[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Sudan: Questions of Responsibility

[Alfred Kagan]

FYI, I think the last article is most informative.

>
>Sudan: Questions of Responsibility 
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin
>Jul 22, 2004 (040722)
>(Reposted from sources cited below)
>
>Editor's Note 
>
>"There has been a great deal of tough talk since the visits of Mr.
>Powell, Mr. Annan and others, but the UN Security Council so far
>has failed to act decisively [on Darfur]. It is time to move
>directly against regime officials who are responsible for the
>killing." - John Prendergast, New York Times, July 15, 2004
>
>Evidence continues to mount both of continuing atrocities and of
>the Sudanese government's failure to stem attacks by government-
>backed militia in western Sudan. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
>and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell have issued repeated
>warnings to the Sudanese government. International humanitarian
>efforts continue to grow. But even the UN's humanitarian appeal is
>$200 million short of its full funding. Action on the security and
>political fronts faces even more obstacles.
>
>There is rising pressure, particularly in the U.S. Congress, for
>explicit condemnation of the atrocities in Darfur as genocide and
>for stronger action, including targeted sanctions. Press reports,
>such as a front-page article in the Washington Post on July 18,
>are now beginning to name specific Sudanese officials thought to be
>responsible for supporting the militias. So far, however, the
>cumulative pressure is still falling far short of that needed to
>produce real changes in Khartoum's policies.
>
>This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from several recent
>reports relevant to questions of responsibility for the current
>situation and for action to stem the loss of life. These include
>(1) a report from Human Rights Watch documenting the complicity of
>government officials, (2) reports from the UN on the status of UN
>initiatives, and (3) a Justice Africa report that addresses the
>issue of divisions on Darfur within the government of Sudan.
>
>For earlier bulletins on Sudan and links to additional sources, see
>http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
>
>++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
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>
>++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Human Rights Watch
>
>Sudan: New Darfur Documents
>
>Ties Between Government and Janjaweed Militias Confirmed
>
>[For the full report and additional material from HRW on Sudan, see
>http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=africa&c=sudan]
>
>(New York, July 20, 2004) "Sudan government documents
>incontrovertibly show that government officials directed
>recruitment, arming and other support to the ethnic militias known
>as the Janjaweed," Human Rights Watch said today. The government of
>Sudan has consistently denied recruiting and arming the Janjaweed
>militias, including during the recent visits of U.S. Secretary of
>State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Human
>Rights Watch said it had obtained confidential documents from the
>civilian administration in Darfur that implicate high-ranking
>government officials in a policy of militia support.    
>
>"It's absurd to distinguish between the Sudanese government forces
>and the militias - they are one," said Peter Takirambudde,
>executive director of Human Rights Watch's Africa Division. "These
>documents show that militia activity has not just been condoned,
>it's been specifically supported by Sudan government officials." 
>
>Human Rights Watch said that Sudanese government forces and
>government-backed militias are responsible for crimes against
>humanity, war crimes and "ethnic cleansing" involving aerial and
>ground attacks on civilians of the same ethnicity as members of two
>rebel groups in Darfur. Thousands of civilians have been killed,
>hundreds of women and girls have been raped and more than one
>million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes and
>farms in Darfur.    
>
>In a series of official Arabic-language documents from government
>authorities in North and South Darfur dating from February and
>March 2004, officials call for recruitment and military support,
>including "provisions and ammunition" to be delivered to known
>Janjaweed militia leaders, camps and "loyalist tribes."    
>
>A particularly damning February directive orders "all security
>units" in the area to tolerate the activities of known Janjaweed
>leader Musa Hilal in North Darfur. The document "highlights the
>importance of non-interference so as not to question their
>authority" and authorizes security units in a North Darfur province
>to "overlook minor offenses by the fighters against civilians who
>are suspected members of the rebellion".    
>
>Another document calls for a plan for "resettlement operations of
>nomads in places from which the outlaws [rebels] withdrew." This,
>along with recent government statements that displaced persons will
>be settled in 18 "settlements" rather than in their original
>villages, raises concerns that the ethnic cleansing that has
>occurred will be consolidated and that people will be unable to
>return to their villages and lands.    
>
>Human Rights Watch called for Sudan government officials implicated
>in the policy of militia support to be added to the U.N. sanctions
>list included as part of a pending U.N. resolution. It also called
>for international monitoring of the disarmament of the militia
>groups and the establishment of an international commission of
>inquiry into the abuses committed in Darfur by all parties to the
>conflict.    
>
>"Sudan has launched a major public-relations campaign aimed at
>buying more time for diplomatic initiatives to work," said
>Takirambudde. "But at this point and with our new evidence,
>Khartoum has zero credibility. To date, the government of Sudan has
>only used more time to consolidate the ethnic cleansing in Darfur."
>   
>While the government has committed itself to disarming "outlawed"
>groups, including the rebel insurgency, it is unclear whether the
>government considers the Janjaweed militias it has supported as
>among the groups to be disarmed. There are increasing reports that
>Janjaweed militia members are being absorbed into the new police
>forces deployed by the government to "protect" civilians in Darfur.
>   
>Human Rights Watch said that under no circumstances should
>Janjaweed members who have participated in attacks, murders and
>rapes of civilians in Darfur be included within the police and
>military forces the government is now using to protect the
>population.    
>
>Human Rights Watch called for an immediate, strongly worded U.N.
>resolution that sanctions Khartoum and government officials
>responsible for crimes against humanity.    
>
>"The ambiguity in the government's statements shows that
>independent monitoring of the disarmament process is crucial," said
>Takirambudde. "The African Union and other international monitors
>must pay close attention to resettlement plans and ensure that
>militias are not only disarmed, but withdrawn entirely from the
>civilian areas they took over." ...   
>
>***************************************************************
>
>Life-saving UN relief operations in Sudan face $200 million budget
>gap - Annan
>
>UN News Service
>21 Jul 2004
>
>The United Nations has received just $145 million so far of the
>$349 million in funds it has requested to ameliorate the
>humanitarian crisis engulfing Sudan's Darfur region,
>Secretary-General Kofi Annan said today, explaining the world body
>particularly needs helicopters and other equipment to deliver aid.
>
>Mr. Annan also told a press conference at UN Headquarters that the
>Sudanese Government has not taken "adequate steps" to meet its
>commitments to disarm the Arab-dominated Janjaweed militias that
>have conducted deadly attacks against Darfur's black African
>population. ...
>
>"The Sudanese Government doesn't have forever" to meet the pledges
>- such as disarming the Janjaweed and punishing those responsible
>for human rights abuses - it made on 3 July in a joint communiquÈ
>with the UN, the Secretary-General added.
>
>He said the UN may move to take tougher action against Sudan if it
>is not satisfied that the Government is making enough headway
>towards achieving its targets.
>
>So far progress has been uneven, he said, although he praised
>Khartoum for improving access to humanitarian agencies previously
>restricted from operating in Darfur. ...
>
>Mr. Annan said the international community has a responsibility to
>step up pressure on Sudan to meet its commitments and on all sides
>to negotiate a peace agreement "in good faith." But he noted that
>foreign donors are well behind in meeting the UN appeal for funds
>for Darfur and Chad.
>
>"We need money and more resources for humanitarian efforts. We need
>them now, not tomorrow. Tomorrow may already be too late," he said.
>"We are $204 million short. I appeal to donors to make good on the
>pledges they have already made, and to increase their assistance."
>
>...
>
>***************************************************************
>
>Mission to Darfur will see whether Sudan is meeting pledges - UN
>envoy
>
>UN News Service
>
>21 Jul 2004
>
>New York, Jul 21 2004 6:00PM - A joint mission of United Nations
>staff, ambassadors and Sudanese Government ministers and officials
>will travel to the troubled Darfur region in the next week to
>observe first-hand whether Khartoum is making progress in its
>pledges to disarm the militias attacking black Africans and to
>improve security so that displaced civilians can return to their
>homes.
>
>After briefing the Security Council behind closed doors today, Jan
>Pronk, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sudan,
>told reporters that the mission will spend three days in Darfur
>assessing three questions: the degree of security; the current
>state of the Arab-dominated militias, known as the Janjaweed; and
>the future of the more than one million internally displaced
>persons (IDPs).
>
>The mission has been organized under the auspices of the Joint
>Implementation Mechanism (JIM), a body set up after the UN and
>Sudan issued a communiquÈ on 3 July outlining their commitments to
>alleviate the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Darfur.
>
>"On the basis of their findings, we will have a new meeting" of the
>JIM, Mr. Pronk said, adding that meeting will discuss what
>measures, if any, may be necessary to stop the Janjaweed.
>
>The envoy said the mission has been established partly because of
>the conflicting nature of reports about what is happening in
>Darfur, a region the size of France that is beset by fighting
>between Sudanese Government forces and two rebel groups, and the
>deadly Janjaweed attacks against civilians.
>
>"Much of the information cannot be tested because we have
>information [and] we have counter-information," he said.
>
>More than a million people are internally displaced and another
>180,000 live as refugees in neighbouring Chad because of the
>fighting and the militia attacks, creating what senior UN officials
>have described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
>
>Mr. Pronk said it was a positive step that Darfur rebel leaders and
>Sudanese officials have agreed to meet in Geneva tomorrow to
>discuss how to revive peace negotiations, which stalled over the
>weekend. ...
>
>Before briefing the Council, Mr. Pronk told reporters that it
>should "give teeth" to the JIM, adding the UN's humanitarian and
>political efforts in Darfur will gain strength if the Council
>demonstrates its support. ,,,
>
>So far, Mr. Pronk said, Sudan has shown progress in improving
>access for humanitarian workers, but no improvement in security for
>the IDPs who remain fearful of further attacks by the Janjaweed if
>they return to their home villages. ...
>
>***************************************************************
>
>Prospects for Peace in Sudan Briefing 
>
>June-July 2004 
>
>Justice Africa 
>
>[Excerpts only; the full Justice Africa briefing should be
>available soon on http://www.justiceafrica.org/bulletin.htm]
>
>Darfur: The War 
>
>16. The level of violence in Darfur fell after the ceasefire
>agreement of April. But this decline was only relative to the
>exceptional intensity of the violence during February-April, and
>the fact that the militias have already destroyed most of the
>accessible targets. More than 300 villages have been destroyed.
>There are disturbing indications of a continuing level of atrocity
>and indeed a more recent re-escalation in violence. ...
>
>17. African Union ceasefire monitors arrived in Khartoum at the
>beginning of June. They face many obstacles. One of them is the
>absence of provisions for encampment of the parties' armed forces
>during the ceasefire. In the vast territory of Darfur, monitoring
>a ceasefire will be impossible unless the team can monitor the
>movements of the parties. The AU-led mission includes
>representatives from the parties, Chad, the UN, the US and the EU.
>It is important that the monitors make their presence felt in the
>field without delay. 
>
>18. President Bashir has announced on several occasions that the
>Janjawiid would be disarmed, in response to pressure from AU, U.S.
>and UN leaders. This statement has to be treated with some
>scepticism, given the poor record of adherence to commitments by
>the GoS. If carried out, however, it would be the single most
>important step towards a real ceasefire and the establishment of
>security for the civilian population. 
>
>To date, there are no indications of GoS action on this commitment,
>and indeed to the contrary, there are signs of continuing army-
>Janjawiid cooperation, and there is a real possibility that
>Janjawiid members will simply be given police uniforms and
>presented to the world as a civilian police force. A number of
>Janjawiid leaders have been moved from Darfur to Khartoum and other
>cities, a move intended to demonstrate the GoS's readiness to
>distance itself from them, but in reality an indication of close
>government control over their movements. 
>...
>
>Darfur: Humanitarian 
>
>21. The opportunity for a large-scale humanitarian operation before
>the rains make many roads impassable has now been lost.
>International agencies are painfully re-learning the lessons of how
>to operate in western Sudan. Important opportunities have been
>missed, for example for comprehensive immunisation programmes.
>Elevated mortality across Darfur cannot now be prevented. 
>
>Published estimates by NGO workers and USAID indicate that excess
>mortality is likely to be in the region of 100,000-350,000 over the
>next 12 months. These figures are credible, though we need to be
>vigilant over the inflationary tendency in some aid agencies'
>public predictions. Other visitors to the region have been more
>cautious in their projections for malnutrition and mortality. 
>
>22. After considerable international pressure, the GoS lifted some
>of the restrictions on humanitarian access to Darfur at the end of
>May. This came after the absurdity of a three-day travel permit
>being combined with a three-day delay in the ability to travel-a
>ruse illustrative of the GoS's long experience in manipulating
>humanitarian access in conflict zones. 
>
>Further promises have been made during the visits of Colin Powell
>and Kofi Annan. Will we see a protracted cat-and-mouse game between
>the GoS and humanitarian organisations over the latter's
>operations? This is a dispiriting prospect. It also suggests that
>there will be major hindrances in addressing the longer-term
>humanitarian imperative of returning the displaced Darfurians to
>their homes.  ...
>
>24. The focus on international relief efforts obscures the fact
>that the Sudanese government and citizens can do far more than
>foreign aid agencies. Sudan has a surplus of one million tons of
>grain, almost all of it in storage in eastern Sudan. Thus far the
>GoS has made no efforts to mobilise this immense resource. People
>in Darfur rely far more on their own efforts, including gathering
>wild foods, than on food assistance. 
>
>The single most effective measure to support survival would be to
>permit freedom of movement. That in turn would require security.
>...
>
>Darfur: Political 
>
>...
>
>26. The GoS is thus far refusing to treat Darfur with the urgency
>and seriousness it deserves. One element in this internal GoS
>disunity, with serious differences at the heart of government and
>the Congress Party. A majority of government members are
>undoubtedly against the war strategy, including senior ministers,
>members of the Congress Party and regional figures. 
>
>However, a powerful cabal of senior advisors and security officers
>retains control of the Darfur policy. The prominence of Gen. Abdel
>Rahim Mohamed Hussein, shadow head of the army at the time of the
>1989 coup, is symbolic of this. This means that the GoS leadership
>still prefers to characterise proposals for peacekeepers as an
>international conspiracy, and is showing no enthusiasm for engaging
>in peace initiatives. ...
>
>28. The African Union is handicapped by its low level of human and
>financial resources, and the fact that statements from the U.S. and
>others indicating support to the AU role have so far seemed rather
>pro forma. The AU Peace and Security Council was inaugurated at
>Heads of State level on 25 May (Africa Day). 
>
>Sudan, as a member of the PSC, was represented by President Omer al
>Bashir, who followed PSC procedure and withdrew for the closed-door
>discussion of Sudan. Before this, Pres. Bashir succeeded in
>deflecting criticism of the GoS by proposing a High Level
>Independent Committee to investigate reports of human rights
>abuses. The AU PSC responded by directing the African Commission on
>Human and People's Rights to investigate. ...
>
>The Genocide Question 
>
>35. If the international community decides that the events in
>Darfur constitute genocide, they will do so in accordance with the
>definition of the crime in the Genocide Convention, and the
>interpretations of that in the International Criminal Tribunal for
>Rwanda. (Of particular interest in this regard is the ruling of the
>ICTR in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, which determined that an
>ethnic group can be identified as 'a stable and permanent group
>whose membership is determined largely by birth'. This will get
>round the problem that there are no national or religious
>differences between groups in Darfur, no discernible racial
>differences and ethnicities are historically fluid-despite the
>language of the current generation of political leaders on both
>sides, who have adopted the 'African versus Arab' dichotomy.) 
>
>The Genocide Convention has a much broader definition of genocide
>than the common lay definitions, which focus on the Holocaust and
>more recently on Rwanda as well. The worry among major
>international powers is that once they have diagnosed genocide,
>they will be obliged to intervene militarily. However, this does
>not follow. The Genocide Convention is silent on the means that
>should be used to prevent and punish genocide. Military
>intervention is one option but not the only option. In the case of
>Darfur, prudential considerations may militate against military
>intervention, while other options for political action are also
>open. 
>
>36. If the UNSC or other international bodies are to describe the
>events in Darfur as 'genocide', a key consideration will be the
>intent of the perpetrators. An important feature of the Darfur
>campaign has been that while it is as yet impossible to ascertain
>genocidal intent at the highest level of government, it is clear
>that such intent has existed at important levels of the command
>structure of the militia and the security organs of the state. 
>
>While genocide has typically been a state crime in modern history,
>the responsibility of the highest leadership of the state is not a
>necessary condition in fact or in law for the crime to be
>committed. In the case of Darfur, it is clear that most members of
>the Government and Armed Forces have not supported the genocide,
>and in many cases have opposed it and worked to prevent it. 
>
>However, there is a clique within the security establishment that
>has the capacity, will and opportunity to perpetrate genocidal
>crimes. It is notable that the same individuals' names recur
>whenever responsibility for serious human rights violations is
>mooted, ever since the NIF took power in 1989 and in some cases
>from earlier. The U.S. government has also named seven militia
>leaders as the targets for punitive sanctions, and is considering
>naming some of their backers in Khartoum as well. 
>
>37. If the highest leadership of the GoS is indeed not guilty of
>conspiracy to commit genocide in Darfur, the way for it to prove
>this fact is to institute legal proceedings against those that are
>indeed guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
>This would be an international 'first': the first occasion on which
>a government has prosecuted its own servants for these crimes. If
>the GoS were to pursue this course of action, it would be a
>powerful indication that it has indeed made a genuine commitment to
>peace and human rights. ...
>
>*************************************************************
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>providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
>a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
>Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
>
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>************************************************************
>


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu