[Peace-discuss] Summary reflections on Israel/Gaza

[Brussel Morton K.]

We need to remember. This article should help. --mkb

 From Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition.

     <http://MondeDiplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar>



---The long march of folly that began in 1967.

Gaza war changes Middle East equation at Israel’s expense

The European Union’s policy of funding Gaza’s development is just  
one casualty of Israel’s unprecedented attack, which has weakened the  
Palestinian Authority but left Hamas politically stronger than ever

By Alain Gresh

Alain Gresh is editor of Le Monde diplomatique and a specialist on the  
Middle East.

He was born in Cairo in 1948 and moved to Paris in his teens where he  
completed his education (Master’s in mathematics at the Université  
Paris VII in 1971, Diploma of Arabic at the Institut national des  
langues et civilisations orientales in 1977, and a PhD on the  
Palestine Liberation Organisation at the Ecole des hautes études en  
sciences sociales in 1983).

He is a member of the administrative council of the Institute of Arab  
World (IMA) and president of the Association of French journalists  
specialised on the Maghreb and the Middle East (AJMO).

His books include The PLO, The Struggle Within (Zed Books, London,  
1986), Un péril islamiste? (Complexe, Bruxelles, 1994), Israël- 
Palestine, vérités sur un conflit (Fayard, Paris, 2001). He co- 
authored, with Dominique Vidal, An A to Z to the Middle East (Zed,  
1990, and I B Tauris, 2004); Palestine 1947, un partage avorté  
(Complexe, Bruxelles, 1987); and Golfe: Clefs pour une guerre annoncée  
(Le Monde éditions, Paris, 1990). He co-authered, with Didier Billion,  
Actualités de l’Etat palestinien (Complexe, Bruxelles, 2000) and,  
with Françoise Germain-Robin et Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions  
(Actes-Sud/Sindbad, 2000).

His book Israël-Palestine, vérités sur un conflit (Fayard, 2001 et  
2002) has been translated into German, Arabic, Dutch, Italian, Spanish  
and Portugese. His most recent book L’Islam, la république et le  
monde will be published by Fayard in September 2004.

His articles include “Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and their  
impact on the Middle East”, Middle East Journal, spring 1998,  
“Russia’s Return to the Middle East”, Journal of Palestine  
Studies, autumn 1998, and numerous articles in Le Monde diplomatique.


“They’re still living in the War of Independence (1948) and the  
Sinai campaign (1956). With them, it’s all about tanks, about  
controlling territories or controlled territories, holding this or  
that hill. But these things are worthless. (…) The Lebanon war (2006)  
will go down in history as the first war in which the military  
leadership understood that classical warfare has become obsolete” (1).

This view, expressed in September 2008, comes not from an Israeli  
pacifist but the country’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert. It would take  
a highly sophisticated analyst to fathom the subconscious of this  
politician, who is responsible both for the catastrophic war in  
Lebanon in 2006 and the recent offensive in Gaza, and who at the same  
time claims his country needs to abandon its narrow vision of security.

He and the majority of those who govern Israel probably share the view  
bluntly expressed in 2002 by Israel’s then chief of staff, general  
Moshe Yaalon: “The Palestinians must be made to understand in the  
deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated  
people” (2). With each new war comes the same old refrain from  
Israel’s leaders: the Arabs only understand force; teach them a  
lesson and peace will at last be possible. “We’re going to keep our  
finger on the trigger” (3) was how foreign minister Tzipi Livni put  
it. Olmert and his government are in favour of peace in the same way  
that the US government in the 19th century was in favour of the peace
they decided to impose on the Native American tribes.

The shelling of Gaza came to a provisional halt on 18 January. The  
Israeli government wanted its troops out of Gaza before Barack Obama  
was sworn in and Hamas gave Israel a week to withdraw its soldiers and  
reopen crossing points with Gaza. Beyond the deliberate destruction of  
vital infrastructure – which includes ministry buildings and fire  
stations, the parliament and the university – the human cost shown on  
TV screens the world over has been overwhelming. Even the French  
media, which has previously been very timid, hasn’t been able to  
obscure the extent of the catastrophe. Leaving to one side a moral  
reckoning and the crimes which may mean that Israeli leaders one day  
face an international tribunal, how has the fighting changed the  
political landscape at local and regional level?

The prime objective of the Israeli government was to permanently  
weaken Hamas politically and militarily. It claims to have succeeded  
in this and taught the “terrorists” a lesson. But is it that  
simple? The tactic of massive bombardments and avoidance of close  
combat limited Israeli army losses – the third phase of the  
operation, which was never put into action, would have been an  
infantry assault of towns – but hasn’t broken up the military core  
of Hamas, which comprises between three and five thousand fighters.  
Like Hizbullah in 2006, Hamas was able to keep firing rockets until  
the very last moment and its arms supply lines held up, albeit at a  
reduced level.

Whatever the criticisms of Hamas’s strategy, including their rocket  
attacks on civilian targets, the vast majority of the Palestinian  
population holds the Israeli government responsible for the  
destruction. As Elena Qleibo, a Gaza-based aid worker from Oxfam and  
an ex-Costa Rican ambassador to Israel says: “People are extremely  
angry, and the level of hate against Israel is very high. I have lived  
and worked in Gaza for many years, and I have never seen such hatred  
from the population” (4).

The Palestinians also resent the Palestinian Authority’s passivity  
during the war. The internal crisis in Fatah, which was already  
factionalised, has deepened, in spite of the call for unity and  
resistance made by Marwan Barghouti from prison. President Mahmoud  
Abbas, who is himself weakened and marginalised, has called for the  
creation of a government of national unity. So the Gaza of tomorrow  
will either remain under Hamas control or will be governed by a  
national authority in which Hamas plays a central role. Surely not  
what Israel wanted.
The next phase

The focus of the next phase will be the reconstruction of Gaza, which  
the Israeli government wants to control tightly. No project will be  
accepted and not a dollar will reach Gaza without their agreement,  
according to Israeli officials. In addition, Hamas are to be prevented  
from claiming this aid. Israel has gained support on this from the EU  
commissioner for external affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (5), but as  
there is no other authority in Gaza but Hamas, reconstruction risks  
being limited to humanitarian aid. All the conditions for renewed  
hostilities against Israel will once again be met; the Israeli  
blockade was one of the principal causes for the last escalation.

The war has profoundly altered the regional order, too, though not in  
the way that Israel wished. First, it has confirmed the isolation of  
the Palestinian Authority. It has encouraged the consolidation of a  
resistance front based in Qatar (site of the biggest US base in the  
region) and Syria. This alliance was made concrete at a meeting in  
Doha, in which 12 Arab countries took part (among them Algeria,  
Morocco, Lebanon and Iraq, America’s supposed ally) along with  
Senegal (which holds the presidency of the Organisation of the Islamic  
Conference), Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela and Iran. Mauritania has  
suspended diplomatic relations with Israel and Qatar has broken off  
economic links. Venezuela and Bolivia have also severed their  
diplomatic relations.

A few days later, on 19 and 20 January, the Arab summit in Kuwait  
brought a fragile reconciliation even if it didn’t remove differences  
of opinion. This was made easier by Israel’s refusal to negotiate a  
ceasefire as proposed by president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Angered by  
this rebuff and by the signing of a separate US-Israeli agreement to  
combat arms imports to Gaza (and therefore control the border with  
Egypt), Mubarak toughened his stance.

Turkey, Israel’s traditional ally, has confirmed its growing  
importance on the regional stage. Like Mubarak, Turkey’s prime  
minister, Recip Erdogan felt humiliated by Olmert, who kept quiet  
about his intentions regarding Gaza when he saw his Turkish  
counterpart during a visit to Ankara on 22 and 23 December. The day  
after the offensive was launched on 27 December, Erdogan said: “This  
attack, coming while we are making such efforts for peace, is a blow  
against peace” (6). Not only did Turkey, the mediator which had  
brought Israel and Syria to the verge of resuming direct negotiations,  
suspend its efforts, it also called for Israel’s suspension from the  
UN the day after it fired on UN buildings in Gaza.

During the crisis, Turkey has strengthened its relations with Hamas  
and is hoping to mediate between it and the Palestinian Authority. And  
Turkish popular opinion has translated into demonstrations in which  
several million people have taken to the streets in Turkish towns
and villages.

Iran has also seen its regional position strengthened. It has extended  
its alliances in the Arab and Islamic world. Its radical discourse has  
been increasingly echoed within the region and it is now in a position  
of strength vis-à-vis the new US administration. However, Tehran has  
shown restraint in the crisis. Iranian supreme leader ayatollah Ali  
Khamenei has even declared that “our hands are tied on that  
terrain” (7). The firing of rockets from Lebanon prompted fears that  
a second front might open up. Although this didn’t happen, the  
incident can be taken as a warning: Iran has told the Egyptian  
government through diplomatic channels that it will not allow Hamas to  
be crushed.
Contempt for Arab opinion

Western governments have nothing but contempt for Arab popular  
opinion. This was clear when they challenged Hamas’s victory in the  
democratic elections held in Palestine in 2006. They simply shrugged  
when in a communiqué on 12 January the Saudi government condemned the  
“racist genocide” in Gaza. They ignore the extent of protest in the  
Arab and Muslim world, especially in Egypt (despite the state of near- 
siege in Cairo) and in Afghanistan. Yet which Arab government would  
now be willing to sit down to peace talks with Israel? The Saudi king  
has announced that the 2002 Arab initiative for a comprehensive peace  
between the Arab world and Israel in exchange for the creation of a  
Palestinian state on territory occupied by Israel in 1967 won’t  
remain on the table for much longer.

Meanwhile, on Sunday 18 January, while Western journalists broadcast  
images of Gaza’s lunar landscape, prime minster Olmert was to be seen  
expressing his pleasure to six European leaders, including Nicolas  
Sarkozy, over their “extraordinary support for the state of Israel  
and their concern about its security”. More than in any other  
conflict since 1967, the European position, especially that of France,  
has been aligned with the Israeli government’s (see “A people  
abandoned”). In retrospect, the upgrading of relations between the EU  
and Israel in early December 2008 looks like a green light to the  
operation in Gaza. In spite of the Israeli offensive, the EU (and  
France) will strengthen their bilateral relations with Tel Aviv (8).

This Western alliance engaged in the fight against “Islamic  
terrorism” has more than a hint of the crusades about it. Without  
going as far as Silvio Berlusconi, who explained in Jerusalem: “When  
I heard about the rocket fire at Israel, I felt that it was a danger  
to Italy, and to the entire West” (9), or the director of  
L’Express, who wrote that the Israeli army was fighting “for our  
peace” (10) – some on the right used to explain in the 1980s that  
the apartheid government was fighting “for us” in southern Africa,  
against communism, the Soviet Union and Cuba – president Sarkozy has  
explained on many occasions that Hamas bore a heavy responsibility for  
this war as it had broken the truce, which is untrue (see “Reasons  
for war: lies, lies and more lies ”, opposite).

In spite of Sarkozy’s flying around on numerous foreign trips, France  
has lost a great deal of credit, as demonstrated by the unprecedented  
attacks on it in the Arab press, including in moderate countries,  
where it is now bracketed with the US of George Bush. The Saudi daily  
Al Watan wrote on 11 January “all the great powers have supported  
Israel’s position, including France, which has thus far been the  
symbol of balance in regional causes”. And France’s decision to  
fight against smuggled arms in Gaza can only be construed as an  
operation to protect an occupying power: no one has called upon Israel  
to stop re-arming itself.

“A pointless war has led to a moral defeat for Israel” – so ran  
the headline in the British Sunday paper, the Observer on 18 January.  
The majority of moral barriers have crumbled in Israel during the Gaza  
offensive. A phrase sums up this vision: baal habayit histhtageya  
(“the boss has gone mad”). Its essence is captured by Giora Eiland,  
a former Israeli national security adviser: “If our civilians are  
attacked by you, we are not going to respond in proportion, but will  
use all means we have to cause you such damages that you will think  
twice in the future” (11).

This tactic was used in Lebanon in 2006 and was referred to as the  
Dahiya doctrine, after the district in south Beirut where Hizbullah  
was based. The aim is to destroy an entire district or village as soon  
as it is believed to harbour terrorists who are firing on Israel. It  
was employed again in Gaza and constitutes what international law  
recognises as a war crime. Yet it is now openly demanded in Israel. In  
a letter to prime minster Olmert in 2007, the former Sephardic grand  
rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu explained “there is absolutely no moral  
prohibition against indiscriminate killing of civilians during a  
potential massive military offensive on Gaza aimed at stopping the  
rocket launching” (12). The longer the occupation, the more it  
corrupts the occupier. One can only imagine what liberties would have  
been taken by France in Algeria if the war had gone on for 40 years.

The South African government, showing more determination than most,  
has condemned Israeli aggression against Gaza. The long experience of  
fighting the apartheid regime taught ANC leaders all about the  
hypocrisy of western rhetoric on violence and terrorism. Writing about  
his negotiations with the white South African government and its  
demands for the end to violence, Nelson Mandela said: “I responded  
that the state was responsible for the violence and that it is always  
the oppressor, not the oppressed, who dictates the form of the  
struggle. If the oppressor uses violence, the oppressed have no  
alternative but to respond violently. In our case, it was simply a  
legitimate form of self-defence” (13).

Translated by George Miller

(1) As quoted in “The time has come to say these things”,
New York Review of Books, 4-17 December 2008.

(2) Rashid Khalidi, “What you don’t know about Gaza”,
New York Times, 7 January 2009.

(3) Interview with Le Monde, 18-19 January 2009.

(4) Mel Frykberg, “Gazans Do Not Blame Hamas”, IPS,
20 January 2009.

(5) Declaration of 19 January 2009.

(6) Today’s Zaman, Ankara, 29 December 2008.

(7) Trista Parsi, “Israel, Gaza and Iran: Trapping Obama in Imagined  
Fault Lines”, The Huffington Post, 13 January 2009.

(8) The EU has decided, in agreement with Israel, to temporarily  
suspend this upgrading of relations. The Union for the Mediterranean  
has also been a victim of the war; all meetings have been put on hold  
at Egypt’s request.

(9) Haaretz.com, 19 January 2009.

(10) Christophe Barbier, “Une guerre juste, juste une guerre”,  
L’Express, 14 January 2009.

(11) International Herald Tribune, 20 January 2009.

(12) Jerusalem Post, 30 May 2007.

(13) Nelson Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom, Little, Brown, New York  
and London, 1994, p545.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.chambana.net/mailman/archive/peace-discuss/attachments/20090209/973ec7e6/attachment-0001.html