[Peace-discuss] Hans Blix report to the Security Council

[patton paul]

This was posted to the UNMOVIC website http://www.unmovic.org today.
-Paul Patton

(as delivered)



THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 27 JANUARY 2003:
AN UPDATE ON INSPECTION





Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix







The governing Security Council resolutions



The resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in November last
year asks UNMOVIC and the IAEA to RupdateS the Council 60 days after the
resumption of inspections.  This is today.  The updating, it seems, forms
part of an assessment by the Council and its Members of the results, so
far, of the inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable
disarmament in Iraq.



As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be appropriate briefly
to provide some background for a better understanding of where we stand
today.

With your permission, I shall do so.



I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a disarmament process
in Iraq started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War.  They went on for
eight years until December 1998, when inspectors were withdrawn.
Thereafter, for nearly four years there were no inspections. They were
resumed only at the end of November last year.



While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always been to verify
disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the Council over the
years have varied somewhat in emphasis and approach.



In 1991, resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the
cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements.  The three first
related to disarmament.  They called for :





    * declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of mass
destruction and long range missiles;



    * verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the IAEA;



    * supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the
elimination of proscribed programmes and items.





After the completion of the disarmament :



a        the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the
sanctions (economic restrictions); and



    *  the inspecting organizations would move to long-term ongoing
monitoring and verification.





Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to,
required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given
grudgingly.  Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate
its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating
confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance P not even today P of the disarmament, which was demanded of it
and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to
live in peace.



As we know, the twin operation Tdeclare and verifyU, which was prescribed
in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of Thide and seekU.
Rather than just verifying declarations and supporting evidence, the two
inspecting organizations found themselves engaged in efforts to map the
weapons programmes and to search for evidence through inspections,
interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and intelligence
organizations.  As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in
the short time expected.  Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until
Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development of
that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.



The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about
considerable disarmament results.  It has been recognized that more
weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than were
destroyed during the Gulf War:  large quantities of chemical weapons were
destroyed under UNSCOM supervision before 1994.  While Iraq claims P with
little evidence P that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in
1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons
production facilities in 1996.  The large nuclear infrastructure was
destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.



One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain
undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the
second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured
after 1998, when the inspectors left; and the third question is how it can
be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured
in the future.



In December 1999 P after one year without inspections in Iraq P resolution
1284 (1999) was adopted by the Council with 4 abstentions.  Supplementing
the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a
somewhat less ambitious approach:  in return for Rcooperation in all
respectsS for a specified period of time, including progress in the
resolution of Rkey remaining disarmament tasksS, it opened the
possibility, not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.



For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC.
It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States and
pressure by the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared
on 16 September last year that it would again accept inspections without
conditions.



Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and
emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate.  It required this
cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active.  The resolution
contained many provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and strengthening
the inspection regime.  The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a
powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating a last
opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.



UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection
as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of
Iraq.  Under the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by
monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be required.  The
resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as
the ultimate goal.



As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of and
appreciates the close attention, which the Council devotes to the
inspections in Iraq. While todayUs RupdatingS is foreseen in resolution
1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for additional briefings
whenever it wishes.  One was held on 19 January and a further such
briefing is tentatively set for 14 February.





I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and IraqUs response to
it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process.  It
would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle
to provide cooperation on process, notably access.   A similar decision is
indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the
disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection
and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course.  An initial minor step
would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by the
resolutions.



I shall deal first with cooperation on process.




Cooperation on process



It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical
arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While
inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but may lead to
confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of
mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the operation of
inspection.



Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this
field.  The most important point to make is that access has been provided
to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been
prompt. We have further had great help in building up the infrastructure
of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul.  Arrangements and
services for our plane and our helicopters have been good.  The
environment has been workable.



Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential
sites and private residences.  Inspections have also taken place on
Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Years day.
These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other
inspections.  We seek to be both effective and correct.



In this updating I am bound, however, to register some problems. Firstly,
relating to two kinds of air operations.



While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane placed at
our disposal for aerial imagery and for surveillance during inspections
and have informed Iraq that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to
guarantee its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled.  As
these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002)
and what was practiced by UNSCOM and Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq
is not so far complying with our request.  I hope this attitude will
change.



Another air operation problem P which was solved during our recent talks
in Baghdad P concerned the use of helicopters flying into the no-fly
zones.  Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of their own to accompany
ours. This would have raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an
offer on our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders in our helicopters
to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced by UNSCOM in the
past.



I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment.  For
instance, for some time farfetched allegations have been made publicly
that questions posed by inspectors were of intelligence character. While I
might not defend every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq
knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq should not say
so.



On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front of our
offices and at inspection sites.



The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was
followed by an unwarranted public outburst.  The inspectors went without
any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner that is
characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners.  They took off
their shoes and were taken around.  They asked perfectly innocent
questions and parted with the invitation to come again.



Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about
an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of
mass destruction.  Indeed, they were not.  Demonstrations and outbursts of
this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or
encouragement from the authorities.  We must ask ourselves what the
motives may be for these events.  They do not facilitate an already
difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the
same time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they
can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.




Cooperation on substance



The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation
of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and
either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide
evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.



Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall
be RactiveS.  It is not enough to open doors.  Inspection is not a game of
Rcatch as catch canS.  Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification
for the purpose of creating confidence.  It is not built upon the premise
of trust.  Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both
openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to
destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items.





The declaration of 7 December



On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in
response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time
stipulated by the Security Council.  In the fields of missiles and
biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and
information covering the period from 1998 and onward.  This is welcome.



One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have
tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the
many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with
from the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January1999 and the so-called Amorim
Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356).  These are questions which UNMOVIC,
governments and independent commentators have often cited.



While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current Runresolved
disarmament issuesS and Rkey remaining disarmament tasksS in response to
requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the
two reports as unresolved, professionally justified.  These reports do not
contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they
exclude that possibility.  They point to lack of evidence and
inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be straightened
out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.



They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside
as evil machinations of UNSCOM.  Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration,
most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain
any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their
number.  Even IraqUs letter sent in response to our recent discussions in
Baghdad to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not
lead us to the resolution of these issues.



I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be
answered and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons.




Chemical weapons



The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.



Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few
tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable.
Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised.  Iraq said
that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was
unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.



UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There
are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and
stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared.
Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the
purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than
declared.



There are also indications that the agent was weaponised.  In addition,
there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor
chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or
were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.



I would now like to turn to the so-called RAir Force documentS that I have
discussed with the Council before.  This document was originally found by
an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and
taken from her by Iraqi minders.  It gives an account of the expenditure
of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War.  I am
encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to
UNMOVIC.



The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the
Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500
bombs were consumed during this period.  Thus, there is a discrepancy of
6,500 bombs.  The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the
order of about 1,000 tonnes.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.



The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker
at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized.  This
was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved
there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such
munitions.



The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding.  Iraq states that
they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored
there during the Gulf War.  This could be the case.  They could also be
the tip of a submerged iceberg.  The discovery of a few rockets does not
resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical
rockets that are unaccounted for.



The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to
ensure that its declaration is currently accurate.  During my recent
discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in
this regard and had set up a committee of investigation.  Since then it
has reported that it has found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage
depot in Al Taji.



I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a
laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.



Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I
reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical
plant at Al Fallujah.  Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical
processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and
had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols.
We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical
evaluation of it.  On completion, we will decide whether this and other
equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.




Biological weapons



I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions
and I come back to it as it is an important one.



Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological
warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of
1991.  Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no
convincing evidence for its destruction.



There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it
declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared
destruction date.  It might still exist.  Either it should be found and be
destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be
produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.



As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not
declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media,
which was acknowledged as imported in IraqUs submission to the Amorim
panel in February 1999.  As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq
resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this
particular import of media was not included.  The absence of this table
would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document
were renumbered.



In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, IraqUs
Foreign Minister stated that Rall imported quantities of growth media were
declaredS.  This is not evidence.  I note that the quantity of media
involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of
concentrated anthrax.




Missiles



I turn now to the missile sector.  There remain significant questions as
to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War.  Iraq
declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the
development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s.
Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or
data on the consumption of the missiles.



There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the
past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities.  We are
trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and
on-site discussions.



Two projects in particular stand out.  They are the development of a
liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant
missile, called the Al Fatah.  Both missiles have been tested to a range
in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being
tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km.  Some of both
types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces
even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.



The Al SamoudUs diameter was increased from an earlier version to the
present 760 mm.  This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters
to less than 600 mm.  Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from
certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.



During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two
programmes.  We were told that the final range for both systems would be
less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.



These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed
systems.  The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some
further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a
conclusion on this issue.  In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease
flight tests of both missiles.



In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure.
In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had
previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.  They had been used in
the production of solid-fuel missiles.  Whatever missile system these
chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable
of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.



Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the
import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number
of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002.
Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be
used for the Al Samoud 2.



Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants,
test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems.  These items may
well be for proscribed purposes.  That is yet to be determined.  What is
clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some
company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various
resolutions.





Mr. President,



I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and
that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to
arise.  Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these
questions?  I have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues.
Let me be a little more systematic.  Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of
saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented
to the contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed
innocent.  UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are
proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor is it P or I think anyone
else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 P presuming the opposite,
that no such items and activities exist in Iraq.  Presumptions do not
solve the problem.  Evidence and full transparency may help.  Let me be
specific.




Find the items and activities



Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and
concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for
biological weapons production.  We shall certainly follow up any credible
leads given to us and report what we might find as well as any denial of
access.



So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122
mm warheads for chemical weapons.  Iraq declared that it appointed a
commission of inquiry to look for more.  Fine.  Why not extend the search
to other items? Declare what may be found and destroy it under our
supervision?




Find documents



When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we
have all too often met the response that there are no more documents.  All
existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told.  All
documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed
together with the weapons.



However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various
departments, institutions and mechanisms.  It should have budgetary
documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have been used.  It
should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on
production and losses of material.



In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific
documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages
which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical
and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the
biological weapons programme.  Potentially, it might help to clear some
open issues.



The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of
some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment
of uranium support a concern that has long existed that documents might be
distributed to the homes of private individuals.  This interpretation is
refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may
bring home papers from their work places.  On our side, we cannot help but
think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of
documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield
documents by placing them in private homes.



Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious.  The
Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to
accept access also to private sites.  There can be no sanctuaries for
proscribed items, activities or documents.  A denial of prompt access to
any site would be a very serious matter.




Find persons to give credible information:  a list of personnel



When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents is not
available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists
and managers to testify about their experience.  Large weapons programmes
are moved and managed by people.  Interviews with individuals who may have
worked in

programmes in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and
understanding.  It could also be useful to learn that they are now
employed in peaceful sectors.  These were the reasons why UNMOVIC asked
for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441.



Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well
as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side.  This can be
compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons
programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from
documents and other sources.  At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi
side committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80 additional
names have been provided.

Allow information through credible interviews



In the past, much valuable information came from interviews.  There were
also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the
presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials.  This was the background
of resolution 1441Us provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to
hold private interviews Rin the mode or locationS of our choice, in
Baghdad or even abroad.



To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us.  The
replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at IraqUs
monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi
official.  This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have
evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not
wish them to say.  At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side
committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews Rin privateS,
that is to say alone with us.  Despite this, the pattern has not changed.
However, we hope that with further encouragement from the authorities,
knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or
abroad.





UNMOVICUs capability



Mr President, I must not conclude this RupdateS without some notes on the
growing capability of UNMOVIC.



In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from
nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries.  This includes
approximately 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as
security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff,
medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field
office.  All serve the United Nations and report to no one else.
Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our
training programme continues Q even at this moment we have a training
course in session in Vienna.  At the end of that course, we shall have a
roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors.



A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our offices in
Baghdad, which had been empty for four years.  The Government of New
Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team.
The German Government will contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for
surveillance and a group of specialists to operate them for us within
Iraq.  The Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field
Office in Larnaca.  All these contributions have been of assistance in
quickly starting up our inspections and enhancing our capabilities.  So
has help from the UN in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.



In the past two months during which we have built-up our presence in Iraq,
we have conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites.
Of these, more than 20 were sites that had not been inspected before.  By
the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the
transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work. We now have eight
helicopters.  They have already proved invaluable in helping to RfreezeS
large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and around the area.



Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of
sites in northern Iraq.  We plan to establish soon a second field office
in the Basra area, where we have already inspected a number of sites.





Mr. President,



We have now an inspection apparatus that permits us to send multiple
inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by road or by air.  Let me end
by simply noting that that capability which has been built-up in a short
time and which is now operating, is at the disposal of the Security
Council.





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