[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [SRRTAC-L:7851] Venezuela report from ZNet (fwd)

[Al Kagan]

Here is an excellent article that addresses the situation, explains 
the role of the media, and provides an analysis of Chavez' pluses and 
minuses reflecting larger organizing principles.

>Delivered-To: akagan at alexia.lis.uiuc.edu
>Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002 23:48:10 -0400 (EDT)
>From: Mark Hudson <hudsonm at telerama.com>
>To: SRRT Action Council <srrtac-l at ala.org>
>Subject: [SRRTAC-L:7851] Venezuela report from ZNet (fwd)
>Reply-To: srrtac-l at ala.org
>Sender: owner-srrtac-l at ala.org
>Status:  
>
>Probably the best article I've read on the Venezuelan situation so far --
>very interesting discussion of the elite media's role in creating an
>"alternate reality" in the aftermath of the coup, and a good analysis of
>Chavez's shortcomings from a progressive standpoint as well . . .
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: znetupdates-owner at zmag.org [mailto:znetupdates-owner at zmag.org]On
>Behalf Of Michael Albert
>Sent: Monday, April 15, 2002 8:26 AM
>To: znetupdates at zmag.org
>Subject: FreeUpdate Venezuela report from ZNet
>
>Hello,
>
>Please visit www.zmag.org/weluser.htm for continuing coverage not only
>of the events in Venezuela, of course, but the Mideast, and the world
>more broadly -- for essays on strategy, vision, news, and analysis --
>updated daily.
>
>But, for this morning...our voice from Venezuela, reports again...
>
>---
>
>Venezuela: Not a Banana-Oil Republic after All
>
>Gregory Wilpert
>
>The Counter-Coup
>
>It looks like Venezuela is not just another banana-oil republic after
>all. Many here feared that with the April 11 coup attempt against
>President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela was being degraded to being just
>another country that is forced to bend to the powerful will of the
>United States. The successful counter-coup of April 14, though, which
>reinstated Chavez, proved that Venezuela is a tougher cookie than the
>coup planners thought.
>
>The coup leaders against President Chavez made two fundamental
>miscalculations. First, they started having delusions of grandeur,
>believing that the support for their coup was so complete that they
>could simply ignore the other members of their coup coalition and place
>only their own in the new government. The labor union federation CTV,
>which saw itself as one of the main actors of the opposition movement to
>President Chavez, and nearly all moderate opposition parties were
>excluded from the new "democratic unity" cabinet. The new transition
>cabinet ended up including only the most conservative elements of
>Venezuelan society. They then proceeded to dissolve the legislature, the
>Supreme Court, the attorney general's office, the national electoral
>commission, and the state governorships, among others. Next, they
>decreed that the 1999 constitution, which had been written by a
>constitutional assembly and ratified by vote, following the procedures
>outlined in the pervious constitution, was to be suspended. The new
>transition president would thus rule by decree until next year, when new
>elections would be called. Generally, this type of regime fits the
>textbook definition of dictatorship.
>
>This first miscalculation led to several generals' protest against the
>new regime, perhaps under pressure from the excluded sectors of the
>opposition, or perhaps out of a genuine sense of remorse, and resulted
>in their call for changes to the sweeping "democratic transition"
>decree, lest they withdraw their support from the new government.
>Transition President Pedro Carmona, the chair of Venezuela's largest
>chamber of commerce, immediately agreed to reinstate the Assembly and to
>the rest of the generals' demands.
>
>The second miscalculation was the belief that Chavez was hopelessly
>unpopular in the population and among the military and that no one
>except Cuba and Colombia's guerilla, the FARC, would regret Chavez'
>departure. Following the initial shock and demoralization which the coup
>caused among Chavez-supporters, this second miscalculation led to major
>upheavals and riots in Caracas' sprawling slums, which make up nearly
>half of the city. In practically all of the "barrios" of Caracas
>spontaneous demonstrations and "cacerolazos" (pot-banging) broke out on
>April 13 and 14. The police immediately rushed-in to suppress these
>expressions of discontent and somewhere between 10 and 40 people were
>killed in these clashes with the police. Then, in the early afternoon,
>purely by word-of-mouth and the use of cell phones (Venezuela has one of
>the highest per capita rates of cell phone use in the world), a
>demonstration in support of Chavez was called at the Miraflores
>presidential palace. By 6 PM about 100,000 people had gathered in the
>streets surrounding the presidential palace. At approximately the same
>time, the paratrooper battalion, to which Chavez used to belong, decided
>to remain loyal to Chavez and took over the presidential palace. Next,
>as the awareness of the extent of Chavez' support spread, major
>battalions in the interior of Venezuela began siding with Chavez.
>
>Eventually the support for the transition regime evaporated among the
>military, so that transition president Carmona resigned in the name of
>preventing bloodshed. As the boldness of Chavez-supporters grew, they
>began taking over several television stations, which had not reported a
>single word about the uprisings and the demonstrations. Finally, late at
>night, around midnight of April 14, it was announced that Chavez was set
>free and that he would take over as president again. The crowds outside
>of Miraflores were ecstatic. No one believed that the coup could or
>would be reversed so rapidly. When Chavez appeared on national TV around
>4 AM, he too joked that he knew he would be back, but he never imagined
>it would happen so fast. He did not even have time to rest and write
>some poetry, as he had hoped to do.
>
>So how could this be? How could such an impeccably planned and smoothly
>executed coup fall apart in almost exactly 48 hours? Aside from the two
>miscalculations mentioned above, it appears that the military's hearts
>were not fully into the coup project. Once it became obvious that the
>coup was being hijacked by the extreme right and that Chavez enjoyed
>much more support than was imagined, large parts of the military decided
>to reject the coup, which then had a snowball-effect of changing
>military allegiances. Also, by announcing that one of the main reasons
>for the coup was to avoid bloodshed and by stating that the Venezuelan
>military would never turn its weapons against its own people, Chavez
>supporters became more courageous to go out and to protest against the
>coup without fear of reprisals.
>
>Very important, though, was that the coup planners seem to have believed
>their own propaganda: that Chavez was an extremely unpopular leader.
>What they seem to have forgotten is that Chavez was not a fluke, a
>phenomenon that appeared in Venezuela as a result of political chaos, as
>some analysts seem to believe. Rather, Chavez' movement has its roots in
>a long history of Venezuelan community and leftist organizing. Also, it
>seems quite likely that although many people were unhappy with Chavez'
>lack of rapid progress in implementing the reforms he promised, he was
>still the most popular politician in the country.
>
>The media and the opposition movement tried to create the impression
>that Chavez was completely isolated and that no one supported him any
>longer. They did this by organizing massive demonstrations, with the
>extensive help of the television stations, which regularly broadcast
>reports of the anti-Chavez protests, but consistently ignored the
>pro-Chavez protests, which, by all fair accounts, tended to be just as
>large. The television channels claimed that they did not cover
>pro-Chavez demonstrations because protestors threatened their lives.
>While this seems unlikely since the demonstrators usually unequivocally
>want their demonstrations covered by the media, they could have gotten
>protection, if they had cared to.
>
>The Media
>
>Nearly the entire media is owned and operated by Venezuela's oligarchy.
>There is only one neutral newspaper, which is not an explicitly
>anti-Chavez newspaper and one state-run television station. During the
>coup, the state-run station was taken off the air completely and all of
>the other media kept repeating the coup organizer's lies without
>question. These lies included the claim that Chavez had resigned and had
>dismissed his cabinet, that all of the demonstration's dead were
>"martyrs of civil society" (i.e., of the opposition, since the media
>does not consider Chavez supporters as part of civil society), and that
>Chavez had ordered his supporters to shoot into the unarmed crowd of
>anti-Chavez demonstrators.
>
>The media never addressed the repeated doubts that members of Chavez'
>cabinet raised about his resignation. Also, the media did not release
>the names of those who were shot, probably because this would have shown
>that most of the dead were pro-Chavez demonstrators. Finally, the media
>edited the video footage of the shootings in such a way as to avoid
>showing where the Chavez supporters were shooting-namely, as
>eyewitnesses reported, at police and individuals who were shooting back
>while hidden in doorways. Also, they did not show the pro-Chavez crowd
>repeatedly pointing at the snipers who were firing at them from the
>rooftop of a nearby building.
>
>These media distortions in the aftermath of the coup drove home the
>point just how powerful the media is at creating an alternate reality.
>Those Chavez supporters who were at the demonstration and witnessed the
>events realized more than ever that power needs a medium and that those
>who control the media have much more power than they let on. This is why
>the television stations became a key target in the hours leading up to
>Chavez' reinstatement. The take-over of four of the eight stations was
>essential to Chavez' comeback because it showed the rest of the military
>and the rest of Venezuela that Chavez still had strong support among the
>population and that if the people really wanted to, they could fight for
>what was right and win.
>
>Quo Vadis Chavez?
>
>An aspect of the rise of Chavez to power that is often forgotten in
>Venezuela is that as far as Venezuelan presidents are concerned, Chavez
>has actually been among the least dictatorial. True, Chavez is a deeply
>flawed president with many shortcomings, among which one of the most
>important is his autocratic style. However, earlier presidencies, such
>as that of Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993), the killing of demonstrators
>were nearly a monthly occurrence. Also, the outright censorship of
>newspapers was quite common during the Perez presidency. None of this
>has happened during the Chavez presidency.
>
>President Hugo Chavez is an individual who raises the passions of
>people, pro or con, unlike anyone else. It almost seems that Venezuelans
>either love him or hate him. A more balanced picture of the president,
>however, would show, first, that he is someone who deeply believes in
>working for social justice, for improving democracy, and believes in
>international solidarity. Also, he is a gifted and charismatic speaker,
>which makes him a natural choice as a leader.
>
>However, one has to recognize that he has some very serious
>shortcomings. Among the most important is that while he truly believes
>in participatory democracy, as is evidenced in his efforts to
>democratize the Venezuelan constitution, his instincts are that of an
>autocrat. This has led to a serious neglect of his natural base, which
>is the progressive and grassroots civil society. Instead, he has tried
>to control this civil society by organizing "Bolivarian Circles" which
>are neighborhood groups that are to help organize communities and at the
>same time to defend the revolution. The opposition easily stigmatized
>these circles, however, as being nothing other than a kind of SS for
>Chavez' political party. Another crucial flaw has been his relatively
>poor personnel choices. Many of the ministries and agencies suffer from
>mismanagement.
>
>Finally and perhaps the most often mentioned flaw, is his tendency for
>inflammatory rhetoric. Accusations that Chavez divided Venezuelan
>society with his constant talk about the rich and the poor are
>ridiculous, since Venezuelan society was divided along these lines long
>before Chavez came to power. However, by trying to belittle his
>opponents by calling them names, such as "escualidos" (squalids), he
>made it virtually impossible for real dialogue to take place between
>himself and his opponents. The crucial question that Chavez-supporters
>and opponents alike are now asking is whether Chavez has grown through
>the experience of this coup. In his initial statement after being freed
>from his military captors, was, "I too have to reflect on many things.
>And I have done that in these hours. . I am here and I am prepared to
>rectify, wherever I have to rectify." Right now, however, it is too
>early to see if he really is going to change his ways, so that he
>becomes more productive in achieving the goals he has set for Venezuela.
>While Chavez' many progressive achievements should not be forgotten,
>neither should his failures be overlooked, most of which have important
>lessons for progressives everywhere. The first lesson is to keep the
>eyes on the prize. Chavez has become so bogged-down with small
>day-to-day conflicts that many people are no longer sure if he remembers
>his original platform, which was to abolish corruption and to make
>Venezuelan society more egalitarian. While greater social equality is
>extremely difficult to achieve in a capitalist society, it is fair to
>say that Chavez' plans have not had enough time to bear fruit. He has a
>six-year social and economic development plan for 2001-2007, of which
>only a small fraction has so far been implemented. However, on the
>corruption front, he has fallen seriously behind. The second lesson is
>that the neglect of one's social base, which provides the cultural
>underpinnings for desired changes, will provide an opening for opponents
>to redefine the situation and to make policy implementation nearly
>impossible. By not involving his natural base, the progressive and
>grassroots civil society, Chavez allowed the conservative civil society,
>the conservative unions, the business sector, the church, and the media
>to determine the discourse as to what the "Bolivarian revolution" was
>really all about. The third lesson is that a good program alone is not
>good enough if one does not have the skillful means for implementing it.
>Chavez has some terrific plans, but through his incendiary rhetoric he
>manages to draw all attention away from his actual proposals and focuses
>attention on how he presents them or how he cuts his critics down to
>size. Finally, while it is tempting to streamline policy-implementation
>by working only with individuals who will not criticize the program,
>creates a dangerous ideological monoculture, which will not be able to
>resist the diverse challenges even the best plans eventually have to
>face. Chavez has consistently dismissed from his inner circle those who
>criticized him, making his leadership base, which used to be quite
>broad, smaller and smaller. Such a narrow leadership base made it much
>easier for the opposition to challenge Chavez and to mount the coup.
>
>Whether Chavez and his opposition have learned these lessons remains to
>be seen. Venezuelan society is still deeply divided. One has to
>recognize that, at heart, this conflict is also a class conflict. While
>there certainly are many Chavez opponents who come from the lower
>classes and numerous supporters from the upper classes, the division
>between Chavez supporters who come from the lower light-skinned classes
>and the opponents who come from the higher dark-skinned classes cannot
>be denied. What Venezuela needs, if social peace is to be preserved, is
>a class compromise, where social peace is maintained at the expense of a
>more just distribution of Venezuela's immense wealth. However, today's
>globalized world makes such a compromise increasingly difficult to
>achieve because free market competition militates against local
>solutions to this increasingly global problem. But perhaps Venezuela is
>a special case because of its oil wealth, which might allow it to be an
>exception. Such an exception, though, will only be possible if power
>plays, such as the recent coup attempt, come to an end.
>
>Gregory Wilpert lives in Caracas, is a former U.S. Fulbright scholar in
>Venezuela, and is currently doing independent research on the sociology
>of development. He can be reached at: Wilpert at cantv.net
>
>----------------------------------------
>Gregory Wilpert, Ph.D.
>Central University of Venezuela, Caracas New School University, New York
>----------------------------------------
>
>
>
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-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu