[Peace-discuss] Fwd: What Does the Pentagon See in 'Battle of Algiers'?]

[Alfred Kagan]

FYI
>
>>What Does the Pentagon See in 'Battle of Algiers'?
>>By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN
>>New York Times
>>7 September 2003
>>
>>Challenged by terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare in Iraq, the 
>>Pentagon recently held a screening of "The Battle of Algiers," the 
>>film that in the late 1960's was required viewing and something of 
>>a teaching tool for radicalized Americans and revolutionary 
>>wannabes opposing the Vietnam War.
>>
>>Back in those days the young audiences that often sat through 
>>several showings of Gillo Pontecorvo's 1965 re-enactment of the 
>>urban struggle between French troops and Algerian nationalists, 
>>shared the director's sympathies for the guerrillas of the F.L.N., 
>>Algeria's National Liberation Front. Those viewers identified with 
>>and even cheered for Ali La Pointe, the streetwise operator who 
>>drew on his underworld connections to organize a network of 
>>terrorist cells and entrenched it within the Casbah, the city's old 
>>Muslim section. In the same way they would hiss Colonel Mathieu, 
>>the character based on Jacques Massu, the actual commander of the 
>>French forces.
>>
>>The Pentagon's showing drew a more professionally detached audience 
>>of about 40 officers and civilian experts who were urged to 
>>consider and discuss the implicit issues at the core of the film — 
>>the problematic but alluring efficacy of brutal and repressive 
>>means in fighting clandestine terrorists in places like Algeria and 
>>Iraq. Or more specifically, the advantages and costs of resorting 
>>to torture and intimidation in seeking vital human intelligence 
>>about enemy plans.
>>
>>As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon screening declared: 
>>"How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. 
>>Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in 
>>cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. 
>>Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but 
>>fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of 
>>this film."
>>
>>The idea  came from the Directorate for Special Operations and 
>>Low-Intensity Conflict, which a Defense Department official 
>>described as a civilian-led group with "responsibility for thinking 
>>aggressively and creatively" on issues of guerrilla war. The 
>>official said, "Showing the film offers historical insight into the 
>>conduct of French operations in Algeria, and was intended to prompt 
>>informative discussion of the challenges faced by the French." He 
>>added that the discussion was lively and  that more showings would 
>>probably be held.
>>
>>No details of the discussion were provided but if the talk was 
>>confined to the action of the film it would have focused only on 
>>the battle for the city, which ended in 1957 in apparent triumph 
>>for the French with the killing of La Pointe and the destruction of 
>>the network. But insurrection continued throughout Algeria, and 
>>though the French won the Battle of Algiers, they lost the war for 
>>Algeria, ultimately withdrawing from a newly independent country 
>>ruled by the F.L.N. in 1962.
>>
>>During the last four decades the events re-enacted in the film and 
>>the wider war in Algeria have been cited as an effective use of the 
>>tactics of a "people's war," where fighters emerge from seemingly 
>>ordinary lives to mount attacks and then retreat to the cover of 
>>their everyday identities. The question of how conventional armies 
>>can contend with such tactics and subdue their enemies seems as 
>>pressing today in Iraq as it did in Algiers in 1957. In both 
>>instances the need for on-the-ground intelligence is required to 
>>learn of impending attacks. Even in a world of electronic devices, 
>>human infiltration and interrogations remain indispensable, but how 
>>far should modern states go in the pursuit of such information?
>>
>>Mr. Pontecorvo, who was a member of the Italian Communist Party, 
>>obviously felt  the French had gone much too far by adopting 
>>policies of torture, brutal intimidation and outright killings. 
>>Though their use of force led to the triumph over La Pointe, it 
>>also provoked political scandals in France, discredited the French 
>>Army and traumatized French political life for decades, while 
>>inspiring support for the nationalists among Algerians and in much 
>>of the world.  It was this tactical tradeoff that lies at the heart 
>>of the film and presumably makes it relevant for Pentagon study and 
>>discussion.
>>
>>But this issue of how much force should be used by highly organized 
>>states as they confront the terror of less sophisticated enemies is 
>>far from simple. For example, what happens when a country with a 
>>long commitment to the  Geneva Convention has allies who   operate 
>>without such restriction.
>>
>>Consider the ambivalent views over the years of General Massu, the 
>>principal model for the film's Colonel  Mathieu.
>>
>>In 1971, General Massu wrote a book challenging "The Battle of 
>>Algiers," and the film was banned in France for many years. In his 
>>book General Massu, who had been considered by soldiers the 
>>personification of military tradition, defended torture as "a cruel 
>>necessity."  He wrote: "I am not afraid of the word torture, but I 
>>think in the majority of cases, the French military men obliged to 
>>use it to vanquish terrorism were, fortunately, choir boys compared 
>>to the use to which it was put by the rebels. The latter's extreme 
>>savagery led us to some ferocity, it is certain, but we remained 
>>within the law of eye for eye, tooth for tooth."
>>
>>In 2000, his former second in command, Gen. Paul Aussaresses, 
>>acknowledged, showing neither doubts nor remorse, that thousands of 
>>Algerians "were made to disappear," that suicides were faked and 
>>that he  had taken part himself in the execution of 25 men. General 
>>Aussaresses said "everybody" knew that such things had been 
>>authorized in Paris and he added that his only real regret was that 
>>some of those tortured died before they revealed anything useful.
>>
>>As for General Massu, in 2001 he told interviewers from Le Monde, 
>>"Torture is not indispensable in time of war, we could have gotten 
>>along without it very well." Asked whether he thought France should 
>>officially admit its policies of torture in Algeria and condemn 
>>them, he replied: "I think that would be a good thing. Morally 
>>torture is something ugly."
>>
>>At the moment it is hard to specify exactly how the Algerian 
>>experience and the burden of the film apply  to the situation in 
>>Iraq, but as the flier for the Pentagon showing suggested, the 
>>conditions that the French faced in Algeria are similar to those 
>>the United States is finding in Iraq.
>>
>>According to Thomas Powers, the author of "Intelligence Wars: 
>>American Secret History From Hitler to Al Qaeda": "What's called a 
>>low-intensity war in Iraq brings terrible frustrations and 
>>temptations — the frustrating difficulty of finding and fixing an 
>>enemy who could be anyone anywhere, and the temptation to resort to 
>>torture to extract the kind of detailed information from prisoners 
>>or suspects needed to strike effectively. How the United States is 
>>dealing with this temptation is one of the unknowns of the war. We 
>>are told that outright torture is forbidden, and we hope it is 
>>true. But as low-intensity wars drag on, soldiers tell themselves, 
>>`We're trying to save lives, no one will ever know, this guy can 
>>tell us where the bastards are.' "
>>
>>If indeed the government is currently analyzing or even weighing 
>>the tactical choices reflected in "The Battle of Algiers," 
>>presumably that is being done at a higher level of secrecy than an 
>>open discussion following a screening of the Pontecorvo film. 
>>Still, by showing the movie within the Pentagon and by announcing 
>>that publicly, somebody seems to be raising issues that have 
>>remained obscure throughout the war against terror.
>><br>
>></blockquote></x-html>


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.cu.groogroo.com/mailman/archive/peace-discuss/attachments/20030912/596bc3b1/attachment.html