[Peace-discuss] Clinton I, not Bush II, responsible for WMD myth

[C. G. Estabrook]

	Iraq's WMD Myth: Why Clinton is Culpable
	By ANDREW COCKBURN

A former senior UN diplomat has revealed to me details of how, just over 
10 years ago, the Clinton administration deliberately sabotaged UN 
weapons inspections in Iraq.

American officials were fearful that Iraq would be officially certified 
as weapons-free, a development that was seen as a political liability 
for Bill Clinton. Thus the stage was set for the manufacture of the 
Iraqi WMD myth as the excuse for George Bush's catastrophic invasion of 
Iraq.

It was March 1997. For six years the UN inspectors had been probing the 
secrets of Saddam's weapons programs, in the process destroying huge 
quantities of chemical munitions and other production facilities. To 
enforce Saddam's cooperation, Iraq was subject to crushing sanctions.

Now, Rolf Ekeus, the urbane Swedish diplomat who headed the inspection 
effort, was ready to announce that his work was almost done. "I was 
getting close to certifying that Iraq was in compliance with Resolution 
687," he confirmed to me recently.

At the time, he declared that although there were some loose ends to be 
cleared up, "not much is unknown about Iraq's retained proscribed 
weapons capabilities."

For the Clinton administration, this was a crisis. If Ekeus was allowed 
to complete his mission, then the suspension of sanctions would follow 
almost automatically.

Saddam would be off the hook and, more importantly for the Clintonites, 
the neo-conservative republicans would be howling for the president's blood.

The only hope was somehow to prevent Ekeus completing his mission.

Enter Madeleine Albright, newly appointed Secretary of State. On March 
26, 1997, she strode on to the stage at Georgetown University to deliver 
what was billed as a major policy address on Iraq. Many in the audience 
expected that she would extend some sort of olive branch toward the 
Iraqi regime, but that was far from her mind.

Instead, she was set on making sure that Saddam effectively ended his 
cooperation with the inspectors. "We do not agree with the nations who 
argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of 
mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted," she declared. Sanctions, 
she stated without equivocation, would remain unless or until Saddam was 
driven from power.

Ekeus understood immediately what Albright intended. "I knew that Saddam 
would now feel that there was no point in his cooperating with us, and 
that was the intent of her speech."

Sure enough, the following day he got an angry call from Tariq Aziz, 
Saddam's deputy prime minister and emissary to the outside world. "He 
wanted to know why Iraq should work with us any more."

 From then on, the inspectors found their lives increasingly difficult, 
as Iraqi officials, clearly acting under instructions from Saddam, 
blocked them at every turn.Ekeus resigned in July 1997, to be replaced 
by the Australian Richard Butler. Butler was soon embroiled in 
acrimonious confrontation with the Iraqis. Later the following year, all 
the inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq and the US mounted a series of 
bombing raids.

Clinton's strategy had been successful. Iraq remained under sanctions, 
while in Washington the neo-conservative faction spun the wildest 
conjectures as to what evil schemes Saddam, unmolested by inspectors, 
might be concocting with his weapons scientists.

In fact Saddam had long abandoned all his WMD programs, but as the CIA 
had no sources of intelligence inside Iraq, no one in the West could 
prove this.

Finally, following 9/11, the war party in George Bush Jr's 
administration was able to make the case for invasion on the grounds 
that Saddam had refused to comply with UN resolutions on disarmament by 
refusing to grant access to the weapons inspectors. The Iraq disaster 
has many fathers.

[Footnote: Ekeus knew from the mid-l990s on that Saddam Hussein had no 
such weapons of mass destruction. They had all been destroyed years 
earlier, after the first Gulf war.

Ekeus learned this on the night of August 22, l995, in Amman, from the 
lips of General Hussein Kamel, who had just defected from Iraq, along 
with some of his senior military aides. Kamel was Saddam's son-in-law 
and had been in overall charge of all programs for chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

That night, in three hours of detailed questioning from Ekeus and two 
technical experts, Kamel was categorical. The UN inspection teams had 
done a good job. When Saddam was finally persuaded that failure to 
dispose of the relevant weapons systems would have very serious 
consequences, he issued the order and Kamel carried it out. As he told 
Ekeus that night, "All weapons, biological, chemical, missile, nuclear, 
were destroyed." (The UNSCOM record of the session can ne viewed at 
http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kamel.pdf). In similar debriefings 
that August Kamel said the same thing to teams from the CIA and MI6. His 
military aides provided a wealth of corroborative details. Then, the 
following year, Kamel was lured back to Iraq and at once executed. Editors.]

Andrew Cockburn is the author of Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and 
Catastrophic Legacy.