[Peace] Final update/summary for Al-Muajaha - 21 Sept

[Sascha Meinrath]

Hi all,

This is from Ramzi, who I've been working with to help set up and fund 
Al-Muajaha.  Al-Muajaha is an all volunteer run, monthly newspaper (sound 
familiar) and is based in Baghdad.  I was toying with the idea of perhaps 
having the UCIMC has a "sister paper" -- but wanted to see what the 
reaction from folks here would be.  It would be possible that we could 
greatly help Al-Muajaha at a critical time in their history.  Below is 
attached a very honest assessment of the strengths and weaknesses (and 
trials and tribulations) that Al-Muajaha has faced.  If there is interest 
in undertaking support for this project, please let me know.  Al-Muajaha 
is already fiscally sponsored by the UCIMC -- though our sponsorship of 
IMC Baghdad -- this is an opportunity to fight for (media) freedom right 
in the belly of the beast.

I hope this sparks some discussion & Let me know,

--Sascha

---------- Forwarded message ----------

Dear Friends,

This is a long post, so please be patient with me here
:-)

I'm writing from Lebanon (I left Baghdad on Sept.
9th), and this is my final summary/update for this
list. I'm also forwarding it to the folks at
Al-Muajaha in Baghdad, and to others who have been
involved in the project. I'm not on the list formed to
consider the IMC application, so - Majid, would you
please forward this to that list too? And could the
folks in Baghdad please print it out & post it in the
office?

Okay, this has been a wonderful project, but there
have been problems, and I do think there are lessons
to be learned for future work along these lines. There
is also much more work that could be done - both in
Baghdad & by internationals - to keep Al-Muajaha
going, and truly make this an IMC...

I. Current Structure of the Project (location,
publications, leadership, email addresses)
II. Background & Initial Mistakes
III. Current Strengths
IV. Current Weaknesses
V. Future Needs & Involvement by Internationals

---

I. Current Structure of the Project: location,
publications, leadership, emails

Location
Al-Muajaha is located in two rooms in the ground floor
of Beit Al-Bacher, the Voices in the Wilderness house
in Baghdad. There is no phone or internet service
available on location, but it is hoped that both will
be forthcoming over the next few months (hoped for,
but uncertain). The physical address is: Baghdad,
Karrada Dakhil, Mahala 901, Street 41, House 6 (2
blocks past Asfar Gallery, behind Al-Qersh Ice Cream
Store). 

In the short-term, this location is fine. Over the
long-term, it's not clear whether the project should
move to another location or not - for three, main
reasons: 1) It's uncertain whether Voices will keep
the house in the long-term, we're still finding our
way in the new Iraq; 2) It's uncertain how the
newspaper/project will "grow" - it may be that the
space will not fit the needs of the project, depending
on how it continues to develop; & 3) It's uncertain
how the relationship between Voices and the newspaper
will develop over the coming weeks & months.

I hope that both Voices & the newspaper/project will
continue to work in Baghdad, and that they will stay
in the same location. I think it's a mutually
beneficial relationship. But we'll have to see how
things come together, and, ultimately, it's going to
be the decision of the people on the ground in Iraq.

Publications
Al-Muajaha remains an entirely volunteer project, and
likely will in the near future (as funds are short).
The project has published 5 issues in Iraq over the
last 5 months, beginning on May 15th, and is almost
finished (or may be finished as of now) with the 6th
issue. The first 4 issues were Arabic/English. The 5th
issue was Arabic only, and, to the best of my
knowledge, it hasn't been resolved whether the 6th
issue will have an English version or not. Providing
an English version of the paper is helpful in building
relationships & informing people outside of the
Arabic-speaking world. By local prejudices it also
helps establish "credibility" in Iraq, as an
"educated" publication. However, it is logistically
difficult to do translations (especially on an
volunteer basis), and it is financially straining to
print English versions. 

There is a functioning website for the project
(www.almuajaha.com), but it is not updated with any
regularity, nor is it accessed within Iraq to any
significant degree.

Leadership
There are currently 30-40 Iraqis working on the
project in Baghdad, including 7 women, and no
internationals. Of this group, perhaps 8-12 are
extremely active, volunteering 40+ hours a week on the
project. 

Most of the Iraqis are high-school or college
students, but there are several older people involved.
The project began on a partial-consenus model for
reaching decisions, but has evolved into a voting
model, with major decisions requiring a super-majority
of 75% to pass. Meetings are held every week, at the
newspaper's office, on Wednesdays at 4pm. Meetings are
open to anyone, and anyone who attends is eligible to
vote. There has been some tension over this, and it's
likely that the group will decide to keep meetings
open, but restrict voting priviledges to anyone who
has worked on either the previous issue, or the
previous 2 issues. Meetings are generally attented by
perhaps 15 people, but occasionally swell up to almost
the full group. 

Leadership within the group has developed in three
ways: 1) Through a general vote of the group; 2)
Through appointment by me, with approval (although not
vote) of the group; & 3) As a result of who is
actually working (if you're working, you're a leader -
by definition :-))

While there have been tensions within the general
group, at times over the last 5 months, the leadership
models adopted have been remarkably free of
resentments or tensions. The current leadership of the
paper is:

Editor-in-Chief: Sit Amal
Managing Editors: Amar Hassan & Usted Wasaf
News Editor: Salam Haythem Al-Jubouri
Treasurer: Mohammed Al-Jumaili
Webmaster: Majid Jarrar

Of this group, unfortunately, only Majid has an email
address that is regularly checked. 

Email Addresses of Majid & others at Al-Muajaha are:

Majid Jarrar, webmaster: 
the_majitrix at yahoo.com

Salam Haythem Al-Jubouri, news editor: 
haythemsalam at yahoo.com

Salam Al-Onaibi, contributing writer: 
salamhawk at yahoo.com

Hamsa Husni, contributing writer: 
hamsahusni at yahoo.com

Yasir Naseer, contributing layout editor & writer: 
yasir_azami at yahoo.com

Hiba Alsoudani, contributing writer: 
hiba_alsoudani at yahoo.com

Waleed Rabi'a, contributing writer: 
waleed_rabiaa at yahoo.com

---

II. Background & Initial Mistakes

Prior to the war, I did think it was critical to
solicit and widely distribute writing by Iraqis, and
hoped to facilitate that after the war also. And,
while there had been some very brief discussions with
other internationals in Baghdad about the possibility
of a Baghdad IMC, I had not envisioned this project
involving me in any substantial way. 

During & after the war, several things happened that
pushed toward this project. One was that -
particularly after the war - it no longer felt like it
was necessary for me, as an international, to write &
report on the situation in Iraq. There were thousands
of journalists, many of them quite good, freely
operating in post-war Iraq. There was also the
anticipation that hundreds of NGOs would soon descend
on the country, and begin to report on various aspects
of the crisis. Finally, there was incredible
excitement around the idea of Iraqis being able to
freely speak & report on what their situation was -
for many of them, for the first time in their lives.

Another factor was that the writing I was soliciting
from Iraqis immediately after the war was only
occasionally being published by groups such as
ElectronicIraq.net and CommonDreams.org, and it felt
like we *needed* a Baghdad IMC to insure that
everything people were writing would be published
somewhere.

Finally, while there are 150+ newspapers in Baghdad
today, immediately after the war there was nothing.
People were hungry for information about what was
happening in the country and in the rest of the world.
It seemed like there was an incredible opportunity to
educate and empower people, and be part of a
physically-tangible movement toward building a new
country. Newspapers have a power that other mediums
cannot reproduce. There's something special,
Franklinesque, about a newspaper - even in today's
electronic age. 

So, meeting with a group of students whom I knew from
before the war, we decided to start the project, sent
out the initial email, posted flyers around town, and
enthusiastically jumped off this particular cliff. 

The idea that a group of high-school & college kids
could start their own newspaper, and that that
newspaper could change the history of their country,
was audacious to say the least. We did create a
functioning newspaper, and this has been & is an
incredible project, but... it's not a newspaper that
can "change the history of Iraq." Not yet, anyway. 

It may be that we were too ambitious, but we (me) also
made several mistakes. That's a given. You don't
generally know how to do something until after you've
done it, but... there are lessons to be learned from
the experience:

1) This project should not have had only one
international involved on the ground in Baghdad in the
beginning. We needed more people, and we needed at
least one who spoke Arabic. It is extremely important
that projects like this be handed over to locals as
soon as possible, and be contiunally informed by their
needs & desires. Having one international who doesn't
speak Arabic running the project certainly helped that
along (lol), but it also extremely limited our ability
to train people, provide critical input, and deal with
problems as they developed. 

2) The project should have been more fully developed
by internationals prior to the war, and funded - we
stepped into this with no money whatsoever. Money
isn't essential to everything, but (lol) it certainly
is helpful. To date the project has raised roughly
$6800, and that is impressive, but more money *in the
beginning* would have been very useful. It's also
worth noting for future projects that most of this
money was raised outside of the "indymedia" network.
(my thanks again to Sascha for all her/his help, and
great patience, in explaining the funding situation to
me! :-)

3) When we started there were no newspapers in
Baghdad, and we wanted to if not dominate at least
strongly influence the emerging media structures. I'm
still uncertain whether or not that was too ambitious,
but as things developed the structure we choose for
the paper (weekly - Arabic/English) was problematic. 

If I had to do it over again, I'd ask the group to
choose one of two other structures: a daily broadsheet
or a monthly magazine. A daily, single-sheet paper
would have forced everyone on the project to do daily
writing and meet deadlines; it would have been easier
to distribute (although, paradoxically, harder to
physically get printed); and it would have established
our "name" much quicker and more strongly in Baghdad.

Alternatively, a monthly magazine would have reduced
physical & emotional pressures on everyone involved.
As it turns out, we are averaging a paper a month now
- but if we *set out* to do it monthly, rather than by
default, I'm convinced it would make the work easier
mentally & emotionally. A monthly also provides more
time to develop stories and do substantive reporting -
especially as we're not paying salaries & everyone's a
volunteer.

4) We should have had sufficient funds on hand from
the beginning to pay writers for stories (at perhaps a
penny a word), and cover all transportation costs for
everyone involved on the project. This may be outside
the indymedia model, but that model doesn't fit Iraq.
It just doesn't (we've gone into this in previous
emails to this list). 

One significant problem on this project was that we
lost people to mainstream media outlets. Of the
initial group of participants, one is a producer for
Reuters, one is a producer for BBC Radio, one became a
translator/fixer/producer for CNN & later a
correspondent for Dubai Business Channel, and several
took significant time out to work as fixers for
various international media in Iraq. 

I didn't know this was going to happen in the
beginning, but it should have been anticipated. In
some ways it was beneficial - the people who took time
out to work with other journalists came back as
stronger journalists themselves. But it did deprive us
of needed staff. It was also an unavoidable situation
- even if we had paid a penny a word for stories, that
can't compete with CNN paying $100 a day! Nor could
folks work for mainstream outlets, and continue to
volunteer on the paper. In the aftermath of the war,
and at $50-100/day, CNN, Reuters & others required
Iraqis to work 7 days a week.

5) We should have taken better advantage of the
international journalists working in Iraq. While we
provided numerous stories for many journalists (as
well as supplying them with translators/fixers), we
didn't involve them directly in the project. We should
have had designated trainings each and every week, and
used the community on the ground to provide story,
editing, layout, and web trainings - especially as we
didn't have people within the project (other than me,
and Jacquie & Andy for the time they came out) to do
this.

6) There should have been a more sustained outreach
program aimed at informing & involving more Iraqis -
particularly young Iraqis, and especially women - in
the project. 

7) Despite having lived in Iraq, on & off, for 7
months prior to the war - I didn't anticipate how
little confidence Iraqis would have in themselves,
just how emotionally brutalized they have been by the
former regime & the rest of the world. The most
important thing I ever did on this project was to let
people know that it was *possible*. More of this
needed to have been done. Iraqis need to feel the hope
that exists that, together, they can build a brighter
future, regardless of the obstacles in their path
(okay, I'm starting to sound like a politician so I'll
shut up on this ;-))

8) Distribution. We've gone to a different distributor
for every issue of the paper, & none of them have been
very good. Part of this problem is due to the lack of
government, police & accountability, and part of it
may be due to a lack of experience. We need time
develop our "niche" and build a readership, and maybe
this goes back to money but... it hasn't felt like
we've had that time/opportunity...

---

III. Current Strengths

While mistakes have been made, and there are current
problems - this remains an amazing project. That a
group of high school & college students - whom had
never lived their lives outside of war, isolation, &
incredible tyranny - could establish & run their own
newspaper in the immediate aftermath of war, under
foreign occupation, and with almost no money... it's
amazing. I'm priviledged to have worked with these
people. I will carry them with me in my heart for as
long as I live.

Their strengths include:
1) There is a functioning, if irregular, newspaper
that people are regularly writing for, editing,
laying-out, and publishing. There is a (small!)
readership that follows the paper.

2) The staff is entirely volunteer, and they are
working their asses off on the paper - which means,
for me, that they *love* what they do.

3) The project is almost entirely made up of young
people. While young people lack experience and to some
degree discipline, no one in Iraq has that experience
in "freedom" (and okay, yes, "freedom" doesn't exist
in Iraq yet, but the freedom to publish this paper
does exist). 

The people on the paper possess enthusiasm, energy,
and idealism that more than makes up for the lack of
experience. 

4) The staff on the paper have gained experience in
all areas of running a media project (except
fundraising) over the last 5 months, and are training
new people joining the project in these areas (if a
bit irregularly).

5) This is a democratically run project, open to all
Iraqis, with regular, organized meetings & a structure
that's easy to plug into. There is a heartfelt
commitment to continue this structure.

6) There is a physical infrastructure that has been
built up over the last 5 months, including: office &
meeting space, desks, chairs, sofas, computers,
cameras & other equipment.

7) There is an established, functioning website with a
readership.

8) There is funding to publish at least 2 more issues
of the paper, and the potential for raising more.

---

IV. Current Weaknesses

The most serious problem this project faces stems from
the low self-esteem I perceive among most of the
people working on it. This lack of self-confidence is
reflected at large in Iraq, and comes from the years
of isolation and violence that Iraqis have faced as a
result of Saddam Hussein's regime, successive wars,
and the massive impoverishment/isolation/violence of
sanctions. This low self-esteem has been made worse by
the last 5 months of looting, criminal violence, and
the violence of the Occupation. 

If Iraqis don't believe that they can make this
project a continuing success then they won't be able
to do it. 

Other problems include...

1) There are some limiting factors to the success of
the project, largely outside the control of the people
on the project. These include: uncertainty about
future funding and future success in distributing the
paper, meaning we don't know that we'll still be
*able* to publish by the end of the year; and lack of
affordable access to internet in Iraq for most Iraqis,
making the website only useful, for the forseeable
future, for people outside Iraq.

2) Despite it being a volunteer effort, there are
tensions within the paper over how hard various people
are working. While these tensions are normal, and not
overwhelming right now - they need to be watched &
controlled. If they get out of hand, it could threaten
the long-term viability of the project. Over the
long-term, no one should feel like they have to work
harder then they *want* to, No one should feel like
they have to work harder then they *can*, and no one
should feel like they aren't welcome if they can't
work harder than they're able.

3) There is a serious problem with theft in the
office/house. This problem needs to be overcome
without hurting the open & welcoming nature of the
project - which is difficult. The most significant
damage the theft causes is that it creates suspicion &
destroys trust among the group working on the project,
and it damages *everyone's* self-confidence. People on
the project genuinely feel that the theft is a
collective indictment of all of their (and all Iraqis)
poor character. Secondarily, but still important - the
theft damages the relationship between Voices in the
Wilderness & the paper.

4) The Iraqis working on this project are not
communicating to any significant degree with the
internationals supporting the project, at indymedia
and elsewhere. This is partly due to the difficulty in
communications infrastructures, and partly due to the
lack of experience Iraqis have had in communicating
with the outside world - they've been isolated for a
long, long time. 

5) No project organized like this one is going to be
very "disciplined" (lol), but... there does need to be
a more sustained effort to meet deadlines and complete
tasks. For example, the newspaper leadership was asked
to write a letter to "indymedia" summarizing the
project as it stands, from their point of view, and
describing the help they would like to get from
internationals. This letter has not been done
(hint-hint for everyone at Al-Muajaha! :-))

Other tasks that were assumed as early as May, and
have not been done include: regular trainings,
particularly web trainings, for all the staff on the
paper; thank you letters to everyone who has donated
money to the project, describing what that money has
been used for; and staff biographies for the website -
to let people visiting the website know who the people
on the project are, and why they're working on it.

Most importantly of all - there needs to be regular
outreach, at universities in particular, to inform
people about this project. Bringing new people into
the project is secondary in this - primarily we need
to let more Iraqis know about the website & know that
they can contribute to it even if they never work on
the paper. This hasn't really happened yet. 

6) The structure of the paper (as a weekly) may not be
sustainable, given the resources (financial & human)
available right now. For the time being, the people on
the project want to continue to try to make it a
weekly, but... ???

7) There may be enough money to cover transportation
expenses for people writing stories and regularly
commuting to the office to edit & layout, but, because
the finances aren't strong, many people are reluctant
to request transportation money - leading to a
situation where not only are people volunteering, but
they're putting their own money into the project. This
is NOT sustainable, particularly in a country as poor
as Iraq.

8) The staff on the paper is not representative of the
population of Iraq. Only 20% are women, and not enough
poor & working class people are involved in the
project. This is not going to be a problem that gets
"solved" easily or quickly, but it is something that
must continually be considered & addressed. There have
to be active, sustained efforts to make the paper more
representative of Iraqis.

9) Partly because funding/distribution has been a
concern, the folks on the paper have felt a strong
need to make the paper more "sexy" - in order to sell
copies. This has meant a stronger focus over the last
6 weeks or so on sports & entertainment stories, and
on redesign & layout, rather than on story development
& writing. This is a mistake, and it is understood by
the folks on the paper to be a mistake, but... those
pressures to sell the paper or possibly stop
publishing remain. This needs to be dealt with, and
the focus has to return to hard reporting of important
social, cultural, political, and economic issues.
We'll see how well folks respond to the varying
pressures...

10) If the project is going to *grow* to envelope
other media (such as micro-radio, or video reporting),
then it desperately needs a project manager. This
person must make at least a 6-month commitment to the
project, must have the experience necessary to do the
job, must speak Arabic, and the position must be
funded. I don't know if there is anyone in Iraq who
can do this job, so - if it's going to get done, then
the internationals need to take charge of finding the
person & funding the position...

---

V. Future Needs & Involvement by Internationals

There are several ways in which internationals can
contribute to the development and success of this
project - without "corrupting" it (to borrow a word
that was used on this list not too long ago). Most
important is to build connections with the Iraqis
organizing & running the project, and encourage them -
logistically & emotionally. This is very difficult, I
know, given the continuing communications problems.
But, it is essential. We have to make a solution...

Other things that can/should be done, include:

1) Control of the website needs to be turned over to
the Iraqis running the project. This has been a
problem to date, and I'm not sure why. It may be
because of the communications difficulties between
Iraq & the rest of the world, or it may be because of
the emotional involvement internationals have
developed in this project. Believe me, I totally
understand those feelings, and Al-Muajaha is
exceptionally grateful & indebted to Bristol indymedia
for all of their help to date. Everyone very much
hopes this relationship will continue. 

But, the Bristol IMC is in Bristol - not Baghdad.
Control of the website needs to go to Baghdad. 

2) We need to continue to fundraise for the project.
This cannot be done easily inside Iraq, so it's up to
us internationals. Money isn't the most essential
thing at this point (unless we do try for a project
manager), but it is *extremely* useful. I would
suggest that the situation in Iraq is critical in a
way that doesn't apply to most IMCs... ?

3) This project would benefit enormously if there were
a regular flow of internationals coming to Iraq to do
trainings and build connections between Iraqis & the
outside world. Again, with communications so
difficult, it's hard to organize this, but I volunteer
to help coordinate. Please get in touch with me if you
want to go to Iraq for a month to do trainings.

There hasn't been a formal invitation from people on
the ground outlining exactly what they'd like to see
from internationals visiting them (hint-hint,
Al-Muajaha! :-)), but...

The project needs help in:

*Webtraining* - We need to train at least 4 people to
manage the website. To date we've trained 2 people. Of
the 2, one left in early July to focus on final exams
& then went to Jordan for the summer with his family.
The other, Majid, works very hard - but he's
overcommited & working on several other projects in
addition to this one. We need more people available
who are trained & able to handle the technical work.

As importantly, webtraining has to be done to show
*everyone* on the project how to use the website,
provide them with email addresses & show them how to
use them, and therefore connect the Iraqis on this
project more directly with the website. LOTS of stuff
goes unreported in the paper because there isn't room,
or because by the time we publish it seems "old." All
of this can - and more! - can go on the web.

Webtrainings should also be offered at universities in
order to show other people how they can post to the
site, regardless of whether they work with the paper
or not.

The fact that this needs to be done, and likely needs
internationals to start it off, is an indication of
how isolated Iraq has been & remains. Can anyone think
of another country in the region where the
overwhelming majority of high school & college
students not only don't have email, but don't know how
to get it or use it?

*Management Training* - Al-Muajaha needs
internationals to come & help show them how to manage
a media collective: how to generate, structure, write,
& post stories. Help in learning how to manage a
newspaper/magazine would also be extremely useful. 

In addition to those 2, primary needs, the project
would benefit from photo & video trainings, and from
activists coming in who could connect them with other
activism, particularly media activism, being done
around the world. 

Internationals could also help in providing people on
the project with the confidence to do outreach in
Iraq, and bring more people into the project,
particularly young people & Iraqi activists, such as
the Union of the Unemployed & others. Also, female
internationals would be very useful in helping to
recruit more women to the project - again, in
providing confidence & credibility to the Iraqis
involved.

In terms of living arrangements, Voices in the
Wilderness can no longer offer to host internationals
coming in to help with the paper. I'm sorry, but we're
concerned about the risks involved and we're mindful
of trying to maintain a cohesive, functioning house
environment for ourselves. However, there are
practical alternatives. It may be that some of the
people on the paper will offer to host internationals
coming to help them. There is also an excellent hotel,
Beit al-Dulaimi, located near the Hamra hotel, where
folks can stay. The rooms are nice, include
kitchenettes, and are only $7 a night. The hotel is
within the Hamra complex, which means not on a main
street, and the roads immediately around the hotel are
guarded & blocked off to cars & trucks. It's also
fairly close to the newspaper - about 5 minutes by
taxi.  

Iraq is objectively dangerous, particularly for
internationals, and particularly for young women. This
is real and must not be ignored. But these risks need
to be evaluated, and the cost of ignoring the needs of
Iraqis for our help weighed in. If it wasn't so
dangerous, it wouldn't be so necessary for us to help.

4) Finally, I think we need to all ask ourselves why
we began this project in the first place, and why it's
needed. 

There's been talk - in various places - that a Baghdad
IMC is needed, but this isn't the "right" group to do
it. There's also been talk of wanting to do
micro-radio, or generate video reporting. 

Alongside this, there are groups, like Occupation
Watch, Human Rights Watch, and Iraq Revenue Watch,
that are working to document specific issues in Iraq
today. There are news sites such as ElectronicIraq.net
that are posting some articles/information about the
situation. There are many (*MANY*) Iraqi groups that
are springing up to deal with specific and general
problems. 

I believe in the idea of democratic media. I believe
that relying on a specific political group to make
that happen, particularly in a country as isolated as
Iraq, would be a mistake. I believe that providing a
clearinghouse for ALL the groups operating in Iraq,
and for people who don't want to be "activists," is
important, useful, and needed. 

And I believe that we have an infrastructure in place,
with human resources and physical resources, already
run by Iraqis, that can form the nexus of that
clearinghouse. 

We can bring in all the groups in Iraq for the
specific purpose of dissimenating their
information/stories, being that clearinghouse - the
role that IMCs across the world fulfill. Isn't that
what this is about?

I know that not everyone who reads this post is going
to know exactly what I'm refering to, or all of it,
and I'm sorry about the crypticism, but... I am a bit
bewildered by what I perceive as a desire among some
to either ignore the infrastructure we've built up in
this project, or try to duplicate it. Why not use what
we have already, and build upon it? It's completely
open to being used, developed, and expanded into
multiple directions. Why throw it away?

And if we're not commited to either the concept of
democratic media, or to the idea that Iraqis should
tell their own stories - then, exactly why are we all
associated with this project?

The work has been hard, and will continue to be
difficult, often overwhelming, and dangerous - but
there is righteous hope in confronting oppressions and
speaking truth to power. And if it weren't so hard, it
wouldn't be so important.

Yours,
Ramzi Kysia