[Peace-discuss] du

[Dlind49 at aol.com]

A 2 Part Warning to the Citizens for the World
"Do Not Use Depleted Uranium Munitions Again"
Dr. Doug Rokke
Former U.S. Army's  DU team health physicist
Former U.S. Army's DU Project Director
and
George Angus Parker
Formerly Sgt with the 1st Field Laboratory Unit,
Biological-Warfare Detection Unit. Porton Down.
Great Britain


Part 1: Dr. Rokke's comments

    The leaders of the United States and Great Britain are considering a 
preemptive military attack against Iraq.  Consequently, the potential use of 
military force requires the careful evaluation of the health and 
environmental impact of any weapon system that may be employed by U.S. or 
British forces in their attempts to achieve their military objectives.  
Consequently, I must issue a warning against the deliberate use of any 
munitions containing depleted uranium.  Depleted uranium munitions (DU) have 
been used effectively in combat since 1973.  Their destructive capabilities 
are absolutely superior to any other known munitions that can be fired by 
tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and rifles.  In addition the ADAM and PDM, 
which are land mines, are essentially conventional explosives wrapped in 
shell containing uranium or a  "dirty bomb".  Although DU munitions are an 
excellent weapon, they leave a path of death, illness, and environmental 
contamination.  The radiological and chemical toxicity are due to uranium, 
plutonium, neptunium, and americium isotopes within each DU bullet.   We also 
have all of the inherent contamination from the equipment, terrain, and 
facilities that were destroyed.

    Upon the completion of the ground combat phase of the Gulf war, I was 
assigned by Headquarters Department of the Army and consequently the U.S. 
Central Command to clean up the depleted uranium contaminated U.S. equipment 
and provide initial medical recommendations for all individuals who were or 
may have been exposed as a consequence of military actions.   Our initial 
observations of the DU contamination can be summed simply by three words "OH 
MY GOD!" Although my mission was limited to U.S. personnel and equipment all 
affected persons and equipment should have been processed identically. They 
were not!  Although I and U.S. Army physicians assigned to the 3rd U.S. Army 
Medical Command issued immediate verbal and written medical care 
recommendations those still have not been complied with for not only all U.S. 
and coalition military DU casualties but for Iraqi military personnel and 
especially noncombatants, women and children, who were exposed to DU 
munitions contamination. A United States Defense Nuclear Agency memorandum 
written by LTC Lyle that was sent to our team in Saudi Arabia during March 
1990 stated that quote "As Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), ground combat 
units, and civil populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq come 
increasingly into contact with DU ordnance, we must prepare to deal with 
potential problems.  Toxic war souvenirs, political furor, and post conflict 
clean up (host nation agreement) are only some of the issues that must be 
addressed.  Alpha particles (uranium oxide dust) from expended rounds is a 
health concern but, Beta particles from fragments and intact rounds is a 
serious health threat, with possible exposure rates of 200 millirads per hour 
on contact." end quote.  
        It took our team from March 1991 to June 1991 to collect and prepare 
30 U.S. vehicles that were damaged or destroyed during friendly fire 
incidents involving DU munitions for burial or shipment to a specialized 
facility in South Carolina for decontamination and disposal.  Thousands of 
other DU contaminated pieces of equipment, bunkers, and terrain were just 
ignored. The approximate 1 million individual DU rounds and submunitions that 
were used by United States and British forces were never cleaned up but left 
where they fell. During January 1993 following analysis of our written 
reports and personal discussions, scientists and physicians assigned to the 
United States General Accounting Office issued a report ("Operation Desert 
Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium 
Contamination", GAO/NSAID-93-90, January 1993, page 7) recommending that the 
Secretary of the Army quote:      

1. ensure that appropriate Army training schools provide adequate information 
and training to personnel who would come in contact with DU contaminated 
equipment,
2. develop time frames to implement the proposed DU testing policy involving 
the testing of all crew members inside vehicles penetrated by DU munitions,
3. expand testing to include personnel involved in the vehicle recovery 
process should testing of the Army National Guard personnel show that uranium 
is present in excess of the standards being applied in the medical tests, and
4. develop a formal plan for dealing with the recovery of DU-contaminated 
equipment.

At approximately the same time that this report was being prepared, the 
United States Army's Environmental Policy Institute, AEPI, was tasked 
(December 13, 1992) by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Environment, Safety, and Occupational health to determine (quote):

1. The health and environmental consequences of using DU on the battlefield.
2. Which remediation technologies exist or might be developed to clean up DU 
contamination.
3. Ways to reduce DU toxicity.
4. How to best protect the environment from the long-term consequences of DU 
use. 

Therefore it was and still is obvious that United States military leaders 
knew that using DU would cause health and environmental problems. I was asked 
to help conduct the research and prepare the recommendations and final AEPI 
report because I was the Army health physicist who helped clean up the DU 
mess following Desert Storm and was working for the Army preparing 
environmental compliance procedures. The findings issued in 1995 (Health and 
Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the Army: Technical 
Report, U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute, June 1995) were quote 
1. The battlefield is contaminated with many dangerous things. The impact of 
DU contamination on the battlefield is not well defined. Relative to many of 
the other hazards, such as unexploded ordnance. The hazards are probably 
small; however, additional environmental modeling and data are needed to 
support this judgment.
2. DU remediation technologies involve one or more of the following: 
excavation and earth moving, physical separation, chemical separation, and 
in-place stabilization. The Army will continue to identify and evaluate 
remediation technologies by comparing the cost and effectiveness. From this 
analysis, the Army will seek effective, less expensive DU remediation 
technologies.
3. There are no technologies available that can significantly change the 
inherent chemical and radiological toxicity of DU.
4. Range management and DU recovery systems have been implemented and are 
being improved.  Models to better describe the environmental fate and effect 
are being developed. DU migration on test ranges in the United States has 
been minimal because soil and water conditions on those test ranges tend to 
prevent formation of soluable DU. 

Once more we can see that Army officials acknowledged that DU is toxic 
forever and that specific remediation procedures are required to clean up DU 
contamination.  I then developed and verified these procedures while the DU 
Project Director.

Consequently, in response to the GAO report, initial reports submitted by 
AEPI scientists, and my/our efforts the United States Deputy Secretary of 
Defense issued an order that was consequently reissued on August 14, 1993 and 
signed by General Eric Shinseki that DOD shall:

"1.  Provide adequate training for personnel who may come in contact with 
depleted uranium equipment.
2.  Complete medical testing of personnel exposed to DU contamination during 
the Persian Gulf War.
3. Develop a plan for DU contaminated equipment recovery during future 
operations."

The criteria describing unusual DU exposures requiring medical screening 
within 24 hours of exposure and consequent medical care were specified in a 
message from Headquarters Department of the Army dated October 14, 1993.  
These exposures included:
"a.  Being in the midst of smoke from DU fires resulting from the burning of 
vehicles uploaded with DU munitions or depots in which DU munitions are being 
stored.
b. Working within environments containing DU dust or residues from DU fires.
c. Being within a structure or vehicle while it is struck by DU munitions." 

Today, at least one decade after thousands and maybe millions of individuals 
were exposed to DU contamination and who should have received medical care 
per our original 1991 recommendations and as specified in the October 14, 
1993 directive less than 500 individuals have ever been provided the required 
radio-bioassay testing and consequent medical care. We must note that if 
United States personnel should receive medical care then all exposed 
individuals also must receive medical care.  A letter sent to General Leslie 
Groves, head of the Manhatten Project (the development of the first atomic 
bomb), during 1943 that I obtained during Fall 1999 emphasized the need for 
immediate medical care.  In that memorandum dated October 30, 1943, senior 
scientists assigned to the Manhattan Project suggested that uranium could be 
used as an air, water, and terrain contaminant.  According to the letter sent 
by the Subcommittee of the S-1 Executive Committee on the "Use of Radioactive 
Materials as a Military Weapon" to General Groves (October 30, 1943) 
inhalation of uranium would result in "bronchial irritation coming on in a 
few hours to a few days".  This is exactly what happened to those of us who 
inhaled DU dust during Operation Desert Storm, U.S. and KFOR soldiers and 
civilians in the Balkans, and residents of Vieques, Puerto Rico. 
The subcommittee went on further to state that "Beta emitting products could 
get into the gastrointestinal tract from polluted water, or food, or air.