[Peace-discuss] Correction

David Green davegreen84 at yahoo.com
Wed Jun 15 12:05:52 CDT 2011


This is the article that appeared yesterday in the N-G, from the LA Times June 
5.
The long view in Israel against the 1967 line
For decades, Israel's greatest strategic minds have concluded that the Jewish 
state can safeguard its future only by retaining defensible borders beyond the 
1967 line.
June 05, 2011|By Dore Gold
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent statement that Israel can't defend 
itself with borders drawn along pre-1967 lines has been questioned in certain 
foreign policy circles. These critics have noted that Israel successfully fought 
two wars, in 1956 and in 1967, while based within those borders. And they have 
claimed that borders don't matter as much in modern warfare. But Netanyahu is 
right.
The idea that the 1967 line isn't defensible has actually been around for 
decades. Indeed, the architects of Israel's national security doctrine reached 
that conclusion soon after the Six-Day War. The main strategic problem that 
Israel faced at that time was the enormous asymmetry between its small standing 
army, which needed to be reinforced with a timely reserve mobilization, and the 
large standing armies of its neighbors, which could form coalitions in times of 
tension and exploit Israel's narrow geography with overwhelming numbers. True, 
Israel won in 1967, but the war also pointed out the country's many 
vulnerabilities.
In the years following the war, the main advocate for creating new boundaries to 
replace the fragile lines from before 1967 was Yigal Allon, then Israel's deputy 
prime minister. Allon had considerable military experience, having commanded the 
Palmach, the elite strike units of the Jewish forces, in the 1948 war that 
created Israel.
In 1976, while serving as foreign minister, Allon wrote an article for Foreign 
Affairs outlining the strategic logic for his position. He pointed out that the 
1967 line was an armistice line from Israel's war of independence and never 
intended as a final political boundary. Allon quoted the U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations in 1967, Arthur Goldberg, who said that the 1967 line was neither 
secure nor recognized. Given this background, U.N. Security Council Resolution 
242, backed by both the United States and Britain, only called for "withdrawal 
of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" — but 
not from "all the territories." The resolution also didn't specify strict 
adherence to the pre-1967 line, advocating only that "secure and recognized" 
boundaries be established.
Under the Allon plan, Israel would include much of the Jordan Valley within its 
border. This area is not within the pre-1967 line, but it is essential to 
Israel's defense. Because it rises from an area that was roughly 1,200 feet 
below sea level up a steep incline to mountaintops that are 2,000 to 3,000 feet 
above sea level, it serves as a formidable line of defense that would enable a 
small Israeli force to hold off much large conventional armies, giving Israel 
time to mobilize its reserves. Control of the Jordan Valley also allowed Israel 
to prevent the smuggling of the same kind of weaponry to the West Bank that has 
been entering the Gaza Strip: rockets, antiaircraft missiles and tons of 
explosives for terrorist attacks.
Today, it might be argued that after the demise of Saddam Hussein, Israel no 
longer has to worry about Iraqi expeditionary forces racing across Jordanian 
territory. Yet Israeli planning for the future cannot be based on a snapshot of 
reality in 2011. No one can guarantee what the orientation of Iraq will be five 
years from now: a budding pro-Western democracy or a heavily armed Iranian 
satellite subverting the security of its neighbors. The Saudis, it should be 
noted, are not taking any chances and are constructing a security fence along 
the border with Iraq.
Israeli vulnerability has regional implications. Should it become clear that the 
great Jordan Valley barrier that protected Israel for more than 40 years is no 
longer in Israeli hands, then the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will become an 
increasingly attractive forward position for jihadi groups seeking to link up 
with Hamas to wage war against Israel. In 2007, when Al Qaeda activity in Iraq 
was at its height, the organization sought to build up a forward position in 
Irbid, Jordan, to recruit West Bank Palestinians. This effort was scuttled. But 
if Israel is back on the 1967 line, then the whole dynamic of regional security 
will change and the internal pressures on Jordan will undoubtedly increase.
Yitzhak Rabin, who promoted the Oslo agreements in 1993, understood better than 
anyone Israel's strategic dilemmas in the years that followed. In October 1995, 
one month before he was assassinated, he addressed the Knesset and asked it to 
ratify the Oslo II interim agreement, which he had just signed at the White 
House in the presence of President Clinton. In his speech, he laid out how he 
saw the future borders of Israel. He made clear that Israel would not withdraw 
to the 1967 line. He insisted on keeping Jerusalem united. And finally, like his 
mentor Yigal Allon, Rabin stressed that Israel would hold on to the Jordan 
Valley "in the widest sense of that term."
It is always possible to find Israelis who will say the 1967 line is just fine. 
But Israel's greatest strategic minds since the Six-Day War have disagreed. They 
overwhelmingly have concluded that Israel can safeguard its future only if it 
retains defensible borders, which means redrawing the 1967 line to include parts 
of the West Bank crucial to the country's survival.
Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, is president of 
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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