[Peace-discuss] WPost: In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue

[Robert Naiman]

Now it's official -- it's been reported in the Post. But what the
Inter Press Service story indicated that this one doesn't is the likelihood that
this deal is still available.

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In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue
Some Officials Lament Lost Opportunity
Glenn Kessler, Washington Post
Sunday, June 18, 2006; A16


Just after the lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three
years ago, an unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at
the Near East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from
Iran for a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax
suggested everything was on the table -- including full cooperation on
nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian
support for Palestinian militant groups.

But top Bush administration officials, convinced the Iranian
government was on the verge of collapse, belittled the initiative.
Instead, they formally complained to the Swiss ambassador who had sent
the fax with a cover letter certifying it as a genuine proposal
supported by key power centers in Iran, former administration
officials said.

Last month, the Bush administration abruptly shifted policy and agreed
to join talks previously led by European countries over Iran's nuclear
program. But several former administration officials say the United
States missed an opportunity in 2003 at a time when American strength
seemed at its height -- and Iran did not have a functioning nuclear
program or a gusher of oil revenue from soaring energy demand.

"At the time, the Iranians were not spinning centrifuges, they were
not enriching uranium," said Flynt Leverett, who was a senior director
on the National Security Council staff then and saw the Iranian
proposal. He described it as "a serious effort, a respectable effort
to lay out a comprehensive agenda for U.S.-Iranian rapprochement."

While the Iranian approach has been previously reported, the actual
document making the offer has surfaced only in recent weeks. Trita
Parsi, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, said he obtained it from Iranian sources. The
Washington Post confirmed its authenticity with Iranian and former
U.S. officials.

Parsi said the U.S. victory in Iraq frightened the Iranians because
U.S. forces had routed in three weeks an army that Iran had failed to
defeat during a bloody eight-year war.

The document lists a series of Iranian aims for the talks, such as
ending sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology and a
recognition of its "legitimate security interests." Iran agreed to put
a series of U.S. aims on the agenda, including full cooperation on
nuclear safeguards, "decisive action" against terrorists, coordination
in Iraq, ending "material support" for Palestinian militias and
accepting the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document also laid out an agenda for
negotiations, with possible steps to be achieved at a first meeting
and the development of negotiating road maps on disarmament, terrorism
and economic cooperation.

Newsday has previously reported that the document was primarily the
work of Sadegh Kharazi, Iran's ambassador to France and nephew of
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi and passed on by the Swiss
ambassador to Tehran, Tim Guldimann. The Swiss government is a
diplomatic channel for communications between Tehran and Washington
because the two countries broke off relations after the 1979 seizure
of U.S. embassy personnel.

Leverett said Guldimann included a cover letter that it was an
authoritative initiative that had the support of then-President
Mohammad Khatami and supreme religious leader Ali Khamenei.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed that the U.S.
decision to join the nuclear talks was not an effort to strike a
"grand bargain" with Iran. Earlier this month, she made the first
official confirmation of the Iranian proposal in an interview with
National Public Radio.

"What the Iranians wanted earlier was to be one-on-one with the United
States so that this could be about the United States and Iran," said
Rice, who was Bush's national security adviser when the fax was
received. "Now it is Iran and the international community, and Iran
has to answer to the international community. I think that's the
strongest possible position to be in."

Current White House and State Department officials declined to comment
further on the Iranian offer.

Paul R. Pillar, former national intelligence officer for the Near East
and South Asia, said that it is true "there is less daylight between
the United States and Europe, thanks in part to Rice's energetic
diplomacy." But he said that only partially offsets the fact that the
U.S. position is "inherently weaker now" because of Iraq. He described
the Iranian approach as part of a series of efforts by Iran to engage
with the Bush administration. "I think there have been a lot of lost
opportunities," he said, citing as one example a failure to build on
the useful cooperation Iran provided in Afghanistan.

Richard N. Haass, head of policy planning at the State Department at
the time and now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said
the Iranian approach was swiftly rejected because in the
administration "the bias was toward a policy of regime change." He
said it is difficult to know whether the proposal was fully supported
by the "multiple governments" that run Iran, but he felt it was worth
exploring.

"To use an oil analogy, we could have drilled a dry hole," he said.
"But I didn't see what we had to lose. I did not share the assessment
of many in the administration that the Iranian regime was on the
brink."

Parsi said that based on his conversations with the Iranian officials,
he believes the failure of the United States to even respond to the
offer had an impact on the government. Parsi, who is writing a book on
Iran-Israeli relations, said he believes the Iranians were ready to
dramatically soften their stance on Israel, essentially taking the
position of other Islamic countries such as Malaysia. Instead, Iranian
officials decided that the United States cared not about Iranian
policies but about Iranian power.

The incident "strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the
only way to compel the United States to talk or deal with Iran is not
by sending peace offers but by being a nuisance," Parsi said.

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Robert Naiman
Just Foreign Policy
www.justforeignpolicy.org