[Peace-discuss] Cheney's right...

[C. G. Estabrook]

[...about (some) Democrats' attempt to rewrite the history of
the invasion of Iraq.  In a well-run society, they'd be
sharing a cell with Cheney at The Hague, awaiting trail for
the supreme international crime, launching an aggressive war.
--CGE]

Last week, former Senator John Edwards took the lead in an
attempt to rewrite history about responsibility for the war in
Iraq. In a major statement in which he acknowledged that he
should not have voted for the war resolution, he absolved
himself, and other Democrats who voted for the resolution, of
responsibility for the grotesque consequences of their action:

    "The argument for going to war with Iraq was based on
intelligence that we now know was inaccurate. The information
the American people were hearing from the president -- and
that I was being given by our intelligence community -- wasn't
the whole story. Had I known this at the time, I never would
have voted for this war."

With all due respect to Edwards, and all those Democrats still
seated in Congress who find themselves thrashing about trying
to escape the personal and political consequences of their
cowardly lack of nerve, this is a deliberately deceptive
statement, a statement designed to obscure their complicity in
facilitating the war in Iraq. Other Senators voted against the
war, despite a belief that Iraq had unspecified chemical and
biological weapons, because, as West Virginia Senator Robert
Byrd trenchantly observed:

    "We know who was behind the September 11 attacks on the
United States. We know it was Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda
terrorist network. We have dealt with al Qaeda and with the
Taliban government that sheltered it - we have routed them
from Afghanistan and we are continuing to pursue them in hiding.

    "So where does Iraq enter the equation? No one in the
Administration has been able to produce any solid evidence
linking Iraq to the September 11 attack. Iraq had biological
and chemical weapons long before September 11. We knew it
then, and we know it now. Iraq has been an enemy of the United
States for more than a decade. If Saddam Hussein is such an
imminent threat to the United States, why hasn't he attacked
us already?"

While there was confusion over the nature and extent of any
WMDs that Iraq may have possessed, it was commonly known that
the intelligence provided by the President did not establish
the likelihood that such weapons would be used offensively. It
was also recognized that the war in Iraq would divert
resources away from known terror threats to the US. Indeed,
the intelligence itself was politically irrelevant, as
Edwards, like his future running mate, John Kerry, and many
other Democrats, had already decided to support the war, hell
or high water. Crass political opportunism must be expunged
from the record by recourse to self-serving victimization.

Too harsh? Let's look at an interesting article published by
former Florida Senator Bob Graham today. Graham, never known
for his liberalism, or, for that matter, his willingness to
challenge the Pentagon, voted against the resolution, unlike
Edwards, Kerry and many other Senate Democrats. In an opinion
piece provocatively entitled, "What I Knew Before the
Invasion", he has done us a wonderful service by again
explaining why he did so. Just the title itself must be
sufficient to send chills down the spines of Democratic
Capital Hill staffers. Careful reading reveals that such
anxiety is fully warranted:

    "In the early fall of 2002, a joint House-Senate
intelligence inquiry committee, which I co-chaired, was in the
final stages of its investigation of what happened before
Sept. 11. As the unclassified final report of the inquiry
documented, several failures of intelligence contributed to
the tragedy. But as of October 2002, 13 months later, the
administration was resisting initiating any substantial action
to understand, much less fix, those problems.

    "At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on
Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale
for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the
entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive
assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been
requested by the White House and none had been prepared.
Invoking our rarely used senatorial authority, I directed the
completion of an NIE.

    "Tenet objected, saying that his people were too committed
to other assignments to analyze Saddam Hussein's capabilities
and will to use chemical, biological and possibly nuclear
weapons. We insisted, and three weeks later the community
produced a classified NIE.

    "There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document.
While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites,
it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the
information, especially by the departments of State and
Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes
that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its
nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons
he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so
unless he was first attacked.

    "Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in
the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative
responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was
inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi
exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the
United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.

    "The American people needed to know these reservations,
and I requested that an unclassified, public version of the
NIE be prepared. On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document
titled 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.' It
represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them,
avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them
and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the
classified version. Its conclusions, such as 'If Baghdad
acquired sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from
abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year,'
underscored the White House's claim that exactly such material
was being provided from Africa to Iraq."

All along the way, alarm bells rang, and Graham kept asking
questions, and, eventually, the bells got so loud that he
realized that there was no justification for the war. Ever the
Southern gentleman, Graham preserves a way out for his former
Democratic colleagues. He was able to vote against the
resolution because of his "privileged position", an implied
reference to his position on the intelligence committee. But
he is well aware this is merely window dressing, because, as
you must have guessed, he explained his reasons for voting
against the resolution on the floor of the Senate before the vote:

    "They say that passing this resolution is the equivalent
of if the Alllies had declared war on Hitler. I disagree with
that assessment of what this lesson of history means. In my
judgment, passing this resolution tonight will be the
equivalent of declaring war on Italy. That is not what we
should be doing. We should not just be declaring war on
Mussolini's Italy. We should be declaring war on Hitler's Germany.

    "Now, there are good reasons for considering attacking
today's Italy, meaning Iraq. Saddam Hussein's regime has
chemical and biological weapons and is trying to get nuclear
capacity. But the briefings I have received have shown that
trying to block him and any necessary nuclear materials have
been largely successful, as evidenced by the recent intercept
of centrifuge tubes. And he is years away from having nuclear
capability. So why does it make sense to attack this era's
Italy, and not Germany, especially when by attacking Italy, we
are making Germany a more probable adversary?

    "The CIA has warned us that international terrorist
organizations will probably use United States action against
Iraq as an indication for striking us here in the homeland.
You might ask, what does the word 'probably' mean in
intelligence speak? It probably means that there is a 75
percent greater chance of the event occurring. And the event
is that international terrorist organizations will use United
States actions against Iraq as a justification for striking us
here in the homeland.

    "Let me read a declassified briefing of the CIA report
presented to the Select Committee on Intelligence: 'Baghdad,
for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or biological
weapons against the U.S. Should Saddam conclude that U.S-led
attacks could no longer be deterred, he probably would become
much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such
terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's
unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or
(chemical and biological weapons).'"

20 other Senate Democrats came to a similar conclusion,
including Senator Byrd, as already noted. Fortunately,
Graham's fears of retaliation proved groundless, primarily
because his lack of confidence in the intelligence was all too
justified. After all, it is pretty hard to launch a
retaliatory attack if you don't possess the capacity to do so.

Byrd decried the unwillingness of the bipartisan leadership of
the Senate to allow reasoned debate and investigation before
approving the resolution:

    "The great Roman historian, Titus Livius, said, 'All
things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not
hurry; haste is blind and improvident.'

    "'Blind and improvident,' Mr. President. 'Blind and
improvident.' Congress would be wise to heed those words
today, for as sure as the sun rises in the east, we are
embarking on a course of action with regard to Iraq that, in
its haste, is both blind and improvident. We are rushing into
war without fully discussing why, without thoroughly
considering the consequences, or without making any attempt to
explore what steps we might take to avert conflict.

    "The newly bellicose mood that permeates this White House
is unfortunate, all the moreso because it is clearly motivated
by campaign politics. Republicans are already running attack
ads against Democrats on Iraq. Democrats favor fast approval
of a resolution so they can change the subject to domestic
economic problems."

Take a moment, and savor that last remark, with an
appreciation for its honesty and clarity: Democrats favor fast
approval of a resolution so they can change the subject to
domestic economic problems. Here, finally, we have the
unvarnished truth. Democratic leadership in both the House and
Senate were willing to green light the war in Iraq without
meaningful debate as part of a strategy to win the 2002 off-
year election. Redcake, Bluecake, Yellowcake, it was all just
a rationalization for politicians who already wanted to
believe what they were being told by Cheney and the White
House Iraq Group. Just like crazed investors in 1999 and 2000
wanted to believe that the stock bubble would grow forever,
despite the warnings of sane, experienced market participants
like Warren Buffett. It was therefore essential that
congressional Democrats collude with the Republicans to shut
down any process that would increase the doubts that many
Americans rightly had about the presence of WMDs in Iraq.

And, they did so. According to Stephen Zunes, there were
numerous reputable sources that seriously doubted that Iraq
possessed any WMD capability:

    "In the months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
there were many published reports challenging Bush
administration claims regarding Iraq's WMD capabilities.
Reputable journals like Arms Control Today, the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, Middle East Policy, and others published
articles systematically debunking accusations that Iraq had
somehow been able to preserve or reconstitute its chemical
weapons arsenal, had developed deployable biological weapons,
or had restarted its nuclear program. Among the disarmament
experts challenging the administration was Scott Ritter, an
American who had headed the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) division that looked for hidden WMD facilities in
Iraq. Through articles, interviews in the broadcast media, and
Capitol Hill appearances, Ritter joined scores of disarmament
scholars and analysts in making a compelling and — in
hindsight — accurate case that Iraq had been qualitatively
disarmed quite a few years earlier. Think tanks such as the
Fourth Freedom Foundation and the Institute for Policy Studies
also published a series of reports challenging the
administration's claims.

    "And there were plenty of skeptics from within the U.S.
government. For example, the State Department's intelligence
bureau noted how the National Intelligence Estimate — so
widely cited by war supporters of both parties — did not add
up to 'a compelling case' that Iraq had 'an integrated and
comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.' Even the
pro-war New Republic observed that CIA reports in early 2002
demonstrated that 'U.S. intelligence showed precious little
evidence to indicate a resumption of Iraq's nuclear program.'
A story circulated nationally by the Knight-Ridder wire
service just before the congressional vote authorizing the
invasion noted that 'U.S. intelligence and military experts
dispute the administration's suggestions that Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction pose an imminent threat to the United
States' and that intelligence analysts in the CIA were
accusing the administration of pressuring the agency to
highlight information that would appear to support
administration policy and to suppress contrary information."

Were Senate Democrats interested in publicizing information
that contradicted the President's case for war? Of course not:

    "In September 2002, a month before the vote to authorize
the invasion, I contacted the chief foreign policy aide to one
of my senators, Democrat Barbara Boxer of California, to let
him know of my interest in appearing before an upcoming
hearing on Capitol Hill regarding the alleged threat that Iraq
posed to the United States. He acknowledged that he and other
staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were
familiar with my writing on the topic and that I would be a
credible witness. He passed on my request to a staff member of
the committee's ranking Democrat, Senator Joseph Biden of
Delaware. I was never invited, however. Nor was Scott Ritter,
Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies or anyone
else who expressed skepticism regarding the administration's
WMD claims. The bipartisan Senate committee only allowed those
who were willing to come forward with an exaggerated view of
Iraq's military potential to testify."

Zunes properly notes that Kerry and Edwards were especially
mendacious in this regard. First, Kerry:

    "In a Senate speech defending his vote to authorize Bush
to launch an invasion, Senator Kerry categorically declared,
despite the lack of any credible evidence, that 'Iraq has
chemical and biological weapons' and even alleged that most
elements of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs
were 'larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf
War.' Furthermore, Kerry asserted that Iraq was 'attempting to
develop nuclear weapons,' backing up this accusation by
falsely claiming that 'all U.S. intelligence experts agree'
with that assessment. The Massachusetts junior senator also
alleged that 'Iraq is developing unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare
agents [that] could threaten Iraq's neighbors as well as
American forces in the Persian Gulf.' Though it soon became
evident that none of Kerry's allegations were true, the
Democratic Party rewarded him in 2004 with its nomination for
president.

    "Kerry supporters claim he was not being dishonest in
making these false claims but that he had been fooled by 'bad
intelligence' passed on by the Bush administration. However,
well before Kerry's vote to authorize the invasion, former UN
inspector Scott Ritter personally told the senator and his
senior staff that claims about Iraq still having WMDs or WMD
programs were not based on valid intelligence. According to
Ritter, 'Kerry knew that there was a verifiable case to be
made to debunk the president's statements regarding the threat
posed by Iraq's WMDs, but he chose not to act on it.'"

And, Edwards:

    "Joining Kerry in voting to authorize the invasion was
North Carolina Senator John Edwards, who — in the face of
growing public skepticism of the Bush administration's WMD
claims — rushed to the president's defense in an op-ed article
published in the Washington Post. In his commentary, Edwards
claimed that Iraq was 'a grave and growing threat' and that
Congress should therefore 'endorse the use of all necessary
means to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's
weapons of mass destruction.' The Bush administration was so
impressed with Edwards' arguments that they posted the article
on the State Department website."

Given numerous opportunities to request credible information,
as did Senator Graham, to conduct meaningful debate and
investigation, as suggested by Senator Byrd, to speak with
informed critics of the war policy, as did Senator Boxer, the
congressional leadership of the Democratic party wilfully
declined to take advantage of them. Or, even worse, in Kerry's
case, publicly supported the war after privately being
informed that there was no basis for it. Now, cognizant of the
political peril created by growing opposition to the war, and
the corruption emerging as a consequence of Fitzgerald's
investigation, they are, with Edwards in the vanguard, trying
to inscribe an alternative history. We should respond to these
efforts as contemptously as we do those of Bush, Cheney and
their neo-consevative allies. All deserve to be consigned to
the dustbin of history.

http://amleft.blogspot.com/

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