[Peace-discuss] Iraqi resistance (II)

[C. G. Estabrook]

[My previous post was an important observation on the nature of the
attacks in Iraq, from Rahul Mahajan, whose blog Empire Notes is generally
good.  The piece below is by the author of the best book on al-Qaida,
Jason Burke, on Zarqawi, whom the US wants to make the cynosure for
discussion of the Iraqi resistance, as Mahajan explains.  --CGE]

   The bin Laden of Baghdad
   Jason Burke on how Abu al-Zarqawi has become public enemy number one
   Sunday June 27, 2004
   The Observer

Dominating one wall of the huge room, faced by ranks of soldiers with
telephones and monitors, is a screen showing a large map of a substantial
chunk of Iraq, direct feeds from predator pilotless surveillance drones,
live TV pictures and three slogans: 'What has happened? What is happening?
What is to be done?'

The screen covers a portion of Iraq populated by nearly four million
people. One man is at the top of the 'What is to be done?' list.

Fadel al-Khalailah, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is Washington's
public enemy number, almost supplanting Osama bin Laden as the main focus
of the global counter-terrorist hunt. The Americans believe that the
38-year-old Jordanian is the mastermind behind much of the recent violence
in Iraq. Kill or capture him, the logic goes, and the insurgency falls
apart. The reward for his capture is now $10 million.

Unlike many senior militants, Zarqawi is from a poor background. Of Beduin
stock, he once ran a video shop and his family still live in a rundown
house not far from Amman, the Jordanian capital. In the late 1980s, he
joined the thousands of young Arabs helping the Afghans to fight the
Soviet forces, then, like so many of them, returned home determined to
continue the battle 'against unbelief' there. His efforts earned him a
lengthy prison sentence.

On his release in 1999, Zarqawi went to Europe, where he organised a
fundraising and terror network stretching from Germany to the UK, then
moved on to the one place where militants could plot in relative security
- Taliban-run Afghanistan. Inevitably he came into contact with bin Laden.
Washington has consistently claimed that he is 'linked' to the al-Qaeda
chief, but the relationship is more complex. German police intelligence
reports say that Zarqawi's al-Tauhid group was set up, not as a branch of
al-Qaeda, but in competition.

In fact, Zarqawi tried to get help from bin Laden to enhance his own
career. He received logistical support from the Saudi-born militant
leader, but never swore loyalty to him, instead working to build his own
reputation - crucial to drawing in recruits and funds from wealthy donors
in the Middle East.

His chance came in the autumn of 2001. Zarqawi fought the Americans, then
escaped through Iran. He seems to have arrived in northern Iraq - outside
the control of Saddam Hussein - in late 2002. Reports that the dictator's
surgeons amputated an injured leg in Baghdad are now known to be
incorrect. In fact, he appears to have linked up with the Ansar-ul-Islam
militant group, which was opposed to the regime.

Zarqawi has worked to co-ordinate the disparate elements of insurgents in
Iraq. As his profile has risen - boosted by spectacular suicide attacks,
public statements and the widely publicised execution of a US civilian -
an increasing number of militants have been drawn to his banner.

Some analysts see the focus on Zarqawi as a mistake.

'He has become Iraq's bin Laden,' said Charles Pena, of Washington's Cato
Institute. 'His role is more inspirational than operational. Killing him
won't end radical violence in Iraq any more than killing bin Laden will
end it globally.'

This weekend, sources in America believe Zarqawi's capture is imminent
but, even when his name is shifted to the 'What happened?' column on the
surveillance centre's screen, few think that the 'What needs to be done?'
column will be empty.

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004