[Peace-discuss] Fwd: Sudan: Darfur and Beyond

[Alfred Kagan]

>To: akagan at uiuc.edu
>Subject: Sudan: Darfur and Beyond
>From: africafocus at igc.org
>Sender: World Wide Web Owner <www at africafocus.org>
>Date: Sun, 12 Sep 2004 08:55:36 -0700
>
>
>Sudan: Darfur and Beyond
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin
>Sep 12, 2004 (040912)
>(Reposted from sources cited below)
>
>Editor's Note
>
>U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement last week that the
>Sudanese government and its proxy militias have indeed committed
>genocide in Darfur caught media attention and incrementally
>increased the pressure on the Khartoum regime to rein in the
>violence. However, the Secretary of State also noted that the
>determination in itself dictated no new action by Washington. The
>political will of the international community to increase pressure
>remains in doubt. How best to focus such pressure is also under
>debate.
>
>This issue of AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from two
>recent reports on Sudan, by the International Crisis Group and
>Justice Africa. While the two reports differ on the issue of
>sanctions, both stress not only the need for stepped-up pressure on
>Khartoum, but also that the scope of such pressure must extend
>beyond Darfur to the stalled peace agreement in the south and
>issues of national governance as well.
>
>The point was underlined by a speech on Friday to the Congressional
>Black Caucus by southern Sudanese leader John Garang, who said
>stopping the violence required a neutral force of 30,000 troops,
>including one-third each from the Sudanese government, the Sudanese
>People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M), and the African Union.
>The force should be funded by the international community and
>monitored by international observers, he added.
>  [http://allafrica.com/stories/200409120001.html]
>
>Secretary of State Powell's testimony, including his conclusion
>that genocide has been committed in Darfur, is available at
>http://allafrica.com/stories/200409090553.html The Department of
>State's investigative report on Darfur is available at
>http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm
>
>++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan
>
>International Crisis Group
>
>Africa Report No. 83, 23 August 2004
>
>Executive Summary and Recommendations
>
>[excerpts only; full text of summary and of report available on
>http://www.crisisweb.org]
>
>The international response to the crisis in the western Sudanese
>region of Darfur remains limp and inadequate, its achievements so
>far desperately slight. The UN Security Council must, by its
>review deadline of 30 August 2004, endorse a new international
>action plan -- taking tougher measures against the Khartoum
>government, which has acted in bad faith throughout the crisis,
>and authorising the African Union (AU), with stronger
>international support, to follow up more decisively its efforts
>to improve the situation on the ground and mediate a political
>settlement.
>
>History has shown that Khartoum will respond constructively to
>direct pressure, but this pressure must be concerted, consistent
>and genuine. Its sixteen-month ethnic cleansing campaign has
>elicited a slow-motion reaction which is having a negligible
>positive impact. ...
>
>On 30 July 2004 the UN Security Council finally passed its first
>resolution in response to the atrocities, including killings and
>systematic rape, being committed in Darfur, but that resolution
>was most notable for what it failed to do. It placed an
>essentially meaningless arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias
>who have caused so much havoc and the rebels alike, but directed
>no measures at the Sudanese government for whom the Janjaweed
>have acted as a proxy and left officials in Khartoum confident
>they could continue indefinitely to deflect pressure to resolve
>the crisis. ...
>
>Months after Secretary Powell warned that significant
>international action could be only days away and Secretary
>General Annan raised the possibility of military intervention,
>Khartoum remains adept at saying and doing just enough to avoid a
>robust international response. Key officials, particularly within
>military intelligence, continue to undermine avenues toward
>peace, directing integration of the Janjaweed into official
>security bodies like the police, army and Popular Defence Forces
>(a paramilitary arm of the government), rather than disarming
>them. ...
>
>The one bright spot is the AU's increasingly energetic response.
>The regional organisation's observers in Darfur have filed
>reports that demonstrate the ceasefire is being violated
>regularly by both sides but particularly by the government. Its
>some 100 observers are being joined by a force of 300 Nigerian
>and Rwandan troops who will protect them, and it has intensified
>planning for a much larger force of some 3,000 troops that it
>wants to use for the wider purpose of protecting civilians. The
>European Union (EU), the U.S. and others who have indicated a
>willingness to support, logistically and financially, the
>deployment and maintenance of such a force must convincingly
>demand that Khartoum accept it and its mandate.
>
>The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly
>finalised peace agreement to end the larger and older civil war
>between the government and the insurgent Sudan People's
>Liberation Army (SPLA). As long as Darfur festers, the chance
>remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the
>concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn
>government policy back toward war. There is also less prospect
>that a final agreement with the SPLA, even if signed, could be
>implemented, or that there would be the necessary support in the
>West to provide both sides the help they need to make that
>agreement work.
>
>It is vital, therefore, for the AU also to enhance its efforts to
>mediate the political problems at the root of the Darfur crisis.
>The international community must provide full support to the
>AU-sponsored Darfur talks, such as those scheduled to begin on 23
>August in Abuja, while it helps keep the government/SPLA
>negotiation under the regional organisation IGAD
>(Inter-governmental Authority on Development) moving forward. The
>two sets of peace talks are very much interrelated. For example,
>the AU should utilise the terms of the deal that has been struck
>on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a starting point
>for its work on the Darfur negotiations. The international
>community must support both processes robustly, and the mediation
>teams should find ways to coordinate closely. Had there been a
>comprehensive national peace process from the outset, the Darfur
>rebellion might well have been avoided: the need now is to
>maximise linkages and leverage.
>
>RECOMMENDATIONS
>
>To the UN Security Council:
>
>1. Pass a resolution on 30 August 2004 that:
>
>(a) concludes that the Government of Sudan has not satisfactorily
>fulfilled its obligations within the time period established by
>Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004;
>
>(b) imposes mandatory targeted sanctions against specific
>government officials most responsible for supporting the
>atrocities in Darfur and against the key businesses of the ruling
>National Congress Party (NCP), particularly those doing business
>abroad and those in the oil services sector;
>
>(c) imposes a mandatory, comprehensive and monitored arms embargo
>against the government;
>
>(d) authorises the African Union (AU) to form, lead and deploy to
>Darfur a mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops -- and
>preferably many more -- with a mandate to provide civilian
>protection and use force as necessary, demands that the
>Government of Sudan accept such a mission and cooperate with it,
>and indicates that if such cooperation is not forthcoming urgent
>consideration will be given to appropriate further action;
>
>(e) demands that the Government of Sudan accept deployment of a
>substantially enlarged contingent of UN Human Rights Monitors
>from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
>and cooperate with it; and
>
>(f) authorises an International Commission of Inquiry into war
>crimes and crimes against humanity, including systematic rape and
>other gender-based violence, committed during the Darfur
>conflict.
>
>To the African Union (AU):
>
>2. Continue and expand urgent efforts to resolve the Darfur
>crisis, in particular by:
>
>(a) completing the deployment to Darfur of personnel to monitor
>the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and the deployment of the
>Rwandan and Nigerian-led force to protect those monitors;
>
>(b) raising and deploying, under UN Security Council
>authorisation, an AU-led mission consisting of at least 3,000
>troops -- and preferably many more -- to provide civilian
>protection in Darfur, using force if necessary;
>
>(c) being prepared to request further assistance from the UN,
>such as the imposition of a no-fly zone, and from member states
>as may be needed should cooperation not be forthcoming from the
>Government of Sudan or the environment in Darfur otherwise proves
>to be hostile; and
>
>(d) pursuing mediation of serious political negotiations between
>the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM movements on an
>agreement that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
>
>To the U.S., EU and Others Willing to Support the AU Initiatives:
>
>3. Increase assistance immediately to the AU-led Ceasefire
>Commission charged with monitoring and facilitating
>implementation of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and apply
>pressure to all sides to implement fully their commitments under
>that agreement.
>
>4. Work with the AU to provide strong support, including funding,
>equipment, and transportation logistics (e.g., helicopters and
>other airlift capacity), for the rapid deployment to Darfur and
>effective operation there of an AU-led mission consisting of at
>least 3,000 troops mandated to protect civilians, using force if
>necessary.
>
>5. Develop contingency plans to provide appropriate military
>reinforcement to the AU-led mission if it encounters serious
>resistance.
>
>6. Make clear to the Government of Sudan that it cannot expect to
>receive the kind of peace benefit that would otherwise be its due
>in the event of reaching a peace agreement with the SPLA unless
>it meets its international commitments on Darfur and otherwise
>cooperates in resolving that crisis promptly.
>
>To the UN and International Donors:
>
>7. Support an urgent surge in humanitarian capacity for Darfur by
>fully funding the UN humanitarian appeal and providing logistical
>support, including military transport where necessary, to enable
>much greater levels of assistance to be provided rapidly to a
>larger number of locations in Chad and Darfur.
>
>8. Negotiate with the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM
>movements to begin immediately cross-line humanitarian aid
>deliveries to civilian populations in rebel-held areas, while
>making contingency plans to distribute such aid in the event that
>access is denied.
>
>To the Government of Sudan:
>
>9. Immediately implement steps to neutralise the Janjaweed
>militia and stabilise the situation in Darfur ... Specifically,
>the government should:
>
>(a) identify all militia groups it has armed and supported during
>the course of the rebellion;
>
>(b) cut off all material and political support to the Janjaweed;
>
>(c) begin to demobilise the Janjaweed;
>
>(d) expel all foreign elements within the Janjaweed;
>
>(e) dismiss senior military intelligence officials responsible
>for the policy of arming the Janjaweed and turning them loose
>against civilians; and
>
>(f) initiate legal action against individual Janjaweed
>responsible for war crimes.
>
>10. Allow unobstructed humanitarian access immediately to all
>areas of Darfur and cease using claims of security considerations
>as justification for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian
>aid.
>
>11. Accept the deployment in Darfur of an African Union (AU)
>mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops, with a mandate to
>provide civilian protection, and cooperate with that mission.
>
>12. Allow full access immediately to Human Rights Monitors from
>the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
>
>To the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA), and the Justice and
>Equality Movement (JEM):
>
>13. Immediately implement all provisions of the 8 April 2004
>ceasefire agreement and in particular cease attacks on aid
>convoys to government-controlled areas, while facilitating
>humanitarian relief to areas under rebel control by establishing
>teams to assist populations to receive and make use of aid.
>
>14. Clarify political agendas in advance of the formal initiation
>of peace talks.
>
>To the International Supporters of the IGAD Process, especially
>the Observer Countries (U.S., UK, Norway and Italy), the UN, AU
>and Arab League:
>
>15. Intensify collective pressures on the Government of Sudan and
>the SPLA to resolve the outstanding issues rapidly and sign a
>comprehensive peace agreement before the end of 2004.
>
>16. Encourage the Government of Sudan and the SPLA respectively,
>once the negotiations on security arrangements for that
>comprehensive peace agreement have been concluded and even before
>final signature, to involve First Vice President Ali Osman Taha
>and Chairman John Garang directly in the AU-facilitated
>negotiations on Darfur.
>
>To the IGAD and AU Mediators:
>
>17. Establish close cooperation and take steps to coordinate
>ideas on the overlap between the two peace processes, without
>making progress on one dependent on the other.
>
>18. Use the IGAD provisional agreements on the Nuba Mountains and
>Southern Blue Nile as a starting point for work on the Darfur
>negotiations.
>
>Nairobi/Brussels, 23 August 2004
>
>*************************************************************
>
>Prospects for peace in Sudan:
>
>Justice Africa Briefing 
>
>August-September 2004 
>
>[brief excerpts only; for full briefing see
>http://www.justiceafrica.org/bulletin.htm]
>
>Overview 
>
>1. The GoS is pursuing the high-risk strategy of seeking a
>solution on its own terms in Darfur, anticipating that
>international interests in the Naivasha process will allow it to
>prevail. It may yet be proven right. It has made only modest
>progress in implementing its commitments in Darfur, focusing its
>efforts on building an international coalition opposed to
>sanctions. The practical obstacles to ensuring security are
>considerable, but the GoS needs to demonstrate much more goodwill
>and determination. 
>
>2. The Darfur peace process is making some progress in the
>AU-convened talks at Abuja, Nigeria. It is clear that the
>negotiations will take some time. The best options for immediate
>progress include upgrading the AU military force in the region,
>while refining the proposals for establishing security and moving
>towards a comprehensive political settlement. 
>
>3. There are three parallel negotiating tracks at present.
>Naivasha is currently in suspended animation, while the Abuja
>talks progress. The NDA-GoS talks have resumed in Cairo under
>Egyptian auspices. How can these initiatives be coordinated?
>Should they be sequenced? The GoS is content for delays to
>continue at Naivasha, as it wants to organise its core northern
>constituencies before concluding deals with the SPLA and the
>Darfur rebels. GoS hints about linking the peace processes are in
>fact an indication that it prefers to slow them down. 
>
>4. The international community and many observers remain opposed
>to such close linkages, preferring to emphasise the successful
>completion of Naivasha without it being complicated by the Darfur
>conflict. In fact there is no reason for delaying Naivashsa. Its
>conclusion before the other tracks makes it the main reference to
>any subsequent Agreements on Sudan. 
>
>...
>
>
>9. The GoS was slow at drawing up its plan for controlling the
>Janjawiid, presenting it to the Joint Implementation Mechanism
>only on 19 August. This reflects the fact that a large proportion
>of the Janjawiid, including its commanders, are part of the
>command structure of the Sudanese armed forces and PDF, so that
>disarming them while also maintaining the pretence that they are
>an independent force represents political challenges. 
>
>The actions taken thus far for disarmament have been token only,
>as alluded to by the UNSG's report. The well-documented attack on
>26 August demonstrated the GoS failure to implement its
>commitments. Was this an instance of contempt for the
>international community? Or internal dissension within the ruling
>clique? At the moment it is unclear, but it is probable that the
>government has yet to decide on its plan of action. (In this
>respect it is interesting to note that the GoS reported to the
>JIM that some of the militias were indeed under its control, and
>were associated with the PDF, thus contradicting its earlier
>statements and explicitly opening up the agenda of disarming the
>PDF itself.) 
>
>There is no sign of any efforts to prosecute Janjawiid leaders
>allegedly responsible for abuses. 
>
>...
>
>
>11. The UNSG's report concludes, fairly, that the GoS has not met
>some of the commitments it entered into. This conclusion is
>qualified by the report's acknowledgement of practical
>difficulties in making progress, and efforts already made. The
>challenge is now on the UNSC to find a means of maintaining or
>intensifying pressure. There is an international consensus,
>supported by most in Sudan, that sanctions are crude and
>ineffective. The rebel movements are calling for a no-fly zone
>over Darfur to prevent aerial attacks. But the key areas for
>progress must be the parties' negotiation of a political
>settlement, and the substantial upgrading of the African Union
>military presence in Darfur. 
>
>Darfur: The Parties' Calculations 
>
>12. The GoS calculation is that the international community does
>not have sufficient seriousness or staying power on the Darfur
>issue, and that time is therefore on its side. It assumed that
>with the support of the Arab League, the benefit of the doubt
>from some prominent African states plus Russia and China, it
>would evade sanctions at the UN Security Council. The GoS also
>calculates that the U.S. and other western countries will not
>risk derailing the Naivasha process over Darfur. 
>
>...
>
>18. Both principals in Darfur have been counting on the SPLA. The
>GoS assumes that the Naivasha process, whether completed or in
>suspension, effectively neutralises the SPLA as an opposition.
>The rebels have assumed that their contacts with the SPLM will
>translate into political solidarity. However, neither side should
>take the Southerners for granted. The GoS should not
>underestimate the determination of the Southerners and the SPLM
>not to be outmanoeuvred now or during the transitional period.
>Neither should the Darfur rebels underestimate the Southerners'
>commitment to peace in the South, and their resistance to
>revisiting the North-South peace process and agreements reached
>therein, on account of the Darfur conflict. 
>
>The SPLA position on Darfur, made clear by a statement by the
>Chairman at New Site during the visit of Senator Bill Frist, is
>that there should be a tripartite security force consisting of
>GoS, SPLA and African Union forces (10,000 of each). This
>proposal was rejected out of hand by the GoS. The SPLA is also
>encouraging the Darfur rebels to study closely the Naivasha
>agreements on the three areas. Clearly, the SPLA leadership is
>becoming concerned that the Darfur conflict may delay the
>completion of the Naivasha process. 
>
>Conclusions 
>
>41. Naivasha remains the linchpin of peace in Sudan. Without the
>completion of Naivasha, all other peace processes are doomed to
>failure. The completion of Naivasha will significantly change the
>political dynamics in Khartoum and make a settlement of all other
>outstanding issues and conflicts, beginning with Darfur, much
>easier. In addition, many of the formulae agreed at Naivasha,
>such as those for the three areas, can with suitable modification
>be applied to Darfur and the Beja. For all these reasons, it is
>important that the Naivasha process be rejuvenated and brought to
>a rapid conclusion. The GoS should not be allowed to
>procrastinate or be distracted by other concerns, however
>legitimate they may be.
>
>42. The outlines for a settlement in Darfur are in place. The
>mediation process is beginning to function. The key issues have
>been identified. The monitoring mechanisms have been identified,
>even if the AU capacity is as yet inadequate. The key
>international organisations are appraised of the issue. However,
>there should be no illusions that this will be a rapid process. 
>
>The best that can reasonably be expected is a framework agreement
>in the next two months or so, and the creation of a strong
>secretariat on the Naivasha model, followed by negotiations on
>the details and the implementation modalities, concurrent with an
>upgraded and more assertive AU peace support operation (more
>African troops with a more robust mandate), linked to sustained
>political and diplomatic pressure by the international community.
>
>The GoS, currently intransigent, is likely to see that conceding
>a more effective AU presence is its least bad option. 
>
>*************************************************************
>AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
>providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues,
>with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies.
>AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
>
>AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus at igc.org.
>Please write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the
>bulletin, or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information 
>about reposted material, please contact directly the original source 
>mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see 
>http://www.africafocus.org
>
>************************************************************


-- 


Al Kagan
African Studies Bibliographer and Professor of Library Administration
Africana Unit, Room 328
University of Illinois Library
1408 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801, USA

tel. 217-333-6519
fax. 217-333-2214
e-mail. akagan at uiuc.edu