[Peace-discuss] Fwd: [SRRTAC-L:8989] Hans van Sponeck on US Aggression v Iraq

[Alfred Kagan]

>Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2002 02:55:52 -0500 (CDT)
>From: Dale Wertz <dwertz at mc.net>
>To: SRRT Action Council <srrtac-l at ala.org>
>cc: PLGNet-L at listproc.sjsu.edu
>Subject: [SRRTAC-L:8989] Hans van Sponeck on US Aggression v Iraq
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>IRAQ: Four Questions, Four Answers
>by
>Hans C. von Sponeck
>UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (1998-2000)
>at the European Colloquium
>Brussels, 25 September 2002
>http://www.irak.be/ned/bivv/iraq4questions4answers.htm
>
>
>Question No.1: Is there an Imminence of Threat posed by Iraq?
>
>The United States maintains that Iraq poses a threat to its security. This
>threat, it is argued, is so serious that a pre-emptive military strike is
>required to protect the US and the wider global community. The UK shares
>this perception.
>
>The rest of the world, particularly Iraq's neighbours, do not agree with
>this assessment. In any case articles 39, 42 and 51 of the UN Charter are
>not applicable. None of the 'evidence' the US and the UK have produced is
>accepted by the international community as hard core and unquestionable
>evidence that Iraq is in possession of or trying to produce ABC weapons
>materials.
>
>Attempts to link acts of terrorism involving the 1993 and 2001 WTC, the US
>Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-salaam, the USS Cole in Aden, the Anthrax
>cases in the US and collaboration with Al Qaeda to the Government of Iraq
>have failed.
>
>A study by the UK International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
>published on 9 September 2002 constitutes a good compendium of speculation
>concluding (see p.74) that Iraq "could probably assemble nuclear weapons",
>"probably resumed biological growth media", "probably retained chemical
>agent such as mustard gas and precursors", "probably retained a small
>force of ballistic missiles with ranges up to 650 km, such as the al
>Hussein missiles."
>
>In its introduction the IISS study re-assures that its purpose is to
>describe these (WMD) issues "accurately and fairly". Its conclusions (see
>p.73) unfortunately constitute a political statement which amounts to
>war-mongering. The document states inter alia: "A war, if it installs a
>new government in Baghdad willing to comply with Iraq's international
>commitments, would eliminate Iraq's WMD threat, but at the risk of limited
>CBW use (and civilian casualties) during the conflict of overthrow the
>present regime."
>
>During a July 2002 visit to Iraq, the Government of Iraq gave me the
>permission to visit two sites of my choice, Al Dora at the outskirts of
>Baghdad and Al Fallujah III, which western intelligence agencies and main
>stream US and UK media had identified as sites for which evidence existed
>that they had been producing biological agents since the departure of UN
>arms inspectors in December 1998.
>
>The IISS report points out that at Al Dora "work appears to have started.
>The facility has about 25% of its capacity" (see p.30). For Al Fallujah
>III it points out that the "plant for processing castor beans has been
>destroyed. Its current status is unknown" (see p.30).
>
>In a document entitled "A decade of Deception and Defiance" handed out by
>the US Government on 12 September at the time when US President Bush was
>delivering his speech at the UN/GA, it is pointed out that Al Dora "has an
>extensive air handling and filtering system" (see p.8) and for Al Fallujah
>it states (see p.9) that "(the Government of Iraq) is making an effort to
>hide activities at (the) Fallujah plant."
>
>The British Government released its long announced 'dossier' on 24
>September 2002. More a review of past WMD programmes than an empirical
>analysis of the current situation in Iraq, the dossier is a document of
>allegations not of evidence of the seriousness of the current WMD reality
>in Iraq. For Al Fallujah, the dossier maintains that "the castor oil
>production facility has been rebuild." Al Dora is cited as a "facility of
>concern."
>
>My visit to these two sites (accompanied by the ARD German TV) showed
>conclusively that Al Dora and Al Fallujah III facilities had been
>destroyed (it should be noted that the IISS report acknowledges this for
>Al Fallujah III). What is destroyed can not be a threat.
>
>Conclusions: The evidence offered by the US and UK administration as well
>as the IISS assessment of Iraq's WMD status does not support in any way
>the contention that an imminent threat emanates from Iraq justifying a
>military offensive. The US government promoted mass hysteria and the
>psycho war are internationally unacceptable. In the interest of preventing
>such a war, the Iraqi Foreign Minister's statement to the UN/GA that the
>country is free of WMD and the agreement by the Iraqi authorities to
>re-admit unconditionally UN arms inspectors at this stage should be taken
>at face value and UNMOVIC's installation in Baghdad be pursued without
>delay.
>
>
>Question No.2: What explains the present US Government Iraq policy?
>
>There is no simple explanation. The importance of Iraq's sources of
>energy, the composition of the Bush II administration and changes in the
>political landscape of the Middle East, however, are three major factors
>which are part of such an explanation:
>
>Iraq's sources of energy:
>During the 31 july/1 august hearings on Iraq in the US Senate Foreign
>Relations Committee, the ranking representative of the Republican Party,
>Senator Richard Lugar (R-In) stated: " ...we are going to run the oil
>business. We are going to run it well, we are going to make money; and
>it's going to help pay for the rehabilitation of Iraq because there is
>money there!"
>
>The Bush II administration:
>Key policy makers in the administration of the present US Government had
>been involved in the Bush I 1991 Gulf War. This may explain why the US
>Government is taking the Iraq Liberation Act of the US Congress of October
>1998 much more literal than the Clinton administration did. The Act calls
>for 'regime change' in Iraq. The policy of 'containment within' under
>President Clinton has become a policy of 'occupation from outside' under
>President Bush.
>
>This policy change combined with a missionary fanaticism to spread their
>version of 'democracy' and a fatal mix-up of the justified fight against
>terrorism and a regime change strategy for governments considered as too
>aggressively anti-American are the main ingredients of the US
>administration's approach on Iraq.
>
>The political landscape in the Middle East:
>The severe deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the course
>of the past twelve months has intensified the cohesion among Arab
>governments. Testimony of significant policy changes within the Arab
>League became apparent in the final communiqui of the March 2002 Beirut
>Summit. It concluded with a rejection of a war against the 'brotherly
>country Iraq'. Since then all Arab governments including Kuwait and Saudi
>Arabia have repeated their opposition to a military confrontation with
>Iraq. There is strong public resentment, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to
>what is perceived as double standards in dealing with the two major
>conflicts in the Middle East, the Palestinian issue and Iraq. It can also
>no longer be hidden that the US is on notice that agreements to their
>military presence in the Middle East are no longer to be taken for
>granted. This in turn has added an element of extreme urgency in
>introducing changes in the US Iraq policy.
>
>Conclusions: The Iraq policy of the US administration has little to do
>with the return of UN arms inspectors or with a concern for the suffering
>of the Iraqi people. It has all to do with a determination to introduce a
>regime change in Baghdad. With this objective, the US enjoys no
>international support. President Chirac confirmed this when he stated
>publicly: "It is not a question of Bush/Blair on one side and
>Chirac/Schroeder on the other side, it is Bush/Blair on one side and all
>the others on the other side."
>
>
>Question No.3: What are the implications for the Iraqi population?
>
>First of all it must be pointed out that the suffering and the trauma
>resulting from the intensified confrontation between Iraq and the US/UK
>and the prospects of war have been sidelined by politicians and the media
>in Europe. The massive evidence of the toll these developments and twelve
>years of economic sanctions have taken among the Iraqi population is well
>documented by reputable IGOs and INGOs. The impact of this reality will be
>felt long after economic sanctions have been lifted and the Iraq conflict
>has ended.
>
>The humanitarian exemption, the oil for food programme has at all times
>been underfunded, particularly, in the initial three phases when the UN/SC
>had been decided that the oil for export revenue could not exceed $2.6
>billion per phase. Despite this small amount, the UN/SC insisted that the
>UNCC had to receive 30% of the oil revenue, funding which was desperately
>needed by an undernourished population deprived from even basic medicines
>to protect their health.
>
>The total value of what has been received in Iraq between 16 December
>1996, the beginning of the oil for food programme and 10 may 2002 amounts
>to $172 per person/year. One indicator of the state of impoverishment of
>the Iraqi population is that 55% of the population lives below the poverty
>line. Were the monthly food basket valued at $25 not given to the
>population free of charge under the oil for food programme, some 90% of
>the population would be forced to live under the poverty line.
>
>Another dramatic indicator of the ill being of the population relates to
>child mortality. UNICEF in its annual State of the Children's report
>identified Iraq as the country which showed an increase of 160% in the
>mortality rate of children under five for the period 1990 to 1999. This
>constitutes the highest recorded increase of all the 188 countries
>surveyed. According to the same organisation, female literacy has slipped
>to 45% in 1995 while in 1987 Iraq had received from UNESCO international
>recognition that it had achieved a literacy level of 80%. There are other
>alarming figures published by WHO showing that the number of youth with
>mental disorders has more than doubled between 1990 and 1998.
>
>While the US Government accuses Iraq of having violated 16 UN resolutions,
>no mention is made that the main responsibility for the violation of just
>about all international treaties and conventions from the UN Charter to
>the International Covenant of economic, social and cultural rights, the
>Geneva and Hague Conventions and the genocide convention points to the US
>and British governments (see in this connection a document of UN/ECOSOC
>dated 21 June 2000 (GE.00-14092) in which Prof. Marc Bossuyt, presently
>judge in the Belgian Supreme Court and formerly chairman of the UN Human
>Rights Commission gives evidence to this effect; see also selected papers
>on "The Impact on International Law of a Decade of Measures Against Iraq"
>published by Oxford University Press in February 2002).
>
>It must also be stated that the establishment of the two no-fly-zones is
>based on no UN mandate and constitutes a serious breach of international
>law and UN resolutions which make specific mention of Iraq's territorial
>integrity and sovereignty. As the UN designated Official for Security of
>UN staff in Iraq, I introduced air strike reports which reflected
>collected and verified information on damage to life and property of
>civilians as a result of US/UK air incursions and attacks in Iraq. In 1999
>my office in Baghdad recorded 132 air strikes with 144 civilian death and
>over 300 wounded and civilian property destroyed. These air strike reports
>were, when possible, handed to US and UK officials in New York during
>various briefing visits. I was told by representatives of those two
>governments that I was violating my mandate in producing such documents
>and that in any case all I was doing was to put a UN stamp on Iraqi
>propaganda. It is a serious matter that the UN Security Council having a
>mandated oversight responsibility has not been able to stop this serious
>violation, particularly since US and UK pilots have operated in Iraqi
>airspace after Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 under 'enlarged rules
>of engagement'. These allow them to use their firing power with fewer
>restrictions and consequently with more damage to civilian life and
>property.
>
>Should a US war against Iraq take place, particularly the high-tech war
>currently contemplated in Washington, there would be significant civilian
>casualties and destruction. To prevent this must be a major challenge for
>European democracies.
>
>Conclusions: The political battle continues to be played on the backs of
>the Iraqi people. Objectionable treatment of people within Iraq can not
>provide the justification for a crippling punishment extended by the UN
>Security Council to the Iraqi people in the form of economic sanctions,
>blocking of humanitarian supplies, regular air attacks and, possibly
>military confrontation. Governments who are in possession of the many
>accounts from reputable international organisations on the state of human
>condition can no longer remain silent regarding the fact that today the
>main perpetrators responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people are
>the governments of the US and the UK. This does not mean that one should
>negate the concern over the internal human rights situation. The UN Human
>Rights Rapporteur must be allowed to continue his dialogue with the Iraqi
>authorities in this respect.
>
>
>Question No.4: What could be the demands of the international public
>conscience against a war on Iraq and for the lifting of economic
>sanctions?
>
>The European Colloquium (EC) should convey to the European
>Parliament (EP) that the February 2001 hearings on Iraq have failed to
>contribute to a credible EU Iraq policy. In the absence of an objective
>position on Iraq, The EU had been largely excluded as a contributor to the
>international Iraq debate. The EC should point out that this could be
>redressed.
>
>Neither the report of the UK International Institute for
>Strategic Studies (IISS) dated 9 September 2002 nor the document handed
>out by the US Government dated 12 September provides any evidence
>whatsoever of the imminence of an international threat posed by the Iraqi
>Government that would justify evoking articles 39, 42 or 51 of the UN
>Charter. A unilateral military strike by the US against Iraq would in any
>case be a grave violation of international law. The EP should be reminded
>of this serious fact. 
>
>The EC should advise the EP that in case of such a unilateral attack on
>Iraq by the US, permission by EU member countries for US forces to use
>airfields, harbours and other facilities might be consistent with NATO
>statutes but would constitute a breach of international law. The EP should
>be requested to convey this to member governments.
>
>The Brussels meeting of the EC should be concluded by expressing full
>support for the UN/Security Council-led arms inspection process. The EC
>should emphasize in this context that the Iraq Government should not be
>hindered in any way to demonstrate its preparedness to unconditionally
>cooperate with UNMOVIC. The EC should furthermore convey to the UN
>Secretary General that it considers the protection of the integrity of the
>team of UN inspectors as a paramount responsibility of the chairman of
>UNMOVIC. Misuse of UNMOVIC for intelligence operations, as had been the
>case with UNSCOM, harbours the grave danger of a confrontation between
>Iraq and the US. It would undoubtedly be used by US authorities as an
>immediate pretext to respond with a military attack. The EC should convey
>to the EP that it has a profound responsibility to pass these concerns to
>member governments and to the UN.
>
>Comprehensive economic sanctions against the people of Iraq are entering
>their 13th year. The human condition identified already in 1991 after the
>Gulf War as 'apocalyptic' have significantly worsened since then in both
>mental and physical terms. The amount of evidence collected by reputable
>international organisations about child mortality, malnutrition,
>re-emerging diseases, impoverishment, educational neglect and
>psychological disorders continues to accumulate (please see in particular
>recent reports by UNICEF, CARITAS, Save The Children/UK).
>
>What the international community has seen since May 2002 when UN/SC
>resolution 1409 introduced so-called 'smart sanctions' represents, as
>predicted by individual members of the current UN Security Council,
>anything but an improvement. In addition, over $5 billion worth of
>humanitarian supplies remain on hold-blocked by US/UK authorities. The oil
>pricing confrontation created by the US/UK governments to end the
>'illegal' surcharge issue has resulted in a major shortfall of funding for
>the present phase XII of the oil for food programme and seriously
>endangers the already fragile humanitarian exemption programme.
>
>The EC should make a strong case in its Brussels' communiqui for the
>lifting of economic sanctions once the UN arms inspectors programme is
>underway with the full cooperation of the Government of Iraq. The EC
>should request the EP to strongly support such an approach in the interest
>of ending the suffering of a people who have done nothing wrong.
>
>National anti-sanction groups in Europe and elsewhere are unrelenting in
>their efforts to bring about justice and conditions of human dignity for
>the Iraqi people. The public conscience is alert and at national levels
>has helped in shaping political decision making. In these critical days of
>international relations, efforts to make it possible that at times
>national initiatives can function in an integrated manner would seem of
>importance. The ideal would be to create a European response mechanism
>that can be used to periodically react to morally, ethically and legally
>unacceptable policies and positions on Iraq maintained by individual
>members of the United Nations. Such a mechanism would be particularly
>significant at this moment to protest against economic sanctions and to
>solicit support against a military attack on Iraq. Protesting would create
>awareness that such an attack would lead to another human catastrophe and
>endanger the international solidarity in the fight against terrorism. It
>would be of immense value in this respect if the EC could agree on an
>'action alert focal point'. Such a focal point would function as a basis
>for the strategic issuance of joint statements and the preparation of
>integrated actions and lobby work.
>
>As a step in this direction, national associations, whether represented at
>the Brussels' meeting or not should be encouraged to forward the final
>communiqui and a copy of the open letter to the EP to all the
>representative foreign media and other influential bodies on the ground.
>The EC should forward these two documents to the President of the UN
>Security Council, the UN Secretary General, the Secretary General of the
>Arab League, the Holy Sea and the International Court of Justice.
>
>An important first step towards improved cooperation among different
>national groups working towards the lifting of economic sanctions and
>averting an unjustified war against Iraq would be the preparation of a
>master-list of cooperating entities and their coordinates.
>
>
>			#####


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu