[Peace-discuss] Cogent analysis of Iraqi elections

[Morton K.Brussel]

The following analysis is important to read. mkb

ZNet | Iraq

The Election In Iraq:
The U.S. Propaganda System Is Still Working In High Gear

by Edward S. Herman; February 13, 2005

The Earlier Demonstration Elections

In our 1984 book Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections In The 
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Frank Brodhead and I 
stressed that such elections were mainly designed to placate (and 
mislead) the home population of the United States rather than to decide 
anything important in the countries in which the election was held. In 
each of the earlier cases the election did help consolidate the power 
of the U.S.-chosen leaders, but its most important function was to 
demonstrate to the U.S. public that we were on the right track in the 
occupied countries, helping them on the road to democracy. The fact 
that the peoples there came out and voted was interpreted as proof that 
they approved our occupation and wanted us to stay and finish the job. 
And in Vietnam and El Salvador the United States stayed on and managed 
a great deal more destruction and killings.

  We also called attention to the fact that there was a sharp difference 
between what the voters allegedly wanted out of the election and what 
they got. In both Vietnam and El Salvador the public was reportedly 
eager for peace, according to U.S. news reports. However, the point of 
those elections was to strengthen the authority of political elements 
that were completely geared to further war, in accord with U.S. 
official demands, and further war is what ensued. Thus the elections 
yielded a result in contradiction to the apparent goals of the voters.

  Another theme of the book was the failure of those demonstration 
elections to meet accepted standards that make elections truly free, 
including: freedom of assembly, speech, and press; the right to 
organize intermediate bodies like unions and political associations; 
the ability of candidates of all political complexion to enter their 
slates and compete; and the absence of state terror that might coerce 
voters into voting or voting for particular candidates. None of these 
conditions were met in the earlier demonstration elections.

  A further theme was the calculated use of voter turnout as a measure 
of approval of the election and occupation itself, with the opposition 
of rebels serving as the dramatic counterpart of the contest. If people 
voted despite that rebel opposition it supposedly demonstrated the 
populace’s support of the official candidates--and of the 
occupation--and rejection of any opposition. We noted that this formula 
was not used in the case of the Polish election of 1947 sponsored by 
the Soviet Union; there the high turnout was cited as proof of 
coercion. There, the 170,000 Soviet-trained security police on hand was 
in itself considered to rule out the possibility of a free election. 
The Nicaraguan election of 1984 yielded a fine turnout for the 
Sandinistas, but here too, despite the contra opposition to the 
election, the turnout was not interpreted as demonstrating popular 
support of the Sandinista government, which was undergoing attack and 
destabilization by the Reagan administration.

  The U.S. media’s treatment of those earlier demonstration elections 
was perfect as service to the election’s U.S. organizers, and the 
perfection of this service was further exhibited in the media’s refusal 
to apply the same criteria of evaluation to the Nicaraguan election of 
1984 (see Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, pp. 116-137, for 
details on this amusing but gross double standard) . For each of their 
own government’s demonstration elections the media featured turnout as 
proving something important. In the case of Vietnam, the standard 
formula employed throughout the media ran: “Despite attempts by the 
Vietcong to intimidate them, South Vietnamese voters turned out in 
large numbers” (NYT, Sept. 11, 1967), which “surprised and heartened” 
U.S. officials (NYT, Sept. 4, 1967); and another article featured 
officials saying “U.S. Aides Foresee Saigon Peace Step as a Result of 
Vote” (NYT, Sept. 6, 1967). The New York Times and media in general 
never allowed awkward facts, such as a brutal military occupation, the 
absence of freedoms of speech, assembly, or organization, and that 
virtually all authorities agreed that the “Vietcong,” which was not on 
the ballot, had more indigenous support than the U.S.-appointed 
leaders, to cause them to call the election a farce and a “sham” (as 
the New York Times called the vastly superior Nicaraguan election of 
1984). And while the media reported the public’s desire for peace, they 
uniformly failed to point out before, during or after the election that 
it was clearing the ground for war, and of course they never suggested 
that this might be its very purpose.

  This model of apologetics was closely followed in the Salvadoran 
elections of 1982 and 1984, where turnout was featured and made a 
triumph, the failure to meet any of the conditions of a free election 
considered not worth mentioning, and the purpose—preparing the ground 
for further warfare—was misrepresented, and the resultant escalation of 
violence never related to the election triumph. As for dealing with 
military rule and ongoing state terror, the New York Times was 
satisfied that the murderous Salvadoran army, which had been killing an 
average of 800 civilians a month in the year before the 1982 election, 
“has pledged to protect voters from violence and to respect the outcome 
of the contest” (Warren Hoge, NYT, March 27, 1982). The paper 
editorialized that “despite the guerilla death threats…an impressive 
majority of eligible voters…went to the polls” in El Salvador’s “freest 
election in 50 years….The Salvadoran turnout marks a significant 
achievement,” never mentioning that voting was obligatory and the 
failure to vote dangerous. (“Democracy’s Hope in Central America,” NYT, 
March 30, 1982). The editors referred to “a boycott by left-wing 
parties,” when in fact all the leaders of those parties were on an army 
death list. The editorial statement that “American support for the 
outgoing right-centrist junta was always contingent on political 
pluralism and land reform” was a blatant lie; neither of these were on 
the U.S. or junta agenda. The only requirement for support was an 
agreement to fight on, as in Vietnam, a point never acknowledged by the 
editorialists.

  The Iraq Demonstration Election

The similarities of the media treatment of those earlier demonstration 
election to their performance on the January 30, 2005 Iraq election 
have been close, with only minor differences reflecting altered 
circumstances. Once again the media have played the turnout card, in 
line with the official public relations agenda, with the Iraqi public 
defying the insurgents and the U.S. military playing a pro-democracy 
role in protecting the election, just as the Salvadoran army did in the 
Salvadoran elections of 1982 and 1984. This makes the election a 
success and a vindication of U.S. policy, as the election was organized 
by the United States and opposed by the insurgents; and for the media 
elections are inherently good if carried out under proper auspices 
(that is, by the current Bush administration, or in El Salvador by the 
Reagan administration, or in Russia in 1996 when Boris Yeltsin was 
favored, by Yeltsin with the support of the Clinton administration--as 
opposed to the election under Sandinista auspices in Nicaragua in 
1984).

  Once again the media do not discuss whether the conditions of a free 
election have been met, and whether a genuine free election can be held 
under a military occupation and in the midst of violent warfare. They 
were sure that the Soviet occupation of Poland in 1947 precluded a free 
election and they were doubtful it could be free under Sandinista rule 
in 1984 with that government’s “pugnacity” and “awesome monopoly of 
force” (Time). But the U.S. army in Iraq is seen only as protecting the 
election, not in any way influencing its outcome, which is the official 
and patriotic view and reflects a durable double standard (e.g., Ken 
Dilanian, “U.S. troops: after laying groundwork, a cautious step back,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 31, 2005).

  The media did not discuss the fact that Al-Jazeera had been barred 
from Baghdad, that other independent media were regularly harassed, and 
that the U.S.-appointed interim government completely dominates 
television, although the media were very upset at the Sandinistas’ 
restrictions on the newspaper La Prensa in 1984 and implied that this 
badly compromised the election held there. The freedom of speech and 
assembly in Iraq, and the ability of candidates to campaign, were very 
much limited by the U.S.-insurgents war, and a large fraction of the 
candidates never campaigned and never even had their names listed. 
These disabilities were felt least by the U.S.-appointed leadership and 
bureaucracy, who had media access and protection by the security 
forces. The freedom to organize and build intermediate groups was also 
limited by the violence, and by the occupation authority’s hostility to 
labor organizations. Thus the “civil institutions that make an election 
meaningful” were in short supply (Brian Whitaker, “Fig-leaf freedom,” 
Guardian, Jan. 31, 2005). The media focused on the Iraqi insurgents 
pressures against voting, but they failed to mention the pressures to 
vote, including (as in Fallujah) the setting up of polling stations at 
centers that distribute food, water and money to refugees, and the 
reported tie-in of voter registration and voting itself with the 
receipt of monthly food rations (see Dahr Jamail, “Some Just Voted for 
Food,” Inter Press Service; also, Michel Chossudovsky, “Iraqi 
Elections: Media Disinformation on Voter Turnout?”) According to 
veteran journalist and Mexico specialist, John Ross, “making food 
giveaway programs contingent on delivering votes is a pillar of 
Mexico’s corrupted electoral system,” and he notes that two Mexican 
Federal Electoral Institute commissioners had been dispatched to 
Baghdad to give expert advice there (“Hecho en Mexico: the Iraqi 
Election: Fox Helps Bush Craft Bloody Electoral Farce,” Feb. 9, 2005). 
Perhaps most important, the media have not discussed how a military 
occupation (and war of pacification) shapes an election’s meaning and 
process. The occupation is the dominant military force in Iraq, with 
150,000 service personnel, 20,000 private “security” contractors, a 
massive budget (some $50 billion a year in military costs), and with 
four permanent military bases already in place and ten more planned 
(see Christine Spolar, “14 ‘enduring bases’ set in Iraq,” Chicago 
Tribune, March 23, 2004). The U.S. Embassy is the most powerful 
political institution in Iraq, shaping the Iraqi official structures 
and bureaucracy by orders, personnel choices among Iraqis and those 
seconded from the U.S. government and elsewhere, and controlling the 
national budget—both the oil sales revenues and reconstruction and 
other funds allocated to it by the U.S. administration. As Phyllis 
Bennis has pointed out, the $16 billion in U.S. taxpayer’s money not 
spent on the reconstruction effort, and the U.S. military budget, “will 
become a potential slush fund for the new assembly’s favored projects” 
(“UFPJ Talking Points #29: Reading the Election in Iraq,” Feb. 1, 2005)

  U.S. pro-consul Paul Bremer handed down 100 or more rules with the 
force of law that have affected the economy by imposing low tax rates, 
opening the door to trade and investment, and privatizing segments of 
state-owned property, in violation of international law, but creating a 
new structure of vested interests in continued U.S. domination. The 
occupation has reorganized the Iraqi government and bureaucracy, chosen 
judges, installed 24 ministers, and placed advisers with multi-year 
contracts in these ministries, again giving the occupation and its 
political agents economic power and leverage. It has issued 
Transitional Administrative Laws that will control Iraq governance 
while the transitional National Assembly operates and into the period 
following a presidential election. These laws severely limit the 
decision capability of the National Assembly, thus making the 
occupation’s rules and chosen officials the government, not the newly 
elected assembly, and along with the financial resources and unified 
direction of the occupation the occupation authorities will have an 
edge in any bargaining over future major appointments and legislation 
in the fragmented Assembly.

  This military, political and financial power held by the invader must 
surely have affected the election at many levels, including election 
issues, effective candidacy, the positions taken by candidates, and the 
consequent limits in the policy outcomes of the election. This might 
not be so if the United States was truly neutral, with no stake in the 
outcome, no policies it wished implemented, and no differential 
treatment of candidates. In a remarkable illustration of internalized 
acceptance of the premises of a propaganda system, the U.S. mainstream 
media do take the United States as neutral, essentially ignoring the 
U.S. power position and goals in Iraq as factors that might shape the 
election and cause its results to accord with U.S. interests. As with 
the media of a well-managed totalitarian system, the U.S. media take as 
a premise the benevolent intent of their leadership, and as its alleged 
goals have shifted--in this case from “security” and eliminating Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction to liberation--so has the media’s premise 
regarding U.S. goals.

  Honest, objective, and non-ideological analysis of the Iraq election 
would have featured heavily the Bush administration’s aims in Iraq, how 
it strove to realize those aims, and how the election fits into Bush 
plans. It would have discussed in detail how the occupation and its 
policies might make it possible for Bush aims to be realized through an 
electoral process that seems—like the earlier grant of “sovereignty” 
seemed—to relinquish final authority to Iraqis. The Bush 
administration’s leaders made it clear in published documents that 
their aim in attacking Iraq would be to project power in the Middle 
East, which would include the establishment of military bases there and 
gaining assured “access” to Iraqi oil, goals that called for a client, 
not a democratic, regime. This is why the administration pushed for 
Chalabi rule and fought against one-person one-vote elections for many 
months, and used the interlude till the January 30th election to work 
around the election threat to U.S. domination.

  You will look in vain for a media analysis of the pre-invasion Bush 
objectives, which should have been a prelude to any discussion of the 
election itself as essential context. You will look in vain for any 
analysis of possible hidden motives behind the Bush support of the 
election, and how we might reconcile the apparent contradiction between 
support of a supposedly democratic election and the Bush 
administration’s oil and base control objectives. Michael Wines writes 
that threats to a “functioning Iraqi democracy” are “legion,” and he 
names them: “insurgency; a once-dominant Sunni minority that resisted 
the election; a now-powerful Shiite majority that remembers oppression; 
neighbors like Syria and Iran with reasons to sabotage democracy, and 
more” (“Democracy Has to Start Somewhere,” NYT, Feb. 6, 2005). But the 
United States is not included, despite its known pre-election goals, 
the character of the Bush administration, the oft-mentioned fear of 
Shiite majority rule producing an Islamic state allied with Iran, and 
the numerous U.S. actions in Iraq incompatible with self-rule. The 
propaganda premise and ideology are fully internalized by Michael 
Wines.

  As to the meaning of the Iraq election turnout and vote, the media do 
not discuss how issues are distorted in a military occupation by the 
fact that the occupation itself becomes a major bone of contention. 
Some won’t vote because it would seem to approve the occupation, and 
non-voters outnumbered those who did vote. Others vote because while 
they oppose the occupation they hope a successful election will get the 
invader out faster than otherwise; still others vote in the hope that 
getting the election out of the way will somehow bring with it more 
security and stability. Some voted because of fears of loss of ration 
cards; still others voted because their religious leaders instructed 
them to vote.

  The invasion-occupation may be the prime cause of insecurity and 
instability, but the occupation authorities and their agents, and the 
media, present the occupiers as the solution to occupation-generated 
violence. And since the occupiers dominate the flow of information as 
well as the means of violence their claim strikes many as plausible. As 
James Carroll notes, “The irony is exquisite. The worse the violence 
gets, the longer the Americans will claim the right to stay…. Full 
blown civil war, if it comes to that, will serve Bush’s purpose too” 
(“Train Wreck of an Election,” Boston Globe, Feb. 1, 2005). In short, 
the occupation itself profoundly influences the election both directly 
as a result of occupation authority’s actions and power, and by its 
indirect affect of making the occupation itself a crucial but confusing 
election issue l Polls show that a clear majority of Iraqis oppose the 
occupation and want the United States to leave quickly—a Coalition 
Provisional Authority-sponsored poll in May 2004 showed that 92 percent 
of Iraqis viewed the invaders as “occupiers” rather than “liberators”; 
85 percent wanted them to leave as soon as possible, 41 percent 
immediately--but no candidate ran on an end-the-occupation ticket or 
put that goal on his or her priority agenda. (Both the United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA) , the dominant Shiite party grouping, and Allawi’s 
party, at first included a demand for ending the occupation as part of 
their platform, but withdrew it, presumably under U.S. pressure.) What 
the individual candidates and even the various groupings on the ballot 
stood for was not very clear, as the names of many candidates were not 
even disclosed (the UIA named only 37 of their 225 candidates), and 
there was hardly any serious campaigning and debate over the issues. 
But many of the candidates are beholden to the occupation and may be 
prepared to give it a lengthy stay. Voters may be in for some 
unpleasant surprises, especially the large number who voted in the 
belief that the National Assembly will end the occupation.

  A special feature of the Iraq election has been the support given it 
by top Shia leaders, who hope to be able to use it to convert their 
numerical majority into political authority. This gave the election an 
element of democratic authenticity or democratic potential which may or 
may not be realized. It should be recognized that the Bush 
administration strove desperately to avoid this situation, rejecting a 
one-person one-vote election from the start in favor of a 
U.S.-appointed Governing Council, then an interim government of U.S. 
choice and long-lagged popular election only under the pressures of 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the major Shiite parties--and a failing 
policy. As Juan Cole points out, “if it had been up to Bush, Iraq would 
have been a soft dictatorship under Chalabi, or would have had 
stage-managed elections with an electorate consisting of a handful of 
pro-America notables” (“A Mixed Story,” Informed Comment, Jan. 30, 
2005).

  But in belatedly giving way and agreeing to the January 30th election 
in the midst of a growing Sunni-based insurgency, the Bush 
administration effectively shifted the character of the conflict from a 
fight against the occupation to a civil war between Sunni and Shiites 
with the occupation aligned with the Shiites. This splintering tactic 
and the entire electoral process may have strengthened the 
administration’s position in Iraq, not only by giving it that seeming 
democratic imprimatur, but also by bringing together the occupation and 
Shiites in a pragmatic alliance that enhances the prospect of the 
achievement of Bush administration goals.

  The New York Times writes that in the election, “in an open expression 
of popular will—Iraqis have expressed their clear preference that these 
battles be fought exclusively in the peaceful, constitutional arena” 
(editorial, “Message From Iraq,” NYT, Jan. 31, 2005). This alleged 
clear preference is not at all clear: as noted earlier a majority 
failed to vote at all, and many may have voted in the hopes that this 
would expedite the exit of the invaders, while still believing that the 
invaders might have to be thrown out. Many voted on the instruction of 
Sistani that voting was a religious duty; and some may even have voted 
hoping that the occupation and killing would continue as their jobs 
depended on this.

  But the deeper dishonesty of this editorial statement is this: it 
ignores the fact that the “battles” have occurred because the Bush 
administration invaded Iraq in violation of international law and has 
committed massive crimes there, stoking a resistance. The invaders, 
having taken over the state and in command of military power and the 
machinery of state by illegal force and violence, are now prepared to 
rule mainly through “peaceful, constitutional” means, defined, 
organized and protected by themselves. So the insurgents should stop 
fighting and let the invader run the show, by means of his forcibly 
imposed rules, bureaucrats, judges, and money (a good part of it stolen 
from the proceeds of Iraq oil sales), with the U.S. army as “protector” 
of this “constitutional” regime. Would Pravda have had the nerve to 
write something this brazen about Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Afghanistan 
under Soviet proxy rule?

  As the media have portrayed the election as a triumph for the Bush 
administration, and therefore a partial vindication of the 
aggression-occupation, as in the case of the earlier Vietnamese and 
Salvadoran elections this will give the administration a freer hand. 
Given the administration’s initial objectives it seems reasonable to 
expect that it will do two things: First it will intensify the 
pacification-by-violence program to marginalize the insurgency and 
clear the ground for rule by groups chosen by or deeply indebted to the 
invader-occupier. As Seymour Hersh has pointed out, the administration 
has already steadily escalated its bombing raids month by month, making 
all of Iraq into a “free fire zone”—“It’s simply a turkey shoot…Hit 
everything, kill everything”--virtually unreported in the media; and we 
may surely anticipate more of the same (“We’ve Been Taken Over By a 
Cult,” CounterPunch, Jan. 27, 2005).

  Second, the administration will try to bolster the political position 
of its chosen and preferred agents and neutralize any Shia threat (a 
possible Islamic state; insistence on a U.S. withdrawal) by deals, 
bribes, and threats. The Shia are already indebted to the 
administration for removing Saddam, currently trying to crush a 
Sunni-based resistance, and agreeing to an election in which Shia 
voting power will give them nominal power. They may be willing to 
strike a deal—and a deal may already have been struck-- in which a 
dollop of substantive power is granted in exchange for concessions that 
make for limited client state status.

  This all seems more likely given the fact that an important member and 
candidate of a leading Shiite Party, the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution, and current Iraqi Finance Minister, Abdel Mahdi, 
announced at a press conference in Washington on December 22, 2004 that 
“Iraq” wants to open up its oil industry to private investment. Mahdi 
is a leading candidate for Prime Minister. With a man like this in 
power the Bush administration would be well on its way to achieving its 
strategic objectives of controlling Iraq’s oil reserves and maintaining 
at least some military bases in the country.

  So with media assistance the election may have helped enable the Bush 
administration to fight the insurgency more aggressively for an 
extended period; and by domination of a technically flawed election 
built on an unlevel playing field, by taking advantage of the various 
modes of power available to the occupation (rules, agents within the 
government, vast sums of money), and by means of deals with Shia 
influentials, the election may facilitate the establishment of a 
parent-client relationship that will allow the achievement of major 
Bush aims. This all requires that the insurgency be brought under 
control without too great an expenditure of time, money and U.S. 
casualties, that the election-based deal-making and government are 
sufficiently accommodating, and that the Iraqi people will accept more 
pacification and political clienthood without widening and intensifying 
the resistance.

  Some might argue that as the United States committed aggression in 
Iraq, built on a system of lies, and then proceeded to perform so 
poorly that a major insurgency ensued, that it ought to get out or be 
thrown out quickly, just as Saddam was thrown out of Kuwait in 1991. 
But we are dealing here with a superpower, whose aggression and 
occupation rights are even given sanction by the UN, IMF, and 
“international community.” As the officials of these governments and 
institutions, and others, applaud the election and ignore the 
occupation’s influence on its results we can hardly expect the media to 
do otherwise. Here, as in the past, the media provide what is now 
standard demonstration election apologetics: the media leopard never 
changes its spots.

  For more on this see a related article by Gareth Porter at 
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=7241

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