[Peace-discuss] Miltary Role in Disaster Relief

[David Green]

These letters in the NYT today respond to the
subsequent column from last week. Note the letter from
Steve Israel, Tim Johnson's partner in the "civility
caucus" in the House. This topic is put into context
by Mike Davis on Democracy Now today--the solution to
every problem is seen as "boots on the ground," rather
than an overall approach to public health.

 
October 19, 2005
A Military Role in Disaster Relief (4 Letters) 
To the Editor:
Re "Next: A War Against Nature," by Robert D. Kaplan
(Op-Ed, Oct. 12): 
With the aim to win hearts and minds, militaries
provide aid in accordance with political or public
relations priorities, not necessarily to those most in
need. Witness the huge military support to aid efforts
after the South Asia tsunami versus the meager
assistance offered to the millions of people displaced
by conflict in Congo.
Instead of a gesture of human solidarity with no aim
other than to alleviate the suffering of populations
in need, militarized aid becomes a political tool in
the conflict when it is seen as part of a political
agenda in natural disasters or wars. People in
Brooklyn would not want to see politics in their
doctor's office. People in Afghanistan should get no
less.
Although Doctors Without Borders recognizes the value
of military logistics in some natural disasters, we
cannot seek or accept the collaboration with the
military that Mr. Kaplan suggests. To do so would
undermine the neutrality and independence that allows
us as a humanitarian aid organization to reach people
in need, regardless of their political or religious
affiliations, as well our safety when we do so.
Kenny Gluck
Director of Operations
Doctors Without Borders
Amsterdam, Oct. 13, 2005
• 
To the Editor:
A historic controversy has been reawakened by
President Bush's proposal to turn disaster relief over
to the military. Robert D. Kaplan confuses this
important issue further by stating that the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878, prohibiting the standing army
from enforcing the laws of the United States, "was
enacted in a rural America when natural disasters took
a relatively small human toll, and such calamities
were viewed more fatalistically." 
This observation is totally irrelevant to the Posse
Comitatus Act, which was a statutory recognition of an
implicit constitutional prohibition. Our founders were
republicans and believed the use of standing military
forces in domestic affairs to be a threat to
republican liberties. They thus explicitly recognized
the role of citizen-soldiers in the form of the
militia (today's National Guard) for this mission.
They were right then, and they are still right today.
Gary Hart
Kittredge, Colo., Oct. 12, 2005
• 
To the Editor:
I saw firsthand the enormous strategic value of the
United States military on a humanitarian mission when
I visited tsunami-ravaged Sri Lanka last January.
A group of marines were working hard to remove rubble
that had been caught in a bulldozer. The bulldozer had
been clearing debris that surrounded a mosque. Dozens
of children cheered the marines when they fixed the
bulldozer. 
One day, some of those children may be recruited by
terrorists to act against our interests. I believe
that they will remember that when the United States
military showed up in their village with a bulldozer,
it was on a mission of relief and reconstruction. We
gained allies that hot day in Sri Lanka. 
Steve Israel
Washington, Oct. 12, 2005
The writer is a member of the House Armed Services
Committee.
• 
To the Editor:
Robert D. Kaplan is usually pretty good about military
culture, but he fractured a well-worn adage: "Amateurs
discuss tactics, while professionals discuss
logistics." This is a distinction with a real
difference, because strategy encompasses both
logistics and tactics. 
I am deputy director of operations (future operations)
at United States Southern Command in Miami.
Humanitarian assistance-disaster relief to host
nations in our geographic area of responsibility is a
source of pride and endless preparation, but it is
hardly new. Moreover, we have extremely cordial
relations with civilian disaster relief organizations,
and I reject Mr. Kaplan's stereotypical suggestion
that we exhibit a "gruff attitude toward the civilian
workers." One-fifth of my staff are civilians and we
all pull on the same rope - and we pull hard.
(Col.) David H. Gurney
Miami, Oct. 12, 2005

 
October 12, 2005
Op-Ed Contributor
Next: A War Against Nature 
By ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Stockbridge, Mass.
THE rest of the world and even quite a few Americans
are uncomfortable with the globe-trotting United
States military. But in future years they will see
much more of it. The causes will be more related to
the natural environment than to terrorism. Just ask
the earthquake victims in northern Pakistan, where
eight American military helicopters have now arrived
with relief supplies - the start of an aid effort by
the military's Central Command that will include
airborne reconnaissance and heavy-lifting equipment.
With the global population now at six billion, humans
are living in urban concentrations in an unprecedented
number of seismically, climatically and
environmentally fragile areas. The earthquake-stricken
region of Pakistan saw a doubling of its population in
recent decades, certainly a factor in the death toll
of more than 20,000. The tsunami in Asia last December
showed the risks to the rapidly growing cities along
the Indian Ocean. China's booming population occupies
flood zones. Closer to home, cities like Memphis and
St. Louis lie along the New Madrid fault line,
responsible for a major earthquake nearly 200 years
ago when those cities barely existed; and the
hurricane zone along the southern Atlantic Coast and
earthquake-prone areas of California continue to be
developed. More human beings are going to be killed or
made homeless by Mother Nature than ever in history.
When such disasters occur, security systems break down
and lawlessness erupts. The first effect of the
earthquake in the Pakistani town of Muzaffarabad was
widespread looting - just as in New Orleans. Relief
aid is undermined unless those who would help the
victims can monopolize the use of force. That requires
troops. 
But even using our troops in our own country is
controversial: the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
strictly limits the use of troops inside the United
States. The Gulf Coast devastation has helped remind
us that this law was enacted in a rural America at a
time when natural disasters took a relatively small
human toll, and such calamities were viewed more
fatalistically.
In a nation and a world where mass media and the
Internet spread the word of disaster so effectively,
impassioned calls to do something can quickly erode
constitutional concerns, political differences and
worries over sovereignty. Just as Pakistan has now
agreed to accept aid from its rival India, Iran
accepted help from the United States Air Force after
the earthquake in Bam in 2003. The very people who
typically denounce the American military will surely
be complaining about its absence should our troops not
show up after a major natural calamity.
Indeed, because of our military's ability to move
quickly into new territory and establish security
perimeters, it is emerging as the world's most
effective emergency relief organization. There is a
saying among soldiers: amateurs discuss strategy,
while professionals discuss logistics. And if disaster
assistance is about anything, it's about logistics -
moving people, water, food, medical supplies and heavy
equipment to save lives and communities. We also have
our National Guard, which is made up primarily of men
in their 30's (many of whom are police officers and
firefighters in civilian life) trained to deal
effectively with the crowds of rowdy young men that
tend to impede relief work.
The distinctions between war and relief, between
domestic and foreign deployments, are breaking down.
This is especially true within the Special Operations
contingents. As democratization takes hold, and as
feisty local news outlets arise in previously
autocratic third-world countries, the military's
Special Operations Command can no longer carry out
commando-style raids at will. 
In recent years, I have been a witness to a shift in
emphasis from "direct action" to the soft side of
"unconventional war": undertaking relief work in
places like the southern Philippines and northern
Kenya to win goodwill and, informally, to pick up
intelligence on America's terrorist enemies. On a
larger scale, the disaster relief provided by the
aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln during the Indian
Ocean tsunami probably did more to improve America's
image in Asia in relation to that of China than any
conventional training deployment.
So, how can the Pentagon become better at emergency
relief without impeding its ability to fight wars?
First, it must continue to train primarily for combat.
Combat provides a vital esprit de corps, and the
skills that are honed in preparation for combat are
also the most valuable tools for disaster relief. 
In addition, just as our Special Operations division
has special units for select commando operations (like
Army Special Forces who can deploy in the snow on skis
from helicopters), it should likewise develop more
niche capacities for missions like rescuing people
from rubble and flood waters. 
Also, the Central Command and each of the military's
other geographic-area commands need to create
permanent planning units to anticipate disaster
responses in their spheres of responsibility. The
diplomatic gains we make when our military arrives on
scene can be vastly increased if those troops arrive
quickly as part of an advance plan. 
Finally, just as civilian nongovernmental groups are
often needlessly antagonistic toward the American
military, our troops are sometimes guilty of having a
gruff attitude toward the civilian workers. If
American soldiers want to be more effective and better
liked abroad, they'll have to be able to work in a
coordinated way with, or even alongside,
nongovernmental groups like Doctors Without Borders
and the International Red Cross. The Pentagon is a big
fan of peacetime "combined ops" with foreign
militaries, and this term should be expanded to
include training with civilian do-gooder groups as
well. (To its credit, the Navy has plans to experiment
with this by embedding personnel from nongovernmental
groups on its hospital ships.)
Will a new emphasis on disaster relief further strain
an already overstretched military? No. Most of our
deployments around the world, for either military or
humanitarian efforts, involve small groups, perhaps
several platoons. It is Iraq that's been breaking the
system, and as we gradually lower our troop levels in
that country, there will be more capacity for
operations that provide significant diplomatic
benefits.
Fluidity and flexibility now define military affairs.
There is no better example than Pakistan, a country
always on the brink of dissolving into chaos, which
would result in our having to place Special Operations
forces in great numbers inside the tribal groups and
agencies along the Afghan border. In any case, hunting
down Al Qaeda in its lair will be impossible without
the goodwill of the local population. That attitude
can be generated by relief work of the kind taking
place in Kashmir. It's the classic counterinsurgency
model: winning without firing a shot. And it's what
the future of the American military will be
increasingly about.
Robert D. Kaplan is a correspondent for The Atlantic
Monthly and the author of "Imperial Grunts: The
American Military on the Ground."




		
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