[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Update & Chomsky Essay from ZNet

[Morton K. Brussel]

Chomsky aat his best, I think. Even his style is acceptable.  --mkb

Begin forwarded message:

> From: "Michael Albert" <sysop at ZMAG.ORG>
> Date: April 26, 2006 12:22:23 PM CDT
> To: <znetupdates at zmail.zmag.org>
> Subject: Update & Chomsky Essay from ZNet
> Reply-To: sysop at ZMAG.ORG
>
> Hello.
>
> As usual there is a steady stream of new material on available on  
> ZNet. The purpose of this message, however, is to convey to you the  
> following major essay from ZNet author, Noam Chomsky. It is an  
> expanded version of the afterword to his new book Failed States:  
> The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy (Metropolitan  
> Books, 2006).
>
>
> Afterword: Failed States
> Noam Chomsky
>
> We began by considering four critical issues that should rank high  
> on the agenda of those concerned with the prospects for a decent  
> future. Two of them are literally matters of survival: nuclear war  
> and environmental disaster. The first danger is ever-present,  
> beyond imagination, and in principle avoidable; practical ways to  
> proceed are understood. The second is longer-term, and there is  
> much uncertainty about how a serious crisis can be averted, or at  
> least mitigated, though it is clear enough that the longer the  
> delay in confronting the tasks, they harder they will be. And  
> again, sensible measures to proceed are well known. The third major  
> crisis is that the government of the global superpower is acting in  
> ways that enhance these threats, and others as well, such as the  
> threat of terrorism by enemies. That conclusion, unfortunately all  
> too credible, brings to prominence a fourth critical issue: the  
> growing democratic deficit, the gap between public will and public  
> policy, a sign of the increasing failure of formal democratic  
> institutions to function as they would in a democratic culture with  
> vitality and substance. This last issue is both threatening and  
> hopeful. It is threatening because it increases the dangers posed  
> by the first three imminent crises, apart from being intolerable in  
> itself. It is hopeful because it can be overcome, and again,  
> practical ways to proceed are well understood, and have often been  
> implemented under far more difficult circumstances than those faced  
> in the industrial societies today.
>
> No one familiar with history should be surprised that the growing  
> democratic deficit at home is accompanied by declaration of  
> messianic missions to bring democracy to a suffering world.  
> Declarations of noble intent by systems of power are rarely  
> complete fabrication, and the same is true in this case. Under some  
> conditions, forms of democracy are acceptable. Abroad, as the  
> leading scholar-advocate of "democracy promotion" concludes from  
> his inquiries, we find a "strong line of continuity," extending to  
> the present moment: democracy is sometimes acceptable, but if and  
> only if it is consistent with strategic and economic interests  
> (Thomas Carothers). Much the same holds at home, where democracy is  
> valued by power and privilege insofar as it "protects the opulent  
> minority from the majority," as Madison held.
>
> As the strong line of continuity illustrates, the policy planning  
> spectrum is narrow. The basic dilemma facing policy makers is  
> sometimes candidly recognized at its dovish liberal extreme, for  
> example, by Robert Pastor, President Carter's national security  
> advisor for Latin America. He explained why the administration had  
> to support the murderous and corrupt Somoza regime in Nicaragua,  
> and when that proved impossible, to try at least to maintain the US- 
> trained National Guard even as it was massacring the population  
> "with a brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy," killing  
> some 40,000 people. The reason was the familiar one: "The United  
> States did not want to control Nicaragua or the other nations of  
> the region, but it also did not want developments to get out of  
> control. It wanted Nicaraguans to act independently, except when  
> doing so would affect U.S. interests adversely." The Cold War was  
> scarcely relevant, but once again we find the dominant operative  
> principle, illustrated copiously throughout history.
>
> Similar dilemmas faced Bush administration planners after their  
> invasion of Iraq. They want Iraqis "to act independently, except  
> when doing so would affect U.S. interests adversely." Iraq must  
> therefore be sovereign and democratic, but within limits. It must  
> somehow be constructed as an obedient client state, much in the  
> manner of the traditional order in Central America, where the  
> experiences that shape foreign policy planners are the richest and  
> most instructive. These experiences are particularly alive for the  
> current administration, with its firm roots in the cruel and savage  
> Reagan years, when "democracy enhancement" programs were able to  
> restore "the basic order of....quite undemocratic societies,"  
> tolerating only "limited, top-down forms of democratic change that  
> did not risk upsetting the traditional structures of power with  
> which the United States has long been allied" (Carothers) - by  
> means of mass slaughter, torture, and barbarism At a very general  
> level, the pattern is not unfamiliar throughout history, reaching  
> to the opposite extreme of modern institutional structures. The  
> Kremlin was able to maintain satellites that were run by domestic  
> political and military forces, with the iron fist poised if needed.  
> Germany was able to do much the same in occupied Europe even while  
> it was at war, as did fascist Japan in Manchuria (its Manchukuo).  
> Fascist Italy achieved similar results in North Africa while  
> carrying out virtual genocide that in no way harmed its favorable  
> image in the West and possibly inspired Hitler: for example in  
> Libya from 1929-1933, a campaign waged with unspeakable brutality  
> and ethnic cleansing on a grand scale. Traditional imperial and neo- 
> colonial systems illustrate many variations on similar themes.
>
> To achieve the traditional goals in Iraq has proven to be  
> surprisingly difficult, despite unusually favorable circumstances,  
> as already reviewed. The dilemma of combining a measure of  
> independence with firm control arose in a stark form not long after  
> the invasion, as mass non-violent resistance compelled the invaders  
> to accept far more Iraqi initiative than they had anticipated, or  
> desired. The outcome even began to evoke the nightmarish prospect  
> of a more or less democratic and sovereign Iraq taking its place in  
> a loose Shiite alliance comprising Iran, Shiite Iraq, and possibly  
> the nearby Shiite-dominated regions of Saudi Arabia, controlling  
> most of the world's oil and independent of Washington. Even the  
> thought of such an outcome evokes memories of the near hysteria  
> over Nasser-led secular nationalism in 1958, particularly when Iraq  
> broke free of Anglo-American domination of the vast energy  
> resources of the Middle East. It was feared that the "contagion"  
> might spread even to Saudi Arabia, where the extremist  
> fundamentalist regime has the task of ensuring that this  
> "stupendous source of strategic power," "one of the greatest  
> material prizes in world history," remains firmly in US hands. It  
> still performs this role, but with increasing uncertainty.
>
> It could become even worse. Washington's dedicated efforts to  
> punish Iran for overthrowing the tyranny of the Shah in 1979 might  
> backfire. Iran does have options. Iran might give up on hopes that  
> Europe could become independent of the US, and turn eastward. If  
> that happens, Iran will have reasons, which have rarely been  
> discussed in Western commentary on the confrontation over Iranian  
> uranium enrichment programs. In a rare break from the silence, the  
> reasons are discussed by Selig Harrison, a leading specialist on  
> these topics. "The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the  
> European Union were based on a bargain that the EU, held back by  
> the US, has failed to honour," Harrison observes:
>
> 		Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment efforts temporarily  
> pending the outcome of discussions on a permanent enrichment ban.  
> The EU promised to put forward proposals for economic incentives  
> and security guarantees in return for a permanent ban but  
> subsequently refused to discuss security issues. The language of  
> the joint declaration that launched the negotiations on November 14  
> 2004, was unambiguous. "A mutually acceptable agreement," it said,  
> would not only provide "objective guarantees" that Iran's nuclear  
> programme is "exclusively for peaceful purposes" but would "equally  
> provide firm commitments on security issues."
>
> The phrase "security issues" is a thinly veiled reference to the  
> threats by the US and Israel to bomb Iran, and the well-publicized  
> preparations to carry out such an attack. The model regularly  
> adduced is Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in  
> 1981, which appears to have initiated Saddam's nuclear weapons  
> programs, another demonstration that violence tends to elicit  
> violence in reaction. Any attempt to execute similar plans against  
> Iran could lead to immediate violence, as is surely understood in  
> Washington. During a visit to Teheran, the influential Shiite  
> cleric Moqtada Sadr warned that his militia would defend Iran in  
> the case of any attack, "one of the strongest signs yet," the  
> Washington Post reported, "that Iraq could become a battleground in  
> any Western conflict with Iran, raising the specter of Iraqi Shiite  
> militias -- or perhaps even the U.S.-trained Shiite-dominated  
> military -- taking on American troops here in sympathy with Iran."  
> The Sadrist bloc, which registered substantial gains in the  
> December 2005 elections, may soon become the most powerful single  
> political force in Iraq. It is consciously pursuing the model of  
> other successful Islamist groups, such as Hamas in Palestine,  
> combining strong resistance to military occupation with grassroots  
> social organizing and service to the poor.
>
> Washington's unwillingness to allow regional security issues to be  
> considered, tolerated by Europe, is nothing new, not just in the  
> case of Iran. It has arisen repeatedly in the confrontation with  
> Iraq as well, with serious consequences, ever since Saddam became  
> an enemy in 1990. In the background, raising very serious security  
> concerns, is the matter of Israeli nuclear weapons, a topic that  
> Washington bars from international consideration in violation of  
> firm agreements and Security Council resolutions. Beyond that lurks  
> what Harrison rightly describes as "the central problem facing the  
> global non-proliferation regime": the failure of the nuclear states  
> to live up to their NPT obligation "to phase out their own nuclear  
> weapons" -- and in Washington's case, formal rejection of the  
> obligation.
>
> Unlike Europe, China refuses to be intimidated by Washington, a  
> primary reason for the growing fear of China on the part of US  
> planners, which also poses a dilemma: steps toward confrontation  
> are inhibited by US corporate reliance on China as an export  
> platform and growing market, as well as China's financial reserves,  
> reported to be approaching Japan's in scale. Much of Iran's oil  
> already goes to China, and China is providing Iran with weapons  
> that both states presumably regard as a deterrent to US designs.  
> Still more uncomfortable for Washington is the fact that "the Sino- 
> Saudi relationship has developed dramatically," the Financial Times  
> reports, including Chinese military aid to Saudi Arabia and gas  
> exploration rights for China. By 2005, Saudi Arabia provided about  
> 17 percent of China's oil imports. Chinese and Saudi oil companies  
> have signed deals for drilling and construction of a huge refinery  
> (with Exxon Mobil as a partner). A January 2006 visit by Saudi King  
> Abdullah to Beijing was expected to lead to a Sino-Saudi memorandum  
> of understanding calling for "increased cooperation and investment  
> between the two countries in oil, natural gas, and investment," the  
> Wall Street Journal reported.
>
> Indian analyst Aijaz Ahmad observes that Iran could "emerge as the  
> virtual lynchpin in the making, over the next decade or so, of what  
> China and Russia have come to regard as an absolutely indispensable  
> Asian Energy Security Grid, for breaking Western control of the  
> world's energy supplies and securing the great industrial  
> revolution of Asia." South Korea and Southeast Asian countries are  
> likely to join, possibly Japan as well. A crucial question is how  
> India will react. It rejected US pressures to withdraw from an oil  
> pipeline deal with Iran, though it is still vacillating on grounds  
> of security within Pakistani Baluchistan. Meanwhile Pakistan has  
> pledged to build the pipeline whatever India decides (and  
> presumably against US wishes). On the other hand, India joined the  
> US and EU in voting for an anti-Iranian resolution at the IAEA,  
> joining also in their hypocrisy, since India rejects the NPT regime  
> to which Iran, so far, appears to be largely conforming. Ahmad  
> reports that India may have secretly reversed its stand at the IAEA  
> after Iran briefly threatened to terminate a $20 billion gas deal.  
> Washington later "warned India that Delhi's own nuclear deal with  
> the US could be ditched if the Indian government did not vote to  
> refer Tehran to the United Nations Security Council," the Financial  
> Times reported, eliciting a sharp rejoinder from the Indian foreign  
> ministry and an evasive tempering of the warning by the US Embassy.
>
> India too has options. It may choose to be a US client, or it may  
> prefer to join a more independent Asian bloc that is taking shape,  
> with growing ties to Middle East oil producers. In a series of  
> informative commentaries, the deputy editor of The Hindu observes  
> that "if the 21st century is to be an `Asian century', Asia's  
> passivity in the energy sector has to end." Though it "hosts the  
> world's largest producers and fastest growing consumers of energy,"  
> Asia still relies "on institutions, trading frameworks and armed  
> forces from outside the region in order to trade with itself," a  
> debilitating heritage from the imperial era. The key is India-China  
> cooperation. In 2005, he points out, "India and China have managed  
> to confound analysts around the world by turning their much-vaunted  
> rivalry for the acquisition of oil and gas assets in third  
> countries into a nascent partnership that could alter the basic  
> dynamics of the global energy market." A January 2006 agreement  
> signed in Beijing "cleared the way for India and China to  
> collaborate not only in technology but also in hydrocarbon  
> exploration and production, a partnership that eventually could  
> alter fundamental equations in the world's oil and natural gas  
> sector." At a meeting in New Delhi of Asian energy producers and  
> consumers a few months earlier, India had "unveiled an ambitious  
> $22.4 billion pan-Asian gas grid and oil security pipeline system"  
> extending throughout all of Asia, from Siberian fields through  
> Central Asia and to the Middle East energy giants, also integrating  
> the consumer states. Furthermore, Asian countries "hold more than  
> two trillion dollars worth of foreign reserves," overwhelmingly  
> denominated in dollars, though prudence suggests diversification. A  
> first step, already being contemplated, is an Asian oil market  
> trading in euros. The impact on the international financial system  
> and the balance of global power could be significant. The US "sees  
> India as the weakest link in the emerging Asian chain," he  
> continues, and is "trying actively to divert New Delhi away from  
> the task of creating new regional architecture by dangling the  
> nuclear carrot and the promise of world power status in alliance  
> with itself." If the Asian project is to succeed, he warns, "India  
> will have to resist these allurements." Similar questions arise  
> with regard to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001  
> as a Russia-China-based counterweight to the expansion of US power  
> into former Soviet Central Asia, now evolving "rapidly toward a  
> regional security bloc [that] could soon induct new members such as  
> India, Pakistan, and Iran," long-time Moscow correspondent Fred  
> Weir reports, perhaps becoming a "Eurasian military confederacy to  
> rival NATO."
>
> The prospect that Europe and Asia might move towards greater  
> independence has seriously troubled US planners since World War II,  
> and concerns have significantly increased as the "tripolar order"  
> has continued to evolve, along with new and important south-south  
> interactions (Brazil, South Africa, India, and others), and rapidly  
> growing EU engagement with China - perhaps now, or soon, each  
> other's largest trading partners.
>
> US intelligence has projected that the US, while controlling Middle  
> East oil for the traditional reasons, will itself rely mainly on  
> more stable Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa, Western  
> hemisphere). Control of Middle East oil is now far from a sure  
> thing, and these expectations are also threatened by developments  
> in the Western hemisphere, accelerated by Bush administration  
> policies that have left the US remarkably isolated in the global  
> arena. The Bush administration has even succeeded in alienating  
> Canada, an impressive feat. Canada's relations with the US are more  
> "strained and combative" than ever before as a result of  
> Washington's rejection of Nafta decisions favoring Canada, Joel  
> Brinkley reports. "Partly as a result, Canada is working hard to  
> build up its relationship with China [and] some officials are  
> saying Canada may shift a significant portion of its trade,  
> particularly oil, from the United States to China." Canada's  
> minister of natural resources said that within a few years one- 
> quarter of the oil that Canada now sends to the US may go to China  
> instead. In a further blow to Washington's energy policies, the  
> leading oil exporter in the hemisphere, Venezuela, has forged  
> probably the closest relations with China of any Latin American  
> country, and is planning to sell increasing amounts of oil to China  
> as part of its effort to reduce dependence on the openly hostile US  
> government. Latin America as a whole is increasing trade and other  
> relations with China, with some setbacks, but likely expansion, in  
> particular for raw materials exporters like Brazil and Chile.
>
> Meanwhile Cuba-Venezuela relations are becoming very close, each  
> relying on its comparative advantage. Venezuela is providing low- 
> cost oil while in return Cuba organizes literacy and health  
> programs, sending thousands of highly skilled professionals,  
> teachers and doctors, who work in the poorest and most neglected  
> areas, as they do elsewhere in the third world. Joint Cuba- 
> Venezuela projects are also having a considerable impact in the  
> Caribbean countries, where Cuban doctors are providing health care  
> to thousands of people who had no hope of receiving it, with  
> Venezuelan funding. Operation Miracle, as it is called, is  
> described by Jamaica's ambassador to Cuba as "an example of  
> integration and south-south co-operation," and is generating great  
> enthusiasm among the poor majority. The US and Mexico apparently  
> toyed with the idea of an oil subsidy to counter Venezuelan petro- 
> diplomacy, but do not seem to have pursued it. Cuban medical  
> assistance is also being welcomed elsewhere. One of the most  
> horrendous tragedies of recent years was the October 2005  
> earthquake in Pakistan. In addition to the huge toll, unknown  
> numbers of survivors have to face brutal winter weather with little  
> shelter, food or medical assistance. There has been extensive  
> coverage of Western aid, but one has to turn to the South Asian  
> press to read that "Cuba has provided the largest contingent of  
> doctors and paramedics to Pakistan," paying all the costs (perhaps  
> with Venezuelan funding), and that President Musharraf of Pakistan  
> expressed his "deep gratitude" to Fidel Castro for the "spirit and  
> compassion" of the Cuban medical teams. These are reported to  
> comprise more than 1000 trained personnel, 44 percent of them  
> women, who remained to work in remote mountain villages, "living in  
> tents in freezing weather and in an alien culture" after the  
> Western aid teams had been withdrawn, setting up 19 field hospitals  
> and working 12-hour shifts.
>
> Some analysts have suggested that Cuba and Venezuela might even  
> unite, a step towards further integration of Latin America in a  
> bloc that is more independent from the US. Venezuela has joined  
> Mercosur, the South American customs union, a move described by  
> Argentine President Néstor Kirchner as "a milestone" in the  
> development of this trading bloc, and welcomed as opening "a new  
> chapter in our integration" by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula  
> da Silva. Independent experts say that "adding Venezuela to the  
> bloc furthers its geopolitical vision of eventually spreading  
> Mercosur to the rest of the region." At a meeting in Uruguay  
> convened to mark Venezuela's formal entry into Mercosur, Venezuelan  
> president Chávez said that the organization must be "politicized":  
> "We cannot allow this to be purely an economic project, one for the  
> elites and for the transnational companies," a not very oblique  
> reference to the US-sponsored "Free Trade Agreement for the  
> Americas," which has aroused strong public opposition. Venezuela  
> also supplied Argentina with fuel oil to help stave off an energy  
> crisis, and bought almost a third of Argentine debt issued in 2005,  
> one element of a region-wide effort to free the countries from the  
> controls of the IMF after two decades of disastrous effects of  
> conformity to the rules imposed by the US-dominated international  
> financial institutions. The IMF has "acted towards our country as a  
> promoter and a vehicle of policies that caused poverty and pain  
> among the Argentine people," President Kirchner said in announcing  
> his decision to pay almost $1 trillion to rid itself of the IMF  
> forever. Radically violated IMF rules, Argentina enjoyed a  
> substantial economic recovery from the disaster left by IMF policies.
>
> Steps toward independent regional integration advanced further with  
> the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2005. He became  
> the first indigenous president in Bolivia, where a majority  
> identify themselves with indigenous groups. Morales moved quickly  
> to reach a series of energy accords with Venezuela. The Financial  
> Times reported that these "are expected to underpin forthcoming  
> radical reforms to Bolivia's economy and energy sector" with its  
> huge gas reserves, second only to Venezuela's in South America.  
> Morales too committed himself to reverse the neoliberal policies  
> that Bolivia had pursued rigorously for 25 years, leaving the  
> country with lower per capita income than at the outset. Adherence  
> to the neoliberal programs was interrupted during this period only  
> when popular discontent compelled the government to abandon them,  
> as when it followed World Bank advice to privatize water supply and  
> "get prices right" -- incidentally, to deprive the poor of access  
> to water.
>
> Venezuelan "subversion," as it is described in Washington, is  
> extending to the US as well. Perhaps that calls for expansion of  
> the policies of "containment" of Venezuela ordered by Bush in March  
> 2005. In November 2005, the Washington Post reported, a group of  
> Senators sent a letter "to nine big oil companies: With huge  
> increases in winter heating bills expected, the letter read, we  
> want you to donate some of your record profits to help low-income  
> people cover those costs." They received one response: from CITGO,  
> the Venezuelan-controlled company. CITGO offered to provide low- 
> cost oil to low-income residents of Boston, later to the Bronx and  
> elsewhere. Chávez is only doing it "for political gain," the State  
> Department responded; it is "somewhat akin to the government of  
> Cuba offering scholarships to medical school in Cuba to  
> disadvantaged American youth." Quite unlike aid from the US and  
> other countries, which is pure-hearted altruism. It is not clear  
> that these subtleties will be appreciated by the recipients of the  
> "12 million gallons of discounted home-heating oil [provided by  
> CITGO] to local charities and 45,000 low-income families in  
> Massachusetts." The oil is distributed to poor people facing a  
> 30-50 percent rise in oil prices, with fuel assistance "woefully  
> underfunded, so this is a major shot in the arm for people who  
> otherwise wouldn't get through the winter," according to the  
> director of MassEnergyConsumer Alliance, which will distribute low- 
> cost oil to "homeless shelters, food banks, and low-income housing  
> groups." He also "said he hoped the deal would present `a friendly  
> challenge' to US oil companies -- which recently reported record  
> quarterly profits -- to use their windfall to help poor families  
> survive the winter," apparently in vain.
>
> Though Central America was largely disciplined by Reaganite  
> violence and terror, the rest of the hemisphere is falling out of  
> control, particularly from Venezuela to Argentina, which was the  
> poster-child of the IMF and the Treasury Department until its  
> economy collapsed under the policies they imposed. As noted,  
> Argentina did manage to recover, but only by defying IMF orders,  
> which does not please international creditors or Washington. Much  
> of the region has left-center governments. The indigenous  
> populations have become much more active and influential,  
> particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, both major energy producers,  
> where they either want oil and gas to be domestically controlled  
> or, in some cases, oppose production altogether. Many indigenous  
> people apparently do not see any reason why their lives, societies,  
> and cultures should be disrupted or destroyed so that New Yorkers  
> can sit in their SUVs in traffic gridlock. Some are even calling  
> for an "Indian nation" in South America. Meanwhile the internal  
> economic integration that is underway is reversing patterns that  
> trace back to the Spanish conquests, with Latin American elites and  
> economies linked to the imperial powers but not to one another.  
> Along with growing south-south interaction on a broader scale,  
> these developments are strongly influenced by popular organizations  
> that are coming together in the unprecedented international global  
> justice movements, ludicrously called "anti-globalization" because  
> they favor globalization that privileges the interests of people,  
> not investors and financial institutions. For many reasons, the  
> system of US global dominance is fragile, even apart from the  
> damage inflicted to it by Bush planners.
>
> One consequence is that the Bush administration's pursuit of the  
> traditional policies of deterring democracy, called "democracy  
> promotion" in the doctrinal system, face new obstacles. It is no  
> longer as easy as before to resort to military coups and  
> international terrorism to overthrow democratically elected  
> governments, as Bush planners learned ruefully in 2002 in  
> Venezuela. The "strong line of continuity" must be pursued in other  
> ways, for the most part. In Iraq, as we have seen, mass non-violent  
> resistance compelled Washington and London to permit the elections  
> they had sought to block by a series of schemes. The subsequent  
> effort to subvert the unwanted elections by providing substantial  
> advantages to the administration's favorite candidate, and  
> expelling the independent media, also failed. Problems still remain  
> beyond those usually discussed. The Iraqi labor movement is making  
> considerable progress despite the opposition of the occupation  
> authorities. The situation is rather like Europe and Japan after  
> World War II, when a primary goal of the US and UK was to undermine  
> independent labor movements - as at home, for similar reasons:  
> organized labor contributes in essential ways to functioning  
> democracy with popular engagement. Many of the measures adopted at  
> that time - withholding food, supporting fascist police, etc. - are  
> no longer available. Nor is it possible today to rely on the labor  
> bureaucracy of AIFLD to help undermine unions. Today, some American  
> unions are supporting Iraqi workers, just as they do in Colombia,  
> where more union activists are murdered than anywhere in the world  
> but at least now receive support from the United Steelworkers of  
> America and others, while Washington continues to provide enormous  
> funding for the government, which bears a large part of the  
> responsibility.
>
> The problem of elections arose in Palestine much in the way it did  
> in Iraq. As already discussed, the Bush administration refused to  
> permit elections until the death of Yasser Arafat, aware that the  
> wrong man would win so that elections would not conform to the  
> democratic vision that animates policy. After Arafat's death, the  
> administration agreed to respond to the popular pressure for  
> elections, expecting that its favored candidates in the Palestinian  
> Authority would win. To promote this outcome, Washington resorted  
> to much the same modes of subversion as in Iraq, and often before.  
> The national press reported that Washington used USAID as an  
> "invisible conduit" in an effort to "increase the popularity of the  
> Palestinian Authority on the eve of crucial elections in which the  
> governing party faces a serious challenge from the radical Islamic  
> group Hamas," spending "about $1.9 million of its yearly $400  
> million in aid to the Palestinians on dozens of quick projects  
> before elections this week to bolster the governing Fatah faction's  
> image with voters and strengthen its hand in competing with the  
> militant faction Hamas." As is normal, the US consulate in East  
> Jerusalem assured the press that the concealed efforts to promote  
> Fatah were merely intended "to enhance democratic institutions and  
> support democratic actors, not just Fatah." In the US or any  
> Western country, even a hint of such foreign interference would  
> destroy a candidate, but deeply rooted imperial mentality  
> legitimates such routine measures of subversion of elections  
> elsewhere. However, the attempt to subvert the elections again  
> resoundingly failed.
>
> The US and Israeli governments now have to adjust to dealing  
> somehow with a radical Islamic party that approaches their  
> traditional rejectionist stance, though not entirely, at least if  
> Hamas really does mean to agree to an indefinite truce on the  
> international border as its leaders state. The idea is completely  
> foreign to the US and Israel, which insist that any political  
> outcome must include Israeli takeover of substantial parts of the  
> West Bank (and the forgotten Golan Heights). Hamas's refusal to  
> accept Israel's "right to exist" mirrors the refusal of Washington  
> and Jerusalem to accept Palestine's "right to exist" - a concept  
> unknown in international affairs; Mexico accepts the existence of  
> the US, but not its abstract "right to exist" on almost half of  
> Mexico, acquired by conquest. Hamas's formal commitment to "destroy  
> Israel" places it on a par with the US and Israel, which vowed  
> formally that there could be no "additional Palestinian state" (in  
> addition to Jordan) until they relaxed their extreme rejectionist  
> stand partially in the past few years, in the manner already  
> reviewed. Although Hamas has not said so, it would come as no great  
> surprise if Hamas were to agree to allow Jews to remain in  
> scattered cantons in the present Israel, while Palestine constructs  
> huge settlement and infrastructure projects to take over the  
> valuable land and resources, effectively breaking Israel up into  
> unviable cantons, virtually separated from one another and from  
> some small part of Jerusalem where Jews would also be allowed to  
> remain. And they might agree to call the fragments "a state." If  
> such proposals were made, we would -- rightly -- regard them as a  
> reversion to Nazism, a fact that might elicit some thoughts. If  
> such proposals are made, Hamas's position would be essentially like  
> that of the US and Israel for the past five years. Before that,  
> they refused to consider even this impoverished form of  
> "statehood." It is entirely fair to describe Hamas as radical,  
> extremist, and violent, and as a serious threat to peace and a just  
> political settlement. But the organization hardly is alone in this  
> stance.
>
> Elsewhere traditional means of undermining democracy have  
> succeeded. In Haiti, the Bush administration's favorite "democracy- 
> building group, the International Republican Institute," worked  
> assiduously to promote the fortunes of the opposition to President  
> Aristide. The project was helped by the withholding of desperately  
> needed aid on grounds that were dubious at best. When it seemed  
> that Aristide would probably win any genuine election, Washington  
> and the opposition chose to withdraw, a standard device to  
> discredit elections that are going to come out the wrong way:  
> Nicaragua in 1984 and Venezuela in December 2005 are examples that  
> should be familiar. Then followed a military coup by former state  
> terrorists based in the Dominican Republic (which Washington claims  
> to have known nothing about), expulsion of the President to South  
> Africa, and a reign of horrifying terror and violence, vastly  
> exceeding anything under the elected government that Washington  
> helped to overthrow. The miserable fate of Haiti is traceable in no  
> slight measure to US intervention through the past century, joined  
> by France in 2004, perhaps because President Chirac was offended by  
> Aristide's request for some extremely limited compensation for  
> France's own hideous crimes in Haiti, which surpass anything since,  
> a considerable claim to fame.
>
> The persistence of the strong line of continuity to the present  
> again reveals that the US is very much like other powerful states.  
> It pursues the strategic and economic interests of dominant sectors  
> of the domestic population, to the accompaniment of impressive  
> rhetorical flourishes about its exceptional dedication to the  
> highest values.  That is practically a historical universal, and  
> the reason why sensible people pay scant attention to declarations  
> of noble intent by leaders, or accolades by their followers. They  
> are predictable, therefore carry virtually no information.
>
> One commonly hears that carping critics complain about what is  
> wrong, but do not present solutions. There is an accurate  
> translation for that charge: "They present solutions, but I don't  
> like them." In addition to the proposals that should be familiar  
> about dealing with the crises that reach to the level of survival,  
> a few simple suggestions for the US have already been mentioned:  
> (1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and  
> the World Court; (2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols;  
> (3) let the UN take the lead in international crises; (4) rely on  
> diplomatic and economic measures rather than military ones in  
> confronting the grave threats of terror; (5) keep to the  
> traditional interpretation of the UN Charter: the use of force is  
> legitimate only when ordered by the Security Council or when the  
> country is under imminent threat of attack, in accord with Article  
> 51; (6) give up the Security Council veto, and have "a decent  
> respect for the opinion of mankind," as the Declaration of  
> Independence advises, even if power centers disagree; (7) cut back  
> sharply on military spending and sharply increase social spending:  
> health, education, renewable energy, and so on. For people who  
> believe in democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they  
> appear to be the opinions of the majority of the US population, in  
> most cases the overwhelming majority. They are in radical  
> opposition to public policy; in most cases, to a bipartisan  
> consensus. To be sure, we cannot be very confident about the state  
> of public opinion on matters such as these, because of another  
> essential feature of the democratic deficit: the topics scarcely  
> enter into public discussion and the basic facts are little known.  
> In a highly atomized society, the public is therefore largely  
> deprived of the opportunity to form considered opinions.
>
> Another conservative and useful suggestion is that facts, logic,  
> and elementary moral principles should matter. Those who take the  
> trouble to adhere to that suggestion will soon be led to abandon a  
> good part of familiar doctrine, though it us surely much easier to  
> repeat self-serving mantras. And there are other simple truths.  
> They do not answer every problem by any means. But they do carry us  
> some distance toward developing more specific and detailed answers,  
> as is constantly done. More important, they open the way to  
> implement them, opportunities that are readily within our grasp if  
> we can free ourselves from the shackles of doctrine and imposed  
> illusion.
>
> Though it is natural for doctrinal systems to seek to induce  
> pessimism, hopelessness and despair, reality is different. There  
> has been substantial progress in the unending question for justice  
> and freedom in recent years, leaving a legacy that can easily be  
> carried forward from a higher plane than before. Opportunities for  
> education and organizing abound. As in the past, rights are not  
> likely to be granted by benevolent authorities, or won by  
> intermittent actions - attending a few demonstrations or pushing a  
> lever in the personalized quadrennial extravaganzas that are  
> depicted as "democratic politics." As always in the past, the tasks  
> require dedicated day-by-day engagement to create -- in part re- 
> create -- the basis for a functioning democratic culture in which  
> the public plays some role in determining policies, not only in the  
> political arena from which it is largely excluded, but also in the  
> crucial economic arena, from which it is excluded in principle.  
> There are many ways to promote democracy at home, carrying it to  
> new dimensions. Opportunities are ample, and failure to grasp them  
> is likely to have ominous repercussions: for the country, for the  
> world, and for future generations.
>
> Copyright 2006 by Noam Chomsky.
>
> Noam Chomsky is the author of numerous best-selling political  
> works. His latest books are Failed States, Imperial Ambitions, and  
> Hegemony or Survival, all in the American Empire Project series of  
> Metropolitan Books, 9-11 (Seven Stories Press), Understanding Power  
> (New Press), and New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind  
> (Cambridge University Press). He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts,  
> and is a professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy  
> at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
>
>

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