[Peace-discuss] Powell/Blix

C. G. Estabrook galliher at alexia.lis.uiuc.edu
Mon Feb 17 16:57:00 CST 2003


[Here's the response to Colin Powell's speech at the UN that some found
"convincing"  -- responding to the performance more than to the substance,
I think.  --CGE]


Traprock Peace Center

http://traprockpeace.org/BlixElBaradeivsPowell.html

February 14, 2003: The following analysis was written by Glen Rangwala,
Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University, <gr10009 at cam.ac.uk>...

This page reviews the evidence presented by Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and
Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA) to the Security Council on 14 February 2003, and
contrasts it to the claims of Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5
February and Tony Blair in a dossier of 2 February. Links to the original
documents are at the end of this page.

1. GENERAL

CLAIM

Powell: "The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the
threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number
of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and
destroyed."

------------------------------

2. COMPLIANCE with INSPECTIONS

a) CLAIM 

Blair dossier, p.3: "Journeys are monitored by security officers stationed
on the route if they have prior intelligence. Any changes of destination
are notified ahead by telephone or radio so that arrival is anticipated.
The welcoming party is a give away."

Powell: "This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq
had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji"

EVIDENCE

Blix: "Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400
inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed
without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case
have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that
the inspectors were coming."

--------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Blair dossier, p.3: "Escorts are trained, for example, to start long
arguments with other Iraqi officials ‘on behalf of UNMOVIC’ while any
incriminating evidence is hastily being hidden behind the scenes."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "we note that access to sites has so far been without problems,
including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to
Presidential sites and private residences."

-------------------------------------

3. 'COMPLIANCE on SUBSTANCE'

a) CLAIM

Powell: "We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with [chemical
weapons] and he has not come clean with the international community. We
have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from
Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "a letter of 12 February from Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate
may be of relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of participants 'in
the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the
summer of 1991'. As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction
has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have
been deemed 'unaccounted for', the presentation of a list of persons who
can be interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to
cooperation on substance."

---------------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Blair dossier, p.2: "The Regime has intensified efforts to hide documents
in places where they are unlikely to be found, such as private homes of
low-level officials and universities."

Powell: "Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors
recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched
the homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000
pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and
placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related to
Iraq's nuclear program."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "The IAEA has completed a more detailed review of the 2000
pages of documents found on 16 January at the private residence of an
Iraqi scientist. The documents relate predominantly to lasers, including
the use of laser technology to enrich uranium. [...] While the documents
have provided some additional details about Iraq's laser enrichment
development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to
the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose
home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the
conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's
laser enrichment programme."

----------------------------------------

c) CLAIM

Powell: "Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who
were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them,
not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their
jobs."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been
appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads,
had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed
items. This was welcomed. A second commission, we learnt, has now been
appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents
relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is
headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have
very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even
private houses."

--------------------------------

4. CONCEALMENT?

a) CLAIM

Powell: "you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken
in response to the resumption of inspections. [...] We must ask ourselves:
Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections
if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?"

EVIDENCE

Blix: "intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found.
Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in
proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other
items ­ conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being
moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to
weapons of mass destruction."

-----------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Powell: "This one is about a weapons munition facility, a facility that
holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such
facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions.
[...] Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The
four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers.
[...] Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of
those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are
gone. It's been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of December as the
UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles
arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. The bunkers are
clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of
State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up
sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like
to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the
trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a
munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the
sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two
satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported
movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine
activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent
inspection."

----------------------------------

5. The EFFECTIVENESS of INSPECTIONS

a) CLAIM

Powell: "The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it
merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to
prevent any meaningful inspection work."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to
comply with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and
active co-operation with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq
making good on this commitment, the above measures will contribute to the
effectiveness of the inspection process."

-----------------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Powell: "Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and
thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day. It
took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological
agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one
of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to
with the information about these kinds of capabilities."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying
ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent
intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons
production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of
inspections."

--------------------------------------

6. INTERVIEWS

a) CLAIM

Powell: "The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence
of an Iraqi official, a minder."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We
have recently been able to conduct four interviews in private - that is,
without the presence of an Iraqi observer."

----------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Powell: "Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a
comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass
destruction programs."

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the
list of relevant Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current
work locations. The list includes the higher-level key scientists known to
the IAEA in the nuclear and nuclear related areas."

------------------------------------

7. WEAPONS and FACILITIES

a) CLAIM

Powell: "These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.
[...] Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to
us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One
must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

---------------------------------------

b) CLAIM

Powell: "As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq
has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever
had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the
left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust
vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent
on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The
one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The one on the right is
clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers.
This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has
been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for
satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand."

EVIDENCE

Blix: "The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand
that is nearing completion [...]. So far, the test stand has not been
associated with a proscribed activity."

--------------------------------------

c) CLAIM

Powell: "it strikes me as quite odd that these [aluminium] tubes are
manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for
comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional
weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so.

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "Iraq has been asked to explain the reasons for the tight
tolerance specifications that it had requested from various suppliers.
Iraq has provided documentation related to the project for reverse
engineering and has committed itself to providing samples of tubes
received from prospective suppliers."

-----------------------------------

d) CLAIM

Powell: "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer
showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used
to balance gas centrifuge rotors. [...] there is no doubt in my mind.
These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much
focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons
program".

EVIDENCE

ElBaradei: "IAEA inspectors found a number of documents relevant to
transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a dual-use material
used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment programme for the
manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these documents
suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended for
enrichment purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to
be consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes. In
addition, we have carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have
been able to observe the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related
applications and to take samples."

-----------------------------------

References:

Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, "Briefing to the Security
Council" (14 February 2003), at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, "The Status of Nuclear
Inspections in Iraq" (14 February 2003), at:

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml

Tony Blair, "Iraq - its infrastructure of concealment, deception and
intimidation" (2 February 2003), via:

http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7111.asp

Secretary of State Colin Powell, "Remarks to The United Nations Security
Council" (5 February 2003), at:

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm

For more detailed analysis of the evidence for the claims by the US and UK
governments, see "Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons",
at: 

http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.html

  ==============================================================
  Carl Estabrook
  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign [MC-190]
  109 Observatory, 901 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana IL 61801 USA
  office: 217.244.4105 mobile: 217.369.5471 home: 217.359.9466
  <www.carlforcongress.org>
  ===============================================================





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