[Peace-discuss] . JACOBIN The Lost History of Antifa

[David Johnson]

 <https://www.jacobinmag.com/> 

 

*	JACOBIN

The Lost History of Antifa

 <https://www.jacobinmag.com/author/Loren%20Balhorn> Loren Balhorn 

72 years after the triumph over Nazism, we look back to postwar Germany,
when socialists gave birth to Antifa.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/08093346/Antifa-Conference-1932.png

Scene from the 1932 Antifaschistische Aktion conference.

The origins of the word “antifa” — shorthand for decentralized, militant
street activism associated with its own aesthetic and subculture — might be
murky to most readers. Even in Germany, few know much about the popular
forms of antifascist resistance that coined the term.

The movement’s short but inspiring political legacy proved too uncomfortable
for both Cold War-era German states, and was ignored in schools and
mainstream history. Today its legacy is almost entirely lost to the Left.

Out of the Ruins

By 1945, Hitler’s Third Reich lay physically destroyed and politically
exhausted. Basic civil society ceased to function in many areas, as the Nazi
grip on power faltered and regime supporters, particularly in the middle-
and upper classes, realized that Hitler’s “final victory” was a fantasy.

On the Left, many Communists and Social Democrats had either been outright
murdered by the Nazis, or died in the ensuing war. The unimaginable human
and material destruction wrought by Nazi rule killed millions and turned
German society upside down, decimating the labor movement and murdering most
of the country’s Jewish population. Millions who had supported or at least
acquiesced to the regime ­— including many workers and even some former
socialists — now faced a new beginning in unknown political terrain.

Yet despite its
<http://isj.org.uk/divided-they-fell-the-german-left-and-the-rise-of-hitler/
> failure to stop Hitler in 1933 and
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/11/nuremberg-trials-hitler-goebbels-himmler
-german-communist-social-democrats/> veritable dismantling in subsequent
years, Germany’s socialist labor movement and its decidedly progressive
traditions outlived Hitler in the factories of its industrial cities, and
began gathering up the fragments as soon as open political activity became
possible. As
<https://www.academia.edu/28659208/_Like_Wildfire_The_East_German_Uprising_o
f_1953> historian Gareth Dale describes:

Of all sectors of the population, it was industrial workers in the major
towns that showed the greatest immunity to Nazism. Many trade unionists and
socialists were able to maintain their traditions and beliefs, at least in
some form, through the Nazi era. A courageous minority, including some
150,000 Communists, took part in illegal resistance. Wider layers avoided
danger but were able to keep labour movement values and memories alive
amongst groups of friends, in workplaces and on housing estates.

These groups, oftentimes launched from the aforementioned housing estates,
were generally called “Antifaschistische Ausschüsse,” “Antifaschistische
Kommittees,” or the now famous “Antifaschistische Aktion” – “Antifa” for
short. They drew on the slogans and orientation of the prewar united front
strategy, adopting the word “Antifa” from a last-ditch attempt to establish
a cross-party alliance between Communist and Social Democratic workers in
1932. The alliance’s iconic logo, devised by Association of Revolutionary
Visual Artists members Max Keilson and Max Gebhard, has been since become
one of the Left’s most well-known symbols.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/08093521/antifa_aktion_1932.png

After the war, Antifas varied in size and composition across the former
Reich, now divided into four zones of occupation, and developed in
interaction with the local occupying power. Emerging seemingly overnight in
dozens of cities, most formed immediately after Allied forces arrived, while
some such as the group in Wuppertal “liberated” themselves in street battles
with Hitler loyalists before the Allies could.

Pivotally, these circles were not spontaneous instances of solidarization
between traumatized war survivors, but the product of Social Democratic
Party (SPD) and Communist Party (KPD) veterans reactivating prewar networks.
<https://books.google.de/books?id=RLA3MQAACAAJ&dq=isbn:3788117028&hl=en&sa=X
&ved=0ahUKEwjkxr_lk8XTAhWDNJoKHVLcDtYQ6AEILjAB> Albrecht Lein reports that
the core of the Braunschweig Antifa was made up of KPD and SPD members in
their forties and fifties who had avoided the front, though Catholic
workers’ organizations and other forces were also involved.

The Antifa groups numbered between several hundred and several thousand
active members in most cities, while the openly decried lack of youth
involvement can be ascribed to twelve years of Nazi education and
socialization, which annihilated the once widespread proletarian-socialist
attitude among most young Germans. Though the material needs of war and
reconstruction incorporated women into economic life in new ways, the male
dominance characteristic of German society at the time was also reflected in
the Antifa movement, which consisted largely (but not entirely) of men.

Antifas tended to focus on a combination of hunting down Nazi criminals and
underground Nazi partisans (the so-called “Werewolves”) and practical
concerns affecting the general population. Braunschweig’s Antifa, for
example, printed a
<https://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/aam/broschueren/hist/komit.html>
twelve-point program demanding, among other things, the removal of Nazis
from all administrative bodies and their immediate replacement with
“competent antifascists,” liquidation of Nazi assets to provide for war
victims, emergency laws to prosecute local fascists, and the reestablishment
of the public health-care service. Typical of an organization led by
socialists and thus keenly aware of the need for print media as an
organizing medium, the program’s twelfth and final point consisted bluntly
of a “Daily newspaper.”

Although surviving records indicate that many Antifas were dominated by the
KPD, the political mood in the early months was far from the “Third Period”
adventurism of the late Weimar period. Across the board, local Antifas were
motivated by a desire to learn from the mistakes of 1933 and build a
non-sectarian labor movement bridging divisions. This was buoyed by a
widespread sense at the war’s end that the horrors of Nazism had been a
result of the instability and inequality of capitalism, and that a new,
egalitarian economic system was needed for the postwar order.

Demands for nationalization of industry and other left-wing policies were
widespread. Even the forced marriage between KPD and SPD into the Socialist
Unity Party (SED) in the Soviet zone drew on this sentiment and recruited
many former oppositionists in the first year. In British-occupied Hamburg, a
joint KPD-SPD action committee convened in July 1945 with broad support from
their respective memberships to declare:

The will to merge into a powerful political party lives in the hearts of the
millions of supporters of the once warring German workers’ parties as the
most meaningful outcome of their shared suffering. This desire is deeply
etched into all of the surviving prisoners from the concentration camps,
prisons, and Gestapo institutions.

The rest of the document consisted of practical demands around which to
unite Hamburg’s fragmented labor movement.

Antifas enjoyed varying degrees of success depending on the composition of
the local movement and the amount of leeway allowed to them by occupying
powers. Despite forming outside of the Allied administration and pushing
forward popular de-Nazification policies against occupying forces who sought
reconciliation with the old authorities, they were in no position to contest
Allied hegemony and represented militant minorities at best.

The southwestern industrial city of Stuttgart, for example, was fortunate
enough to be involved in territorial maneuvering between the United States
and France, which occupied the city preemptively. Keen to avoid civil unrest
and thus give the Americans a pretext to take it back, French authorities
allowed Stuttgart’s antifascists considerable leeway in dismantling the
Nazi-era German Labor Front (DAF), rebuilding shop-floor organization in the
factories, and organizing the population in cross-party antifascist
alliances.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/08093528/Antifascist-Rally-Buchenwald-
Concentration-Camp-1945.pngAntifascist rally at Buchenwald concentration
camp, 1945. 

Stuttgart is also noteworthy for the presence of the
<http://www.vsa-verlag.de/nc/detail/artikel/gegen-den-strom-1/> Communist
Party (Opposition), or KPO. This group around former KPD leaders August
Thalheimer and Heinrich Brandler had recruited a large number of the city’s
mid-level KPD factory activists and functionaries following that party’s
ultra-left turn in 1929. The KPO’s vocal advocacy for an anti-Nazi front of
all workers’ organizations in the run-up to 1933 allowed it to consolidate a
small but considerable base of experienced Communist cadre repulsed by the
Stalinization of their party.

Although never a mass organization and only a shadow of its former self
after the war, what remained of the KPO had a decisive influence over
Stuttgart’s metal workers’ union for several years and was able to play a
role in the factories. These activists and others provided the city with a
core of capable militants who understood, through experience, the need to
unite workers on a cross-party basis around basic social demands.

Like everywhere else in Germany, Stuttgart’s Antifa movement was soon
neutralized and diverted back into the old divisions between SPD and KPD,
but the
<http://www.vsa-verlag.de/nc/detail/artikel/klassenkampf-solidaritaet/>
city’s rebellious tradition and penchant for unity in action would reemerge
in 1948, when widespread anger at drastic price rises triggered a citywide
general strike that encompassed 79 percent of the workforce and spread to
several other localities.

Overdetermined

The Antifa movement faced an almost impossible situation in 1945. The
country lay in ruins in every sense imaginable, and had gone through a phase
of destruction, brutality, and wanton murder unprecedented in scale.

The Antifa’s predicament was by and large “overdetermined,” in the sense
that historical forces beyond their control would ultimately seal their
fate. These socialists and antifascists, though numbering in the tens of
thousands across the country, could not have been expected to provide a
plausible political alternative to the overwhelming might of the Cold War.

Germany in 1945 was set to become the staging ground for the longest
geopolitical confrontation in modern history, and there was no way the
fragments of a shattered socialist movement could have influenced
developments in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, statements and documents
from the time reveal thousands of determined antifascists and socialists,
keenly aware of the unprecedented nature of their historical moment and
putting forward a political perspective for what remained of the country’s
working class.

Although their numbers were comparatively and regrettably few given the
movement’s former glory, their existence refutes the notion that the prewar
German left was entirely destroyed by Nazism. Hitler certainly broke the
back of German socialism, but West Germany’s postwar prosperity laced with
anti-Communist paranoia would finally bury what remained of the country’s
radical prewar traditions.

Albrecht Lein recounts how the incredibly difficult conditions facing the
Antifa also necessarily restricted their political perspective. Though they
attracted thousands of socialists and were soon bolstered by returning
Communists and other political prisoners from the concentration camps,
briefly becoming the dominant political force in cities like Braunschweig,
they were unable to offer a political road out of the country’s social
misery.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/08093536/CDU-Poster-1946-for-Socialism
.jpgIn 1946, even the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was
calling for nationalization and socialism in their propaganda. 

Lein argues that the labor movement’s failure to defeat Hitler and the fact
that Germany had required liberation from without drove antifascists to a
largely reactive policy, vigorously pursuing former Nazi officials and
purging society of collaborators, but neglecting to build a plausible vision
for a “new Germany” beyond both fascism and Cold War machinations.

After the Communists dissolved the National Committee for a Free Germany
(NKFD) in the weeks after the war, underground Nazi resistance groups began
calling themselves the “Movement for a Free Germany.” Lein argues that this
circumstance was symbolic of the overall political trajectory at the time:
“Other than the notable exceptions of Leipzig, Berlin and Munich, the
antifascist movements described themselves as fighting organizations against
fascism, and not as Committees for a Free Germany. Leaving the task of
gathering social forces for ‘liberation’ and thus, implicitly, renewing
Germany to the Nazis and reactionaries characterized [. . .] their defensive
position.”

Germans’ failure to engage in popular resistance to Hitler even in the
second half of the war understandably demoralized the Left and shook its
faith in the masses’ capabilities — a trait
<http://www.chbeck.de/Sabrow-Erich-Honecker/productview.aspx?product=1655425
3> historian Martin Sabrow also ascribes to the caste of Communist
functionaries operating under Soviet tutelage in the East.

In the French, British, and American zones, Antifas began to recede by the
late summer of 1945, marginalized by Allied bans on political organization
and re-emerging divisions within the movement itself. The Social Democratic
leadership under Kurt Schumacher sided with the Western occupiers and
returned the party to its prewar anti-Communist line by the end of the year,
decreeing that SPD membership was incompatible with participation in the
Antifa movement.

In Stuttgart, the Antifa and what remained of the old trade union
bureaucracy fought each other for political influence from the outset. The
old leadership of the ADGB, prewar Germany’s central trade union federation,
sought to reestablish formalized employment relations in the occupied zones,
which would at least mean a return to normalcy for Germany’s working class.
This ran counter to the approach of the Antifas, however, who cultivated
strong ties to leftist shop stewards and factory committees, and usually
called for nationalization and worker control of industry. These demands
were ultimately not realistic in a shattered economy occupied by powerful
foreign armies.

The prospect of stability and a degree of economic recovery under the SPD
simply proved more appealing to workers forced to choose between that and
the principled but harrowing struggle put forward by the Antifa.

Antifas were further hindered by the decision by the Allies, particularly
the United States and Britain, to cooperate with what remained of the Nazi
regime below its most executive levels. Antifas seeking to imprison local
Nazi leaders or purge municipal bureaucracies were often stopped by
occupying authorities who preferred to integrate functionaries of the old
state into new, ostensibly democratic institutions.

This had less to do with any particular affinity between the Allies and
ex-fascist functionaries so much as it served the practical interests of
keeping German society running under exceedingly difficult conditions
without ceding influence to the reemerging radical left. Outnumbered and
outgunned by the occupying powers and outmaneuvered by the SPD, the Antifa’s
influence in the three western zones of occupation would evaporate in less
than a year. West German society stabilized, the Cold War polarized the
continent, and the political forces of old Germany in alliance with Social
Democracy and the emerging Western bloc consolidated their hold over the
country.

The KPD, for its part, initially took on waves of new members, as its
prestige rose in light of the Soviet victory over Hitler and broad
anticapitalist sentiment. The party soon rebuilt its industrial bases, and
by 1946 controlled just as many shop floor committees in the heavily
industrialized Ruhr Region as the SPD. In his classic study of the German
labor movement,
<https://books.google.de/books?id=VO4ZAAAAMAAJ&q=arno+kl%C3%B6nne+die+deutsc
he+arbeiterbewegung&dq=arno+kl%C3%B6nne+die+deutsche+arbeiterbewegung&hl=en&
sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwja1qzCksfTAhXnYZoKHaFVAJkQ6AEIJjAA> Die deutsche
Arbeiterbewegung, German scholar Arno Klönne places its total membership in
the three Western zones of occupation at three hundred thousand in 1947, and
six hundred thousand in the East prior to the founding of the SED in 1946.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/08093544/SED-Poster.jpgEarly Socialist
Unity Party of Germany (SED) poster. 

Following a brief period of participation in postwar provisional
governments, however, the Allies sidelined the KPD, and the party soon
returned to its ultra-leftist line. It sealed its political irrelevance in
1951 with the passage of “Thesis 37,” a position paper on labor strategy
riddled with anti–Social Democratic and anti-trade-union slurs. The motion,
passed at the party conference, obligated all KPD members to obey party
decisions above and against trade union directives if necessary. This move
obliterated Communist support in the factories veritably overnight and
relegated the party to society’s fringes. It failed to re-enter parliament
in the 1953 elections and was banned by the West German government outright
in 1956.

Developments were markedly different in the Soviet zone, but ultimately
ended in perhaps an even grimmer dead end: that of SED leader Walter
Ulbricht’s thoroughly Stalinized German Democratic Republic (GDR). An
old-school Communist cadre from the party’s early years, Ulbricht had
survived twenty years of Stalinist purges and fascist repression to lead the
“Ulbricht Group,” a team of exiled KPD functionaries who now returned from
Moscow to rebuild the country under Soviet occupation.

Though the Red Army generals certainly did not have a particularly
democratic or egalitarian vision for East Germany in mind, they rejected
cooperation with the old Nazi hierarchy for their own reasons and for a
while permitted Antifas and related institutions to operate relatively
freely. Eyewitness accounts from as late as 1947 report of factories in East
Germany’s prewar industrial centers like Halle (traditional Communist
strongholds) where KPD-led works councils exerted a decisive influence over
factory life, confident enough to conduct negotiations and argue with Soviet
authorities in some instances.

In an interview with Jacobin to be published later this year, veteran KPO
activist Theodor Bergmann tells of Heinrich Adam, prewar KPO member and
mechanic at the Zeiss optics factory in Jena who joined the SED in hopes of
realizing socialist unity. Heinrich was an active Antifa and trade unionist
who organized protests against the Soviets’ decision to take the Zeiss
factory as war reparations (he suggested building a new factory in Russia
instead). Adam was kicked out of the party for his independent views in
1952, although never persecuted, and lived out his days in Jena on a modest
state pension for antifascist veterans.

In Dresden, a group of roughly eighty Communists, Social Democrats, and
members of the left-social democratic Socialist Workers Party (SAP) formed a
committee in May 1945 to surrender the city to the Red Army, citing
broadcasts from the NKFD as inspiration. In cooperation with Soviet
authorities, this group subsequently raided food and weapons stores from the
German Labor Front and other Nazi institutions, and organized a distribution
system for the city’s populace in the first postwar weeks.

Reports from Soviet officials and the Ulbricht Group describe rival
antifascist groups, generally tolerated by the occupation, which beyond
arming residents and organizing shooting practice also arrested local Nazis
and opened soup kitchens for refugees from the eastern provinces. Internal
communications reveal that leading Communists thought little of the Antifa,
dismissed by Ulbricht as “ <http://d-nb.info/964631822/34> the antifascist
sects” in a communiqué to Georgi Dimitrov in mid-1945.

The Ulbricht Group’s initial goal was to incorporate as many of these
antifascists into the KPD as possible, and feared that repression would
repel rather than attract them. Former Ulbricht Group member Wolfgang
Leonhard would later claim in his memoirs,
<https://www.amazon.com/Child-Revolution-Wolfgang-Leonhard/dp/0906133262>
Child of the Revolution, that Ulbricht explained to fellow Communist
functionaries: “It’s quite clear – it’s got to look democratic, but we must
have everything in our control.”

This period ended as the German Democratic Republic began to establish
itself as a Soviet-style one-party state in the late 1940s, particularly
after relatively free elections in 1946 delivered disappointing returns.
Former KPO members and other oppositionists permitted to join after the war
were investigated for past political crimes, purged, and often imprisoned.
In the workplaces, the SED sought to rationalize production and thus
neutralize the instances of factory control and democratic representation
that had emerged.

The establishment of the Free German Trade Federation (FDGB) in 1946 marked
the beginning of the SED’s attempt to establish party control over the
factories. These “unions” in fact organized East German workers in line with
the interests of their practical bosses, the East German state, and sought
to buy their loyalty through “socialist competition” schemes, piece work,
and union-sponsored vacation packages.

However, the “free” unions could not afford to phase out competitive
elections overnight. Antifa activists were often elected to FDGB shop floor
committees in early the years, thus exercising continued influence in the
workplace for a bit longer. Some were integrated into mid-level management,
while others refused to betray their principles and stepped down or were
removed for political reasons.

The public split between the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1948
accelerated Stalinization in the Soviet occupation zone, and these limited
spaces of self-organization were soon shut down entirely. Subsequently, the
GDR’s antifascist tradition would be diluted, distorted, and refashioned
into an ahistorical national origins myth in which the citizens of East
Germany were officially proclaimed the “victors of history,” but where
little space remained for the real and complicated history, not to mention
ambivalent role of Stalinized Communism, behind it.

Dare to Dream

Following their collapse in late 1945 and early 1946, Antifas would
disappear from the German political stage for nearly four decades. The
modern Antifa with which most people associate the term has no practical
historical connection to the movement from which it takes its name, but is
instead a product of West Germany’s squatter scene and autonomist movement
in the 1980s — itself a unique outgrowth of 1968 considerably less oriented
towards the industrial working class than its Italian counterpart. The first
Antifas functioned as platforms to organize against far-right groups like
the National Democratic Party (NPD) in an autonomist movement still
numbering in the tens of thousands of active members and capable of
occupying entire city blocks in some West German metropoles.

As the far right began to rebuild in the wake of German reunification,
expressed in shocking mob attacks against asylum-seekers in several eastern
provinces in the early 1990s, Antifa increasingly became a movement unto
itself: a national network of dedicated antifascist groups organized into
the “Antifaschistische Aktion/Bundesweite Organisation” (AA/BO).

In some ways, these groups were the inverse of their progenitors: rather
than a broad alliance of socialists and progressives from separate,
ideologically distinct currents, they were single-issue groups, expressly
radical but vague and deeply heterogeneous in their specifics. Rather than a
point of departure for young activists into a broader socialist and
political left, Antifas outside of major cities are often the only political
game in town, and function as a counter-cultural space with their own
fashion styles, music scenes, and slang, rather than a component of a rooted
mass movement within wider society.

After the AA/BO split in 2001, Antifas continued to work locally and
regionally as dedicated networks of antifascists opposing far-right
demonstrations and gatherings, though many also take up other left-wing
issues and causes. What remains of the squats and infrastructure built up
between the 1970s and 1990s continue to serve as important organizing and
socializing spaces for the radical left, and “Antifa” as movement, trope,
and general political outlook will no doubt continue to exist for quite some
time – but it would appear that this iteration of antifascism has also
exhausted its political repertoire.

The movement has shrunken continuously since the late 1990s, fragmented
across ideological lines and unable to adjust its original autonomist
strategies to shifting patterns of urbanization and the rise of
right-populism. Its most promising products of late — the mass mobilizations
against neo-Nazi marches in cities like Dresden, as well as the formation of
a new, distinctively post-autonomist current in the form of the
<http://www.interventionistische-linke.org/> Interventionist Left — mark a
departure from rather than a revival of classical Antifa strategy.

Antifascism has surged to the fore of debates on the American left under
Trump’s presidency, and many of the tactics and visual styles of the German
Antifa can be seen emerging in cities like Berkeley and elsewhere. Some
argue that with the arrival of European-style neo-fascist movements on
American shores, it is also time to import European Antifa tactics in
response.

Yet the Antifa of today is not a product of a political victory from which
we can draw our own strength, but of defeat — socialism’s defeat at the
hands of Nazism and resurgent global capitalism, and later the exhaustion of
the autonomist movement in the wake of the neoliberal turn and the sweeping
gentrification of many German cities.

Description:
https://images.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/05142008/antifa.pngmightymightymatze /
Flickr 

Although Antifas continue to function as important poles of attraction for
radicalizing youth and guarantee that the far right rarely goes unopposed in
many European countries, its political form is of an exclusive nature,
couched in its own aesthetic and rhetorical style and inaccessible to the
masses of uninitiated people getting involved in activism for the first
time. A left-wing subculture with its own social spaces and cultural life is
not the same thing as a mass social movement, and we cannot afford to
confuse the two.

Of course, the Antifa’s experience in 1945 offers us equally few concrete
lessons for how to fight a resurgent far right in the Trump era. Looking
back at the history of the socialist left is not about distilling victorious
formulas to be reproduced in the twenty-first century, but rather
understanding how previous generations understood their own historical
moment and built political organizations in response, in order to develop
our own (hopefully more successfully models) for today.

The Antifas in Stuttgart, Braunschweig, and elsewhere faced impossible odds,
but still sought to articulate a series of political demands and a practical
organizational vision for the radicalizing workers willing to listen.
Antifas refused to capitulate to their seemingly hopeless predicament and
dared to dream big. Facing an even more fragmented and weakened left than in
1945, American antifascists will have to do the same.

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.png
Type: image/png
Size: 560403 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0004.png>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image002.png
Type: image/png
Size: 57315 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0005.png>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image003.png
Type: image/png
Size: 374086 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0006.png>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image004.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 134052 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0002.jpg>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image005.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 126713 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0003.jpg>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image006.png
Type: image/png
Size: 1187250 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.chambana.net/pipermail/peace-discuss/attachments/20171010/f5f01198/attachment-0007.png>