[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [UFPJ] New Talking Points - Iran and Nuclear Dangers

Morton K. Brussel brussel at uiuc.edu
Thu Mar 16 17:13:44 CST 2006


Phyllis Bennis tries to understand what is going on, and she is  
progressive, well informed, and imaginative.
--mkb

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Pbennis2 at cs.com
> Date: March 15, 2006 8:32:33 PM CST
> To: ufpj at lists.mayfirst.org
> Subject: [UFPJ] New Talking Points - Iran and Nuclear Dangers
>
>
> UFPJ Talking Points #39 -
> New War Dangers: Iran, the U.S. and Nukes in the Middle East
>
> By Phyllis Bennis
> Institute for Policy Studies
> 15 March 2006
>
> ** Escalating rhetoric, continued losses in Iraq, Bush's political  
> problems, and an ideologically-driven pursuit of power make the  
> possibility of a U.S. military attack on Iran - however reckless  
> and however dangerous its consequences - a frighteningly real  
> possibility.
>
> ** Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and  
> has not violated the Treaty. While there appear to be unresolved  
> issues regarding full transparency, its nuclear program, including  
> enriching uranium, is perfectly legal under NPT requirements for  
> non-nuclear weapons states.
>
> ** Iran does not have nuclear weapons; even if it is trying to  
> build a nuclear weapons program, it could not produce weapons for  
> five to ten years or more.
>
> ** There is a dangerous, unmonitored and provocative nuclear  
> arsenal in the Middle East; it belongs to Israel, not Iran. U.S.  
> hypocrisy and double standards in nuclear policy, accepting  
> Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal and rewarding India's  
> nuclear weapons status while threatening war against Iran and  
> denying its own obligations under the NPT, has undermined  
> Washington's claimed commitment to non-proliferation.
>
> ** U.S. officials claim they are not considering an invasion of  
> Iraq but "only" surgical air strikes against known nuclear  
> facilities; they have not explained what their military response  
> will be when Iran retaliates, whether against U.S. troops in Iraq  
> or elsewhere in the region, against U.S. oil tankers in near-by  
> shipping lanes, or against Israel.
>
> ** Global suspicions remain regarding U.S. claims because of  
> Washington's lies leading to the invasion of Iraq, but  
> international conditions regarding Iran are significantly  
> different; many governments appear more willing to consider Iran a  
> "threat."
>
> ** The only solution to the crisis is to move towards a nuclear  
> weapons-free, or even weapons of mass destruction-free zone across  
> the entire Middle East.
> ________________________
>
> The Bush administration's rapid escalation of anti-Iran rhetoric in  
> the last few months should not be dismissed as posturing. Some of  
> the attacks, especially Vice-President Cheney's and UN Ambassador  
> John Bolton's speeches to the American-Israel Public Affairs  
> Committee convention, were clearly aimed at least partly at that  
> specific audience. But this administration has a history of  
> carrying out actions widely viewed, even among U.S. elites, as  
> reckless and dangerous. The Bush administration's new campaign of  
> claiming Iran is responsible for the improvised explosive devices  
> (IEDs - or roadside bombs) that are proving so deadly against Iraqi  
> civilians and U.S. troops in Iraq, represents a further escalation  
> of the threat by linking Iran to the rise in U.S. casualties in Iraq.
>
> The extremist language of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad  
> also has played a role in heating up the rhetorical battle. His  
> outrageous claims denying the Holocaust appear to be playing to  
> what he perceives as the views of his own domestic audience. But  
> Ahmedinejad's refusal to recognize the obligations of national  
> presidents in the world spotlight - especially the president of a  
> nation in Washington's crosshairs - has created a situation in  
> which both sides may become boxed into political corners from which  
> they cannot escape.
>
> The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is based on the idea that  
> countries with and without nuclear weapons all give up something,  
> and both have rights and obligations under the Treaty. Countries  
> without nuclear weapons - almost all countries in the world have  
> signed the Treaty - agree not to buy or build nuclear weapons. In  
> return, the NPT allows them to create and use nuclear power, and  
> even urges the nuclear weapons countries to provide them with  
> nuclear technology for their peaceful use - including the  
> technology to enrich uranium. (This encouragement of the spread of  
> nuclear technology and nuclear power is a huge weakness of the NPT,  
> but it remains the operative legal framework.) On the other side,  
> the five recognized nuclear weapons countries - the U.S., Russia,  
> France, the UK and China - are obligated under Article VI of the  
> NPT to move towards full and complete nuclear disarmament.
>
> The three known nuclear weapons states beyond the five official  
> nuclear powers are Israel, India and Pakistan. Unlike Iran, none of  
> them have signed the NPT. (North Korea, widely viewed as having the  
> ability to build, or perhaps even an existing nuclear weapon, was a  
> signatory to the NPT, but withdrew from the treaty before moving  
> towards full nuclear weapons capacity.)
>
> Iran, however, is a signatory to the NPT, and as such has been  
> under voluntary international scrutiny for many years. Like all non- 
> nuclear weapons signatories, Iran maintains the right to have  
> access to nuclear technology, to build nuclear power plants, and to  
> enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Iran has not violated the  
> NPT's restrictions for non-nuclear weapons countries. Even the U.S.  
> does not claim Iran is violating the NPT; the Bush administration  
> claims, rather, that it "does not trust" Iran, and therefore Iran  
> should be denied the rights granted to it under the treaty.
>
> Iran has no capacity to produce nuclear weapons at this time. If it  
> chooses to move towards nuclear weapons production, estimates are  
> that it would take five to ten years before it would be possible.  
> Tehran has made clear its desire for a security guarantee with the  
> U.S. During the year-long European-led negotiations over Iran's  
> nuclear program, Washington's refusal to offer such a guarantee  
> fueled public support in Iran for the nuclear program.
>
> The escalating danger of a new U.S. military strike or a nuclear  
> arms race in the Middle East must take into account the provocative  
> nature of Israel's unacknowledged but widely known nuclear arsenal  
> of 200-400 high-density nuclear bombs produced at its Dimona  
> nuclear center in the Negev desert. The Israeli nuke was first  
> tested jointly with apartheid South Africa in 1979 and made public  
> by nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu in 1986. Since then  
> Israel, with U.S. support, has maintained a nuclear policy of  
> "strategic ambiguity," neither confirming nor denying the existence  
> of its nuclear weapons. As long as Israel, while continuing to  
> violate international law in its occupation of Palestinian and  
> Syrian territory, remains the Middle East's sole nuclear power,  
> other countries in the region will continue seeking nuclear parity  
> for deterrence. (Alternatively, they may seek chemical or  
> biological weapons, often termed the "poor countries' nuclear  
> weapons.")
>
> U.S. officials are not yet openly calling for military action  
> against Iran; their rhetoric so far states that "all options are on  
> the table," with Cheney, Rice, Bush and others making explicit  
> threats about what Iran "must" do. When details do come out, U.S.  
> and Israeli military and political officials claim to be looking  
> only at "surgical" air strikes against known Iranian nuclear  
> facilities. What is not being publicly answered is what the U.S.  
> plans to do should Iran retaliate militarily to such an attack.  
> Whether such retaliation is an attack on U.S. troops in Iraq or  
> elsewhere in the region, a move to stall shipping in the strategic  
> Strait of Hormuz, or an attack against Israel, would the U.S. then  
> consider an invasion of Iran in response? In this context it makes  
> less difference whether an initial military strike against Iran is  
> carried out by the U.S. directly or by Israel - since Iran might  
> respond militarily against either one regardless of which air force  
> actually dropped the bombs.
>
> Governments around the world, including powerful European  
> governments, remain skeptical of Washington's intentions and  
> especially dubious regarding U.S. intelligence claims following the  
> lies of the Iraq war. But most governments, including those who  
> defied U.S. pressure on Iraq, remain eager to get back into  
> Washington's good graces. So since they know Iran, unlike Iraq  
> before the invasion, does in fact have a functioning nuclear energy  
> program, many are prepared to put aside Iran's legal position under  
> the NPT and embrace Washington's campaign to treat Iran as a global  
> danger. The UN's nuclear watchdog (IAEA) continues to call for de- 
> escalation of the rhetoric and reliance on negotiations, and has  
> reported that there is no evidence of nuclear weapons production.  
> But the IAEA itself has been unwilling to challenge Washington's  
> campaign directly, emphasizing instead its unhappiness with Iran's  
> allegedly insufficient transparency; IAEA Director Mohamed el  
> Baradei even stated that "diplomacy has to be backed by pressure  
> and, in extreme cases, by force." The result is that overall  
> international skepticism regarding the Bush administration's claims  
> may not be sufficient for winning governmental opposition to rising  
> U.S. threats against Iran.
>
> The IAEA board has now reported the Iran issue to the UN Security  
> Council where closed, non-public debate is underway, initially  
> involving only the five permanent members. At the moment it appears  
> unlikely Russia and China would accept a resolution imposing full- 
> scale economic sanctions against Iran. Both are strong trade  
> partners with Iran, China depends on Iran for more than 10% of its  
> growing oil needs, and Russia's own nuclear industry remains tied  
> to Iran's nuclear power production.
>
> Instead, it is likely that any call for Security Council sanctions  
> will be in the form of so-called "smart sanctions," largely limited  
> to freezing assets and denying travel rights to specific members of  
> the Iranian regime and specific Iranian companies. A greater danger  
> may be the language of the resolution; if the U.S. agrees to call  
> only for "smart" sanctions, the quid pro quo from Russia and China  
> may be language that the Security Council decision is taken under  
> Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The significance is that Chapter VII  
> includes the Council's right to use military force to enforce UN  
> decisions. Even if only the Council itself may legally make such a  
> determination, the very presence of the words "Chapter VII" in the  
> text may be used by the Bush administration to make the claim that  
> any future unilateral attack on Iran is somehow "enforcing UN  
> resolutions."
>
> Another international shift whose consequences remain uncertain has  
> to do with Iran's planned opening (perhaps as early as this month)  
> of a new international oil trading center, with a euro- rather than  
> dollar-based exchange. Such a move would potentially threaten the  
> dominance of the petro-dollar in the global oil markets, and thus  
> pose new risks for the U.S. currency dominance. Saddam Hussein had  
> shifted from dollars to euros for oil trading two years before the  
> U.S. invasion; it was almost certainly one of the several reasons  
> for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. The opening of such a new  
> euro-based oil exchange in Iran would likely benefit Europe, with  
> the possibility of a shift away from the current European passivity  
> towards Washington's military threats.
>
> There is no military "solution" to the Iran nuclear issue. The only  
> answer is the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone across the  
> Middle East. In fact, the U.S. is already legally bound to the even  
> broader commitment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in  
> the region. In the U.S.-drafted UN Security Council Resolution 687,  
> that ended the 1991 Gulf War and imposed sanctions on Iraq, Article  
> 14 states calls for "establishing in the Middle East a zone free  
> from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their  
> delivery." It is time Washington was held accountable to that  
> commitment.
> ________________________________
> (For two-page summary versions of our Iraq Exit Strategy and Costs  
> of War reports, see the new Iraq Index page.)
>
> Phyllis Bennis' new book is Challenging Empire: How People,  
> Governments, and the UN Defy U.S. Power, just published by  
> Interlink. It is available from IPS or from www.interlinkbooks.com.
>
> You can also get a copy of Challenging Empire with a donation of  
> $100 or $10/month to IPS.
>
>
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