[Peace-discuss] Chomsky & Achcar on Libya

[C. G. Estabrook]

Noam Chomsky: On Libya and the Unfolding Crises
Interviewed by Stephen Shalom and Michael Albert
March 31, 2011

1. What are U.S. motives in international relations most broadly? That is, what 
are the over arching motives and themes one can pretty much always find 
informing U.S. policy choices, no matter where in the world we are discussing? 
What are the somewhat more specific but still over arching motives and themes 
for U.S. policy in Middle East and the Arab world? Finally, what do you think 
are the more proximate aims of U.S. policy in the current situation in Libya?


CHOMSKY. A useful way to approach the question is to ask what U.S. motives are 
NOT. There are some good ways to find out. One is to read the professional 
literature on international relations: quite commonly, its account of policy is 
what policy is not, an interesting topic that I won’t pursue.


Another method, quite relevant now, is to listen to political leaders and 
commentators. Suppose they say that the motive for a military action is 
humanitarian. In itself, that carries no information: virtually every resort to 
force is justified in those terms, even by the worst monsters – who may, 
irrelevantly, even convince themselves of the truth of what they are saying. 
Hitler, for example, may have believed that he was taking over parts of 
Czechoslovakia to end ethnic conflict and bring its people the benefits of an 
advanced civilization, and that he invaded Poland to end the “wild terror” of 
the Poles. Japanese fascists rampaging in China probably did believe that they 
were selflessly laboring to create an “earthly paradise” and to pr! otect the 
suffering population from “Chinese bandits.” Even Obama may have believed what 
he said in his presidential address on March 28 about the humanitarian motives 
for the Libyan intervention. Same holds of commentators.

There is, however, a very simple test to determine whether the professions of 
noble intent can be taken seriously: do the authors call for humanitarian 
intervention and “responsibility to protect” to defend the victims of their own 
crimes, or those of their clients? Did Obama, for example, call for a no-fly 
zone during the murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
in 2006, with no credible pretext? Or did he, rather, boast proudly during his 
presidential campaign that he had co-sponsored a Senate resolution supporting 
the invasion and calling for punishment of Iran and Syria for impeding it? End 
of discussion. In fact, virtually the entire literature of humanitarian 
intervention and right to protect, written and spoken, disappears under this 
simple and appropriate test.

In contrast, what motives actually ARE is rarely discussed, and one has to look 
at the documentary and historical record to unearth them, in the case of any state.

What then are U.S. motives? At a very general level, the evidence seems to me to 
show that they have not changed much since the high-level planning studies 
undertaken during World War II. Wartime planners took for granted that the US 
would emerge from the war in a position of overwhelming dominance, and called 
for the establishment of a Grand Area in which the US would maintain 
“unquestioned power,” with “military and economic supremacy,” while ensuring the 
“limitation of any exercise of sovereignty” by states that might interfere with 
its global designs. The Grand Area was to include the Western hemisphere, the 
Far East, the British empire (which included the Middle East energy reserves), 
and as much of Eurasia as possible, at least its industrial and commercial 
center in Western Euro! pe. It is quite clear from the documentary record that 
“President Roosevelt was aiming at United States hegemony in the postwar world,” 
to quote the accurate assessment of the (justly) respected British diplomatic 
historian Geoffrey Warner. And more significant, the careful wartime plans were 
soon implemented, as we read in declassified documents of the following years, 
and observe in practice. Circumstances of course have changed, and tactics 
adjusted accordingly, but basic principles are quite stable, to the present.

With regard to the Middle East – the “most strategically important region of the 
world,” in Eisenhower’s phrase -- the primary concern has been, and remains, its 
incomparable energy reserves. Control of these would yield “substantial control 
of the world,” as observed early on by the influential liberal adviser A.A. 
Berle. These concerns are rarely far in the background in affairs concerning 
this region.

In Iraq, for example, as the dimensions of the US defeat could no longer be 
concealed, pretty rhetoric was displaced by honest announcement of policy goals. 
In November 2007 the White House issued a Declaration of Principles insisting 
that Iraq must grant US military forces indefinite access and must privilege 
American investors. Two months later the president informed Congress that he 
would ignore legislation that might limit the permanent stationing of US Armed 
Forces in Iraq or “United States control of the oil resources of Iraq” – demands 
that the US had to abandon shortly after in the face of Iraqi resistance, just 
as it had to abandon earlier goals.

While control over oil is not the sole factor in Middle East policy, it provides 
fairly good guidelines, right now as well. In an oil-rich country, a reliable 
dictator is granted virtual free rein. In recent weeks, for example, there was 
no reaction when the Saudi dictatorship used massive force to prevent any sign 
of protest. Same in Kuwait, when small demonstrations were instantly crushed. 
And in Bahrain, when Saudi-led forces intervened to protect the minority Sunni 
monarch from calls for reform on the part of the repressed Shiite population. 
Government forces not only smashed the tent city in Pearl Square – Bahrain’s 
Tahrir Square -- but even demolished the Pearl statue that was Bahrain’s symbol, 
and had been appropriated by the protestors. Bahrain is a particularly sensitive 
case becau! se it hosts the US Fifth fleet, by far the most powerful military 
force in the region, and because eastern Saudi Arabia, right across the 
causeway, is also largely Shiite, and has most of the Kingdom’s oil reserves. By 
a curious accident of geography and history, the world’s largest hydrocarbon 
concentrations surround the northern Gulf, in mostly Shiite regions. The 
possibility of a tacit Shiite alliance has been a nightmare for planners for a 
long time.

In states lacking major hydrocarbon reserves, tactics vary, typically keeping to 
a standard game plan when a favored dictator is in trouble: support him as long 
as possible, and when that cannot be done, issue ringing declarations of love of 
democracy and human rights -- and then try to salvage as much of the regime as 
possible.

The scenario is boringly familiar: Marcos, Duvalier, Chun, Ceasescu, Mobutu, 
Suharto, and many others. And today, Tunisia and Egypt. Syria is a tough nut to 
crack and there is no clear alternative to the dictatorship that would support 
U.S. goals. Yemen is a morass where direct intervention would probably create 
even greater problems for Washington. So there state violence elicits only pious 
declarations.

Libya is a different case. Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have 
often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the 
present, he is not reliable. They would much prefer a more obedient client. 
Furthermore, the vast territory of Libya is mostly unexplored, and oil 
specialists believe it may have rich untapped resources, which a more dependable 
government might open to Western exploitation.

When a non-violent uprising began, Qaddafi crushed it violently, and a rebellion 
broke out that liberated Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and seemed about 
to move on to Qaddafi’s stronghold in the West. His forces, however, reversed 
the course of the conflict and were at the gates of Benghazi. A slaughter in 
Benghazi was likely, and as Obama’s Middle East adviser Dennis Ross pointed out, 
“everyone would blame us for it.” That would be unacceptable, as would a Qaddafi 
military victory enhancing his power and independence. The US then joined in UN 
Security Council resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone, to be implemented by 
France, the UK, and the US, with the US supposed to move to a supporting role.

There was no effort to limit action to instituting a no-fly zone, or even to 
keep within the broader mandate of resolution 1973.

The triumvirate at once interpreted the resolution as authorizing direct 
participation on the side of the rebels. A ceasefire was imposed by force on 
Qaddafi’s forces, but not on the rebels. On the contrary, they were given 
military support as they advanced to the West, soon securing the major sources 
of Libya’s oil production, and poised to move on.

The blatant disregard of UN 1973, from the start began to cause some 
difficulties for the press as it became too glaring to ignore. In the NYT, for 
example, Karim Fahim and David Kirkpatrick (March 29) wondered “how the allies 
could justify airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi’s forces around [his tribal center] 
Surt if, as seems to be the case, they enjoy widespread support in the city and 
pose no threat to civilians.” Another technical difficulty is that UNSC 1973 
“called for an arms embargo that applies to the entire territory of Libya, which 
means that any outside supply of arms to the opposition would have to be covert” 
(but otherwise unproblematic).

Some argue that oil cannot be a motive because Western companies were granted 
access to the prize under Qaddafi. That misconstrues US concerns. The same could 
have been said about Iraq under Saddam, or Iran and Cuba for many years, still 
today. What Washington seeks is what Bush announced: control, or at least 
dependable clients. US and British internal documents stress that “the virus of 
nationalism” is their greatest fear, not just in the Middle East but everywhere. 
Nationalist regimes might conduct illegitimate exercises of sovereignty, 
violating Grand Area principles. And they might seek to direct resources to 
popular needs, as Nasser sometimes threatened.

It is worth noting that the three traditional imperial powers – France, UK, US – 
are almost isolated in carrying out these operations. The two major states in 
the region, Turkey and Egypt, could probably have imposed a no-fly zone but are 
at most offering tepid support to the triumvirate military campaign. The Gulf 
dictatorships would be happy to see the erratic Libyan dictator disappear, but 
although loaded with advanced military hardware (poured in by the US and UK to 
recycle petrodollars and ensure obedience), they are willing to offer no more 
than token participation (by Qatar).

While supporting UNSC 1973, Africa -- apart from US ally Rwanda -- is generally 
opposed to the way it was instantly interpreted by the triumvirate, in some 
cases strongly so. For review of policies of individual states, see Charles 
Onyango-Obbo in the Kenyan journal East African 
(http://allafrica.com/stories/201103280142.html).

Beyond the region there is little support. Like Russia and China, Brazil 
abstained from UNSC 1973, calling instead for a full cease-fire and dialogue. 
India too abstained from the UN resolution on grounds that the proposed measures 
were likely to "exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of 
Libya,” and also called for political measures rather than use of force. Even 
Germany abstained from the resolution.

Italy too was reluctant, in part presumably because it is highly dependent on 
its oil contracts with Qaddafi – and we may recall that the first post-World War 
I genocide was conducted by Italy, in Eastern Libya, now liberated, and perhaps 
retaining some memories.


2. Can an anti-interventionist who believes in self determination of nations and 
people ever legitimately support an intervention, either by the U.N. or 
particular countries?



CHOMSKY. There are two cases to consider: (1) UN intervention and (2) 
intervention without UN authorization. Unless we believe that states are 
sacrosanct in the form that has been established in the modern world (typically 
by extreme violence), with rights that override all other imaginable 
considerations, then the answer is the same in both cases: Yes, in principle at 
least. I see no point in discussing that belief, so will dismiss it.

With regard to the first case, the Charter and subsequent resolutions grant the 
Security Council considerable latitude for intervention, and it has been 
undertaken, with regard to South Africa, for example. That of course does not 
entail that every Security Council decision should be approved by “an 
anti-interventionist who believes in self-determination”; other considerations 
enter in individual cases, but again, unless contemporary states are assigned 
the status of virtually holy entities, the principle is the same.

As for the second case – the one that arises with regard to the triumvirate 
interpretation of UN 1973, and many other examples – then the answer is again 
Yes, in principle at least, unless we take the global state system to be 
sacrosanct in the form established in the UN Charter and other treaties.

There is, of course, always a very heavy burden of proof that must be met to 
justify forceful intervention, or any use of force. The burden is particularly 
high in case (2), in violation of the Charter, at least for states that profess 
to be law-abiding. We should bear in mind, however, that the global hegemon 
rejects that stance, and is self-exempted from the UN and OAS Charters, and 
other international treaties. In accepting ICJ jurisdiction when the Court was 
established (under US initiative) in 1946, Washington excluded itself from 
charges of violation of international treaties, and later ratified the Genocide 
Convention with similar reservations – all positions that have been upheld by 
international tribunals, since their procedures require acceptance of 
jurisdiction. More generally, US practice is to a! dd crucial reservations to 
the international treaties it ratifies, effectively exempting itself.

Can the burden of proof be met? There is little point in abstract discussion, 
but there are some real cases that might qualify. In the post-World War II 
period, there are two cases of resort to force which – though not qualifying as 
humanitarian intervention – might legitimately be supported: India’s invasion of 
East Pakistan in 1971, and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, in 
both cases, ending massive atrocities. These examples, however, do not enter the 
Western canon of “humanitarian intervention” because they suffer from the 
fallacy of wrong agency: they were not carried out by the West. What is more, 
the US bitterly opposed them and severely punished the miscreants who ended the 
slaughters in today’s Bangladesh and who drove Pol Pot out of Cambodia just as 
his ! atrocities were peaking. Vietnam was not only bitterly condemned but also 
punished by a US-supported Chinese invasion, and by US-UK military and 
diplomatic support for the Khmer Rouge attacking Cambodia from Thai bases.

While the burden of proof might be met in these cases, it is not easy to think 
of others. In the case of intervention by the triumvirate of imperial powers 
that are currently violating UN 1973 in Libya, the burden is particularly heavy, 
given their horrifying records. Nonetheless, it would be too strong to hold that 
it can never be satisfied in principle – unless, of course, we regard 
nation-states in their current form as essentially holy. Preventing a likely 
massacre in Benghazi is no small matter, whatever one thinks of the motives.


3. Can a person concerned that a country's dissidents not be massacred so they 
remain able to seek self determination ever legitimately oppose an intervention 
that is intended, whatever else it intends, to avert such a massacre?


CHOMSKY. Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the intent is genuine, 
meeting the simple criterion I mentioned at the outset, I don’t see how to 
answer at this level of abstraction: it depends on circumstances. Intervention 
might be opposed, for example, if it is likely to lead to a much worse massacre. 
Suppose, for example, that US leaders genuinely and honestly intended to avert a 
slaughter in Hungary in 1956 by bombing Moscow. Or that the Kremlin genuinely 
and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in El Salvador in the 1980s by 
bombing the US. Given the predictable consequences, we would all agree that 
those (inconceivable) actions could be legitimately opposed.


4. Many people see an analogy between the Kosovo intervention of 1999 and the 
current intervention in Libya. Can you explain both the significant 
similarities, first, and then the major differences, second?



CHOMSKY. Many people do indeed see such an analogy, a tribute to the incredible 
power of the Western propaganda systems. The background for the Kosovo 
intervention happens to be unusually well documented. That includes two detailed 
State Department compilations, extensive reports from the ground by Kosovo 
Verification Mission (western) monitors, rich sources from NATO and the UN, a 
British Parliamentary Inquiry, and much else. The reports and studies coincide 
very closely on the facts.

In brief, there had been no substantial change on the ground in the months prior 
to the bombing. Atrocities were committed both by Serbian forces and by the KLA 
guerrillas mostly attacking from neighboring Albania – primarily the latter 
during the relevant period, at least according to high British authorities 
(Britain was the most hawkish member of the alliance). The major atrocities in 
Kosovo were not the cause of the NATO bombing of Serbia, but rather its 
consequence, and a fully anticipated consequence. NATO commander General Wesley 
Clark had informed the White House weeks before the bombing that it would elicit 
a brutal response by Serbian forces on the ground, and as the bombing began, 
told the press that such a response was “predictable.”

The first UN-registered refugees outside Kosovo were well after the bombing 
began. The indictment of Milosevic during the bombing, based largely on US-UK 
intelligence, confined itself to crimes after the bombing, with one exception, 
which we know could not be taken seriously by US-UK leaders, who at the same 
moment were actively supporting even worse crimes. Furthermore, there was good 
reason to believe that a diplomatic solution might have been in reach: in fact, 
the UN resolution imposed after 78 days of bombing was pretty much a compromise 
between the Serbian and NATO position as it began.

All of this, including these impeccable western sources, is reviewed in some 
detail in my book A New Generation Draws the Line. Corroborating information has 
appeared since. Thus Diana Johnstone reports a letter to German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel on October 26, 2007 by Dietmar Hartwig, who had been head of the 
European mission in Kosovo before it was withdrawn on March 20 as the bombing 
was announced, and was in a very good position to know what was happening. He 
wrote:

“Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the 
evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major or 
systematic crimes against Albanians, nor there was a single case referring to 
genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes. Quite the opposite, in my reports 
I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more frequent KLA 
attacks against the Serbian executive, their law enforcement demonstrated 
remarkable restraint and discipline. The clear and often cited goal of the 
Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement [of 
October 1998] to the letter so not to provide any excuse to the international 
community to intervene. … There were huge ‘discrepancies in perception’ between 
what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting ! to their respective 
governments and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media 
and the public. This discrepancy can only be viewed as input to long-term 
preparation for war against Yugoslavia. Until the time I left Kosovo, there 
never happened what the media and, with no less intensity the politicians, were 
relentlessly claiming. Accordingly, until 20 March 1999 there was no reason for 
military intervention, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter 
by the international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States 
prior to, and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because 
the truth was killed, and the EU lost reliability.”

History is not quantum physics, and there is always ample room for doubt. But it 
is rare for conclusions to be so firmly backed as they are in this case. Very 
revealingly, it is all totally irrelevant. The prevailing doctrine is that NATO 
intervened to stop ethnic cleansing – though supporters of the bombing who 
tolerate at least a nod to the rich factual evidence qualify their support by 
saying the bombing was necessary to stop potential atrocities: we must therefore 
act to elicit large-scale atrocities to stop ones that might occur if we do not 
bomb. And there are even more shocking justifications.

The reasons for this virtual unanimity and passion are fairly clear. The bombing 
came after a virtual orgy of self-glorification and awe of power that might have 
impressed Kim il-Sung. I’ve reviewed it elsewhere, and this remarkable moment of 
intellectual history should not be allowed to remain in the oblivion to which it 
has been consigned. After this performance, there simply had to be a glorious 
denouement. The noble Kosovo intervention provided it, and the fiction must be 
zealously guarded.

Returning to the question, there is an analogy between the self-serving 
depictions of Kosovo and Libya, both interventions animated by noble intent in 
the fictionalized version. The unacceptable real world suggests rather different 
analogies.


5. Similarly, many people see an analogy between the on-going Iraq intervention 
and the current intervention in Libya. In this case too, can you explain both 
the similarities, and differences?


CHOMSKY. I don’t see meaningful analogies here either, except that two of the 
same states are involved. In the case of Iraq, the goals were those that were 
finally conceded. In the case of Libya, it is likely that the goal is similar in 
at least one respect: the hope that a reliable client regime will reliably 
supported Western goals and provide Western investors with privileged access to 
Libya’s rich oil wealth – which, as noted, may go well beyond what is currently 
known.


6. What do you expect, in coming weeks, to see happening in Libya and, in that 
context, what do you think ought to be the aims of an anti interventionist and 
anti war movement in the U.S. regarding U.S. policies?


CHOMSKY. It is of course uncertain, but the likely prospects now (March 29) are 
either a break-up of Libya into an oil-rich Eastern region heavily dependent on 
the Western imperial powers and an impoverished West under the control of a 
brutal tyrant with fading capacity, or a victory by the Western-backed forces. 
In either case, so the triumvirate presumably hopes, a less troublesome and more 
dependent regime will be in place. The likely outcome is described fairly 
accurately, I think by the London-based Arab journal al-Quds al-Arabi (March 
28). While recognizing the uncertainty of prediction, it anticipates that the 
intervention may leave Libya with “two states, a rebel-held oil-rich East and a 
poverty-stricken, Qadhafi-led West… Given that the oil wells have been secured, 
we may find ourselves facing a new Libyan oil emirate,! sparsely inhabited, 
protected by the West and very similar to the Gulf's emirate states.” Or the 
Western-backed rebellion might proceed all the way to eliminate the irritating 
dictator.

Those concerned for peace, justice, freedom and democracy should try to find 
ways to lend support and assistance to Libyans who seek to shape their own 
future, free from constraints imposed by external powers. We can have hopes 
about the directions they should pursue, but their future should be in their hands.


http://www.zcommunications.org/noam-chomsky-on-libya-and-the-unfolding-crises-by-noam-chomsky



And now Gilbert Achcar...


Gilbert Achcar: Barack Obama’s Libya Speech and the Tasks of Anti-Imperialists
March 31, 2011


The speech delivered by Barack Obama on March 28 sheds interesting light on both 
the ongoing Western intervention in Libya and the debate that has been unfolding 
in the antiwar movement about it. What follows is a dissection of key sections 
of the speech -- leaving aside the usual grandiloquent and empty rhetoric of the 
"manifest destiny" type -- with a comment on both issues, ending with an 
assessment of the present situation twelve days after the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973 and the tasks of anti-imperialists.



"Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant 
to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when our interests and 
values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act. That is what happened in 
Libya over the course of these last six weeks....



"Some question why America should intervene at all -- even in limited ways -- in 
this distant land. They argue that there are many places in the world where 
innocent civilians face brutal violence at the hands of their government, and 
America should not be expected to police the world, particularly when we have so 
many pressing concerns here at home.



"It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And 
given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests 
against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on 
behalf of what's right. In this particular country -- Libya; at this particular 
moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale." 
(emphasis mine throughout)



Interests are quite frankly put before values in the above passages. The truth 
is that U.S. imperial interests are what motivate U.S. intervention first and 
above all. Values are only secondary, when not mere window dressing, as the 
whole history of U.S. military interventions abundantly verifies. At times, U.S. 
interests may indeed coincide with U.S. proclaimed values, like in the U.S. 
participation in World War II, but most U.S. interventions took place in 
violation of U.S. proclaimed values whereas the U.S. abstained from upholding 
its proclaimed values in countless instances when they did not match its 
imperial interests.



"For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant -- 
Moammar Gaddafi. He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, 
murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the 
world -- including Americans who were killed by Libyan agents."



That’s absolutely true. And yet, the U.S. has been shamelessly cozying up to the 
tyrant since 2003, and not the Bush administration alone. On April 21, 2009, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received in Washington one of Gaddafi’s seven 
sons, the sinister "Dr." al-Mutassim-Billah Gaddafi, Libya’s "national security 
adviser," who contributed to the "war on terror" by undertaking dirty missions 
for the U.S. government. "I am very pleased to welcome Minister Qadhafi here to 
the State Department. We deeply value the relationship between the United States 
and Libya. We have many opportunities to deepen and broaden our cooperation. A! 
nd I’m very much looking forward to building on this relationship." (U.S. 
Department of State.) And, of course, several European allies of Washington 
cozied up to Gaddafi even more than the U.S. itself did, most prominent among 
them the unbearable racist-sexist buffoon ruling Italy.



"Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the 
international community offered Gaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign of 
killing, or face the consequences. Rather than stand down, his forces continued 
their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, 
women and children who sought their freedom from fear.



"At this point, the United States and the world faced a choice. Gaddafi declared 
that he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He compared them to rats, and 
threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we had seen 
him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single 
day. Now, we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we 
waited one more day, Benghazi -- a city nearly the size of Charlotte -- could 
suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the 
conscience of the world.



"It was not in our national interest to let that happen. ...



"America has an important strategic interest in preventing Gaddafi from 
overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of 
additional refugees across Libya's borders..."



This is strictly true. In a comment sent from Benghazi for The New Yorker and 
entitled "Who are the rebels?," Jon Lee Anderson recently confirmed what many 
other observers on the ground had asserted, corroborating the fears expressed by 
the uprising in Benghazi and the high urgency of their request for air cover: 
"When the first columns of [Gaddafi's] soldiers reached the city’s edge, many 
thousands of Benghazians—including some city-council members—fled eastward. Of 
those who stayed to fight, more than thirty died, and the effort was saved only 
by the arrival of French warplanes." As a Libyan truck driver in Ajdabiya told 
t! he Financial Times' reporter: "We know the weapons of the revolution are 
nothing compared with Gaddafi... If it were not for the planes, he would have 
done zanga zanga" -- the Arabic for "alley by alley," referring to Gaddafi's now 
famous speech in which he threatened to crush the rebellion in frightening terms.



In his editorial in the March 28 issue of the Arabic-language London-based 
al-Quds al-Arabi, Abdul-Bari Atwan, who knows Libya very well, explained the 
reason for Gaddafi’s military superiority over the uprising: "The armament of 
the rebels, especially those who are concentrated in the Eastern province, is 
extremely weak compared with that of the forces loyal to the Libyan leader ... 
Colonel Gaddafi had dissolved the Libyan army some twenty years ago, after the 
coup attempt led by Omar al-Mihayshi, and replaced it with armed militias led by 
his sons or members of his tribe in order to guarantee their complete allegiance.! "



It was a matter of very few days at most before Gaddafi’s forces would have 
taken Benghazi and perpetrated a huge massacre "that would have reverberated 
across the region and stained the conscience of the world," thus putting Western 
governments in the difficult political situation of having failed to respond to 
a request for protection from a population in danger, with a mass-scale 
slaughter resulting from their inaction. The key point here was neither "values" 
nor "conscience" as such, but the fact that the "stained conscience" of the 
Western powers, had they remained inactive, would have compelled them to embargo 
Libya at a time when the oil market was so stressed that this would have driven 
oil prices to a still higher level than their already high level prior to! the 
Libyan crisis, with calamitous consequences for the global economy. This is why, 
as Obama put it: "It was not in our national interest to let that happen."



"I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973. We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save 
that city and the people within it. We hit Gaddafi's troops in neighboring 
Ajdabiya, allowing the opposition to drive them out. We hit his air defenses, 
which paved the way for a No Fly Zone. We targeted tanks and military assets 
that had been choking off towns and cities and we cut off much of their source 
of supply. And tonight, I can report that we have stopped Gaddafi's deadly advance."



This is a basically accurate description of what happened, along with the 
inevitable killing of civilians by coalition bombings, which, to be fair, has 
been relatively limited until now in the intervention in Libya compared to the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, the spectacle of Western planes and 
missiles pounding Gaddafi’s positions in Libya aroused legitimate emotion, and 
could not but evoke the spectacle of purely imperialist aggressions like the 
2003 invasion of Iraq. But there was no way of stopping Gaddafi from committing 
his foretold massacre without enforcing a no-fly zone and halting the movement 
of his armored vehicles toward the populated zones held by the uprising. We 
could not support Western strikes due to our total lack of confidence in the 
heavy-handed approach of the Penta! gon and its allies, and our certainty from 
past experiences that they would overstep the UN mandate of protecting the 
civilians. But neither could we oppose the no-fly zone and initial bombing of 
Gaddafi’s armor that were insistently requested by the uprising for its rescue 
from Gaddafi's murderous vengeance.



"A massacre would have [put] enormous strains on the peaceful -- yet fragile -- 
transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic impulses that are dawning 
across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as 
repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power."



For once, Obama is right against some writers on the left who claimed that the 
Western intervention in Libya was designed to halt -- and would halt -- the wave 
of democratic uprisings sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. On the 
contrary, had Gaddafi been able to crush the Libyan uprising in a bloodbath, 
this would have dramatically affected the situation, boosted the regional 
counter-revolution and deterred the protest movement from carrying on its fight 
in most countries. The fact that the massacre was averted and the uprising 
resumed its offensive in Libya further emboldened the regional revolutionary 
process. Since then not only did the movement gather momentum where it existed, 
in countries like Morocco and Yemen, but it spread and amplified in Syria, the 
only major country in the region where protest ! had been very weak hitherto.



"Moreover, we have accomplished these objectives consistent with the pledge that 
I made to the American people at the outset of our military operations. I said 
that America's role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into 
Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the 
operation, and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners. 
Tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge.



"Our most effective alliance, NATO, has taken command of the enforcement of the 
arms embargo and No Fly Zone. Last night, NATO decided to take on the additional 
responsibility of protecting Libyan civilians. ...



"Of course, there is no question that Libya -- and the world -- will be better 
off with Gaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have 
embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means. But 
broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.



"The task that I assigned our forces -- to protect the Libyan people from 
immediate danger, and to establish a No Fly Zone -- carries with it a UN mandate 
and international support. It is also what the Libyan opposition asked us to do. 
If we tried to overthrow Gaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We 
would likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground, or risk killing many 
civilians from the air. ...



"We have intervened to stop a massacre, and we will work with our allies and 
partners as they're in the lead to maintain the safety of civilians. We will 
deny the regime arms, cut off its supply of cash, assist the opposition, and 
work with other nations to hasten the day when Gaddafi leaves power."



Here we come to the key point with regard to UNSC resolution 1973, which invoked 
the responsibility to protect. Upon the very explicit request of the uprising, 
it excluded "a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory," and this safeguard against imperialist control of Libya is crucial 
indeed. Those who believe that the U.S. could impose a "Karzai" on Libya by 
means of air power alone still have to show us how this could happen. Whoever is 
familiar with the Afghan situat! ion should know that, had the U.S. troops not 
been in control of Kabul, Hamid Karzai, who had absolutely negligible influence 
in the country, would never have been able to play "Mr. President" there. And 
whereas U.S. Afghan allies in the Northern Alliance had no mass base outside 
their ethnic regions, the Libyan opposition is clearly mass based in the 
country's key regions, making it much harder for outsiders to control the 
political outcome without a military presence on the ground. The qualms in 
Western political and military ruling circles as well as reports in mainstream 
Western media about the Libyan uprising are very telling in that regard (for 
example, see this recent report in The Independent).



Pointing to a few individuals of various and contradictory political identities 
who are playing or trying to play some role in the Libyan uprising does not say 
what influence they really command, and cannot be convincing as an indication of 
the shape of a post-Gaddafi Libya, all the less so given that the National 
Transition Council put forward a clear program of democratic change calling for 
free and fair elections. The smear campaign against the Libyan uprising is 
equivalent to that of those who tried to discred! it the Egyptian uprising 
either by pointing to the Muslim Brotherhood's role or by describing Mohamed 
ElBaradei as a stooge of imperialism and the April 6th Youth movement as a 
US-trained operation. And whatever statements this or that member of the Council 
might give to Western media in order to please the governments that are helping 
the uprising is secondary compared to the fact that the downfall of Gaddafi will 
make it possible for a left to emerge in Libya for the first time in more than 
four decades, and will allow international progressive movements to exert 
effective pressure on the Libyan state to discard the shameful agreement that 
Gaddafi concluded with his buddy Silvio Berlusconi in 2008 in order to 
facilitate Italy’s unlawful turning back of African boat people.



The point now is what comes next. The massacre has been averted, Gaddafi’s air 
power crippled beyond repair, his forces very much weakened although they still 
have a clear edge over the insurgents. The UN mandate has been fulfilled to all 
means and purposes in Obama's own acknowledgement, and yet NATO is taking over 
with a plan for a three-month operation over Libya. Any further bombing 
indisputably oversteps the UN mandate by turning NATO into a full participant in 
the ongoing civil war in Libya, albeit only from the air and sea. The pretext 
that this is part of the "all necessary measures" in order to "protect 
civilians" authorized by the unacceptably vague UNSC resolution is sustained by 
the military superiority of Gaddafi loyalists over the uprising.



However, the way to terminate this superiority and enable the uprising to win, 
in conformity with the Libyan people's right to self-determination, is for the 
hypocritical Western governments -- who have sold a lot of weapons to Gaddafi 
since the arms embargo on Libya was lifted in October 2004 and Gaddafi turned 
into a model -- to deliver arms to the insurgency. (The European Union granted 
licenses for $834.5 million of arms exports to Gaddafi through the end of 2009, 
without counting the expanding sales in 2010; the U.S. government un! der the 
Bush administration approved arms sales to Libya for $46 million in 2008; the 
Obama administration reduced this figure to $17 million in 2009 while 
considering an armored car deal that would have increased it substantially.) 
Mahmoud Shammam, a spokesman for the Libyan opposition, told reporters during 
the international meeting on Libya convened in London on March 29 that, properly 
equipped, rebels "would finish Gaddafi in a few days." Other members of the 
Libyan opposition made similar statements. And yet, under the pretext that UNSC 
resolution 1973 reiterated the imposition of an arms embargo on the Libyan 
territory, Western governments are refraining from delivering weapons to the 
uprising, while the U.S. administration is indecisive to the point that Obama 
carefully avoided the issue in his speech, only speaking of denying arms to the 
Libyan regime. When faced with media questions about it later on, he replied: 
"I'm not ruling it out, but I'm also not ruling it in." This should definitely 
be denounced.



In sum, it was wrong for any forces on the left to oppose the idea of a no-fly 
zone and the initial pounding of Gaddafi’s armor in the absence of any 
alternative to avoid the foretold large-scale massacre in Libya. Opposing the 
no-fly zone while offering non-plausible alternatives, as many groups of the 
sane and true left did with the best of intentions, was unconvincing. It put the 
left in a weak position in the eyes of public opinion. Opposing the no-fly zone 
while showing no concern about the civilians, as some fringe groups did, was 
immoral -- not to mention the attitude of those reconstructed or unreconstructed 
Stalinists who are upholding Gaddafi as a progressive anti-imperialist and 
dismissing the uprising as a US-led or al-Qaeda-led conspiracy (while resorting 
to Stalinist-style slanders in discuss! ing the position of those on the left 
who sympathized with the Libyan uprising's request for protection).



The no-fly zone request by the uprising should not have been opposed. Instead, 
we should have expressed our strong reservations on UNSC resolution 1973, and 
warned of any attempt to seize it as a pretext in order to further imperialist 
agendas. As I said the day after resolution 1973 was adopted, "without coming 
out against the no-fly zone, we must express defiance and advocate full 
vigilance in monitoring the actions of those states carrying it out, to make 
sure that they don't go beyond protecting civilians as mandated by the UNSC 
resolution." Our usual presumption against military interventions of imperialist 
states was overruled in the emergency circu! mstances of massacre impending, but 
these emergency circumstances are no longer there at present, and protecting the 
uprising can now be achieved in a much better way by supplying it with weapons.



Now that the no-fly zone has been implemented in NATO's typical heavy-handed 
manner and that Gaddafi forces' ability to threaten civilian concentrations with 
a large-scale massacre has been severely weakened, we should concentrate our 
campaign on two main inseparable demands addressed to the NATO-led coalition:



Stop the bombing! Deliver arms to the insurgents!



Coupling the two demands is our way to show concretely that we care for the 
Libyan people’s uprising against its tyrant much more than those who deny them 
arms while wanting to impose their guardianship over their movement.





Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon, and is currently Professor at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University of London. His books 
include The Clash of Barbarisms: The Making of the New World Disorder, published 
in 13 languages, Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
co-authored with Noam Chomsky, and most recently The Arabs and the Holocaust: 
The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives.


http://www.zcommunications.org/barack-obama-s-libya-speech-and-the-tasks-of-anti-imperialists-by-gilbert-achcar