[Peace-discuss] "Little difference" between Obama, Bush in substance

[C. G. Estabrook]

[Vice President Joe Biden said today in his best tough-guy style, "Look, Israel 
can determine for itself -- it's a sovereign nation -- what's in their interest 
and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else."  Now it's hard 
ever to take Biden seriously, but he may be here indicating that Israel has 
received its (non-)marching orders in no uncertain terms, so US flacks are free 
to reflect piously on Israel's "sovereignty."  More worrisome is the possibility 
that the Obama administration -- more brutal and aggressive in AfPak than the 
Bush administration was -- is taking off the constraints the Bush administration 
put on Israel in regard to Iran.  More evidence that the Obama administrations 
is as duplicitous as the Bush administration, if even more murderous, comes from 
Honduras, where the world recognizes that the Obama administration approved of 
the coup, despite its protestations.  --CGE]


	"Little difference" between Obama, Bush in substance
	Noam Chomsky interviewed by Richard Hall
	The Daily Star, June 24, 2009

Q: Do you see any difference between the policies of former US President George
W. Bush and his successor Barack Obama regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

A: In substance, there is little difference. Obama has reiterated Bush's
positions, in virtually the same words. Like Bush, he has called for a
"Palestinian state," and like Bush, he leaves what he means entirely vague. It
can easily be interpreted to be the same as Netanyahu's position in 1996, when
he became the first Israeli prime minister to countenance the establishment of a
Palestinian state, a fact that seems to be forgotten. Shimon Peres had just left
office declaring forcefully that there would never be a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu's information minister, when asked whether he would adopt the same
policy, answered that if Palestinians wanted to call the fragments left to them
"a state," that was fine: Or they could call them "fried chicken." We do not
know whether Obama means "fried chicken." We do know that he very carefully
evaded the core of the Arab Peace Initiative that he praised.

He called on the Arab states to proceed to normalize relations with Israel. But
he scrupulously omitted the fact, which he surely knew, that this step was
conditional on acceptance of the long-standing international consensus on a
two-state settlement that the US and Israel have blocked for 35 years, with rare
and temporary departures from this stern rejectionism -- not just in words, but
more importantly in deeds. On settlements, Obama avoided any mention of existing
settlements, and repeated the words of the "road map" on expanding settlements.
He also made it clear he would not follow the precedent of George Bush senior,
and impose a slight penalty on Israeli expansion of settlements. Rather, he
said, his steps would be only "symbolic."

Q: Do Obama's recent overtures to the Muslim world signify a different US
approach to the Middle East?

A: The rhetoric is different. On substance, there is little that is new. Obama
has cultivated a style of presenting himself as engaging and friendly, and as a
blank slate, on which his audience can write their hopes and wishes, believing,
if they choose, that he is "on our side." The same is true on the domestic scene.

Q: Does Israel's refusal to halt settlements risk damaging relations between it
and the US?

A: There is always a risk, and as I mentioned, for a brief period under Bush
senior, Washington imposed a slight penalty. What will happen now, we cannot be
sure. Israel has just exploited the focus of attention on Iran to announce
substantial settlement expansion, so far eliciting no response in Washington.
And it may be noted that Obama is implementing an increase in military aid to
Israel for an unprecedented 10 years into the future. Also of significance is
the rapid expansion of US hi-tech investment in Israel, notably a huge Intel
plant intended to carry out a revolution in chip manufacture. There is,
typically, a close relation between government and corporate policy, for obvious
reasons, and there are other close ties, particularly military and intelligence,
that are well-known and stable.

Q: How will the decision taken by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to form a
government without Hamas affect the peace process?

A: Whether one likes it or not, Hamas won a free election in January 2006.
Israel and the US (with the EU tailing behind politely) reacted instantly by
harsh punishment of the population for this transgression. Those familiar with
modern history should have been aware that there is nothing at all surprising
about this reaction, or about the unwillingness of the intellectual classes to
face what it indicates about the fashionable concept "democracy promotion."
Later Israel imprisoned much of the elected government. Israel and the US then
instigated a Fatah military coup to overturn the government. When this failed,
punishment of the population became more severe. Meanwhile US-backed Israeli
programs are crushing Gazans and expanding Israeli control over the West Bank.
The US and Israel, meanwhile, continue to reject the long-standing consensus on
a two-state settlement. What exactly do we mean by the phrase "peace process"
under these circumstances?

Q: The right of return for Palestinian refugees has been a barrier to previous
peace negotiations. Do you think it will be again?

A: Not really. It is useful to consider the one break in US-Israeli
rejectionism: January 2001, Bill Clinton's final month in office. By late 2000,
Clinton realized that his proposals at the failed Camp David conference could
not be accepted by any Palestinians. In December, he proposed his "parameters":
imprecise, but more forthcoming. He then announced that both sides had accepted
the parameters, and both had reservations. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators
met in Taba to deal with their differences, and came very close to a final
settlement, more or less in line with the international consensus. In their
final news conference, they reported that with a few more days, they might reach
a complete agreement, but Israel called off the negotiations prematurely, and
they never continued formally -- informal talks led to the Geneva Accord of
December 2003. There is extensive evidence available in Hebrew and English
sources. The Taba negotiations and the Geneva Accord reached essentially the
same formula: Israel should recognize the right of return, but Palestinians
should recognize that it will not be implemented within Israel except in small
numbers, and refugees would have to be absorbed in the Palestinian state or
elsewhere. One may argue that that outcome is unjust, but in the real world, it
is the most that can be attained. To dangle vain hopes before the eyes of
miserable refugees is hardly a moral stance, in my opinion.

Q: Is an attack by Israel on Iran a likely scenario?

A: No one knows. The Bush administration made it quite clear that it opposed an
attack. During the 2008 presidential campaign -- the most sensitive period in
domestic politics -- the Israel lobby pressured Congress to pass a resolution
that amounted to a blockade against Iran, an act of war. They had lined up many
supporters, but the effort suddenly ended, presumably because the Bush White
House indicated it was opposed. I presume Obama is continuing this policy. It is
I suppose technically possible for Israel to attack Iran, possibly using
submarines armed with nuclear missiles. The consequences could be very severe,
in many domains. We might also recall that Israel's attack on the Osirak reactor
in Iraq in 1981 initiated Saddam Hussein's nuclear-weapons program. That was
reasonably clear from physical inspection at once, later confirmed by defectors,
and more recently by high-level US intelligence.

http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/20090624.htm