[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Sudan: More Reports, Little Action

[Alfred Kagan]

>To: akagan at uiuc.edu
>Subject: Sudan: More Reports, Little Action
>From: africafocus at igc.org
>Sender: World Wide Web Owner <www at africafocus.org>
>Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 09:28:28 -0700
>
>
>Sudan: More Reports, Little Action 
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin
>May 10, 2004 (040510)
>(Reposted from sources cited below)
>
>Editor's Note 
>
>The United Nations Security Council met on Friday in private
>session and heard a report from the UN Commissioner for Human
>Rights documenting a "scorched earth policy" and "repeated crimes
>against humanity" by Sudanese militia and troops in Darfur, western
>Sudan. But they failed to take any collective action other than
>pledging to "monitor developments."
>
>Also on Friday, Human Rights Watch issued its latest report on
>Darfur, concluding that "the response of the international
>community to the events in Sudan has been nothing short of
>shameful."
>
>The U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee
>also held hearings in full session last week on Sudan. Despite
>recent statements by U.S. officials critical of Sudan, John
>Prendergast of the International Crisis Group told the House
>Committee that the Sudan government does not believe "the U.S. will
>apply significant or meaningful pressure in response to its
>actions, allowing Khartoum to act with virtual impunity." The
>committee unanimously passed a resolution urging President Bush to
>impose additional sanctions on Sudanese leaders.
>                                                       
>European governments have been largely silent, failing to match
>stronger statements by UN and U.S. officials. African governments,
>for their part, have not only failed to speak out, but have
>actively worked to undermine action by the UN Human Rights
>Commission. The election of Sudan as one of the African members on
>the Human Rights Commission itself, moreover, sent a strong message
>to Sudan of international indifference to the killings.
>
>This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from Prendergast's
>testimony to the House International Affairs Committee, and from
>another presentation by Omer Ismail of Darfur Peace and
>Development. Each made specific proposals for actions on Darfur by
>the U.S. and the international community.
>
>The web version of this bulletin contains two other recent
>documents:
>* Excerpts from the May 7 report on Darfur presented by the UN High
>Commissioner for Human Rights to the UN Security Council, at 
>http://www.africafocus.org/docs04/sud0405a.php#un
>and
>* An op-ed I wrote for the Providence Journal (May 6) entitled
>"Global Inertia Means Death in Sudan," at
>http://www.africafocus.org/docs04/sud0405a.php#oped
>
>An article by Charles Cobb Jr. of allafrica.com provides a fuller
>report on the House Committee hearing and on the political roots of
>Sudanese government policy
>  (http://allafrica.com/stories/200405070494.html)
>Other presentations made at the hearing are available at:
>http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/fullhear.htm
>
>For previous bulletins and other background links on Sudan, see:
>http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
>
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>
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>++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Committee on International Relations 
>U.S. House of Representatives
>
>John Prendergast
>Special Advisor to the President of the International Crisis Group
>
>May 6, 2004: "Ethnic Cleansing In Darfur" 
>
>[first section only: for full text, including background, see:
>http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/pen050604.htm]
>
>Thank you, Mr Chairman, for the invitation to testify at this
>hearing, and for the Committee's unflagging interest in the
>multi-faceted crisis in Sudan.
>
>My first opportunity to testify to a Congressional committee
>occurred nearly fifteen years ago, when I spoke of a government in
>Khartoum that was using ethnic-based militias to undertake ethnic
>cleansing in south-western Sudan. So it is almost surreal to be
>back again, with many visits here in between, talking about the
>very same tactics being deployed by the very same government with
>the very same result of displacement, destruction and death. This
>time, though, the victims are Muslim, and from the North. More than
>anything else, this should demonstrate to anyone that hasn't paid
>sufficient attention that Sudan's war never was simply between
>North and South, or between Muslim and Christian. Rather, this is
>a national war, in which a small group from the center of the
>country maintains power by any means necessary.
>
>Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the world still frets about
>what it should have or could have done during that 90-day
>slaughter. In Sudan, three times as many people have died, spread
>over a twenty year period. We are still fretting, still wringing
>our hands, still wondering if our aid workers will be granted
>travel permits to clean up after another bout of ethnic cleansing
>has occurred. Sudan is Rwanda in slow motion.
>
>At some point, culpability must enter into the equation. Through
>its military tactics, the government in Khartoum is responsible for
>creating the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (Darfur), the
>second largest death toll since World War II (the conflict with the
>SPLA), and the world's largest forgotten emergency (northern
>Uganda, courtesy of the Lord's Resistance Army). If we keep
>treating the symptoms without squarely identifying the cause, we
>will be here again in another fifteen years discussing these very
>same issues, still wringing our hands.
>
>I. ACTION NEEDED NOW
>
>There are five priorities that must be addressed immediately and
>simultaneously if we are to have any impact in ameliorating the
>current emergency and addressing the roots of the crisis.
>
>1. Prevent Famine in Darfur
>
>The international community acted too slowly to prevent ethnic
>cleansing from occurring in Darfur. The policy of constructive
>engagement that was pursued throughout 2003 in pursuit of an IGAD
>peace deal compromised the international response to Darfur's
>killing fields. The White House did not weigh in publicly until
>March 2004, after Khartoum's campaign was completed. Ironically,
>this was nearly ten years to the day after the Rwandan genocide had
>begun. Even UN representatives spoke out publicly before we heard
>from the President on this issue.
>
>Despite being too late to stop the ethnic cleansing campaign, the
>international community still has a chance to prevent a major
>famine from killing hundreds of thousands more Darfurians. At the
>middle levels of USAID up through to Roger Winter and Andrew
>Natsios, with some mid-level State Department support, the U.S. is
>engaging in this famine prevention effort. But much more must be
>done at the highest level to get the Ceasefire Commission stood up,
>get international monitors into Darfur, open up access to the OTHER
>half million internally displaced persons through road and rail
>options, and begin a process leading to the disarmament of the
>Janjaweed. Rather than waiting to see if access is granted, much
>more assertive planning must be done, in cooperation with Secretary
>General Annan on alternative access modalities, such as cross
>border operations from Libya, Chad or even southern Sudan, and/or
>options for Chapter VII armed protection of emergency aid
>distribution.
>
>2. Address Darfur's Political Roots
>
>It would be a grave mistake if the international community limited
>its involvement in Darfur to humanitarian band-aids. This is
>exactly what happened for most of the last fifteen years in
>southern Sudan, while over two million people perished as the aid
>faucet was turned off and on at the whim of the government in
>Khartoum. There must be a corresponding push to get a credible,
>internationally supported peace process established quickly for
>Darfur, as soon as the ceasefire is operational. Venue, structure
>and substance for the talks all need to become the subject of
>immediate international interest. ICG will have a report on these
>critical questions in the next couple of weeks.
>
>A negotiated political solution between the government and the
>Darfur rebels is, ultimately, the only option for restoring peace
>and stability to Darfur. This is also the best way to deal with the
>devastating humanitarian situation in Darfur and the massive
>displacement in a manner that can be sustained.
>
>3. Close the IGAD Deal in Naivasha
>
>The other casualty of the international community's policy of
>constructive engagement with Khartoum on the IGAD peace process has
>been the delay in finalizing the deal in Naivasha. Constructive
>engagement and quiet diplomacy in the IGAD talks emboldened the
>Sudan government to continue bombing in Darfur and delaying in
>Naivasha. The lesson should not be that engagement is wrong, but
>rather that engagement needs to be backed up by more serious and
>multilateral pressure, as outlined below.
>
>I just returned from Naivasha, where all of the major issues have
>now been ironed out. All that remains is for the parties to take
>the political decision to sign. If the government decides to sign
>the framework deal, we must understand it is only that -  a
>framework - and that work will have to continue to finalize a
>comprehensive peace agreement, which provides yet another
>opportunity for delay and obfuscation.
>
>A major push is needed to finish this process and begin
>implementing the deal. Such closure will lay the groundwork for
>resolution of the Darfur crisis as well.
>
>4. Multilateralize the Sudan Crisis
>
>When the international community has been united on Sudan and used
>pressures and incentives in a coordinated way, we have seen
>progress on a number of issues. But unfortunately, that has not
>usually been the case. The U.S. must work much more intently
>through the UN Security Council to convince others to counter the
>threat to international peace and security that the Sudan crisis
>represents, given the major spillover effects in Chad, Uganda and
>elsewhere.
>
>When the UN World Food Programme and UN Human Rights Commission
>brief the UN Security Council on Friday, the U.S. must be prepared
>to press forward with a resolution that provides Chapter VII
>authority for further action in Sudan. That authority should be
>used for contingency planning for the protection of emergency aid
>deliveries as well as for the establishment of a high level panel
>to investigate the commission of war crimes in Darfur, as a
>precursor to the possible establishment of further mechanisms of
>accountability.
>
>Chapter VII authority remains a pipe dream unless key Security
>Council members, starting with the U.S., begin to urgently campaign
>for such authority. Sources within the Security Council and the UN
>Secretariat believe that if the U.S. is willing to seriously engage
>on behalf of Chapter VII authority, the dynamic of debate could
>change. Leadership is required. At present, the U.S. mission
>remains fixated on getting humanitarian workers into Darfur, a
>worthy but insufficient objective.
>
>5. Build Leverage
>
>The Sudan government no longer believes the U.S. will apply
>significant or meaningful pressure in response to its actions,
>allowing Khartoum to act with virtual impunity. This results from
>three years of a policy of constructive engagement that has
>witnessed, but not reacted to, a human rights crisis without
>parallel in Africa. Not delivering promised incentives related to
>normalization of relations is the current form of pressure being
>utilized by the U.S. This is again insufficient.
>
>It has to be understood that regime survival has been the principal
>impetus for movement in the IGAD peace process. Khartoum was forced
>to recalculate after 9/11 because of concern about possible U.S.
>action. Khartoum now believes it has effectively neutralized the
>post-9/11 threat of U.S. action, and has called the U.S. bluff.
>This renewed confidence could lead to non-implementation of any
>IGAD agreement, and continued intransigence in Darfur.
>
>To alter this damaging calculation, the existing set of sanctions
>and pressures should be enhanced by the following U.S.-led actions:
>
>* Apply targeted sanctions against specific members of the regime
>that are most directly responsible for the human rights violations
>in Darfur. This would include travel bans and asset freezes. All
>efforts should be made to multilateralize these targeted sanctions
>through engagement with the European Union and the United Nations.
>The most important point is to create individual culpability for
>the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
>
>* Impose a UN arms embargo through the UN Security Council, banning
>the importation of arms by any party to the conflict, including the
>government.  
>
>* Lay the foundation for the possible creation of further
>mechanisms for accountability for war crimes and crimes against
>humanity by pressing for the establishment and deployment of a UN
>high level panel to conduct an investigation and report to the
>Council and the Secretary General.  
>
>* Undertake much more concerted and multilateral planning and
>diplomacy in pursuit of cross border emergency aid operations,
>looking at Chad, Libya and southern Sudan as possible staging
>areas.  
>
>* Revive discussion of capital market sanctions, with the new
>caveat that such a provision would only apply if the government of
>Sudan were found by the UN to be responsible for ethnic cleansing
>or genocide. Thus, a high bar would be set which would not open the
>door to the indiscriminate use of this policy instrument, but would
>be reserved for only the most heinous of crimes against humanity.
>
>*************************************************************
>
>Committee on International Relations
>U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
>
>Omer G. Ismail
>Program Director, Darfur Peace and Development
>
>May 6, 2004: "Ethnic Cleansing In Darfur"
>
>[excerpts: for full text see:
>http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/ism050604.htm]
>
>In the wake of the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, the
>world that had said "never again" several times in the past, has
>come face to face with another human catastrophe. The present
>crisis in Darfur, far Western Sudan, is of different character, yet
>has too much the same blue print. ... words are hardly enough to
>curb the cruel determination of the regime in Khartoum.
>
>The current humanitarian and the human rights situation in Darfur
>
>Many experts, diplomats, journalists and politicians are describing
>the humanitarian situation in Darfur with words like catastrophe,
>calamity, the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today,
>10,000 to 30,000 are already dead; one million people have been
>displaced, of which 110,000 have crossed the border to live as
>refugees in neighboring Chad. Their livelihood has been destroyed
>and their terrible destitution is evident. Roger Winter of the
>USAID has estimated that 100,000 more will perish before we can
>catch up with the situation. ... Mr. Gerard Galucci, the Charge
>D'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, spoke recently of a
>looming famine, a sentiment echoed by experts in the UN, USAID and
>several international NGO"s working in Darfur. ...
>
>The human rights violations registered in Darfur are unprecedented.
>The marauding Janjaweed militia, aided by the army, has gone on a
>rampage of killings, pillaging livestock, burning villages and
>gang-raping women. Many hundreds of villages have been destroyed
>and their inhabitants displaced. Women were branded on the forehead
>or hands after they were raped, to live with the shame and become
>stigmatized for life. ...
>
>The scorch-earth policy of the Government that has led to the
>demise of two million people in south Sudan, and hundreds of
>thousands in the Nuba Mountains continues in Darfur. The government
>of Sudan ---which has perfected the art of stalling and deceit ---
>has also taken several measures to conceal the evidence of ethnic
>cleansing, and human rights violations in the area by:
>
># Delaying issuing visas to the human rights as well as the
>humanitarian staff of the U.N. and other NGO's in order to
>"clean-up" before their arrival.   
>
># Even when visas are issued, the delegations will be delayed in
>Khartoum for weeks because of "lack of security" in the areas they
>intend to visit, or will be denied those permits to travel and
>work in Sudan.   
>
># The Government has started to absorb its savage militia allies --
>"the Janjaweed" -- into the regular army and is in the process of
>removing them from Darfur under the guise of redeployment.   
>
># The Government of Sudan issued death certificates to the known
>leaders of the Janjaweed and removed them from the area to avoid
>future trials or becoming witnesses to implicate the Government. 
>
># The Government is using military marked trucks to remove corpses
>from mass graves and rebury them away from the identified sites.
>Large sums of money were also paid to some local leaders to deny
>the atrocities, and with the help of security forces, intimidate
>possible witnesses.
>
>The US government response, North-South v. North-West
>
>The involvement of the US government in Sudan is vital to the peace
>and stability of the country. The Machackos protocol that was
>signed in July of 2002 between the GOS and the Sudan People's
>Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has paved the road to a
>comprehensive settlement to the North-South issue. With the
>negotiations in Naivasha inching towards fruition, the US
>government is wary of undermining that process by pushing too hard
>on the GOS. Hence, its official response to the crisis in Darfur
>has been that of hesitation to commit to more than strong words for
>the regime in Khartoum, denouncing the atrocities of the GOS and
>its Janjaweed allies.
>
>The conflict in Darfur emphasizes the political failure of the
>successive governments in Sudan to address the issues of
>power-sharing and equal distribution of wealth. It is a political
>problem and demands a political solution. The US government -- in
>the words of Mr. Gerard Galucci -- seems to consider the problem to
>be merely humanitarian in nature and capable of being solved solely
>in these terms. But the humanitarian catastrophe, and the massive
>human rights abuses that have produced the catastrophe, are
>symptoms of the much larger political problem. ... It fits all too
>well into the overall GOS scheme of Arabization and Islamization of
>the entire country. The manifestation of this policy was evident in
>declaring Jihad (religious war) against the South. The Nuba
>Mountains was the next site for the ethnic cleansing and forced
>depopulation, and Darfur is the culmination of the previous
>efforts. ...
>
>The role of the US and the International community
>
>In the face of Khartoum's relentless bad faith and these deplorable
>actions, the international community, led by the U.S., should do
>the following:
>
>* Work to pass a resolution in the Security Council rebuking the
>Government of Sudan in the strongest terms, with the threat of
>military intervention if complete humanitarian access is not
>granted to all of Darfur.  
>
>* A no fly zone over Greater Darfur should be imposed.  
>
>* A delegation from the U.S. Congress should visit Khartoum and
>tell the Government of Sudan in unambiguous language that it will
>face dire consequences if unfettered access was not granted to
>humanitarian aid to Darfur, as well as demanding that the GOS stop
>its reign of terror and disband and dismantle the Janjaweed
>militia.  
>
>* Encourage President Bush and the leaders of the European troika
>involved in the North-South peace talks to speak of the importance
>of a peaceful settlement in Darfur as an integral part to the
>overall peace in Sudan.  
>
>* The international community should move the North-West peace
>talks from Chad, which has demonstrated its inability to remain
>impartial and an honest broker of peace. The rebels have lost faith
>in Chad after they were intimidated and by the virtue of the fact
>that Chad knowingly allowed unauthorized individuals that do not
>represent the rebels to sign an agreement on political issue with
>Khartoum. The European countries or the US should be the host to
>any coming negotiations especially after what has happened in
>Geneva and the shameless position of the African countries.
>
>In conclusion:
>
>While the North-South negotiations should continue, the leverage of
>the US government over the GOS should be used to send a clear
>message that the GOS must expedite the peace process by negotiating
>in good faith and stop its stalling tactics. On the North-West
>front, the international community should stand firm and demand of
>the GOS unfettered access for humanitarian aid and access for as
>many teams as are required, and to work for as long as necessary to
>unearth the crimes against humanity and demand that the
>perpetrators stand trial for their heinous crimes.
>
>The conflict in Darfur, if not addressed properly will not only
>undermine whatever peace may be desired for Sudan, but will
>significantly contribute to the instability of the whole
>sub-region. With the lessons of Rwanda still fresh in our memories,
>we owe it to coming generations to prevent another genocide from
>taking place.
>
>*************************************************************
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>providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
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>
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>************************************************************


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu