[Peace-discuss] Just what is it with Iran?

[Brussel Morton K.]

A careful reflection on recent events inside Iran.   --mkb


The World Left and the Iranian Elections

August 05, 2009

By Immanuel Wallerstein
Source: MRZine

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The recent elections in Iran, and the subsequent challenges to their  
legitimacy, have been a matter of enormous internal conflict in Iran,  
and of seemingly endless debate in the rest of the world -- a debate  
that threatens to linger for some time yet.  One of its most  
fascinating consequences has been the deep divisions in this worldwide  
discussion among persons who consider themselves part of the world  
left.  They have ranged in their views from virtually unconditional  
supporters of the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei analysis of the situation to  
virtually unconditional opponents, with multiple positions in- 
between.  This may be as much a commentary on the state of the world  
left as it is on the state of Iran.

What has happened in Iran?  There was an election.  It had seemingly a  
very large turnout of voters.  The government announced a sweeping  
victory for the incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Supporters  
of the three other candidates have charged that the figures were  
fraudulent.  The two principal bases for these charges were the  
rapidity and closed nature of the counting process and the  
implausibility of some of the vote results when broken down by  
different areas of the country.  The ultimate authority in Iran,  
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, asserted in no uncertain terms that the voting  
results were essentially correct and that therefore the election was  
entirely legitimate.  He has insisted that everyone acknowledge the  
validity of the results and cease contesting them.

Immediately following the elections, large numbers of persons  
descended into the streets to protest the reported results and to call  
for a recount or a new election.  As these protests gained steam,  
Ahmadinejad/Khamenei responded with increasingly severe repressive  
measures.  The Revolutionary Guards and the so-called Basiji (a sort  
of popular militia) used considerable force to drive protestors off  
the streets, killing some, and arresting significant numbers in the  
process.

As of now, the major figures in the opposition, the presidential  
candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and two key supporters, ex-presidents  
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, continue to argue that  
the election did not produce a "legitimate" result.  They are  
supported in this by the other two candidates in the race who received  
smaller votes.

What do these major figures want?  They all claim to be faithful  
supporters of the revolution of 1978-79 and devoted to the  
preservation of the existing Iranian Republic.  In short, they are not  
calling for regime change.  On the contrary, they insist that they are  
more faithful adherents of the original spirit of the Iranian  
Revolution than the group presently in power.

How has the world left interpreted all of this?  The present situation  
in Iran is by no means unique.  After all, there have been massive  
popular protests in many countries across the world at one time or  
another for a very long time.  So, the world left has endless  
analogies to which to compare the Iranian situation.  There is, to  
begin with, the Iranian revolution of 1978-79.  But there are also  
Tienanmen in China in 1989, the revolutions of 1968 in endless  
countries, the so-called color revolutions of recent vintage in ex- 
Communist countries, a large number of happenings in different Latin  
American countries, and the general strikes in France in 1995.  One  
can go further back to the Russian and French revolutions, if one  
wishes.

To be sure, the "world left" -- whatever that is -- has no unified  
view of most of these popular protests.  Indeed, one might say that  
one of the principal problems of the contemporary world left is its  
collective incoherence faced with the panoply and remarkable concrete  
variety of such popular protests.

The reason for the collective incoherence is threefold.  First, there  
is the long history of disillusionments with the results of such  
popular protests, especially in the last fifty years.  Secondly, there  
is the objective organizational weakness today of traditional left  
political movements in most countries.  (The principal voices of the  
world left today tend for the most part to be primarily that either of  
free-standing intellectuals or of activists who are located in very  
small organizations.)  Thirdly, there is the fact that so-called left  
analyses differ fundamentally in what they think one should look at  
when one analyzes concrete situations.

Some look primarily at interstate relations.  What would be the  
consequence, geopolitically, of a particular government being either  
replaced by a different set of leaders, or still more of a regime  
being changed to a regime of a different kind?  In the case of Iran at  
the present moment, everyone knows that it is in strong conflict with  
the United States (and to a lesser degree with western Europe),  
primarily but not at all exclusively over nuclear issues.  President  
Ahmadinejad is identified with a strong Iranian position vis-à-vis the  
United States.  Both he and Khamenei have argued repeatedly that the  
United States and Great Britain have been behind the popular protests  
in order to have Ahmadinejad removed in favor of someone more pliable  
from a U.S. point of view.  Hugo Chavez has offered his total support  
to Ahmadinejad primarily on these grounds.  This is a plausible but  
limited way to analyze a situation.  After all, few leftists would  
support the present regime in Myanmar, which recently brutally  
suppressed demonstrations by Buddhist monks, on the grounds that the  
U.S. government would dearly like to see a regime change in Myanmar.

Or one can look rather at class divisions within Iran.  Some self- 
identified members of the world left argue that the supporters of  
Mousavi are largely middle-class and wealthy persons, whereas  
Ahmadinejad draws his supporters from the popular strata.  Therefore,  
they say, a leftist should support Ahmadinejad.  Some other leftists  
analyze the situation differently, arguing that this is merely a  
struggle between two varieties of privileged groups, and that  
Ahmadinejad's support in Tehran's poorer zones is largely the result  
of top down populism (or worse still, of bread and circuses à la  
Berlusconi).  Still others point to ethnic realities among the poorer  
strata, arguing that the non-Farsi-speaking and/or non-Shi'a rural  
areas are left out of populist distribution, oppressed, and hostile to  
Ahmadinejad, who represents, they say, merely the dominant ethnic group.

In addition, many leftists are fundamentally anticlerical.  They  
refuse to recognize the legitimacy of any regime that is based on a  
central role for the clergy.  They also remind us that the present  
Iranian regime systematically eliminated all non-Islamic left parties  
from any role, even those parties that supported the overthrow of the  
Shah.  Tudeh, the Iranian Communist party, has condemned the results  
of the election, and has supported the demands of Mousavi despite its  
reservations about Mousavi.

There are two things to be said about popular uprisings wherever they  
occur.  The first is that it is never easy for people to go out in the  
streets to make demands on a government to change its policy.  All  
governments are ready to use force against such demands, some more  
speedily than others.  So when people do go out in the streets, it is  
never simply because "outsiders" are manipulating them.  When the CIA  
arranged a coup in Iran in 1953, it did not do it by inducing Iranians  
to go out in the streets.  It did it by working behind the scenes with  
military officers.  One ought to respect the political autonomy of  
groups who actually risk going out in the streets.  It is too easy to  
blame outside agitators.

On the other hand, the second thing to say about popular uprisings is  
that they are always and inevitably a coalition of many elements.   
Some of the demonstrators are those with specific immediate  
grievances.  Some are aiming to change the personnel in the government  
but not the regime as such.  And some want to change, that is,  
overthrow, the regime.  Popular demonstrations have seldom been  
composed of an ideologically consistent group of persons.  Uprisings  
normally only succeed when they are such coalitions.  But this always  
means that the post-uprising outcome is inherently uncertain.  So the  
world left has to be careful in offering moral and political support  
to popular uprisings.

We are living in very chaotic times.  A coherent world left strategy  
is not impossible.  But it will not be easy.  And it has not yet been  
achieved.  The world consequences of the struggle inside Iran are not  
crystal clear.  The world left should not be mute, but it should be  
prudent.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is  
the author of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic  
World (New Press).  Copyright ©2009 Immanuel Wallerstein --  
distributed by Agence Global.  This article, first published on the  
Web site of Agence Global on 1 August 2009, is reproduced on MRZine  
with Agence Global's permission.


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