[Peace-discuss] Chomsky on Obama's foreign policy

[C. G. Estabrook]

       NOAM CHOMSKY: My favorite newspaper, the London Financial Times, a couple 
of days ago identified Obama’s major foreign policy problem today as Iran. The 
occasion for the article was Hillary Clinton’s failure to convince Brazil to go 
along with the United States on calling for harsher sanctions and President 
Lula’s insistence that there should be engagement with Iran, commercial 
relations, and so on, and that it has a right to enrich uranium for producing 
nuclear energy, as do all signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

       Well, it was reported here, too, of course, and Lula’s position was 
considered sort of paradoxical. Why is he not going along with the international 
community, with the world? It’s an interesting usage, which is a very striking 
reflection of the depth of the culture of imperialism. Who is the international 
community? Well, it turns out, if you look, that the international community is 
Washington and whoever happens to agree with it at the moment. The rest are not 
part of the world. They’re kind of in opposition.

       Well, in this case, Lula’s position happens to be that of most of the 
world. You can think it’s right or wrong or whatever, but just as a matter of 
fact, for example, it’s the position of the former non-aligned countries, the 
majority of countries of the world and the large majority of their populations. 
They have repeatedly and vigorously supported Iran’s right to enriched uranium 
for peaceful purposes, reiterating that it’s a signer of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which does grant that right. So they’re not part of the world.

       Another group that’s not part of the world is the population of the 
United States. The last polls that I’ve seen, a couple of years ago, in those 
polls a considerable majority of Americans agreed that Iran has a right to 
develop nuclear energy, but of course not nuclear weapons. And in fact, as the 
poll demonstrated, the opinions of Americans on this issue were almost identical 
with opinions of Iranians on a whole range of issues. And, in fact, when the 
poll was presented in Washington at a press conference, the presenter pointed 
out that if people were able to make policy, could be that these tensions and 
conflicts would be resolved.

       Well, that was a few years ago. Since then, there’s been a huge mass of 
propaganda about the threat of Iran and so on. And it’s very likely, I would 
guess, that if the poll were taken today, those figures for the American 
population would be different. But that was 2007, three years ago. So, at that 
point, Americans were not part of the world. Most of the majority of people of 
the world were not part of the world. And Lula, by repeating their view, is also 
not part of the world. Could be added that he’s almost surely the most popular 
political figure in the world, but that doesn’t mean anything, either.

       So, what about the conflict with Iran and the threat of Iran? Nobody in 
their right mind wants Iran to develop nuclear weapons, or anyone, for that 
matter. So, on that, there’s complete agreement. And in fact, there are 
significant problems about proliferation of nuclear weapons. It’s not a joke. 
And Obama’s vision forcibly includes, stresses the need to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce or maybe remove nuclear weapons. 
Well, that’s the vision. What’s the practice?

       Well, the practice became clear a couple of months ago. Once again, the 
Security Council passed a resolution, 1887—I think it was October—calling 
on—with criticism of Iran for not living up to commitments that were demanded by 
the Security Council and also calling on all states to join the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and to solve all their conflicts within the framework 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without any threats of force. Well, that 
particular part of the resolution was not exactly headlined here, for a simple 
reason: it was directed at two countries, the two countries that are regularly 
threatening the use of force, the United States and Israel. The threat of force 
is in violation of the UN Charter, if anybody cares about that stale old stuff, 
even older than the ’60s. But that’s never mentioned. But every—just across the 
spectrum here, almost everyone insists that—the usual phrase is “we must keep 
all options open.” That’s a threat of force.

       And the threat of force is not just idle. So, for example, Israel is 
sending its nuclear submarines into the Gulf, firing distance—they’re 
undetectable, basically—into areas where they could fire nuclear missiles—of 
course, Israel has plenty of nuclear weapons—fire them at Iran. The US and 
others are—its allies are carrying out field operations, you know, the 
exercises, plainly aimed at Iran. And there’s a little hitch, because Turkey is 
refusing to go along, but that’s what they’ve been trying to do. So there are 
regular threats, verbal and in policy. Israel actually is sending the nuclear 
submarines and other warships through the Suez Canal, with the tacit agreement 
of Egypt, the Egyptian dictatorship, another US client in the region. Well, 
those are all threats—constant, verbal, actual.

       And the threats do have the effect of inducing Iran to develop a 
deterrent. Whether they’re doing it or not, I don’t know. Maybe they are. But if 
they are, the reason, as I think almost all serious analysts would agree, is not 
because they intend to use nuclear weapons and missiles with nuclear weapons. If 
they even loaded a missile was nuclear weapons, assuming they had them, the 
country would be vaporized in five minutes. And nobody believes that the ruling 
clerics, whatever one thinks about them, have a kind of a death wish and want to 
see the entire country and society and everything they own destroyed. In fact, 
US intelligence figures pretty high, who have talked about it, estimate the 
possibility of Iran ever actually using a nuclear weapon is maybe one percent, 
you know, so low that you can’t estimate it. But it’s possible that they develop 
them as a deterrent.

       One of Israel’s leading military historians, Martin van Creveld, a couple 
of years ago, after the invasion of Iraq, wrote in the international press that 
of course he doesn’t want to see Iran have nuclear weapons, he said, but if 
they’re not developing them, they’re crazy. The US had just invaded Iraq, 
knowing that it was totally defenseless. It was part of the reason why they felt 
free to invade. Everybody can understand that. The Iranian leaders could 
certainly understand it. So, therefore, to quote van Creveld again, “if they’re 
not developing a nuclear deterrent, they’re crazy.”

       Well, whether they are or not is another question. But there’s no doubt 
that the hostile and aggressive stance taken by the United States and its 
Israeli client are a factor in whatever planning that’s going on in top Iranian 
circles as to whether to develop a nuclear deterrent or not...


       When Obama came into office, or when he was elected, one high Bush 
official—I think it was Condoleezza Rice—predicted that Obama’s foreign policy 
would be a continuation of Bush’s second term. The first and second term of Bush 
were quite different. The first term was aggressive, arrogant, kicking the world 
in the face, even allies, and it had such a negative effect—this is in action as 
well as manner—that US prestige in the world sank to the lowest point it’s ever 
been. That was really harmful to the interests of those who actually set foreign 
policy—business world and corporate interests and, you know, state planners and 
so on. So there was a lot of criticism of Bush right from the mainstream in the 
first term. Well, you know, the second term was somewhat different. For one 
thing, some of the most extreme figures were kicked out. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, a 
couple of others, were sent off to pasture. They couldn’t get rid of Cheney, 
because he was the administration, so can’t dismantle it. But a lot of the 
others went, and policy shifted more towards the norm, to the more-or-less 
centrist norm. And a little talk about negotiations, I mean, less aggression, 
and so on. And a more polite attitude toward allies. So that was more 
acceptable, and fundamentally it didn’t change, but it was more acceptable. And 
this prediction was that that’s what Obama would do. And I think that’s pretty 
much what happened.

       In fact, there’s a pretty interesting characterization of this, which 
sort of captures it, I think, pretty well. It’s anachronistic, but I think it 
applies. Back in 1962, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world 
really was coming, you know, dangerously close to a nuclear war, which would 
have been sort of the end—most dangerous moment in history, Arthur Schlesinger 
called it, Kennedy’s adviser—right at the peak of the missile crisis, US 
planners were considering measures which they knew might destroy Europe, and in 
fact, in particular, Britain. So they were kind of playing out these scenarios 
which led to the destruction of Britain, but they—and taking them very 
seriously, in fact taking the steps towards it. But they didn’t let Britain 
know. Britain is supposed to have a special relationship with the United States, 
and the British were pretty upset. They couldn’t find out what was going on. The 
prime minister, Macmillan, all he could find out was what British intelligence 
was picking up. So here they’re—the best and the brightest are making plans that 
might well lead to the destruction of Britain, but they’re not telling them.

       At that point, a senior adviser—I think it was probably Dean Acheson—of 
the Kennedy administration entered the discussion, and he defined the special 
relationship. He said the special relationship with Britain means that Britain 
is our lieutenant; the fashionable word is “partner.” And the British, of 
course, like to hear the fashionable word. Well, that’s pretty much the 
difference between Bush and Obama. Bush simply told them, “You’re our 
lieutenant. You do what we say, or you’re irrelevant.” In fact, that’s the word 
that I think Colin Powell used at the UN. “Do what we say, or you’re irrelevant. 
You’re just our lieutenant, and forget about it.” They don’t like to hear that. 
What they like to hear is “You’re our partner.” You know, “We love you.” And 
then, back in secret, we treat you as our lieutenant, but that’s OK. And I 
suspect that that’s the main difference.

	...my view, which is not the standard one, is that the antiwar movement is far 
stronger now than it was in the ’60s. In the 1960s, there was a point, 1968, 
’69, when there was a very strong antiwar movement against the war in Vietnam. 
But it’s worth remembering that the war in Vietnam started—an outright war 
started in 1962. By then, maybe 70,000 or 80,000 people had already been killed 
under the US client regime. But in 1962, Kennedy really opened an outright war, 
you know, sent the American Air Force to start bombing South Vietnam—under South 
Vietnamese markings, but everybody knew, it was even reported—authorized napalm, 
authorized chemical warfare to destroy crops and ground cover, started 
open—started the programs which drove ultimately millions of people from the 
countryside into what amounted to concentration camps, to try to—the words were 
“to protect them from the guerrillas,” who the government knew perfectly well 
they were supporting. Same kind of things you read now in Afghanistan, if you 
bother to read the fine print about the conquest of Marjah. But we had to drive 
them into concentration camps to protect them from the people, the guerrillas, 
they were supporting. That’s a war. You know, it’s a serious war.

       Protest was zero, literally. I mean, it was years before you could get 
any sign of protest. I mean, those of you who are old enough may remember that 
in Boston, liberal city, in October 1965—that’s three years after that, hundreds 
of thousands of American troops rampaging the country, you know, war spread to 
North Vietnam and so on—we tried to have our first public demonstration against 
the war on the Boston Common, usual demonstration place. This is October 1965. I 
was supposed to be one of the speakers. I couldn’t say a word. It was broken up, 
you know, violently. A lot of students marched over trying to break it up, 
hundreds of state police there. The next day, the Boston Globe, most liberal 
paper in the country, you know, devoted its whole front page to denouncing the 
demonstrators, not the ones who were breaking it up. You know, a picture of a 
wounded soldier in the middle, that sort of thing. Well, that was October 1965, 
you know, hundreds of thousands of troops there, war escalating beyond. Well, 
finally, after years, in 1968, you got a substantial antiwar movement, ’67, ’68. 
By then, South Vietnam was gone. It was virtually destroyed. And the same was 
true of much of the rest of Indochina. Well, the war did go on for a long time, 
with horrible effects, and we were unwilling to face the fact, even to report 
the fact. But nevertheless, the antiwar movement did have an effect very late.

       Well, compare Iraq. There were huge protests before the war was 
officially launched. I mean, we now know that Blair and Bush were simply lying 
when they said that they were trying to work for a diplomatic settlement. They 
had already started the war. OK, that came out in the famous Downing Street 
memos in England, but it hadn’t been officially announced, so—but there were 
huge demonstrations. And I think they had an effect. The US war in Iraq was 
horrible enough, probably killed about a million people, drove a couple of 
million out of the country, devastated the country, destroyed it, horrible 
cultural destruction and so on. It was pretty awful. Could have been a lot 
worse. It’s not what the US did in South Vietnam. Nothing like it. You know, no 
saturation bombing with B-52s, chemical warfare and so on. And I think it was 
retarded by the antiwar movement. The population here had just become more 
civilized. That’s one of those grim effects of the 1960s.

       Afghanistan is an interesting case. I mean, Afghanistan was sold here as 
a war to retaliate—a just—it’s always called a “just” war—to prevent terror, you 
know, retaliate against a terrorist attack. I mean, it’s such a standard view 
that to take it apart, you know, requires more time than I’d be allowed. But the 
fact of the matter is that that was not the goal of the war.

       I mean, if the goal of the war was to isolate al-Qaeda, eliminate terror, 
there were straightforward ways to proceed. I mean, if you go back to that time, 
the jihadi movement itself was highly critical of the 9/11 attack. There were 
fatwas coming out from the most radical clerics, and, you know, Al Azhar 
University, the main theological center, denouncing al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden 
and the terrorist attacks—it’s not Islamic, we wouldn’t do that, and so on. 
Well, if you wanted to end terror, the obvious thing to do at that point is to 
isolate al-Qaeda, to try to gain support, even from the jihadi movement, and of 
course from the population they’re trying to mobilize. You know, terrorists 
regard themselves as a vanguard. They’re trying to mobilize others to their 
cause. I mean, every specialist on terrorism knows that. So you could have done 
it then, and you could have proceeded to identify the perpetrators, which, 
incidentally, they couldn’t do because they didn’t know who they were, and that 
was conceded later. But they could have tried to identify them, bring them to 
justice, you know, to trials—with fair trials and not torture, but fair trials, 
which would have probably sharply reduced, if maybe not—maybe even have ended 
Islamic terrorism.

       Well, they did the opposite. What they tried to do is to mobilize the 
population and mobilize the jihadi movement to support al-Qaeda. That’s exactly 
the effect of first invading Afghanistan and later invading Iraq. And it’s also 
the effect of Guantánamo and Bagram and the other torture centers. I mean, 
everyone who’s involved in them, you know, seriously, knows, yeah, they created 
terrorists.

Q: Do you think Obama should have these Guantánamo prisoners tried in New York?

       CHOMSKY: Well, it depends whether we want to be—regard ourselves as a 
civilized country or as a rogue state. If you want to be a rogue state, you 
know, do whatever you like. You know, kill them, torture them, whatever. If you 
want to be part of the civilized world, and also if you want to reduce the 
appeal of the extreme jihadi movement, then try them in civilian courts.

       In fact, the very fact that they’re in Guantánamo is outlandish. First of 
all, what’s Guantánamo? I mean, Guantánamo was taken from Cuba a century ago at 
gunpoint. They said, “Give us Guantánamo, or else.” Cuba was under military 
occupation. It’s called a treaty, but, you know—OK. And the treaty of 
Guantánamo, if you want to call it that, allowed Guantánamo to be used as a 
calling station for the Navy. Well, you know, it’s not what it’s being used for. 
In fact, as you know perfectly well, it was used for Haitian refugees. When 
Haitians were fleeing from the dictatorships that the US was supporting, the US 
refused to permit them political asylum. It claimed that they were just economic 
refugees. The Coast Guard tried to stop them, and if any got through, they sent 
them to Guantánamo. OK, now you know what they’re being used for.

       Actually, what they are being used for is to create terrorists. It’s not 
my opinion; that’s the opinion of the main US interrogators, people like Matthew 
Alexander, who actually has an article on it in the same issue of National 
Interest that I mentioned. He said, yeah, it’s a great way to create terrorists. 
It inspires terrorism all over, and it turns many of these people there into 
terrorists, if they were picked up for whatever reason it was.

       So, yes, if you want to—if your goal is to reduce the threat of, say, 
Islamic terrorism and to become part of the civilized world, you have civilian 
trials, just as those who are in Guantánamo—first of all, most of those who are 
in Guantánamo, I mean, it’s kind of outrageous anyway. They’re like some 
fifteen-year-old kid who was found holding a rifle when the US was invading his 
country. That’s a terrorist. OK, but that’s a large part of maybe almost all of 
what’s in Guantánamo. But if you want to—but what should have been done with 
them, if the goal was to be civilized and to reduce terrorism, is to put them in 
prison in the United States. There’s no security problem. You know, they’re not 
going to get out of a maximum-security prison, and they don’t have some magic 
way of spreading poison around the world or anything. But, of course, the 
government didn’t want to do that, because they had no evidence.

       And if they were—they were sent to Guantánamo so that they could, it was 
hoped, be free from US jurisdiction, so you could play that—you could pretend 
that they weren’t under your US jurisdiction, so the laws didn’t apply. Well, 
the Supreme Court finally, after a long time, kind of whittled away at that and 
said, yes, they have the right of habeas corpus. The Bush administration 
accepted that; Obama doesn’t. Obama—the Obama administration is trying to 
overturn a decision by a right-wing Bush judicial appointee that the Supreme 
Court decision holds for Bagram, the torture center in Afghanistan. And the 
Obama administration is trying to override that, so that that means that the 
Supreme Court decision is just a joke. If you want to torture somebody, don’t 
send them to Guantánamo, because the Supreme Court said you can’t torture them 
there; let’s send them to Bagram. So if you pick somebody up in Yemen or, you 
know, wherever you pick him up, and you want them not to be subject to 
international law, also US law, OK, send him to Bagram. That’s the Obama 
administration position.

       I mean, it’s for reasons like these that even the most hawkish 
anti-terrorism specialist, people like Michael Scheuer, who was in charge for 
the CIA of following Obama for years, he says that al-Qaeda’s—Osama bin Laden’s 
best ally is the United States. You know, we’re doing exactly what he wants. 
What he wants is he’s trying to sell a line to the Muslim world, you know, these 
guys are on a crusade, they’re trying to kill us, we’ve got to defend ourselves. 
And the US is acting, you know, as if they’re under command. Yeah, we do 
everything he wants.

       ...Israel-Palestine happens to be a particularly easy case. I mean, there 
has been an overwhelming international consensus for thirty-five years on how to 
settle the problem—short term, at least—namely, a two-state settlement on the 
international border, which everyone agrees on, with, the phrase was, “minor and 
mutual modifications.” That was US official policy until the US departed from 
the world in the early ’70s, as it did. That’s just overwhelming. I mean, there 
was a Security Council resolution in 1976 calling for a two-state settlement. 
The US vetoed it. And it just goes on from there. I won’t run through it, but if 
you get ’til today, there’s just overwhelming agreement. I mean, it includes all 
the Arab states for a long time. It includes Iran, the Organization of Islamic 
States. It includes Hamas. You know, in fact, everybody, except the United 
States and Israel.

       So, what has Obama had to say about this? Well, it’s interesting. He has 
this great vision, but if you look—if you go below the vision and take a look at 
the words, it’s a little different. So his only word so far—there are two, 
really. One is to politely ask Israel to stop expanding settlements. Well, first 
of all, that’s meaningless. The issue is the existence, not the expansion of the 
settlements. But furthermore, those words were also meaningless. He was quoting 
Bush. In fact, he was quoting the—what’s called the Road Map, the official—you 
know, supposedly the agreed-upon scenario for moving forward. He was quoting it. 
OK, that’s meaningless, but that’s part of his great vision.

       The other part, which is more interesting, was a few days after he took 
office, and he gave his one, and so far only, serious talk about 
Israel-Palestine. That’s when he was introducing George Mitchell as his 
negotiator, which is a good choice, if he’s given any leeway. And Obama 
explained what he was going to do. He said—this was his, you know, being very 
forthcoming to the Arab world. He said, well, there’s a constructive proposal on 
the table, the Arab peace proposal—you know, pat people on the head for 
producing it. And then he went on to say, “Well, it’s time for the Arabs to live 
up to their peace proposal. They should start normalizing relations with 
Israel.” Well, you know, Obama is literate, intelligent. I suppose he chooses 
his words carefully. He knows perfectly well that that was not the Arab peace 
proposal. The Arab peace proposal re-endorsed the longstanding international 
consensus and said, in the context of a two-state settlement, the Arab states 
will proceed even beyond to normalize relations with Israel. Well, Obama picked 
out the corollary, but omitted the substance, which is a way of saying we’re 
going to maintain our rejectionist stance. Couldn’t have been clearer. And 
that’s what’s happened.

       With regard to his repetition of the call to stop expansion of 
settlements, he did go a little bit farther—not he, but his spokespersons in 
press conferences. They were asked, is the administration going to do anything 
about it if Israel rejects it? And they said, “No, it’s purely symbolic.” In 
fact, explicitly said that the administration is not going to do what George 
Bush the 1st did. George Bush the 1st had some light taps on the wrist if Israel 
continued to reject what the US was asking for. Clinton pretty much withdrew 
that, and Obama withdrew it totally. He said, “No, this is just symbolic.” Well, 
that’s telling Benjamin Netanyahu, “Go ahead and do what you like. We’ll say we 
don’t like it, but there will be a wink saying, yeah, go ahead. Meanwhile, we 
participate in it. You know, we send you the arms. We give you the diplomatic 
support and a direct participation.” That’s the vision. You know? It could 
hardly be clearer.

       Now, what can we do about it? Well, you know, we can get the United 
States to join the world. In this case it’s literally the whole world. Just 
accept—join the world and accept the international consensus and stop the direct 
participation in violating it—I mean, what Israel is doing. And I should have 
said what the US and Israel are doing. Everything Israel does is a joint 
operation. They can’t go beyond what the US permits and participates in. So what 
the US and Israel are doing in Gaza and in the West Bank is destroying the hope 
of the—for realization of the international consensus.

       And there’s no alternative around, I should say, with regard to a lot of 
the anti-—to pro-Palestinian—you know, supporters of the Palestinians. In fact, 
some of the leading Palestinian activists themselves are saying, well, we ought 
to give up on the two-state solution and just let Israel take over all the 
territories, maybe annex them, and then there will be a civil rights struggle 
and like an anti-apartheid struggle, and that can work like South Africa. That’s 
just blindness. That’s not going to happen. The US and Israel are not going to 
permit that to happen. They’re going to continue with exactly what they’re 
doing: strangling Gaza, separating it from the West Bank, in violation of 
international agreements, and in the West Bank take over whatever they want...

FULL INTERVIEW AT
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/3/15/noam_chomsky_on_obamas_foreign_policy

-- 
This message has been scanned for viruses and
dangerous content by MailScanner, and is
believed to be clean.