[Peace-discuss] Chomsky interview on Iraq

[Morton K. Brussel]

Questions by Michael Albert of ZNet. Chomsky does not answer all that  
is put to him, not wishing to speculate on what cannot be very  
certain, but as usual his thoughts are worth thought. An interesting  
exercise is to try to answer the questions posed to him before  
reading his responses (or not) to those questions.  --mkb


Iraq: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Albert Interviews Chomsky

1.  Why did the U.S. invade Iraq? (And why did important sectors of  
the political elite, like Scowcroft, oppose doing so?) What are the  
U.S.motives for staying?

The official reason was what Bush, Powell, and others called "the  
single question": will Saddam end his development of Weapons of Mass  
Destruction? The official Presidential Directive states the primary  
goal as to: "Free Iraq in order to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass  
destruction, their means of delivery and associated programs, to  
prevent Iraq from breaking out of containment and becoming a more  
dangerous threat to the region and beyond." That was the basis for  
congressional support for the invasion. The Directive goes on with  
the goal of cutting "Iraqi links to and sponsorship of international  
terrorism," etc. A few phrases are thrown in from the standard  
boilerplate about freedom that accompanies every action, and is close  
to a historical universal, hence dismissed as meaningless by  
reasonable people, but there to be dredged up by the doctrinal system  
when needed.

When the "single question" was answered the wrong way, and the claims  
about internationational terrorism became too much of an  
embarrassment to repeat (though not for Cheney and a few others), the  
goal was changed to "democracy promotion." The media and journals,  
along with almost all scholarship, quickly jumped on that bandwagon,  
relieved to discover that this is the most "noble war" in history,  
pursuing Bush's "messianic mission" to bring freedom and democracy to  
the world. Some Iraqis agreed: 1% in a poll in Baghdad just as the  
noble vision was declared in Washington. In the West, in contrast, it  
doesn't matter that there is a mountain of evidence refuting the  
claim, and even apart from the timing -- which should elicit ridicule  
-- the evidence for the "mission" is that our Dear Leader so  
declared. I've reviewed the disgraceful record in print. It continues  
with scarcely a break to the present, so consistently that I've  
stopped collecting the absurd repetitions of the dogma.

The real reason for the invasion, surely, is that Iraq has the second  
largest oil reserves in the world, very cheap to exploit, and lies  
right at the heart of the world's major hydrocarbon resources, what  
the State Department 60 years ago described as "a stupendous source  
of strategic power." The issue is not access, but rather control (and  
for the energy corporations, profit). Control over these resources  
gives the US "critical leverage" over industrial rivals, to borrow  
Zbigniew Brezinski's phrase, echoing George Kennan when he was a  
leading planner and recognized that such control would give the US  
"veto power" over others.  Dick Cheney observed that control over  
energy resources provides "tools of intimidation or blackmail" --  
when in the hands of others, that is. We are too pure and noble for  
those considerations to apply to us, so true believers declare -- or  
more accurately, just presuppose, taking the point to be too obvious  
to articulate.

There was unprecedented elite condemnation of the plans to invade  
Iraq, even articles in the major foreign policy journals, a  
publication of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and  
others.  Sensible analysts were able to perceive that the enterprise  
carried significant risks for US interests, however conceived. Global  
opposition was utterly overwhelming, and the likely costs to the US  
were apparent, though the catastrophe created by the invasion went  
far beyond anyone's worst expectations. It's amusing to watch the  
lying as the strongest supporters of the war try to deny what they  
very clearly said. There is a good review of the "mendacity" of  
neocon intellectuals (Ledeen, Krauthammer, and others) in The  
American Conservative, Jan. 07. But they are not alone.

On the US motives for staying, I can only repeat what I've been  
writing for years. A sovereign Iraq, partially democratic, could well  
be a disaster for US planners. With a Shi'ite majority, it is likely  
to continue improving relations with Iran. There is a Shi'ite  
population right across the border in Saudi Arabia, bitterly  
oppressed by the US-backed tyranny. Any step towards sovereignty in  
Iraq encourages activism there for human rights and a degree of  
autonomy -- and that happens to be where most of Saudi oil is.  
Sovereignty in Iraq might well lead to a loose Shi'ite alliance  
controlling most of the world's hydrocarbon resources and independent  
of the US, undermining a primary goal of US foreign policy since it  
became the world-dominant power after World War II. Worse yet, though  
the US can intimidate Europe, it cannot intimidate China, which  
blithely goes its own way, even in Saudi Arabia, the jewel in the  
crown -- the primary reason why China is considered a leading threat.  
An independent energy bloc in the Gulf area is likely to link up with  
the China-based Asian Energy Security Grid and Shanghai Cooperation  
Council, with Russia (which has its own huge resources) as an  
integral part, along with the Central Asian states (already members),  
possibly India. Iran is already associated with them, and a Shi'ite  
dominated bloc in the Arab states might well go along. All of that  
would be a nightmare for US planners, and its Western allies.

There are, then, very powerful reasons why the US-UK are likely to  
try in every possible way to maintain effective control over Iraq.  
The US is not constructing a palatial Embassy, by far the largest in  
the world and virtually a separate city within Baghdad, and pouring  
money into military bases, with the intention of leaving Iraq to  
Iraqis. All of this is quite separate from the expectations that  
matters can be arranged so that US corporations profit from the vast  
riches of Iraq.

These topics, though surely high on the agenda of planners, are not  
within the realm of discussion, as can easily be determined. That is  
only to be expected. These considerations violate the fundamental  
doctrine that state power has noble objectives, and while it may make  
terrible blunders, it can have no crass motives and is not influenced  
by domestic concentrations of private power. Any questioning of these  
Higher Truths is either ignored or bitterly denounced, also for good  
reasons: allowing them to be discussed could undermine power and  
privilege. I don't, incidentally, suggest that commentators have much  
awareness of this. In our society, intellectual elites are deeply  
indoctrinated, a point that Orwell noted in his (unpublished)  
introduction to Animal Farm on how self-censorship works in free  
societies. A large part of the reason, he plausibly concluded, is a  
good education, which instills the understanding that there are  
certain things "it wouldn't do to say" -- or more accurately, even to  
think.


2.  What, from the elite perspective, would be a major victory in  
Iraq, what would be modest but still sufficient success, and what  
would constitute a loss? More, for completeness, how much does  
democracy in Iraq, democracy in the U.S., the well being of people in  
Iraq, or the well being of people in the U.S. - or even of our  
soldiers - enter into the motivations of U.S. policy?

A major victory would be establishing an obedient client state, as  
elsewhere. A modest success would be preventing a degree of  
sovereignty that might allow Iraq to pursue the rather natural course  
I just described. As for democracy, even the most dedicated scholar/ 
advocates of "democracy promotion" recognize that there is a "strong  
line of continuity" in US efforts to promote democracy going back as  
far as you like and reaching the present: democracy is supported if  
and only if it conforms to strategic and economic objectives, so that  
all presidents are "schizophrenic," a strange puzzle (Thomas  
Carothers). That is so obvious that it takes really impressive  
discipline to miss it. It is a remarkable feature of US (in fact  
Western) intellectual culture that each well-indoctrinated mind can  
simultaneously lavish praise on our awesome dedication to democracy  
while at the same moment demonstrating utter contempt and hatred for  
democracy. For example, supporting the brutal punishment of people  
who committed the crime of voting "the wrong way" in a free election,  
as in Palestine right now, with pretexts that would inspire ridicule  
in a free society. As for democracy in the US, elite opinion has  
generally considered it a dangerous threat, which must be resisted.  
The well-being of US soldiers is a concern, though not a primaryl  
one. As for the well-being of the population here, it suffices to  
look at domestic policies. Of course, these matters cannot be  
completely ignored, even in totalitarian dictatorships, surely not in  
societies where popular struggle has won considerable freedom.


3.  Why has the occupation been such a disaster, again, from the  
elite perspective? Would more troops have helped initially? Was it  
wrong to disband the army and order de-Baathification? If these or  
other policies were mistakes, why were the mistakes made? Why are  
calls to withdraw coming not only from sincere antiwar opposition,  
but also from elites with self serving agendas? Are the latter just  
rhetoric? Do they indicate real differences?

There is plenty of elite commentary about the reasons for the  
disaster, which has few historical counterparts. It's worth bearing  
in mind that the Nazis had far less trouble running occupied Europe  
-- with civilians in charge of administration and security for the  
most part --than the US is having in Iraq. And Germany was at war.  
The same was true of the Russians in Eastern Europe, and there are  
many other examples, in US history too. The primary reason for the  
catastrophe, it is now generally agreed, is what I was told (and  
wrote about) a few months after the invasion by a high-ranking figure  
in one of the leading relief organizations, with rich experience in  
some of the most awful parts of the world. He had just returned from  
failed efforts at reconstruction in Baghdad, and told me that he had  
never seen such a display of "arrogance, incompetence, and  
ignorance." The specific blunders are the topic of an extensive  
literature. I have nothing particular to add, and frankly, the topic  
doesn't interest me much, any more than Russia's tactical mistakes in  
Afghanistan, Hitler's error of fighting a two-front war, etc.

On withdrawal proposals from elite circles, I think one should be  
cautious. Some may be so deeply indoctrinated that they cannot allow  
themselves to think about the reasons for the invasion or the  
insistence on maintaining the occupation, in one or another form.  
Others may have in mind more effective techniques of control by  
redeploying US military forces in bases in Iraq and in the region,  
making sure to control logistics and support for client forces in  
Iraq, air power in the style of the destruction of much of Indochina  
after the business community turned against the war, and so on.


4.   What has been the impact of the anti-war movement on policy and  
policymakers? Would choices by elites have been different if there  
were no antiwar activity? When compared with the Vietnam era, this  
war seems to have much more at stake, yet elite support is wobbling  
quicker and more deeply than it did with Vietnam. The opposition is  
less militant and passionate now, though arguably wider in its reach.  
What is your take on these matters?

It's hard to make an informed judgment about the impact on policy. In  
the case of Indochina, there is an internal record; for Iraq there is  
not, so it is a much more subjective judgment.

On the rest, I think we have to be careful in comparing the two wars.  
They are very different in character, and conditions have changed  
greatly.  The Indochina wars began shortly after World War II, when  
the Truman administration decided to support France's effort to  
reconquer its former colony. The US then blocked a diplomatic  
settlement and established a brutal and corrupt client state in South  
Vietnam, which elicited resistance that it could not control, even  
after killing tens of thousands of people. By 1961, the JFK  
administration decided to attack directly. Within a few years South  
Vietnam was devastated, and by 1965, the LBJ administration expanded  
the war to the North in the hope that Hanoi would pressure the South  
Vietnamese resistance to desist, also sending hundreds of thousands  
of troops to occupy SVN. Through all this long period, there was  
virtually no protest, so little that few even know that Kennedy  
attacked SVN outright in 1962. The war was unpopular, so much so that  
Kennedy planners tried to find some way to reduce the US role, but  
only -- as Kennedy insisted to the end -- after victory. As late as  
October 1965, the first major public demonstration against the war,  
in liberal Boston, was broken up by counter-demonstrators, with the  
strong support of the liberal media. By then the war against Vietnam  
had proceeded far beyond the invasion of Iraq in scale and violence.  
Iraq is consumed by violence today, but it is radically different  
from Indochina, where the US was fighting an murderous war against  
the general population, who supported the indigenous South Vietnamese  
resistance, as US experts knew very well, and reported, sometimes  
even publicly. Very belatedly, a significant anti-war movement  
developed, by 1967-8, including direct resistance to the war, but  
it's worth remembering how long it was delayed, and how much more  
horrendous US actions were in VIetnam than in Iraq, by the time it  
did develop. And even at its peak, the anti-war movement mostly  
focused on the bombing of the North, and elite opposition was mostly  
limited to that, because of the threats posed to US power and  
interests by extension the war to the North -- where there were  
foreign embassies, Russian ships in Haiphong harbor, a Chinese  
railroad passing through North Vietnam, a powerful air defense  
system, and so on. The destruction of SVN, the main target  
throughout, passed with much less protest, and was regarded as  
relatively costless. The government recognized this. To take one  
example, internal records reveal that the bombing of NVN was  
meticulously planned, because of the feared costs. In contrast, there  
was only scanty attention to the far more intense bombing of SVN,  
which was already disastrous in 1965 when it was sharply escalated,  
and by 1967 led the most respected Vietnam specialist and military  
analyst, Bernard Fall (no dove), to wonder whether the society would  
even survive as a cultural and historical entity under the US assault.

Quite unlike Vietnam, there were massive protests against the  
invasion of Iraq even before it was officially undertaken, and  
opposition has continued high, much higher than during corresponding  
stages of the US invasion of SVN.

Turning to what was at stake, the pretexts concocted for the wars in  
Indochia were colossal: preventing the Sino-Soviet conspiracy from  
conquering the world. The near-lunacy of US planners, from the "wise  
men" of the Truman adminstration through the Eisenhower years and the  
"best and the brightest" of Camelot, was quite extraordinary,  
particularly with regard to the images they concocted of China,  
shifting as circumstances required. Though a lot had been known, the  
first major study of the National Security World in those years only  
recently appeared: James Peck's Washington's China. I haven't come  
across reviews. It is highly revealing.

There were, of course, also saner elements in planning circles. They  
recognized that real interests were at stake, though not a "Slavic  
Manchukuo" (Dean Rusk) or "revolutionary China" as part of the  
"monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" to control the world (JFK), etc.  
The internal records reveal the usual concern about the rational  
version of the domino theory -- quite distinct from the fevered  
version served up to the public, but so rational that it is  
consistently invoked in internal planning records. The plausible fear  
in this case was that an independent Vietnam might pursue a path of  
independent development in a manner that would inspire others in the  
region. It might be a "virus spreading contagion," in Kissinger's  
rhetoric (about Allende), perhaps as far as resource-rich Indonesia.  
That might lead Japan to "accommodate" to an independent Southeast  
and East Asia as its industrial and technological center,  
reconstructing Japan's New Order outside US control (Kennan and other  
planners considered that to be fine as long as it was under US  
control). That would mean that the US had effectively lost the  
Pacific phase of World War II. The natural reaction was to destroy  
the virus and inoculate those who might succumb, by establishing  
vicious dictatorships. That goal was achieved, with great success.  
That is why National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy later reflected  
that the US might well have cut back its war effort by 1965, after  
the Suharto coup in Indonesia, which aroused unconstrained euphoria  
after he slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed the  
only mass-based political organization, and opened the country to  
Western plunder.

Without continuing, the real stakes were significant, and the US  
victory was not insubtantial; and the concocted pretexts, apparently  
believed, were not just significant but colossal. The stakes in Iraq  
are enormous too, but it is not at all clear that they exceed those  
perceived in Indochina. And they are very different in character.  
Despite some inflated rhetoric from Eisenhower and others, Vietnamese  
resources were of limited interest, while in Iraq they are an  
overriding concern. The US could achieve its major war aims in  
Vietnam simply by destroying it; not in Iraq, which has to be  
controlled, not destroyed. And while there was concern over the  
"virus" effect in Vietnam, that was never a consideration in Iraq.

Looking more closely at the anti-war movements in both cases, I  
think, as noted, that it has actually been greater in the case of  
Iraq than it was during any comparable state of the Indochina wars.  
Furthermore, this country has significantly changed as a result of  
60s activism and its aftermath. The movement against the war in  
Vietnam, when it finally developed, was not "diluted" by the wide- 
ranging concerns of activists today. I can easily elaborate even  
keeping to my own experience. Consider just talks. In the late 1960s  
almost all requests were about the Vietnam war. Today, only a  
fraction are about the Iraq war, not because the war is not a  
concern, but because there are so many other live and imporant  
concerns. Furthermore the deluge of invitations is far greater in  
scale, on all sorts of issues that were scarcely discussed 40 years  
ago, and audiences are far larger and much more engaged. And there  
are many other factors detracting from activism, such as the enormous  
amount of energy drained away by the "9/11 Truth Movement." There may  
be an impression of less anti-war activism today than in Vietnam, but  
I think it is quite misleading -- even though protest against the war  
in Iraq is far less than the crimes merit.


5.  What policies are available to the U.S. warmakers, now? What  
options are plausible as what they would like to do, if they could  
have their way? Is withdrawal in the cards? Will withdrawal lead to  
even worse civil war? Will withdrawal lead to the victory of either  
Baathists or Islamic fundamentalists? What would be the effect of  
either? If there is no withdrawal now, forced by opposition or sought  
by some elites, or both, what do you think policy will be?

One policy available to US planners is to accept the responsibilities  
of aggressors generally: to pay massive reparations for their crimes  
-- not aid, but reparations -- and to attend to the will of the  
victims. But such thoughts are beyond consideration, or commentary,  
in societies with a deeply rooted imperial mentality and a highly  
indoctrinated intellectual class.

The government, and commentators, know quite a lot about the will of  
the victims, from regular polls run by the US and Western polling  
agencies. The results are quite consistent. By now, about 2/3 of  
Baghdadis want US forces to withdraw immediately, and about 70% of  
all Iraqis want a firm timetable for withdrawal, mostly within a year  
or less: that means far higher percentages in Arab Iraq, where the  
troops are actually deployed. 80% (including Kurdish areas) believe  
that the US presence increases violence, and almost the same  
percentage believe that the US intends to keep permanent military  
bases. These numbers have been regularly increasing.

As is the norm, Iraqi opinion is almost entirely disregarded. Current  
plans are to increase the US force level in Baghad, where the large  
majority of the population wants them out. The Baker-Hamilton report  
did not even mention Iraqi opinions on withdrawal.  Not that they  
lacked the information; they cited the very same polls on matters of  
concern to Washington, specifically, support for attacks on US  
soldiers (considerered legimate by 60% of Iraqis), leading to policy  
recommendations for change of tactics. Similarly, US opinion is of  
little interest, not only about Iraq, but also about the next looming  
crisis, Iran. 75% of Americans (including 56% of Republicans) favor  
pursuing better relations with Iran rather than threats. That fact  
scarcely enters into policy considerations or commentary, just as  
policy is not affected by the large majorities that favor diplomatic  
relations with Cuba. Elite opinion is profoundly undemocratic, though  
overflowing with lofty rhetoric about love of democracy and messianic  
missions to promote democracy. There is nothing new or surprising  
about that, and of course it is not limited to the US.

As to the consequences of a US withdrawal, we are entitled to have  
our personal judgments, all of them as uninformed and dubious as  
those of US intelligence. But they do not matter. What matters is  
what Iraqis think. Or rather, that is what should matter, and we  
learn a lot about the character and moral level of the reigning  
intellectual culture from the fact that the question of what the  
victims want barely even arises.


6.  What do you see as the likely consequences of various policy  
proposals that have been put forward: (a) the Baker-Hamilton  
committee recommendations; (b) the Peter Galbraith-Biden-Gelb  
proposal to divide Iraq into three separate countries.

The Baker-Hamilton recommendations are in part just a wish list:  
wouldn't it be nice if Iran and Syria would help us out? Every  
recommendation is so hedged as to be almost meaningless. Thus, combat  
troops should be reduced, unless they are needed to protect Americans  
soldiers -- for example, those embedded in Iraqi units, where many  
regard them as legitimate targets of attack. Buried in the report are  
the expected recommendations to allow corporate (meaning mostly US- 
UK) control over energy resources. These are left undiscussed,  
perhaps regarded as inappropriate to bring to public attention. There  
are a few words recommending that the President announce that we do  
not intend a permanent military presence, but without a call to  
terminate construction. Much the same throughout. The report  
dismisses partition proposals, even the more limited proposals for a  
high level of independence within a loosely federal structure. Though  
it's not really our business, or our right to decide, their  
skepticism is probably warranted. Neighboring countries would be very  
hostile to an independent Kurdistan, which is landlocked, and Turkey  
might even invade, which would also threaten the long-standing and  
critical US-Turkey-Israel alliance. Kurds strongly favor  
independence, but appear to regard it as not feasible -- for now, at  
least. The Sunni states might invade to protect the Sunni areas,  
which lack resources. The Shia region might improve ties with Iran.  
It could set off a regional war. My own view is that federal  
arrangements make good sense, not only in Iraq. But these do not seem  
realistic prospects for the near-term future.


7.  In contrast, what do you think policy should be? Suppose sincere  
concern for real democracy, sincere concern for populations in need,  
sincere concern for law and justice were to suddenly gain a hold on  
decision making, or suppose the will of an antiwar opposition could  
dictate terms, what should U.S. policymakers be forced to do?

The answer seems to me pretty straightforward. Policy should be that  
of all aggressors: (1) pay reparations; (2) attend to the will of the  
victims; (3) hold the guilty parties accountable, in accord with the  
Nuremberg principles, the UN Charter, and other international  
instruments, even the US War Crimes Act before it was eviscerated by  
the Military Commisions Act, one of the most shameful pieces of  
legislation in American history. There are no mechanical principles  
in human affairs, but these are sensible guidelines. A more practical  
proposal is to work to change the domestic society and culture  
substantially enough so that what should be done can at least become  
a topic for discussion. That is a large task, not only on this issue,  
though i think elite opposition is far more ferocious than that of  
the general public.
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