious Kurdish areas. 

What the U.N., American and other debriefers learned from Kamel led to 
headline-making successes for U.N. inspectors as they tracked down banned 
arms-making gear inside Iraq. 

But an interrogation transcript shows he told them something else as well, 
something they questioned and kept to themselves: All Iraqi WMD were 
destroyed in 1991. 

Hussein Kamel, soon to be killed by fellow clansmen as a traitor, was 
telling the truth. 

The U.N. experts had entered Iraq in 1991, after U.S.-led forces drove 
Iraq's invasion army from Kuwait in a lightning war, and the U.N. Security 
Council required the defeated nation to submit to inspections and 
destruction of its unconventional arms. 

The inspectors withdrew in late 1998, in a dispute over access to sites. By 
then, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teams could report that 
Iraq's nuclear program, which never built a bomb, had been dismantled. As 
for chemical and biological weapons, only scattered questions remained about 
possible hidden stockpiles. 

In fact, as President George W. Bush took office 25 months later, the CIA 
was reporting, "We do not have any direct evidence" Baghdad was rebuilding 
its WMD programs. 

*Baghdad on his mind*

Bush, however, concentrated on Iraq's capital.

The new president quickly called an inner Cabinet meeting to discuss Iraq as 
a destabilizing force in the Mideast, ex-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill 
recalls in the book, *The Price of Loyalty*. Tenet unrolled a grainy 
satellite photo of an Iraqi factory, suggested it was making banned weapons, 
but said his CIA didn't really know, O'Neill said. 

Washington and Baghdad had glowered at each other throughout Bill Clinton's 
presidency, but for a decade it was largely a cold war. Now Bush was ending 
this White House meeting by ordering Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to 
study possible military action, O'Neill said. Soon U.S. policymakers began 
hearing more about Iraq. 

In April 2001, Pentagon intelligence said satellites spotted construction at 
old nuclear sites. Was Iraq resuming bomb research? That same month a CIA 
report told of another "indicator": Iraq was shopping for thousands of 
high-strength aluminum tubes, said to be useful as cores of centrifuges to 
enrich uranium, the stuff of atom bombs. 

Then a shipment of the tubes was intercepted in neighboring Jordan, news 
that upset Baghdad's military industry chief. Abdel Tawab Huweish needed 
those tubes — 3 feet long, 3 inches wide — to make standard artillery 
rockets. He now ordered another metal be found, one that wouldn't arouse U.S. 
suspicions, Huweish later told U.S. arms investigators. 

On April 11, 2001, a day after the classified CIA report was distributed, 
the Energy Department filed a swift dissent. Energy, home of U.S. centrifuge 
specialists, said the tubes' dimensions weren't well-suited for centrifuges, 
and were more likely meant for artillery rockets. The U.N. nuclear agency, 
the Vienna-based IAEA, told U.S. officials the same. 

Evidence shows Iraq in 2001 had little interest in nuclear "reconstitution." 
In one captured document from that May, Iraqi diplomats in Kenya reported to 
Baghdad that a Ugandan businessman had offered uranium for sale, but they 
turned him away, saying U.N. sanctions forbade it. 

*Other 'indicators' surface*

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for months had been receiving reports 
from German intelligence about an Iraqi defector, code-named "Curveball," 
who claimed to have worked on a project to build concealed bioweapons labs 
atop truck trailers. 

Around this time, in June 2001, the trailers that U.S. officials later 
thought confirmed his account were ordered built at the al-Kindi factory in 
northern Iraq, inspectors would learn. Contract No. 73/MD/RG/2001 called not 
for secret weapons labs, however, but for two trailer units to make hydrogen 
for weather balloons. By this time, too, U.S. intelligence had been informed 
that Curveball was a possible alcoholic and "out of control." 

The tubes tale, Curveball's account and other questionable stories about 
Iraqi WMD would survive for two years, in presidential speeches and 
newspaper headlines, on the road to war. 

For now, in the summer of 2001, Iraq was back-page news. But Condoleezza 
Rice, national security adviser, assured an interviewer, "Saddam Hussein is 
on the radar screen." By summer's end, in the traumatic aftermath of Sept. 
11's terror, he was in the crosshairs. 

*Post-9/11*

On the day after Sept. 11, the talk in the White House Situation Room was of 
"getting Iraq," says former White House anti-terrorism chief Richard A. 
Clarke. Clarke's memoir says an insistent Bush ordered him to look for "any 
shred" to tie Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks — even though U.S. agencies knew 
al-Qaeda was responsible and Iraq wasn't linked to the terror group. 
   By Alex Wong, AFP/Getty Images  Joseph Wilson, whose wife is former CIA 
agent Valerie Plame that sparked the Karl Rove leak scandal, reported that 
the story of Iraq receiving uranium from Nigeria was unfounded.    

The immediate target was Afghanistan, however, invaded by U.S. forces in 
October 2001, and as 2002 began the WMD case against Iraq remained 
unimpressive. In his annual unclassified review, Tenet didn't even cite 
evidence of an imminent Iraqi nuclear threat. But Vice President Dick Cheney 
apparently thought he'd found such evidence, in a DIA report. 

It told of a deal in 2000 in which Iraq bought 500 tons of uranium 
concentrate from Niger in central Africa. The information came from Italian 
intelligence, based on what it said was an official Niger document. Because 
of Cheney's interest, the CIA dispatched a seasoned Africa hand, ex-diplomat 
Joseph Wilson, to Niger to check it out. 

After dozens of interviews, Wilson reported back that the story appeared 
unfounded. The State Department's intelligence bureau also deemed it 
implausible. In addition, the text of the supposed Niger document, 
transcribed for the Americans by the Italians, contained misspellings and 
mistaken titles for people that should have been easily detectable. 

It was a forgery. But "Niger uranium" had won a place in the case against 
Iraq. 

*Building a coalition*

In Iraq itself, the government was far from resurrecting a bomb program: In 
April 2002 workers in the western desert were busy smelting down the last 
gear from a long-defunct uranium-enrichment project, U.S. inspectors later 
learned. 

Around this time, U.S. satellite reconnaissance was doubled over suspected 
Iraqi WMD sites, and analysts soon reported stepped-up activity, suggesting 
renewed production, at possible chemical weapons factories. What they 
apparently didn't realize, however, was that activity was being photographed 
more frequently — not that there necessarily was more activity. 

The White House, meanwhile, worked on a political plan. 

Leaked British documents show that Prime Minister Tony Blair told Bush at 
his Texas ranch in April 2002 that London would support military action to 
oust Saddam. But the British set conditions: Washington should seek re-entry 
of U.N. inspectors — which Saddam was expected to refuse — and then Security 
Council authorization for war. 

Blair's Cabinet fretted. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in the secret minutes 
of a July 2002 meeting, observed that the case for war was "thin" but Bush 
had made up his mind. Intelligence chief Richard Dearlove, fresh from 
high-level Washington talks, also told the 10 Downing St. session that war 
had become inevitable, and U.S. intelligence was being "fixed" around this 
policy. 

Blair and U.S. officials now deny war was predetermined and intelligence 
"fixed" to that end. From midsummer 2002 on, however, the Bush 
administration sharply stepped up its anti-Iraq rhetoric, along with U.S. 
air attacks on Iraqi defenses, done under cover of patrols over the "no-fly 
zones," swaths of Iraqi airspace denied to Iraqi aircraft. It also stepped 
up its citing of questionable intelligence. 

As early as July 29, Rumsfeld spoke publicly of reports of Iraqi bioweapons 
labs "on wheels in a trailer" that can "make a lot of bad stuff." 

A second Iraqi exile source had echoed Curveball's talk of such trailers. He 
was judged a fabricator by the CIA in early 2002, but by July his statements 
were back in classified U.S. reports. As for Curveball, whose veracity was 
never checked by the DIA, within three months his German handlers would be 
telling the CIA he was unreliable, a "waste of time." 

As the summer wore on, Cheney struck an urgent, unequivocal tone in public. 

"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of 
mass destruction," the vice president told veterans assembled at an Opryland 
hotel in Nashville. 

In an unusual move, Cheney shuttled to the CIA through mid-2002 to visit 
analysts 10 times, according to Patricia Wald, a member of the presidential 
investigative commission headed by Judge Laurence Silberman and ex-U.S. Sen. 
Charles Robb. The commission concluded analysts "worked in an environment 
that did not encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom." 

*Strong as aluminum*

That conventional wisdom took on more urgency on Sunday, Sept. 8, 2002, when 
the lead article in *The New York Times*, citing unnamed administration 
officials, said Iraq "has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make 
an atomic bomb." 

The "tubes" story had been resurrected. Condoleezza Rice went on the TV talk 
circuit that morning saying the tubes were suited only for uranium 
centrifuges. Four days later in New York, President Bush was at the marble 
podium of the U.N. General Assembly, demanding the world body take action on 
Iraq or become "irrelevant." He, too, cited the aluminum tubes — proof of 
danger. 

But neither the *Times* story nor administration officials hinted at the 
background debate over whether the tubes, in reality, were meant for 
Huweish's rockets. In fact, a CIA officer had recently suggested obtaining 
dimensions of an Italian rocket on which the Iraqi design was based, to 
compare them with the tubes. His idea was rejected. 

As U.S. officials built up the threat, Saddam handed them a surprise: Iraq 
would allow Blix's U.N. inspectors back unconditionally. 

Bush promptly labeled the Sept. 16 announcement a "ploy." But Iraq's foreign 
minister, Naji Sabri, told the General Assembly his country was "totally 
clear" of banned arms. 

*White Paper and not read*

Democratic senators, wary as war momentum built in Washington, demanded a 
comprehensive intelligence report on Iraq. The CIA and other agencies 
patched together a classified National Intelligence Estimate, made available 
to lawmakers in early October. 

Its unclassified version, a 25-page White Paper, was packed with 
"probablys," "mays" and "coulds," uncertainties that somehow led to 
certainties: "Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction programs," 
and "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons." 

It would eventually emerge that the DIA, a month before the White Paper, had 
reported there was "no reliable information" on Iraqi chemical weapons 
production, and it didn't know the nature, amounts or condition of any 
biological weapons. 

Across the Atlantic, Blair's government issued an assessment like the U.S. 
estimate, with conclusions unsupported by evidence. 

"We were told there was other intelligence that we, the experts, could not 
see," senior British government analyst Brian Jones has since said. It later 
became clear such intelligence never existed, Jones said. 

The Australian biologist Barton, a 1990s weapons inspector who by 2002 was a 
top Blix aide, was amazed at the British report's unexplained claim that 
Iraq could "deploy" chemical or biological weapons "within 45 minutes" — a 
claim picked up by Bush in a radio address. 

Over an Irish-pub dinner in New York, Barton asked old friend David Kelly, a 
British bioweapons specialist, how he could have allowed something "so 
silly" in the report. "He just shook his head and said something like, 
'People put in what they want to put in,'" Barton recalled. 

Months later Kelly would commit suicide, caught in a political furor as a 
source for news reports that the WMD dossier was "sexed up." 

The 93-page classified U.S. report had more qualifiers than the White Paper. 
But Wald says her commission learned that only 17 Congress members read the 
lengthier estimate. On Oct. 10-11, the two houses voted overwhelmingly to 
authorize Bush to use military force against Iraq. 

*U.N. debunking*

Then the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted Nov. 8 to send Blix's 
inspectors to Iraq with expanded powers. It denied Washington "trigger" 
authority, however, to attack if the Americans deemed Iraq in violation of 
the resolution. 

Blix knew U.S. leaders were impatient. In his book on the crisis, he writes 
that he met with Cheney at the White House and was told inspections could 
not go on forever, and Washington "was ready to discredit inspections in 
favor of disarmament" — that is, forcible disarmament. 

On Nov. 27, 2002, the U.N. teams returned to Iraq. Springing surprise 
inspections across the countryside, the experts soon were debunking U.S. 
claims. At the Fallujah II chemical plant, for example, caught in a 
satellite's camera lens in the October U.S. estimate, they found the 
production line long broken-down. 

By December, Saddam was informing senior generals in secret meetings that 
Iraq truly had no chemical or biological arms, U.S. investigators later 
learned. Baghdad's troops would have to fight without them. 

Back in Washington, WMD "indicators" were being further undercut. "The 
Administration will ultimately look foolish — i.e. the tubes and Niger!" an 
Energy Department analyst told a colleague in an e-mail later uncovered by 
Senate Intelligence Committee investigators. 

*State of the Union*

Preparing for Bush's 2003 State of the Union address, and sensing the 
weakness, Rice's national security staff asked the CIA for more. It 
responded with the report of a Niger uranium sale. 
   By Tim Dillon, USA TODAY  President Bush used shaky information in his 
State of the Union address in 2003. Vice President Dick Cheney, back, later 
told a TV audience that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons.    

That story had grown still more dubious since Wilson's Niger visit 11 months 
earlier. 

In October 2002, the State Department had obtained a copy of the original 
"Niger document." Its analysts told sister agencies they suspected forgery, 
and in mid-January alerted all that it "probably is a hoax." In October, 
too, Tenet had warned Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, against using the 
alleged uranium sale in a Bush speech. 

This time, however, Hadley accepted the uranium nugget — though attributed 
to the British — to bolster the State of the Union speech. 

The tubes story also had slipped deeper into murkiness. State Department 
intelligence was siding with Energy in viewing them as likely rocket 
casings. The CIA arranged for centrifuge-like testing of the tubes in 
January, and they seemed to fail, only to supposedly pass after a 
"correction" was made. 

On Jan. 28, 2003, with the world listening, Bush delivered his annual 
address. 

"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa," he said. "Our intelligence 
sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum 
tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." 

The U.S. chief executive also claimed Iraq had mobile bioweapons labs, but 
this story of Curveball's would fall further apart in the coming days. 

On Feb. 3, 2003, word went up the CIA ladder that this Iraqi informant's 
German handlers "cannot vouch for the validity of the information." The next 
day, Senate investigators found, a CIA superior e-mailed a worried analyst 
that "this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or 
didn't say." 

*Mr. Powell goes from Washington*

The timing was critical — the eve of a pivotal presentation by Colin Powell. 

    By Mario Tama/Getty Images  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell held 
a vial of anthrax in trying to demonstrate to the U.N. Feb. 5, 2003 the 
threat Iraq posed. Powell has said the administration was deteremined in the 
case.    

That next morning, at the U.N. Security Council's horseshoe table, with CIA 
chief Tenet behind him, the secretary of state delivered an 80-minute 
indictment of Iraq, complete with aluminum tubes, up to "500 tons of 
chemical weapons agent," and artist's conceptions of Curveball's 
questionable "mobile labs." 

Powell's sources went unidentified, tapes of intercepted conversation were 
cryptic, claims made about satellite photos were uncorroborated. 

It turned out the State Department's own analysts had warned, futilely, 
against saying vehicles in spy photos were chemical "decontamination 
trucks," since they might be simple water trucks. And a senior CIA officer 
has told investigators he raised the Curveball concerns with Tenet the night 
before the speech, something Tenet denies. 

After watching the performance on CNN in Baghdad, Amer al-Saadi, Iraqi 
liaison for the inspections, lamented that "the fiction goes on. It goes on 
and on." 

But Powell's sober authority worked in America, where support for action 
soared. 

*Staunch against 'So-called inspections'*

On the ground in Iraq, meanwhile, Blix's inspectors grew frustrated at the 
Iraqis' failure to explain leftover discrepancies from the 1990s. The chief 
inspector emphasized, however, that "unaccounted for" didn't necessarily 
mean weapons existed. 

In one example, former Iraqi bioweapons specialists would eventually tell 
U.S. arms hunters that they never documented destruction of one batch of 
their anthrax in 1991 because it was dumped near a Saddam palace. They 
feared the dictator's wrath. 

By January 2003, the experts from Blix's U.N. commission and Mohamed 
ElBaradei's IAEA had inspected 13 major "facilities of concern" from the 
previous fall's U.S. and British reports, and found no signs of 
weapons-making. The IAEA publicly exposed the Niger document as a forgery, 
and found the aluminum tubes poor candidates for centrifuges. Checking 
supposed sites for manufacturing mobile labs, Blix's teams debunked 
Curveball's tale at the Iraq end. 

Washington was unmoved. Administration loyalists dismissed the "so-called 
inspections." In late February 2003, a Powell aide sternly told Blix nothing 
would suffice short of Iraq's unveiling its "secret hide sites." Most 
significantly, Bush ordered no reassessment of his government's collapsing 
claims. 

Blix told the Security Council he could complete the work within months. The 
White House wasn't interested. "More time, more inspectors, more process, in 
our judgment, is not going to affect the peace of the world," Bush said on 
March 6, as the Pentagon counted down toward war. 

Cheney at one point even told a TV audience — without challenge from the 
host — that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Of ElBaradei, whose IAEA refuted 
the claims about uranium and tubes, Cheney said, "I think Mr. ElBaradei, 
frankly, is wrong." But the CIA had already accepted ElBaradei's judgment on 
the Niger uranium document. 

*WMDs: 'That is what this war was about'*

On March 17, in New York, U.S. diplomats gave up trying to win Security 
Council backing for war. That evening, on television, Bush told the American 
people there was "no doubt" Iraq had "some of the most lethal weapons ever 
devised." 

The bombing began two days later, and as U.S. troops swept up the Tigris and 
Euphrates plain to easy victory, they searched for WMD. "We know where they 
are," Rumsfeld claimed on March 30. But despite a flurry of false "finds" by 
eager troops, they weren't there. 

Finally, on April 19, U.S. weapons hunters celebrated: An equipment-packed 
truck trailer had been seized in northern Iraq. 
   By Patrick Baz, AFP/Getty Images  A U.S. bomb explodes in Baghdad March 
20, 2003.    

Just before the war, al-Kindi company technicians had tested the unit and it 
worked, its tubes spewing hydrogen for weather balloons. They could deliver 
on the 2001 contract. To empty-handed U.S. analysts, however, the vehicle 
and a second trailer looked like the artist's conception of Curveball's 
mobile labs, ready to concoct killer germs. 

The White House embraced this illusion. "We found the weapons of mass 
destruction. We found biological laboratories," President Bush assured 
Polish television on May 29. By then, however, experts had tested a trailer 
and found no trace of pathogens or toxins. 

"They have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about," 
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said on April 10. But soon the 
Washington line shifted to claims Iraq had not weapons, but WMD "programs" — 
also untrue, inspectors later certified. Then the war was framed as one to 
democratize Iraq. 

Through 2003, Iraqis watched their land slip into a chaos of looting, terror 
bombings and anti-American insurgency. "A country was destroyed because of 
weapons that don't exist!" Baghdad University's president, Nihad Mohammed 
al-Rawi, despaired to an AP reporter. 

Month by month, David Kay and his 1,500-member Iraq Survey Group labored 
over documents, visited sites, interrogated detained scientists and came to 
recognize reality. But when he wanted to report it, Kay ran into roadblocks 
in Washington. 

"There was an absolutely closed mind," Kay tells AP. "They would not look at 
alternative explanations in these cases," specifically the aluminum tubes 
and bioweapons trailers. 

In December 2003, Kay flew back to Washington and met with Tenet and CIA 
deputy John McLaughlin. "I couldn't budge John, and so I couldn't budge 
George," he says. Kay resigned, telling the U.S. Congress there had been no 
WMD threat. 

Ex-CIA spokesman Bill Harlow, speaking for Tenet, points out that Kay 
himself, in Senate testimony at the time, said the tubes remained an "open 
question," although it was "more than probable" they were rocket casings. 

*'Fool's gold'*

The Bush administration then sent Charles Duelfer — like Kay a senior U.N. 
inspector from the 1990s — to take over the arms hunt. He arrived in time 
for Tenet's secret visit and palace pep talk on Feb. 12, 2004, but, like Kay 
before him, Duelfer could find no sign of WMD. 

Still, the pressure continued. Barton, recruited as a Duelfer adviser, told 
AP the American chief inspector received an e-mail that March from John 
Scarlett, head of Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee, urging that nine 
"nuggets," past allegations, be dropped back into an interim report by 
Duelfer's group. 

Those "sexy bits," as the Australian called them, are believed to have 
included, for example, baseless speculation that Iraq worked to weaponize 
smallpox. Duelfer called the nuggets "fool's gold," Barton says, and left 
them out. 

Asked about this, the British Foreign Office said Scarlett contacted Iraq 
Survey Group leaders as part of his job, but that the report's content was 
Duelfer's responsibility alone. 

Barton said CIA officers in the Iraq Survey Group insisted that its 
reporting should not discredit the mobile-labs story "because that 
contradicts what Tenet has said." They also wanted the report to suggest the 
tubes might have been for centrifuges, although Duelfer's experts concluded 
otherwise. 

Duelfer's interim testimony to Congress in March 2004 said nothing about 
mobile labs and said the tubes remained under study. 

As late as Sept. 30 last year, in an election debate, Bush stuck to his 
views. 

"Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming," Bush maintained. 

A week before, Duelfer had conveyed his 1,000-page final report to the CIA, 
saying Saddam had disarmed 13 years earlier. 

*Note: This reconstruction of what happened on the road to war in Iraq is 
based on government inquiries, official documents, fresh interviews and 
other sources.*
*
------------------------------
Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may 
not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. *
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