[Peace-discuss] Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei's statement to the Security Council today

[patton paul]

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the director general of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, which is charged with the nuclear weapons portion of the
arms inspections in Iraq.  Here's the statement he gave to the Security
Council today.  He also presented the council with a written report, the
full text of which is at:
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/focus/laealraq/unscreport_290103.html

-Paul Patton


The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

Background:
Understanding the
Starting Point

Conduct of
Inspections to
Date

Findings of
Inspections to
Date

Moving Forward

Conclusion

Other Statements

For the past 60 days, the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency have been engaged in the process of verifying the existence or
absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Today, pursuant to
paragraph 5 of resolution 1441, I have submitted to the President of the
Security Council an update report on our progress since we resumed our
nuclear verification activities in Iraq - in terms of the approach we have
adopted, the tools we have used, the specific results achieved, the degree
of co-operation we have received, and finally our view on how we should
proceed. Let me in this statement outline the key aspects of this report.

Background: Understanding the Starting Point

To understand the approach of the IAEA's inspection over the past two
months, it is important first to recall what was accomplished during our
inspections from 1991 to 1998, in fulfilment of our Security Council
mandate to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. In September 1991,
the IAEA seized documents in Iraq that demonstrated the extent of its
nuclear weapons programme. By the end of 1992, we had largely destroyed,
removed or rendered harmless all Iraqi facilities and equipment relevant
to nuclear weapons production. We confiscated Iraq's
nuclear-weapons-usable material - high enriched uranium and plutonium -
and by early 1994 we had removed it from the country. By December 1998 -
when the inspections were brought to a halt with a military strike
imminent - we were confident that we had not missed any significant
component of Iraq's nuclear programme.

While we did not claim absolute certainty, our conclusion at that time was
that we had neutralized Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and that there
were no indications that Iraq retained any physical capability to produce
weapon usable nuclear material.

During the intervening four years of our absence from Iraq, we continued
our analytical work to the best of our ability, using satellite imagery
and other information. But no remote analysis can replace on-site
inspection - and we were therefore not able to reach any conclusions about
Iraq's compliance with its Security Council obligations in the nuclear
field after December 1998.
Conduct of Inspections to Date

Against this backdrop, when Iraq agreed last September to re-open its
doors to inspection, and following the subsequent adoption by the Security
Council of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA's authority and
the inspection process, the first goal of our inspection activities was
"reconnaissance". In this phase, we sought to re-establish rapidly our
knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key
facilities had not been re-opened, to verify the location of nuclear
material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to identify and begin
interviewing key Iraqi personnel.

Over these first two months of inspection, we have made good progress in
our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139
inspections at some 106 locations to date. The bulk of these inspections
have taken place at State-run or private industrial facilities, research
centres and universities - either at locations where Iraq's significant
technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past, or at new
locations suggested by remote monitoring and analysis. All inspection
activities have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq,
except where notification was needed to ensure the availability of
required support. IAEA inspectors have taken - and will continue to take -
full advantage of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441. In
doing so, the inspectors have been instructed to make every effort to
conduct their activities with appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.

While we are continuing to some extent with this reconnaissance work, our
inspections are now well into the "investigative" phase - with particular
emphasis on determining what, if anything, has occurred in Iraq over the
past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities.
These investigative inspections focus on areas of concern identified by
other States, facilities identified through satellite imagery as having
been modified or constructed since 1998, and other inspection leads
identified independently by the IAEA.

In parallel with these inspection activities, the IAEA has been conducting
exhaustive analysis of supporting information obtained from various
sources. In this context, we have integrated the new information submitted
by Iraq - including the declaration submitted on 7 December in response to
resolution 1441 - with the records we had accumulated between 1991 and
1998 and the additional information we had compiled through remote
monitoring since 1998. The Iraqi declaration was consistent with our
existing understanding of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear programme; however, it
did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that
have been outstanding since 1998 - in particular regarding Iraq's progress
prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development. While
these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they
nevertheless need further clarification.

In addition to onsite inspection and offsite analysis, IAEA inspectors
have employed a variety of tools to accomplish their mission. Taking
advantage of the "signature" of radioactive materials, we have resumed the
monitoring of Iraq's rivers, canals and lakes to detect the presence of
certain radioisotopes. A broad variety of environmental samples and
surface swipe samples have been collected from locations across Iraq and
taken to IAEA laboratories for analysis. And we have re-instituted routine
car-borne and hand-held gamma surveys for the detection of undeclared
nuclear material.

The inspectors have also conducted a great number of interviews of Iraqi
scientists, managers and technicians - primarily in the workplace in the
course of unannounced inspections - as a valuable source of information
about past and present programmes and activities. The information gained
has been helpful in assessing the completeness and accuracy of Iraq's
declarations.

Resolution 1441 also clearly gave to the IAEA and UNMOVIC the authority to
determine the modalities and venues for conducting interviews with Iraqi
officials and other persons. The first two individuals whom the IAEA
requested to see privately declined to be interviewed without the presence
of an Iraqi Government representative. This has been a restricting factor.
Although the Iraqi Government recently committed itself to encouraging
Iraqi officials and other personnel to be interviewed in private when
requested, regrettably the third request, two days ago, for a private
interview was again turned down by the interviewee.

The IAEA will continue to determine the modalities and locations of the
interviews, including the possibility of interviewing Iraqi personnel
abroad. We will continue to report to the Security Council on our efforts
to conduct interviews according to our preferred modalities and venues,
and our degree of success in that regard.
Findings of Inspections to Date

Let me summarize briefly a number of the findings that have resulted from
our inspection activities thus far.

First, we have inspected all of those buildings and facilities that were
identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or
constructed over the past four years. IAEA inspectors have been able to
gain ready access and to clarify the nature of the activities currently
being conducted in these facilities. No prohibited nuclear activities have
been identified during these inspections.

A particular issue of focus has been the attempted procurement by Iraq of
high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of whether these tubes, if
acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Iraqi
authorities have indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the
aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer conventional
rockets. To verify this information, IAEA inspectors have inspected the
relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples,
interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts
and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the
aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and,
unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges;
however, we are still investigating this issue. It is clear, however, that
the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council
resolution 687.

Another area of focus has been to determine how certain other "dual use"
materials have been relocated or used - that is, materials that could be
used in nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses. A
good example is the Iraqi declaration concerning the high explosive "HMX"
- which states that, out of the HMX under IAEA seals in Iraq at the end of
1998, some had been supplied to cement plants as an industrial explosive
for mining. The whereabouts and final use of the removed material are
matters that will require further investigation - although it will be
difficult to verify the disposition of the HMX that is declared to have
been used.

A fourth focal point has been the investigation of reports of Iraqi
efforts to import uranium after 1991. The Iraqi authorities have denied
any such attempts. The IAEA will continue to pursue this issue. At this
stage, however, we do not have enough information, and we would appreciate
receiving more.

We are also making progress on a number of other issues related, for
example, to the attempted importation of a magnet production facility.

Moving Forward

Need for Continued Unified Support from the Security Council
In addition to the new authorities granted by resolution 1441, I believe
that the unified resolve of the Council to support the inspection process
has been a vital ingredient, and must remain so, if we are to achieve a
peaceful resolution of the situation in Iraq. I trust that the Council
would continue its unified and unequivocal support for the inspection
process in Iraq.

Over the next several months, inspections will focus ever more closely on
follow-up of specific concerns, as we continue to conduct visits to sites
and interviews with key Iraqi personnel. We have begun helicopter
operations, which increase the inspectors' mobility and their ability to
respond rapidly to new information, and allow wide-scale radiation
detection surveys. Laboratory analysis of environmental samples is
continuing, and we will be re-installing air samplers for wide-area
environmental monitoring. We also will re-introduce surveillance systems
with video cameras in key locations to allow near-real-time remote
monitoring of dual-use equipment.

Need for Actionable Information from Other States
By its very nature, the inspection process, both in Iraq and elsewhere, is
not based on "trust", but on a thorough process of fact finding, supported
by access to all available information. Where applicable, this should
include information available to States that may be relevant to the
purpose of the inspection. We have begun in the last few weeks to receive
more actionable information from States - that is, information of direct
and current value for inspection follow-up. I would continue to call on
States that have access to such information to provide it to the
inspecting organizations, so that the inspection process can be
accelerated and additional assurances can be generated.

Need for Additional Co-operation by Iraq
Finally, we have urged Iraq once again to increase the degree of its
co-operation with the inspection process. In support of the IAEA
inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities have provided access to all
facilities visited - including presidential compounds and private
residences - without conditions and without delay. The Iraqi authorities
also have been co-operative in making available additional original
documentation, in response to requests by IAEA inspectors.

In our discussions with Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad, we
emphasized the need to shift from passive support - that is, responding as
needed to inspectors' requests - to proactive support - that is,
voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation, people and
other evidence that will assist in filling in the remaining gaps in our
information.

One example of how Iraq could be more proactive was illustrated by the
inspection of a private residence just two weeks ago, which resulted in
the retrieval of a sizeable number of documents, some of which were
classified, and related, in part, to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to use laser
technology for enriching uranium. While these documents do not appear to
reflect new or current activity related to nuclear weapons in Iraq, they
may enhance our detailed understanding of certain aspects of Iraq's
pre-1991 nuclear programme. It is urgent and essential therefore that
Iraq, on its own initiative, identify and provide any additional evidence
that would assist the inspectors in carrying out their mandate.

This proactive engagement on the part of Iraq would be in its own best
interest and is a window of opportunity that may not remain open for very
much longer. Iraq should make every effort to be fully transparent - with
a demonstrated willingness to resolve issues rather than requiring
pressure to do so. The international community will not be satisfied when
questions remain open with regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
the world is asking for a high level of assurance that Iraq is completely
free from all such weapons, and is already impatient to receive it. The
sooner such assurance can be provided by the inspecting organizations, the
sooner the prospects of a peaceful resolution will translate into a
plausible reality.

The Value of Inspections
Inspections are time consuming but, if successful, can ensure disarmament
through peaceful means. It is worth recalling that, in our past experience
in Iraq, the elimination of its nuclear weapons programme was mostly
accomplished through intrusive inspections. It is also worth recalling
that the presence of international inspectors in Iraq today continues to
serve as an effective deterrent to and insurance against resumption of
programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, even as we continue to
look for possible past activities.

Conclusion

To conclude: we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its
nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the
1990s. However, our work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to
run its natural course. With our verification system now in place, barring
exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive
cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to
provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme.
These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they
could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your
support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament
through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can
and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms
control regime.

Other Statements of the Director General

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