[Peace-discuss] The Return of Fascism in Contemporary Capitalism

[David Johnson]

In conclusion, fascism has returned to the West, East, and South; and this
return is naturally connected with the spread of the systemic crisis of
generalized, financialized, and globalized monopoly capitalism. Actual or
even potential recourse to the services of the fascist movement by the
dominant centers of this hard-pressed system calls for the greatest
vigilance on our part. This crisis is destined to grow worse and,
consequently, the threat of resorting to fascist solutions will become a
real danger. 

 

 <https://monthlyreview.org/> Monthly Review 

The Return of Fascism in Contemporary Capitalism

by  <https://monthlyreview.org/author/samiramin/> Samir Amin

 

Samir Amin is director of the Third World Forum in Dakar, Senegal. His books
published by Monthly Review Press include The Liberal Virus, The World We
Wish to See, The Law of Worldwide Value, and, most recently, The Implosion
of Contemporary Capitalism. This article was translated from the French by
James Membrez.

It is not by chance that the very title of this contribution links the
return of fascism on the political scene with the crisis of contemporary
capitalism. Fascism is not synonymous with an authoritarian police regime
that rejects the uncertainties of parliamentary electoral democracy. Fascism
is a particular political response to the challenges with which the
management of capitalist society may be confronted in specific
circumstances.

Unity and Diversity of Fascism

Political movements that can rightly be called fascist were in the forefront
and exercised power in a number of European countries, particularly during
the 1930s up to 1945. These included Italy’s Benito Mussolini, Germany’s
Adolf Hitler, Spain’s Francisco Franco, Portugal’s António de Oliveira
Salazar, France’s Philippe Pétain, Hungary’s Miklós Horthy, Romania’s Ion
Antonescu, and Croatia’s Ante Pavelic. The diversity of societies that were
the victims of fascism—both major developed capitalist societies and minor
dominated capitalist societies, some connected with a victorious war, others
the product of defeat—should prevent us from lumping them all together. I
shall thus specify the different effects that this diversity of structures
and conjunctures produced in these societies.

Yet, beyond this diversity, all these fascist regimes had two
characteristics in common:

(1) In the circumstances, they were all willing to manage the government and
society in such a way as not to call the fundamental principles of
capitalism into question, specifically private capitalist property,
including that of modern monopoly capitalism. That is why I call these
different forms of fascism particular ways of managing capitalism and not
political forms that challenge the latter’s legitimacy, even if “capitalism”
or “plutocracies” were subject to long diatribes in the rhetoric of fascist
speeches. The lie that hides the true nature of these speeches appears as
soon as one examines the “alternative” proposed by these various forms of
fascism, which are always silent concerning the main point—private
capitalist property. It remains the case that the fascist choice is not the
only response to the challenges confronting the political management of a
capitalist society. It is only in certain conjunctures of violent and deep
crisis that the fascist solution appears to be the best one for dominant
capital, or sometimes even the only possible one. The analysis must, then,
focus on these crises.

(2) The fascist choice for managing a capitalist society in crisis is always
based—by definition even—on the categorical rejection of “democracy.”
Fascism always replaces the general principles on which the theories and
practices of modern democracies are based—recognition of a diversity of
opinions, recourse to electoral procedures to determine a majority,
guarantee of the rights of the minority, etc.—with the opposed values of
submission to the requirements of collective discipline and the authority of
the supreme leader and his main agents. This reversal of values is then
always accompanied by a return of backward-looking ideas, which are able to
provide an apparent legitimacy to the procedures of submission that are
implemented. The proclamation of the supposed necessity of returning to the
(“medieval”) past, of submitting to the state religion or to some supposed
characteristic of the “race” or the (ethnic) “nation” make up the panoply of
ideological discourses deployed by the fascist powers.

The diverse forms of fascism found in modern European history share these
two characteristics and fall into one of the following four categories:

(1) The fascism of the major “developed” capitalist powers that aspired to
become dominant hegemonic powers in the world, or at least in the regional,
capitalist system.

Nazism is the model of this type of fascism. Germany became a major
industrial power beginning in the 1870s and a competitor of the hegemonic
powers of the era (Great Britain and, secondarily, France) and of the
country that aspired to become hegemonic (the United States). After the 1918
defeat, it had to deal with the consequences of its failure to achieve its
hegemonic aspirations. Hitler clearly formulated his plan: to establish over
Europe, including Russia and maybe beyond, the hegemonic domination of
“Germany,” i.e., the capitalism of the monopolies that had supported the
rise of Nazism. He was disposed to accept a compromise with his major
opponents: Europe and Russia would be given to him, China to Japan, the rest
of Asia and Africa to Great Britain, and the Americas to the United States.
His error was in thinking that such a compromise was possible: Great Britain
and the United States did not accept it, while Japan, in contrast, supported
it.

Japanese fascism belongs to the same category. Since 1895, modern capitalist
Japan aspired to impose its domination over all of East Asia. Here the slide
was made “softly” from the “imperial” form of managing a rising national
capitalism—based on apparently “liberal” institutions (an elected Diet), but
in fact completely controlled by the Emperor and the aristocracy transformed
by modernization—to a brutal form, managed directly by the military High
Command. Nazi Germany made an alliance with imperial/fascist Japan, while
Great Britain and the United States (after Pearl Harbor, in 1941) clashed
with Tokyo, as did the resistance in China—the deficiencies of the
Kuomintang being compensated for by the support of the Maoist Communists.

(2) The fascism of second rank capitalist powers.

Italy’s Mussolini (the inventor of fascism, including its name) is the prime
example. Mussolinism was the response of the Italian right (the old
aristocracy, new bourgeoisie, middle classes) to the crisis of the 1920s and
the growing communist threat. But neither Italian capitalism nor its
political instrument, Mussolini’s fascism, had the ambition to dominate
Europe, let alone the world. Despite all the boasts of the Duce about
reconstructing the Roman Empire (!), Mussolini understood that the stability
of his system rested on his alliance—as a subaltern—either with Great
Britain (master of the Mediterranean) or Nazi Germany. Hesitation between
the two possible alliances continued right up to the eve of the Second World
War.

The fascism of Salazar and Franco belong to this same type. They were both
dictators installed by the right and the Catholic Church in response to the
dangers of republican liberals or socialist republicans. The two were never,
for this reason, ostracized for their anti-democratic violence (under the
pretext of anti-communism) by the major imperialist powers. Washington
rehabilitated them after 1945 (Salazar was a founding member of NATO and
Spain consented to U.S. military bases), followed by the European
Community—guarantor by nature of the reactionary capitalist order. After the
Carnation Revolution (1974) and the death of Franco (1980), these two
systems joined the camp of the new low-intensity “democracies” of our era.

(3) The fascism of defeated powers.

These include France’s Vichy government, as well as Belgium’s Léon Degrelle
and the “Flemish” pseudo-government supported by the Nazis. In France, the
upper class chose “Hitler rather than the Popular Front” (see Annie
Lacroix-Riz’s books on this subject). This type of fascism, connected with
defeat and submission to “German Europe,” was forced to retreat into the
background following the defeat of the Nazis. In France, it gave way to the
Resistance Councils that, for a time, united Communists with other
Resistance fighters (Charles de Gaulle in particular). Its further evolution
had to wait (with the initiation of European construction and France’s
joining the Marshall Plan and NATO, i.e., the willing submission to U.S.
hegemony) for the conservative right and anti-communist, social-democratic
right to break permanently with the radical left that came out of the
anti-fascist and potentially anti-capitalist Resistance.

(4) Fascism in the dependent societies of Eastern Europe.

We move down several degrees more when we come to examine the capitalist
societies of Eastern Europe (Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, Greece, and western Ukraine during the Polish era). We should
here speak of backward and, consequently, dependent capitalism. In the
interwar period, the reactionary ruling classes of these countries supported
Nazi Germany. It is, nevertheless, necessary to examine on a case-by-case
basis their political articulation with Hitler’s project.

In Poland, the old hostility to Russian domination (Tsarist Russia), which
became hostility to the communist Soviet Union, encouraged by the popularity
of the Catholic Papacy, would normally have made this country into Germany’s
vassal, on the Vichy model. But Hitler did not understand it that way: the
Poles, like the Russians, Ukrainians, and Serbs, were people destined for
extermination, along with Jews, the Roma, and several others. There was,
then, no place for a Polish fascism allied with Berlin.

Horthy’s Hungary and Antonescu’s Romania were, in contrast, treated as
subaltern allies of Nazi Germany. Fascism in these two countries was itself
the result of social crises specific to each of them: fear of “communism”
after the Béla Kun period in Hungary and the national chauvinist
mobilization against Hungarians and Ruthenians in Romania.

In Yugoslavia, Hitler’s Germany (followed by Mussolini’s Italy) supported an
“independent” Croatia, entrusted to the management of the anti-Serb Ustashi
with the decisive support of the Catholic Church, while the Serbs were
marked for extermination.

The Russian Revolution had obviously changed the situation with regard to
the prospects of working-class struggles and the response of the reactionary
propertied classes, not only in the territory of the pre–1939 Soviet Union,
but also in the lost territories—the Baltic states and Poland. Following the
Treaty of Riga in 1921, Poland annexed the western parts of Belarus
(Volhynia) and Ukraine (southern Galicia, which was previously an Austrian
Crownland; and northern Galicia, which had been a province of the Tsarist
Empire).

In this whole region, two camps took form from 1917 (and even from 1905 with
the first Russian Revolution): pro-socialist (which became pro-Bolshevik),
popular in large parts of the peasantry (which aspired to a radical agrarian
reform for their benefit) and in intellectual circles (Jews in particular);
and anti-socialist (and consequently complaisant with regard to
anti-democratic governments under fascist influence) in all the landowning
classes. The reintegration of the Baltic states, Belarus, and western
Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1939 emphasized this contrast.

The political map of the conflicts between “pro-fascists” and
“anti-fascists” in this part of Eastern Europe was blurred, on the one hand,
by the conflict between Polish chauvinism (which persisted in its project of
“Polonizing” the annexed Belarussian and Ukrainian regions by settler
colonies) and the victimized peoples; and, on the other hand, by the
conflict between the Ukrainian “nationalists,” who were both anti-Polish and
anti-Russian (because of anti-communism) and Hitler’s project, which
envisaged no Ukrainian state as a subaltern ally, since its people were
simply marked for extermination.

I here refer the reader to Olha Ostriitchouk’s authoritative work Les
Ukrainiens face à leur passé.
<https://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in-contemporary-
capitalism/#en1> 1 Ostriitchouk’s rigorous analysis of the contemporary
history of this region (Austrian Galicia, Polish Ukraine, Little Russia,
which became Soviet Ukraine) will provide the reader with an understanding
of the issues at stake in the still ongoing conflicts as well as the place
occupied by local fascism.

The Western Right’s Complaisant View of Past and Present Fascism

The right in European parliaments between the two world wars was always
complaisant about fascism and even about the more repugnant Nazism.
Churchill himself, regardless of his extreme “Britishness,” never hid his
sympathy for Mussolini. U.S. presidents, and the establishment Democratic
and Republican parties, only discovered belatedly the danger presented by
Hitler’s Germany and, above all, imperial/fascist Japan. With all the
cynicism characteristic of the U.S. establishment, Truman openly avowed what
others thought quietly: allow the war to wear out its protagonists—Germany,
Soviet Russia, and the defeated Europeans—and intervene as late as possible
to reap the benefits. That is not at all the expression of a principled
anti-fascist position. No hesitation was shown in the rehabilitation of
Salazar and Franco in 1945. Furthermore, connivance with European fascism
was a constant in the policy of the Catholic Church. It would not strain
credibility to describe Pius XII as a collaborator with Mussolini and
Hitler.

Hitler’s anti-Semitism itself aroused opprobrium only much later, when it
reached the ultimate stage of its murderous insanity. The emphasis on hate
for “Judeo-Bolshevism” stirred up by Hitler’s speeches was common to many
politicians. It was only after the defeat of Nazism that it was necessary to
condemn anti-Semitism in principle. The task was made easier because the
self-proclaimed heirs to the title of “victims of the Shoah” had become the
Zionists of Israel, allies of Western imperialism against the Palestinians
and the Arab people—who, however, had never been involved in the horrors of
European anti-Semitism!

Obviously, the collapse of the Nazis and Mussolini’s Italy obliged rightist
political forces in Western Europe (west of the “curtain”) to distinguish
themselves from those who—within their own groups—had been accomplices and
allies of fascism. Yet, fascist movements were only forced to retreat into
the background and hide behind the scenes, without really disappearing.

In West Germany, in the name of “reconciliation,” the local government and
its patrons (the United States, and secondarily Great Britain and France)
left in place nearly all those who had committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity. In France, legal proceedings were initiated against the
Resistance for “abusive executions for collaboration” when the Vichyists
reappeared on the political scene with Antoine Pinay. In Italy, fascism
became silent, but was still present in the ranks of Christian Democracy and
the Catholic Church. In Spain, the “reconciliation” compromise imposed in
1980 by the European Community (which later became the European Union)
purely and simply prohibited any reminder of Francoist crimes.

The support of the socialist and social-democratic parties of Western and
Central Europe for the anti-communist campaigns undertaken by the
conservative right shares responsibility for the later return of fascism.
These parties of the “moderate” left had, however, been authentically and
resolutely anti-fascist. Yet all of that was forgotten. With the conversion
of these parties to social liberalism, their unconditional support for
European construction—systematically devised as a guarantee for the
reactionary capitalist order—and their no less unconditional submission to
U.S. hegemony (through NATO, among other means), a reactionary bloc
combining the classic right and the social liberals has been consolidated;
one that could, if necessary, accommodate the new extreme right.

Subsequently, the rehabilitation of East European fascism was quickly
undertaken beginning in 1990. All of the fascist movements of the countries
concerned had been faithful allies or collaborators to varying degrees with
Hitlerism. With the approaching defeat, a large number of their active
leaders had been redeployed to the West and could, consequently, “surrender”
to the U.S. armed forces. None of them were returned to Soviet, Yugoslav, or
other governments in the new people’s democracies to be tried for their
crimes (in violation of Allied agreements). They all found refuge in the
United States and Canada. And they were all pampered by the authorities for
their fierce anti-communism!

In Les Ukrainiens face à leur passé, Ostriitchouk provides everything
necessary to establish irrefutably the collusion between the objectives of
U.S. policy (and behind it of Europe) and those of the local fascists of
Eastern Europe (specifically, Ukraine). For example, “Professor” Dmytro
Dontsov, up to his death (in 1975), published all his works in Canada, which
are not only violently anti-communist (the term “Judeo-Bolshevism” is
customary with him), but also even fundamentally anti-democratic. The
governments of the so-called democratic states of the West supported, and
even financed and organized, the “Orange Revolution” (i.e., the fascist
counter-revolution) in Ukraine. And all that is continuing. Earlier, in
Yugoslavia, Canada had also paved the way for the Croatian Ustashis.

The clever way in which the “moderate” media (which cannot openly
acknowledge that they support avowed fascists) hide their support for these
fascists is simple: they substitute the term “nationalist” for fascist.
Professor Dontsov is no longer a fascist, he is a Ukrainian “nationalist,”
just like Marine Le Pen is no longer a fascist, but a nationalist (as Le
Monde, for example, has written)!

Are these authentic fascists really “nationalists,” simply because they say
so? That is doubtful. Nationalists today deserve this label only if they
call into question the power of the actually dominant forces in the
contemporary world, i.e., that of the monopolies of the United States and
Europe. These so-called “nationalists” are friends of Washington, Brussels,
and NATO. Their “nationalism” amounts to chauvinistic hatred of largely
innocent neighboring people who were never responsible for their
misfortunes: for Ukrainians, it is Russians (and not the Tsar); for
Croatians, it is the Serbs; for the new extreme right in France, Austria,
Switzerland, Greece, and elsewhere, it is “immigrants.”

The danger represented by the collusion between major political forces in
the United States (Republicans and Democrats) and Europe (the parliamentary
right and the social liberals), on one side, and the fascists of the East,
on the other, should not be underestimated. Hillary Clinton has set herself
up as leading spokeswoman of this collusion and pushes war hysteria to the
limit. Even more than George W. Bush, if that is possible, she calls for
preventive war with a vengeance (and not only for repetition of the Cold
War) against Russia—with even more open intervention in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Moldova, among other places—against China, and against people in revolt
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Unfortunately, this headlong flight of
the United States in response to its decline could find sufficient support
to allow Hillary Clinton to become “the first woman president of the United
States!” Let’s not forget what hides behind this false feminist.

Undoubtedly, the fascist danger might still appear today to be no threat to
the “democratic” order in the United States and Europe west of the old
“Curtain.” The collusion between the classic parliamentary right and the
social liberals makes it unnecessary for dominant capital to resort to the
services of an extreme right that follows in the wake of the historical
fascist movements. But then what should we conclude about the electoral
successes of the extreme right over the last decade? Europeans are clearly
also victims of the spread of generalized monopoly capitalism.
<https://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in-contemporary-
capitalism/#en2> 2 We can see why, then, when confronted with collusion
between the right and the so-called socialist left, they take refuge in
electoral abstention or in voting for the extreme right. The responsibility
of the potentially radical left is, in this context, huge: if this left had
the audacity to propose real advances beyond current capitalism, it would
gain the credibility that it lacks. An audacious radical left is necessary
to provide the coherence that the current piecemeal protest movements and
defensive struggles still lack. The “movement” could, then, reverse the
social balance of power in favor of the working classes and make progressive
advances possible. The successes won by the popular movements in South
America are proof of that.

In the current state of things, the electoral successes of the extreme right
stem from contemporary capitalism itself. These successes allow the media to
throw together, with the same opprobrium, the “populists of the extreme
right and those of the extreme left,” obscuring the fact that the former are
pro-capitalist (as the term extreme right demonstrates) and thus possible
allies for capital, while the latter are the only potentially dangerous
opponents of capital’s system of power.

We observe, mutatis mutandis, a similar conjuncture in the United States,
although its extreme right is never called fascist. The McCarthyism of
yesterday, just like the Tea Party fanatics and warmongers (e.g., Hillary
Clinton) of today, openly defend “liberties”—understood as exclusively
belonging to the owners and managers of monopoly capital—against “the
government,” suspected of acceding to the demands of the system’s victims.

One last observation about fascist movements: they seem unable to know when
and how to stop making their demands. The cult of the leader and blind
obedience, the acritical and supreme valorization of pseudo-ethnic or
pseudo-religious mythological constructions that convey fanaticism, and the
recruitment of militias for violent actions make fascism into a force that
is difficult to control. Mistakes, even beyond irrational deviations from
the viewpoint of the social interests served by the fascists, are
inevitable. Hitler was a truly mentally ill person, yet he could force the
big capitalists who had put him in power to follow him to the end of his
madness and even gained the support of a very large portion of the
population. Although that is only an extreme case, and Mussolini, Franco,
Salazar, and Pétain were not mentally ill, a large number of their
associates and henchmen did not hesitate to perpetrate criminal acts.

Fascism in the Contemporary South

The integration of Latin America into globalized capitalism in the
nineteenth century was based on the exploitation of peasants reduced to the
status of “peons” and their subjection to the savage practices of large
landowners. The system of Porfiro Diaz in Mexico is a good example. The
furtherance of this integration in the twentieth century produced the
“modernization of poverty.” The rapid rural exodus, more pronounced and
earlier in Latin America than in Asia and Africa, led to new forms of
poverty in the contemporary urban favelas, which came to replace older forms
of rural poverty. Concurrently, forms of political control of the masses
were “modernized” by establishing dictatorships, abolishing electoral
democracy, prohibiting parties and trade unions, and conferring on “modern”
secret services all rights to arrest and torture through their intelligence
techniques. Clearly, these forms of political management are visibly similar
to those of fascism found in the countries of dependent capitalism in
Eastern Europe. The dictatorships of twentieth-century Latin America served
the local reactionary bloc (large landowners, comprador bourgeoisies, and
sometimes middle classes that benefited from this type of lumpen
development), but above all, they served dominant foreign capital,
specifically that of the United States, which, for this reason, supported
these dictatorships up to their reversal by the recent explosion of popular
movements. The power of these movements and the social and democratic
advances that they have imposed exclude—at least in the short term—the
return of para-fascist dictatorships. But the future is uncertain: the
conflict between the movement of the working classes and local and world
capitalism has only begun. As with all types of fascism, the dictatorships
of Latin America did not avoid mistakes, some of which were fatal to them. I
am thinking, for example, of Leonardo Fortunato Galtieri, who went to war
over the Malvinas Islands to capitalize on Argentine national sentiment for
his benefit.

Beginning in the 1980s, the lumpen development characteristic of the spread
of generalized monopoly capitalism took over from the national populist
systems of the Bandung era (1955–1980) in Asia and Africa.
<https://monthlyreview.org/2014/09/01/the-return-of-fascism-in-contemporary-
capitalism/#en3> 3 This lumpen development also produced forms akin both to
the modernization of poverty and modernization of repressive violence. The
excesses of the post–Nasserist and post–Baathist systems in the Arab world
provide good examples of this. We should not lump together the national
populist regimes of the Bandung era and those of their successors, which
jumped on the bandwagon of globalized neoliberalism, because they were both
“non-democratic.” The Bandung regimes, despite their autocratic political
practices, benefitted from some popular legitimacy both because of their
actual achievements, which benefited the majority of workers, and their
anti-imperialist positions. The dictatorships that followed lost this
legitimacy as soon as they accepted subjection to the globalized neoliberal
model and accompanying lumpen development. Popular and national authority,
although not democratic, gave way to police violence as such, in service of
the neoliberal, anti-popular, and anti-national project.

The recent popular uprisings, beginning in 2011, have called into question
the dictatorships. But the dictatorships have only been called into
question. An alternative will only find the means to achieve stability if it
succeeds in combining the three objectives around which the revolts have
been mobilized: continuation of the democratization of society and politics,
progressive social advances, and the affirmation of national sovereignty.

We are still far from that. That is why there are multiple alternatives
possible in the visible short term. Can there be a possible return to the
national popular model of the Bandung era, maybe with a hint of democracy?
Or a more pronounced crystallization of a democratic, popular, and national
front? Or a plunge into a backward-looking illusion that, in this context,
takes on the form of an “Islamization” of politics and society?

In the conflict over—in much confusion—these three possible responses to the
challenge, the Western powers (the United States and its subaltern European
allies) have made their choice: they have given preferential support to the
Muslim Brotherhood and/or other “Salafist” organizations of political Islam.
The reason for that is simple and obvious: these reactionary political
forces accept exercising their power within globalized neoliberalism (and
thus abandoning any prospect for social justice and national independence).
That is the sole objective pursued by the imperialist powers.

Consequently, political Islam’s program belongs to the type of fascism found
in dependent societies. In fact, it shares with all forms of fascism two
fundamental characteristics: (1) the absence of a challenge to the essential
aspects of the capitalist order (and in this context this amounts to not
challenging the model of lumpen development connected to the spread of
globalized neoliberal capitalism); and (2) the choice of anti-democratic,
police-state forms of political management (such as the prohibition of
parties and organizations, and forced Islamization of morals).

The anti-democratic option of the imperialist powers (which gives the lie to
the pro-democratic rhetoric found in the flood of propaganda to which we are
subjected), then, accepts the possible “excesses” of the Islamic regimes in
question. Like other types of fascism and for the same reasons, these
excesses are inscribed in the “genes” of their modes of thought:
unquestioned submission to leaders, fanatic valorization of adherence to the
state religion, and the formation of shock forces used to impose submission.
In fact, and this can be seen already, the “Islamist” program makes progress
only in the context of a civil war (between, among others, Sunnis and Shias)
and results in nothing other than permanent chaos. This type of Islamist
power is, then, the guarantee that the societies in question will remain
absolutely incapable of asserting themselves on the world scene. It is clear
that a declining United States has given up on getting something better—a
stable and submissive local government—in favor of this “second best.”

Similar developments and choices are found outside of the Arab-Muslim world,
such as Hindu India, for example. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which
just won the elections in India, is a reactionary Hindu religious party that
accepts the inclusion of its government into globalized neoliberalism. It is
the guarantor that India, under its government, will retreat from its
project to be an emerging power. Describing it as fascist, then, is not
really straining credibility too much.

In conclusion, fascism has returned to the West, East, and South; and this
return is naturally connected with the spread of the systemic crisis of
generalized, financialized, and globalized monopoly capitalism. Actual or
even potential recourse to the services of the fascist movement by the
dominant centers of this hard-pressed system calls for the greatest
vigilance on our part. This crisis is destined to grow worse and,
consequently, the threat of resorting to fascist solutions will become a
real danger. Hillary Clinton’s support for Washington’s warmongering does
not bode well for the immediate future.

 

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