[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [Ufpj-disc] Time for an Arms Race with China
-- just what we need!
Brussel Morton K.
mkbrussel at comcast.net
Fri Oct 10 23:47:05 CDT 2008
Important information from UFPJ. --mkb
Begin forwarded message:
> From: "Kevin Zeese" <kzeese at earthlink.net>
> Date: October 10, 2008 12:41:45 AM CDT
> To: <VotersForPeace at yahoogroups.com>, <ufpj-disc at lists.mayfirst.org>
> Subject: [Ufpj-disc] Time for an Arms Race with China -- just what
> we need!
>
> **Please see footer for list protocol**
>
>
> The State Department's International Security Advisory Board is
> recommending the U.S. immediately launch an arms race with China.
>
> ISAB is headed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul
> Wolfowitz. The article does not mention is that the ISAB includes
> both a current VP at Lockheed-Martin and a current senior director
> at Boeing.
>
> KZ
>
> http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php
>
> State Department Arms Control Board Declares Cold War on China
>
> China, Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Weapons, United States Add comments
>
>
> After planning the war against Iraq, former Assistant Secretary of
> Defense Paul Wolfowitz now heads the State Department’s
> International Security Advisory Board that recommends a Cold War
> against China.
> By Hans M. Kristensen
>
> A report from an advisory board to Secretary of State Condoleezza
> Rice has recommended that the United States beefs up its nuclear,
> conventional, and space-based posture in the Pacific to counter China.
>
> The report, which was first described in the Washington Times,
> portrays China’s military modernization and intentions in highly
> dramatic terms that appear go beyond the assessments published so
> far by the Defense Department and the intelligence community.
>
> Although the Secretary of State asked for recommendations to move
> US-Chinese relations away from competition and conflict toward
> greater transparency, mutual confidence and enhanced cooperation,
> the board instead has produced a report that appears to recommend
> policies that would increase and deepen military competition and in
> essence constitute a small Cold War with China.
>
> China’s “Creeping” Nuclear Doctrine
>
> Although the report China’s Strategic Modernization - written by
> the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) - deals with
> China’s overall military modernization, its focus is clearly on
> nuclear forces. What underpins China’s expansion of its offensive
> nuclear capabilities, the report says, is an “emerging creep
> toward a Chinese assured destruction capability” to create a
> “mutual vulnerability relationship” with the United States.
>
> The objective is, an interpretation the authors say is supported
> by “numerous Chinese military statements,” for Beijing to get
> enough nuclear capability “to subject the United States to
> coercive nuclear threats to limit potential US intervention in a
> regional conflict” over Taiwan and oilfields in the South China Sea.
>
> Yet “assured destruction,” to the extent that means confidence
> in a retaliatory capability against the United States and Russia,
> has been Chinese nuclear policy for decades. Increasing US and
> Russian nuclear capabilities, however, convinced Chinese planners
> that their deterrent might not survive. The current deployment of
> three long-range ballistic missile versions of the mobile DF-31 is
> supposed to restore the survivability of their strategic deterrent.
>
> The “mutual vulnerability relationship” the authors say China is
> trying to create to deter the United States from defending Taiwan
> or limit US escalation options is a curious argument because it
> implies that the United States has not been vulnerable to Chinese
> nuclear threats in the past. In fact, US bases and allies in the
> Western Pacific have been vulnerable to Chinese attacks since the
> 1970s and the Continental United States since the early 1980s.
>
> It is tempting to read the authors’ use of the terms “assured
> destruction” and “mutual vulnerability relationship” as
> borrowed components of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD, the
> term for the nuclear relationship that existed between the United
> States and the Soviet Union during much of the Cold War.
>
> But in responding to China’s nuclear modernization and policy, it
> is very important not to resort to Cold War-like worst-case
> analysis. To that end, two of the best analyzes on Chinese nuclear
> policy are Iain Johnston’s China’s New ‘Old Thinking:’ The
> Concept of Limited Deterrence, and Michael S. Chase and Evan
> Medeiros’ China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and
> Doctrinal Debate. The ISAB members should read them.
>
> Misperceptions or Just Out of Touch
>
> The report contains several claims about Chinese nuclear forces and
> recommendations for counter-steps that appear out of sync with what
> the US intelligence community has stated and steps that the US has
> already taken. Some of the most noteworthy are listed below
> followed by my remarks:
>
> * “By 2015, China is projected to have in excess of 100 nuclear-
> armed missiles…that could strike the United States.” Actually,
> the projection the intelligence community has made in public is for
> 60 ICBMs by 2010 and “about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily
> against the United States” by 2015. The ISAB report talks about
> targeting of the US “homeland.” If that includes Guam, then the
> force could reach a little above 100 by 2015 (it’s about 70
> today). If “homeland” means the Continental United States, which
> has been the focus of the intelligence community’s projection,
> then a force carrying 75-100 warheads would likely include 20
> DF-5As and 40-55 DF-31A. China so far is thought to have deployed
> fewer than 10 DF-31As.
>
> * Some of the missiles “may be MIRVed” by 2015. What the
> intelligence community has said is that China has had the
> capability to MIRV its silo-based missiles for years but has not
> yet done so. MIRV on the mobile missiles, however, represents
> significant technical hurdles and “would be many years off,”
> according to the CIA, and “would probably require nuclear testing
> to get something that small.” Instead, if Chinese planners
> determine that the US missile defense system would degrade the
> effectiveness of the Chinese force, they “could use a DF-31 type
> RV for a multiple-RV payload for the CSS-4 in a few years,” the
> CIA stated in 2002. Even so, a multiple-RV payload is not
> necessarily the same as MIRV.
>
> * China’s “substantial expansion” of its nuclear posture
> “includes development and deployment of…tactical nuclear arms,
> encompassing enhanced radiation weapons, nuclear artillery, and
> anti-ship missiles.” That would certainly be news if it were true,
> but the intelligence community hasn’t talked much about Chinese
> tactical nuclear weapons and what it has said has been
> contradictory, ranging from China might have some to “there is no
> evidence” that they have any. Several of China’s tests
> reportedly involved enhanced radiation or tactical warhead designs,
> but whether China is working on fielding tactical nuclear weapons
> has not been confirmed. China did conduct what appeared to be
> operational tests of tactical bombs in the past, which they might
> have fielded, but ISAB does not mention bombs.
>
> * China’s modernization includes “a growing capability for
> Conventional Precision Strike and other anti-access/area-denial
> capabilities” including “submarine-launched ballistic
> missiles.” That China would use nuclear missiles on its future
> strategic submarines for “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities
> is news to me and would, if it were true, represent a dramatic
> change in Chinese nuclear policy. But I haven’t seen anything that
> suggests its true, and the overwhelming expectation is that China
> will use its SSBNs as a retaliatory strike force, if and when they
> manage to operationalize it.
>
> * The US “should reaffirm its formal security guarantees to
> allies, including the nuclear umbrella.” The US does that
> regularly when it extends the security agreement with South Korea
> and Japan. In addition, in response to the North Korean nuclear
> test in October 2006, President Bush reaffirmed that “The United
> States will meet the full range of our deterrent and security
> commitments.” One week later, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
> arrived in Tokyo where she emphasized the nuclear component by
> saying that “the United States has the will and the capability to
> meet the full range - and I underscore full range - of its
> deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”
>
> * The US should “pursue new missile defense capabilities,
> including taking full advantage of space,” to counter China’s
> growing nuclear capability. For a State Department advisory
> committee to recommend using missile defenses to counter Chinese
> nuclear missiles is, to say the least, interesting given that the
> State Department has publicly stated and assured the Chinese that
> the missile defense system “it is not directed against China.”
>
> * The US should “publicly reaffirm its commitment to retain a
> forward-based US military presence in East Asia.” The US has
> actually done that quite explicitly over the past seven years by
> shifting the majority of its aircraft carrier battle groups and
> nuclear attack submarines to bases in the Pacific, by beginning to
> forward deploy nuclear attack submarines to Guam, by sending
> strategic B-2 and B-52 bombers on extended deployments to Guam, and
> by forward deploying the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS
> George Washington (CVN-75) to Japan. The Pentagon describes the
> recent Valiant Shield exercises as “the largest Pacific exercise
> since the Vietnam War.”
>
> Pacific Exercises Now Biggest Since Vietnam War
>
>
> While ISAB recommends increasing the US military posture in the
> Pacific to counter China, the Pentagon says recent exercises,
> including the thee carrier battle group Valiant Shield 06, are now
> the largest since the Vietnam War.
> .
> * “For almost two decades, the United States has allowed its
> nuclear posture – its stockpile, infrastructure, and expertise –
> to deteriorate and atrophy across the board.” Although the
> stockpile is much smaller compared with the Cold War and industrial-
> scale production of new nuclear warheads has ceased, ISAB’s
> characterization of the US nuclear posture is way off.
>
> Instead, during the nearly two decades the authors describe
> (assuming that means since 1990), the US has deployed eight new
> SSBNs, deployed 336 Trident II D-5 SLBM on its entire SSBN fleet,
> deployed 21 B-2 stealth bombers, deployed the Advanced Cruise
> Missile, deployed the hard-target kill W88 warhead (including in
> the Pacific), deployed three modified nuclear weapons (B61-10,
> B61-11 and W76-1), completely overhauled the Minuteman III ICBM
> force, deployed two new classes of nuclear-powered attack
> submarines capable of launching nuclear cruise missiles, deployed a
> modern nuclear command and control system with new satellites and
> command centers, modernized the Strategic War Planning System (now
> called ISPAN), created a “living SIOP” strategic nuclear war
> plan with broadened targeting against China and new strike options
> against regional adversaries, and built a multi-billion dollar
> Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program to certify the
> reliability of the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing and
> provide weapons designers with unprecedented knowledge about
> warhead aging and the skills and tools to refurbish existing
> warheads or build modified ones.
>
> Where Are The Non-Military Policy Recommendations?
>
> One of the most striking features of the report is its almost
> complete focus on military options and the absence of other policy
> components. It contains no analysis of or recommendations for how
> to engage China on nuclear arms control or confidence building
> measures to limit or influence the nuclear modernization,
> operations and policy. It is almost as if there must be another
> unknown chapter to the report.
>
> Although the authors believe there are a number of measures the US
> should take to reduce the prospect for misunderstanding and the
> chance of miscalculation, those recommendations are few and limited
> to continuing existing Track II discussions, military-to-military
> contacts, and asking the Chinese to be more transparent.
>
> The report concludes that China does not desire a conflict with the
> United States, and describes a disconnect between the political and
> military leadership, and a “clear paranoia and misperceptions
> about US intentions….” Without presenting any analysis, it
> concludes that the US ability to shape or change Chinese choices
> related to its strategic modernization may be “very constrained”
> and that there is no point in trying to “educate” the Chinese.
>
> On the contrary, the report concludes that the US should
> “reject” Chinese arms control proposals because they will
> constrain US military freedom. And US arms transfer to allied
> countries in the region “should be an important dimension of US
> non-proliferation policy.” Indeed, the “most important” policy
> recommendation is for the United States to “demonstrate its
> resolve to remain militarily strong….”
>
> And in a recommendation blatantly “imported” from the Cold War,
> the authors say the US should “focus” its research and
> development on “high technology military capabilities” that
> China doesn’t have to “demonstrate to Beijing that trying to get
> ahead of the United States is futile (much the way SDI did against
> the Soviet Union.”
>
> The report essentially capitulates on non-military policy options
> toward China.
>
> So What Exactly Was ISAB Asked To Do?
>
> The advisory board was asked to come up with ideas that could
> “move the US-China security relationship toward greater
> transparency and mutual confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce
> the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation that can
> contribute to competition or conflict.” That’s a quote!
>
> Instead, the authors appear to have produced a paper that would -
> if implemented - likely move the US-Chinese security relationship
> in the opposite direction by deepening military competition and
> mistrust.
>
> Indeed, the review looks more like the kind one would expect from
> the Pentagon rather than the State Department, which is supposed to
> pursue a wider set of policies and different agenda than the
> military. It is all the more striking given that the charter for
> ISAB - which used to be called the Arms Control and
> Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) - describes that the board
> is supposed to “advise with and make recommendations to the
> Secretary of State on United States arms control, nonproliferation,
> and disarmament policies and activities.”
>
> The Secretary’s hope has been for ISAB to provide “independent
> insight, advice, and innovation,” and serve as “a single
> advisory board, dealing with scientific, military, diplomatic,
> political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control,
> disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation, would
> provide valuable independent insight and advice….”
>
> Concluding Remarks
>
> The militaristic focus of ISAB’s report and its lack of
> recommendations for arms control and broader public diplomacy to
> defuse rather than continuing and deepening the competitive and
> mistrustful relationship between the United States and China
> suggest that ISAB has failed to live up to its charter.
>
> No matter what one might think of China’s military modernization,
> the ISAB appears instead to have drawn up a very effective plan for
> a Cold War with China.
>
> Although the authors correctly state up front that the US-Chinese
> relationship “differs fundamentally from the US-Soviet
> relationship and the strategic rivalry of the Cold War,” they
> nonetheless land on a set of recommendations and observations that
> strongly resemble a China-version of the Reagan administration’s
> aggressive military posture against the Soviet Union.
>
> If implemented or allowed to color US policy toward China, the
> policy recommendations would continue and very likely lead to a
> deepening of military competition and adversarial relationship
> between the United States and China – exactly the opposite of what
> the Board was asked to come up with. It is precisely reports like
> this that create the “deep paranoia and misperceptions about US
> intentions” in the Chinese military.
>
> Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should denounce the ISAB report
> to make it clear that the core of US policy toward China is not
> containment and Cold War posturing. And one of the first acts of
> the next Secretary should be to appoint a new advisory board that
> can - and will - develop recommendations that can “move the US-
> China security relationship toward greater transparency and mutual
> confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of
> misunderstanding or miscalculation that can contribute to
> competition or conflict.” Mission not accomplished!
>
> Background Information: ISAB Report: China’s Strategic
> Modernization | Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008 | US Nuclear Forces
> 2008 | FAS/NRDC Report: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War
> Planning
>
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