[Peace-discuss] Israeli policy

[C. G. Estabrook]

[A good summary by Ran HaCohen, born in the Netherlands in 1964 and reared
in Israel; B.A. in Computer Science, M.A. in Comparative Literature and
PhD is in Jewish Studies, he's a university teacher in Israel and literary
critic for the Israeli daily Yedioth Achronoth. He begins here with the
important observation that "There is nothing very complicated or
mysterious about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."  --CGE]

	September 13, 2004
	Back to Indirect Occupation?
	by Ran HaCohen

There is nothing very complicated or mysterious about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Never trust those who present it as an
extremely complex issue, with endless political, historical, religious and
cultural repercussions, on which you cannot take an informed stand without
a Ph.D. in history and three decades of political activity for AIPAC. It's
quite simple: the Arab states and the Palestinians have in fact
acknowledged Israel's right to exist in peace, if it withdraws from the
occupied Palestinian territories taken in 1967; whereas Israel wants to
keep these territories, though it doesn't quite know how. The conflict is
as simple as that.

Occupation Direct vs. Indirect

Within the Israeli ruling clique the military and political echelon there
are two basic attitudes on how to rule the territories: a direct attitude,
and an indirect one. The direct attitude wants the Israeli army to do the
job; the indirect one would rather rely on co-opted Palestinian elements.
There are, of course, myriad nuisances between these two poles after all,
each politician and every columnist tries to be original but these are the
basic approaches. Note that none of them wants to end the occupation: they
both want to ameliorate it.

Each attitude has its pros and cons. The direct attitude trusts the
Israeli military, which is reliable and always eager to extend its sphere
of power; but this attitude has a minus on the public opinion front, and
its financial costs are high. Using Israeli soldiers to rule millions of
civilians also leads to friction with the Israeli Supreme Court and with
Israeli human rights groups. The indirect attitude solves many of these
problems: the policing is delegated to Palestinians unhampered by the
Israeli law, it's cheaper and looks better; but the co-opted Palestinians
are not as reliable and might betray Israel's interests for their own
people's sake.

Oslo and After

The Oslo years 1993-2000, under Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres and Netanyahu
were thus far the most elaborate experiment in implementing the indirect
attitude, using the Palestinian Authority as Israel's long arm.  It was in
fact quite successful: under cover of an ongoing "peace process," the
Israeli settlements grew enormously, and the occupation could be
entrenched ever more. It was Prime Minister Barak, who had opposed the
Oslo agreements all along in favor of the direct attitude, who probably
fearing the Palestinian Authority could become too independent effectively
managed to put an end to this experiment (and blamed the Palestinians for
it). To undo the realities shaped by the indirect attitude, Barak and his
successor Sharon launched the most comprehensive military assault on the
Palestinian territories, directly re-occupied almost the entire
Palestinian territories and demolished Palestinian self-policing,
destroying its installations, smashing its symbols of sovereignty, and
killing Palestinian policemen whenever possible.

Unique Mixture

Occupation is an inherently unstable situation. Therefore, neither the
direct nor the indirect attitude could ever be implemented in full. For
example, even when Israel, according to the principles of the direct
attitude, confines Arafat to his devastated office in Ramallah, it still
employs the propaganda of the indirect attitude whenever it accuses the
caged "president" of not fighting off terrorism, as if he were still in
charge of Israel's interests. More importantly, during the shift from
indirect to direct occupation after Oslo, Israel succeeded in a unique and
unprecedented manner to not resume its responsibilities for the daily life
of the occupied population, leaving education, health services, etc., to
the all-but-destroyed Palestinian Authority and to the "donor states":  a
convenient relic of the indirect attitude, which even the most devoted
supporters of the direct occupation are careful to keep in place, for
obvious financial reasons.

Turn of the Tide?

After four years of direct occupation, there are now signs that Israel is
trying to reverse the tide and return to a more indirect kind of
occupation. Which is why these days are becoming quite reminiscent of the
Oslo period.

A shocking similarity to the Oslo years was apparent a few weeks ago, when
a controversy broke out in Israel over "rearming Palestinian police," in
the very same terms as during the Oslo years. The right wing aired its old
Oslo slogan, "Don't give them guns," whereas supporters of the measure
explained that unless it is taken (i.e., unless indirect occupation is
partly re-installed), Israel will be blamed for "chaos" in the Palestinian
territories. By the way, only few realized that the (meanwhile suspended)
measure had nothing to do with "re-arming," but rather with changing the
rules of engagement: Palestinian policemen, armed during the Oslo years
with full Israeli consent, their weapons all registered in Israel, were
turned during the Intifada into legitimate military targets (Newspeak
reported this license to kill as "armed men identified and shot by the
Israeli army"), a decision which Israel may now reverse.

"Disengagement"

The most apparent shift in public discourse, also quite reminiscent of the
Oslo years, is due to Sharon's "Disengagement Plan," which consists of
three parts:

(a) entrenching the Israeli occupation in the West Bank by strengthening
and expanding the "settlements blocks," aided by the Apartheid Wall;

(b) entrenching the siege of Gaza from the outside, in the typical manner
of indirect occupation, culminating in the crazy plan to dig a moat along
Gaza's border to separate it from Egypt; and

(c) dismantling the Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Officially, this plan is presented as "unilateral," since both sides are
still hesitant to be seen as returning to the framework of indirect
occupation; but in fact, the media report a growing cooperation between
Israeli and Palestinian security agencies. The cooperation seems to be so
satisfying that, in a most unusual step, Israel broke its habit and did
not point a finger at the Palestinian Authority (but rather at Syria) for
the most recent terror attack in Beer Sheva.

Not surprisingly, parts (a) and (b) of the Disengagement Plan are already
being implemented, with full American support. As for (c)  evicting the
settlements which reigns exclusively in public discourse the only decision
passed in cabinet so far states that "a vote on the dismantling of
settlements would only be held by March 2005," i.e., that no settlements
would be dismantled for the time being.

Deeds, Not Words

The possible return to a more indirect occupation, and the similarities to
Oslo, should be taken as a warning. Most alarming is the total surrender
of the entire liberal media and intellectuals to the legend of Sharon's
"change of heart," from a bloodthirsty warrior to a "man of peace." Just
like in the Oslo years, when Israel managed to double the settlements'
population, not the least thanks to columnists and intellectuals who
supported the alleged "peace process," Sharon's "conversion" is taken for
granted in spite of all contrary evidence.

The prime minister who is supposed to evict up to 20 Gaza settlements has
so far not kept his vow and not dismantled even a single illegal outpost
in the West Bank, with his forces allegedly "helpless" before resistance
from "extremist settlers" whenever it comes to it (how easy it is to
destroy Palestinian houses en masse!). The massive expansion and
over-subsidizing of the settlements goes on as usual: with the so-called
"Oslo support," given to Jewish settlements since the 1990s (when we were
all told they would soon be dismantled!), a settlement like Kiryat Arba
gets 12 times more government subsidy per capita than the
socio-economically similar Bet Shemesh inside Israel proper (Ha'aretz
25.8.04). And the daily killing of Palestinians persists, this time with
the pretext of "preparations for the Disengagement Plan."

The peace camp, in Israel and worldwide, must be careful not to fall into
the Oslo trap once again. An indirect occupation is as bad as a direct
one, and the peace camp should neither trust Sharon's new image nor
support trading direct occupation for an indirect one. Instead of quoting
Sharon's nice but empty words, his actual atrocious deeds should be
exposed. Otherwise we might wake up once again, too late, to discover that
while we were supporting Sharon's vague promises, his actions prepared the
ground for further decades of bloodshed and hatred.


Find this article at: http://www.antiwar.com/hacohen